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A BSTR A CT
This ethnography examines Trinidadian politics by exploring everyday forms of 
participation in authority and what they signal about governance o f public life. It 
first delves into the relationships, values and actions that most matter to ordinary 
women and men. More specifically, it looks at the ways male and female market 
vendors, Carnival masqueraders, illegal squatters and religious leaders manage 
and engage with others, ideas, things, spaces, processes, institutions and habits. It 
then examines how these inform their participation in informal, formal and state- 
centred aspects of public life.
I argue that Trinidadian politics is grounded in the taken-for-granted norms of 
informal social life or lore. Lore is crucially significant to deepening analysis of 
those state institutions, rules and practices, or law , typically studied in political 
scholarship. In fact, the ways formal processes of state and government actually 
work can hardly be understood without a grounded understanding o f informal 
social life.
This study, therefore, examines the relationship between lore and law and, at 
another tier, the interaction between social politics and a legal politics. It explores 
the values, practices and negotiations associated with sociality, and the 
dispositions that articulate them. These dispositions reach across and engage ideas 
connected to legality as well. They createci habitual and homologous ways of 
expressing, participating in and negotiating authority. They give life to what is 
considered desirable and legitimate, and become the basis for women and men’s 
participation in governance.
Together, they inform an approach to authority defined by values of 
reasonableness and advantage. People refer to these when legitimizing how they 
make sense of the world. This is exemplified in the ways that vendors and police 
enforce legislation, party activists and squatters depend on patronage, women and 
men participate in associational life, and Carnival masqueraders and local 
governmental officials compete to lead a national event.
In each instance, and comparing them, I explore what matters to individuals and 
groups and what kinds o f authority, including emotions, family, need, God, and 
gender, weigh in on the moment. Such styles of legitimization point to an 
aesthetic that normatively orders overlapping individual, social and state-centred 
ways o f doing things. Aesthetic authority is, therefore, the basis for my approach 
to everyday, lived aspects o f governance in Trinidad.
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GLOSSARY
Allah Arabic word for God.
Bacchanal Scandal, quarreling, partying, noisy confusion.
Baigan The popularly used Hindi word for eggplant.
Baiya Arabic for vote.
Bandana A type of green leaf used for seasoning food.
Bodi The popularly used Hindi word for green string beans.
Boldface To be pushy, wrong and strong, to defy convention and
courtesy.
Buff To chide.
Calalloo A soup or stew made with dasheen leaves, coconut, ochroes.
Caroni The plains of Central Trinidad.
Chutney Indo-Trinidadian folk music.
Commess Confusion or chaos.
Crocus bag A bag made from burlap, usually holding flour or rice.
Cut eye A menacing side glance.
Dotish To be stupid or dense.
Dougla A person of Indian and African ancestry.
Dua Islamic invocations of God, prayers.
Eid ul Fitr Islamic holiday marking the end of Ramadan.
Farine Dried, grated cassava.
Fas To be inquisitive or mind others’ business.
Fatwa A legal pronouncement in Islam made by a mufti, a scholar
capable of issuing judgments on Sharia (Islamic law).
Fiqh Islamic jurisprudence.
Fishining Fishing.
Haram Polluting, bad, corrupted, evil.
Hijab Islamic head or face covering associated with morality, piety
and morality.
Hajj The holy pilgrimage to Mecca.
Haji, Hajin Men and women to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.
Higglers Informal commercial traders.
Hikmat Arabic for wisdom.
Hosay Shia Muslim rememberence of Muharram, and the death of the
Prophet Muhammad’s grandsons Hussein and Hasan, in 
Trinidad.
Iftar The evening meal for breaking the daily fast during the month
of Ramadan 
Imam Islamic spiritual leader.
Itjehad Arabic for independent reasoning
Jama Masjid The main mosque or the main gathering place for Muslims
from different areas.
Jamaat Community or group.
Jinx Evil spell.
Jouvay The opening Monday morning of Carnival, or Jour Overt,
usually celebrated by masqueraders wearing mud and paint or 
making political commentary.
Jumbie A spirit or ghost.
Khutbah Arabic for speech, address or sermon.
Kicksy Funny or jokey.
Kuchoor The popularly used Hindi word for confusion or bacchanal.
Kufr Arabic word referring to someone who does not recognize or
believe in Allah, or is corrupt.
Langniappe A little extra added on.
Lime To hang out or to socialize.
Macoing To mind someone’s personal business.
Maktab Islamic school.
Maljo Evil eye, from the French mal yeux
Mas Masquerade
Mas Camp A place where costumes for Carnival masqueraders are made.
Masjid Place of Islamic worship, also called a mosque.
Maulana Title preceeding the name of a respected religious leader,
especially a graduate of a religious institution.
Mouloud Festival and birthday of the Prophet Muhammed.
Namaaz Prayers, used collectively made on Fridays at the masjid.





Picong To heckle or cleverly tease someone to their face.
Pirogue An open fishing boat.
Play Whe A state-controlled gambling game of Chinese origin.
Portugal A citrus fruit like a Mandarin.
Puja Hindu prayer ceremony.
Purdah Literally meaning "curtain". It is the practice of preventing men
from seeing women. This takes two forms: physical segregation 
of the sexes and requiring women to cover their bodies so as to 
cover their skin and conceal their form.
Qasida A form of poetry from pre-Islamic Arabia.
Qur’an Islamic holy text.
Sharia The code of law based on the Qur’an.
Shilling Twenty-five cents.
Sita Sita and Rama are the model wife and husband in the Hindu
tradition. Sita is also regarded as an avatar of the goddess 
Lakshmi, the consort of the God Vishnu.
Soca Local party music derived from African and Indian rhythms.
Sousou A group of people contributing to cooperative savings. Each
draws from the total in turn.
Steups To such one’s teeth in annoyance or disbelief.
Sunnah From the Arabic Sunna. The way of life prescribed as
normative in Islam, based on the teachings and practices of 
Muhammad and on exegesis of the Koran. Also called hadith. 
Surah Chapter of the Qur’an.
Sweet talk Flirtatious lyrics.
Tantie A loosely used term meaning older family friend, blood relative
of mother or father, or older woman.
Tafsir The science of explanation and interpretation of the Qur’an.
Tasajo Dried beef.
Ten days Short term unemployment relief work provided by
Unemployment Relief Programme.
Tief To steal.
Traditional mas Masquerade costumes that reproduce historically played
characters every year.
Ulema Muslim scholars trained in Islam and Islamic law.
Umma The Islamic community.
C hap te r  One: Introduction
The new generation wishes to advance not simply from proletarian 
agitation and violence to expert negotiation by technically competent and 
confident cadres: it wishes to become the proprietors o f  the landscape and 
governors o f the dew. (Lloyd Best 2001, 3)
Figure 1: View from a Taxi Driving Up High Street
1.1 Introduction
Driving to San Fernando, a taxi weaves its way across highways, over hills and through 
backroads. Passing street vendors, stores, homes and workers walking home, it slowly 
climbs the High Street and stops at the top. Here, at this city’s busiest comer and most 
central point, it breathes out travelers from all over Trinidad.
It’s late afternoon and, right there, dozens are standing in front of the Kentucky Fried 
Chicken outlet waiting to take a taxi to other parts of San Fernando. Private cars illegally 
used as taxis provide the most regular transport available. Today, most avoid stopping 
because of the police car stationed at the comer to deter this informal business. Some take 
a chance and stop around the comer anyway. Minutes after the police car rolls away,
1
however, normalcy resumes. Everyone seems relieved and there are small scrambles to 
crowd into taxis as they pull up. Many travelling seem like mothers hustling home from 
work and secondary school students unwillingly leaving their friends. On the other side 
o f the street, a group o f four men stand around surveying the action. One of them hails 
his friend who has stopped his taxi in the middle o f the road, blocking cars behind while 
passengers rush in. Another, with a handkerchief version o f Trinidad and Tobago’s flag 
hanging out o f his back pocket, has just returned with beers he has “sponsored” for 
everyone. He is complaining that he doesn’t know anyone who can help him get an 
apartment being built by the government at the base of Naparima Hill. Taking his beer, 
the third assures him not to worry because his cousin knows someone. An older man, 
walking by, says he is on his way to the steelpan1 yard for a meeting and the fourth 
decides to follow.
In this typical scene o f everyday life in San Fernando, women and men are enjoying the 
sociality o f the moment. The police, as state representatives, remind everyone that illegal 
practices are not acceptable. Yet, they know that they may be widely accepted by 
ordinary people. Others feel close to symbols of the nation, such as the flag’s colours, but 
lack enough connections to government offices and benefits. In return for friendly 
generosity, those with political networks, such as cousins or partners, share what they 
have. Still others are part o f organizing a community defined by skill, income and, in this 
instance, commitment to music considered distinctly Trinidadian.
The tributaries leading from this captured moment connect women and men to family, 
culture, work, friendship, God and habitual ways o f doing things. Undulating above and 
below the surface, there are crisscrossing rules, competing legalities, institutional powers, 
emotions and different kinds o f status. There are also notions of fairness, morality and 
equality. Small encounters, such as these, are the stuff of politics, especially politics o f 
the everyday. They are pivotal for appreciating how ordinary women and men participate 
in public life and engage with authority. From this standpoint, the study seeks to
1 Steelpans are Trinidadian musical instruments made out o f oil drums. A steelpan yard is a community 
space where an orchestra o f steelpans are housed and rehearsals held.
2
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understand govemancje, not as an abstract entity but as part and parcel of everyday life. 
This comer aithertop of High Street therefore exemplifies a starting point for examining 
negotiations over participation and authority as they occur just off the streets of San 
Fernando.
Like those disembarking from legal and illegal taxis, this study therefore puts its feet to 
the ground at this junction. Then, in the following pages, it turns right and meanders 
down Mucurapo Street; passing first a large, covered market and tl^n a green-domed 
masjicf. Turning right again, it moves down Sutton Street3, past a mas camp4 with music 
drifting from a dark interior. At the bottom of the street, it turns right and follows 
Independence Avenue (once known as Broadway) to the city’s wharf. Both unique and 
ordinary, each site can be easily seen but also remain unnoticed while walking San 
Femando’s busy streets. Delving into the small community living by the sea and, then, 
making a loop in front of a few men still selling fish in the afternoon, this study returns to 
the top High Street, and begins to reflect on three questions. How do Trinidadian women
and men experience, participate in and negotiate authority? How does their participation 
create or undermine normative order? What does it reveal about governance of public
life?
—
Why ask these particular questions? I first explain 5 mean by participation and why this is 
an important starting point. Second, I outline what authority means, how negotiations 
work and why they matter. Third, I discuss why order is significant. This first section 
introduces the writings of Michel de Certeau, Pierre Bourdieu, Yael Navaro-Yashin and 
Lisa Douglass as part of the discussion. Finally, I outline what I mean by governance and 
how this study is centred in public life. Overall, it illuminates why these questions reach 
to the core of politics and what politics means in this study.
2 Though also called a “mosque”, ASJA members use the word “masjicT
3 Like many streets in San Fernando, this one was named after a Governor of the colony. J.H.T. Manners- 
Sutton was Governor of the colony from 1864 to 1866.
4 As I discuss in the next chapter, a place where Carnival masquerade or “mas” costumes are produced. In 
the study, I refer to the artists, friends, neighbhours, family members and Carnival masquerade players who 
make Carnival costumes as “mas makers”.
3
1.2 Defining Politics: From  de Certeau to San Fernando
Figure 2: A G ust Reaches O ut of the House and Onto the Street
Political anthropology has consistently emphasized the value of ethnographic immersion 
in everyday life (Willis and Trondman 2002). This is because anthropology is committed 
to observing and understanding politics from the perspective of its participation and its 
consequences, not just its form. Ethnography is not simply about naming organizing 
concepts or “arranging abstract entities into unified patterns” (Geertz 1993, 17). It pays 
attention to women and men’s actual lives in order to plumb the “informal logic” in their 
interpretation of rules, habits and practices. Anthropological studies, therefore, attend to 
the minutiae of human culture, emotions and experiences as well as vocabularies that 
express “the symbolic dimensions of social action” (ibid, 30).
French sociologist Michel de Certeau’s (1984) writing on everyday life, particularly his 
concepts of ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’, has shaped how scholars understand the roles of 
culture, power and symbol (Shields 1991, Featherstone and Lash 1999, During 2000, 
Mitchell 2007, Napolitano and Pratten 2007). For de Certeau, strategies refer to the ways 
that the powerful impose, organize, regulate and maneuver order. Whether governments,
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corporations or individuals, these authorities are backed by control of science, laws, 
language, discourse, resources and goods. In contrast, tactics refers to the ways that those 
with less power to set the rules appropriate, recombine and reinterpret them in new ways. 
Tactics are not necessarily ideologically consistent, but are slippery, subversive, 
makeshift, unstable and even temporary responses to necessity. They give an appearance 
of conformity while making rules “habitable” by actively engaging their legitimacy, 
meanings and definition of order.
De Certeau’s approach has influenced perspectives on domination, accommodation and, 
especially, resistance. The concept of resistance has long been used to understand 
organized and informal hegemonic and counter hegemonic practices. Particularly from 
the 1980s, feminist and cultural studies’ attention to micropolitics of domination, 
subversion and transgression dovetailed with “the Foucauldian project of exploring 
power in all of its variations, valences, and subterfuges” (Brown 1996, 730). Concern 
with finding rebellion and resistance everywhere especially mushroomed as revolutionary 
metanarratives, such as Marxism, lost steam (Abu-Lughod 1990, Ortner 1995). Following 
James Scott’s (1985) influential writings, work on everyday resistance highlighted how 
complicated, contradictory, ambivalent and even collaborative it can be (Abu-Lughod 
1986, Stoler 1985, Scott and Kerkvliet 1986, White 1986, Ong 1987).
Walking about the streets of San Fernando, I found that this oft-used concept did not help 
nuance or explain what seemed to be going on. Fieldwork led me to be interested in the 
way that women and men claimed private and public spaces as well as those different 
kinds of power associated with the state and social life. What stood out were not attempts 
to overly reject authority, but to reproduce, mimic, appropriate and invest it with new 
relations and meanings. Groups traditionally considered to be disempowered, including 
women, the popular classes and the landless were simply not overwhelmingly concerned 
with resistance. This reinforced my skepticism both that “the powerless” had mainly 
“arts” or “weapons” of “the weak” (Scott 1985, 1990) and that this concept should define 




This is not to say that their assertions of agency did not seek to challenge stratification 
and inequality. Yet, as Sherry Ortner notes, “resisters are doing more than simply 
opposing domination, more than simply producing a virtually mechanical re­
action...They have their own politics”5 (1995, 176-7). From the point of view of what 
most matters to the women and men in this study, blanket readings therefore 
overdetermine and skew the intricate meanings of their participation in forms of power.
In his brief essay, “On Resisting Resistance” Micheal Brown also concludes, “A myopic 
focus on resistance, then, can easily blind us to zones of complicity and, for that matter, 
sui generis creativity” (1996, 734). Instead, our goal should be to see women and men’s 
social worlds, and its frictions and tensions, in ways that make sense to them.
My analysis therefore seeks to illuminate how “human beings use their emotional, 
intellectual, aesthetic and material resources to thrive in a range of social settings” (ibid,
734). This means not reducing women’s and men’s lives to conflict, but also attending to 
complicity, cooperation, reciprocity and altruism. It also means being ethnographically 
thick about the internal politics of dominated groups, their cultural richness and the 
intentions, desires, fears and projects of those involved (Ortner 1995, 190). As I waited 
for taxis, bought vegetables, listened to business transactions, attended women’s 
meetings or just sat with fishermen at the waterfront, people’s appropriation of authority 
and its meanings stood out. Overall, therefore, I primarily detail aspects of power not 
often connected to some of Trinidad and Tobago’s most peripheralised groups and the 
surprising ways ordinary women and men govern normative order.
De Certeau suggests we attend to “the true, though veiled, mastery with which the 
inhabitants of a neighbourhood manage their own ascendancy over their environment and 
the discreet, though tenacious, way in which they insinuate themselves into public space
V, A  v»
in order to appropriate it for themselves” (1998, 23). This study observes moments of
^  resistance for the relations the^eveal. Yet, in writing about Trinidadian participation, it is
these social practices of appropriation that are my focus. My own argument is that i
informal social life offers much more than “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985). In fact, \ ' -
____________________________
5 Emphasis in original
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“weapons” which really empower women and men emerge from everyday, ordinary 
assertions of what matters.
Plucking from de Certeau the way one picks leaves of seasoning from backyard plants, I 
argue that what I call social politics is the basis for such appropriation. Social politics 
describes women and men’s reflective and active use of the overlap and interrelatedness 
of spaces, considered private and public, to express selfhood and power. As I later 
discuss, the sites magnified here all intersect public and private dimensions, and show 
how these become sources of power in everyday life. Social politics is grounded in more 
privatized, everyday concerns with, for example, food, family, friendship and faith. These 
inform “ways of operating”, “styles of action” and tactics (Giard 1998, xxiii) that enable 
women and men to impose their “own law on the external order of the city” (de Certeau 
1998, 13). In other words, political life on the ‘outside’ is organized from the ‘inside’ 
(ibid, 22). How does this work?
De Certeau argues that everyday life is organized in terms o f visible and repetitive 
behaviours, and their expected symbolic benefits. In a neighbourhood, women and men 
access these benefits by behaving well in the eyes of their peers. This means learning “an 
art of coexisting” with others who share and use, or “consume”, similar space (1998, 8). 
De Certeau calls people’s investment of commonly held ideas regarding behaviour, 
“propriety” (ibid, 8). This investment in propriety is connected to values and practices 
considered customary.
Propriety is a locally-rooted cultural practice that enables women and men to recognize 
themselves in a space, to be recognized by others, to be part of social relations and, 
therefore, to be respected, well-liked or cared about. Like Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus, it is not always explicitly articulated, but works in habitual, taken for granted 
ways. In de Certeau’s words, “it is a more or less coherent and fluid assemblage of 
elements that are concrete and everyday.. .or ideological...at once coming from 
tradition.. .and reactualized from day to day across behaviours” (ibid, 9).
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Neighbourhoods are spaces where women and men have such daily routines and favorite 
routes or often cross each other’s path. Less anonymous than the larger city, everyday 
use gives neighbourhoods more personal meaning and makes them “private, 
particularized space” (ibid, 9). Through their patterns, engagements and familiarity, 
individuals and groups create a connection from what is going on in their more intimate 
spaces to this more public outside. Not merely functional, this is an incredibly social 
process of appropriation. Thus, for de Certeau, “the neighbourhood can be considered as 
the progressive privatization of public space” (ibid, 11).
1 argue that a social politics works similarly. It emerges from consensus shaped by 
habituation. It appropriates public life on the basis of practices, desires and ideals centred 
in families and other networks. This politics expresses the value of relationships and 
reciprocity, livelihood and survival, and feeling good about oneself. It links consumption 
and production to relationship, including the relationship to God. It symbolically 
manages, often through group and individual self-regulation, how women and men live, 
work and cooperate with each other. As de Certeau notes, “The field of the symbolic is 
“equivalently” that of the “cultural rule,” of the internal regulation of behaviors as the 
effect of a heritage (emotional, political, economic, etc.)...From the subject’s point of 
view, propriety rests on an internal legislation...” (ibid, 18).
Everyday concerns are not simply the context for a social politics. They additionally 
invest it with its own informal legitimacy. This is a legitimacy emerging from the 
conventions of informal social life or what I call lore. Lore is that sphere of everyday life 
“where the most powerful legitimization of the social contract is bom” (ibid, 23). For de 
Certeau, the norms of language and behaviour that are part of “tacit collective 
convention” create obligations to participate in a “collective public” (ibid, 16). However, 
it is not only that accepted ways of being, in intimate and public spaces, are the basis for 
participation. It is also that lore is a source of extremely diffused power6. Habituation to
6 As I detail in Chapter Five’s discussion of aesthetic authority, this power has vertical and horizontal 
dimensions.
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• 7 •its requirements enables women and men to appropriate, privatise and poeticise public 
space, and to exercise authority. It is also differentiated, for example, lore affords men 
different powers than women. Additionally, as I show, it infuses more than simply 
‘tactics’ or arts of the weak. It is, in fact, powerful enough to attract surprising kinds of 
individuals and groups.
For de Certeau, propriety is governed by ideals of “mediocritas ” or “moderation”. This 
seeks the “least amount of deviation” and “greatest participation in the standardization of 
behaviours” (ibid, 180). This idea seems applicable to the settings in San Fernando. 
However, here, I suggest that moderation is more defined by common sense notions of 
reasonableness and excess or ‘advantage \  Their meanings flex and shift even as they 
play the same governing purpose. Like propriety, they work as a “reality principle” (ibid, 
21) establishing what is allowable or what goes too far. As de Certeau writes, the 
“everyday face of “public morality”” is not dogmatic, but “a practical morality more or 
less integrated into the heritage of social behaviours that we all practice” (ibid, 28). What 
is considered reasonable is not fixed, but advantage typically marks it^ outer edges.
Significantly, a social politics also intersects what I call a legal politics. This second kind 
of politics is centred in concerns about leadership, rules and office. It primarily emerges 
from formal spheres of power or what I call law as opposed to lore. Women and men 
progressively privatise legal politics just as they do public spaces like neighbourhoods. 
Their practices flow through, twisting, stretching, redefining and claiming its powers, 
roles, status and meanings. This is how they make this term embrace both the colloquial 
sense of legality, or what people consider to be fair, as well as what is enshrined in 
abstract, formal or state rules. In other words, social politics presents a competing and 
coalescing legality.
7 In de Certeau’s words, “The city, in the strongest sense, is “poeticized” by the subject: the subject has 
refabricated it for his or her own use by undoing the constraints of the urban apparatus and, as a consumer 
of space, imposes his or her own law on the external order of the city....urban space becomes not only the 
object of knowledge, but the place o f recognition.” (1998, 13) Emphasis in original.
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As I argue below, this has profound implications for the ways that authority is 
legitimized. In this study, one of the things I pay attention to is the skill and style with
n
which women and men negotiate and navigate different kinds of politics and different 
approaches to authority. A kind of virtuosity is needed to participate in the everyday 
social environment of lore and law, and both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ aspects of political 
life. It is analogous to the skill needed to play All Fours, a Trinidadian card game 
requiring shrewd assessment of odds, strategy, partnership, familiarity with rules, 
secrecy, cheating if you can get away with it, but penalties if you don’t, publicly recorded 
winning points and a lot of crosstalk. As de Certeau writes, “To be “proper,” one must 
know how to play “whoever loses wins,”” to defer benefits and to submit to a “general 
decree of what ought to be done” (ibid, 22). In other words, people should not “believe 
that they are allowed everything” (ibid, 28).
Even where there are “active reversals of supposedly coherent values” (ibid, 33), I show 
in later chapters how propriety does not necessarily lose its hold. The compromises, 
claims and contestations I highlight emphasise many people’s unwillingness to “risk 
disappearing into the worrisome world of anomie, into perversion, or into the codes of 
various social pathologies” (ibid, 34). Law and lore are normative, though in different 
ways. They are the ways that women and men’s everyday moral values become 
expressed. Essentially, they comprise the boundaries of what people think they and others 
should be allowed or prevented from getting away with.
This study observes the practices and relationships of those selling vegetables, meeting 
women in their religious grouj^making art or living on the waterfront in order to thresh 
the especial significance of (lore. In the next chapter, I shift the spotlight to each of the 
study’s settings so that the significance of these activities can become clearer. The
s / ____________________________
8 My definition of negotiation and navigation comes from my M.Phil Thesis on Indo-Trinidadian girlhood 
(Hosein 2004). Negotiation involves agency and engagement with rules and expected roles of various 
kinds. Women and men negotiate, but they are also able (and to some extent compelled) to move among 
and ‘choose’ from a range of multiple and competing prescriptions and demands. This is a continual 
process of finding the balance of identities and practices ‘appropriate’ to different spaces and situations. 
Therefore, I examine the ways that women and men navigate different ideals as well as negotiate the 
expectations of each.
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chapter introduces historical and ethnographic context, and reviews the international, 
regional and national literature relevant to each site, its groups and key issues. In focusing 
on governance of public life in San Fernando, it is these women and men’s relationships, 
their blurring of state-society distinctions, and their negotiation of an overall politics o f  
authority that this study explores. In this way, I ethnographically investigate conceptions 
of governance as involving persuasion, coordination and collective decision-making 
rather than simply domination. I also build on traditional understandings of authority as 
the capacity to act and to make decisions, as well as the right to do so (Hague and Harrop 
2004, 6 and 13).
1.2.1 Centering Informal Politics: Lore and Law
In centering informal politics, I begin with ideals and their diffuse effects. These ideals 
are expressed through dispositions that guide what Trinidadians, including state actors, 
want and do. As I describe further in Chapter 3’s more detailed discussion of habitus, 
dispositions refer to the internalised beliefs and practices of a group (Bourdieu 1977 
[1972]). I argue that dispositions are widely considered to be legitimate if they make 
sense or are reasonable, but not if  they excessively take advantage of others. Once seen as 
legitimate, dispositions have autonomous authority and do not need the support of office 
or rules.
As I show in Chapter 4, this is what explains bandleaders’ confidence in San Fernando 
Carnival Committee meetings. In fact, any single Trinidadian woman or man may have 
comparable legitimate authority if  these dispositions justify it as reasonable or sensible. 
While at times they put brakes on the stretch and strength of state authority, these 
dispositions complement, engage and even compete with official authority in a variety of
ways. Lore and law flow through each other. Caught in the current, different kinds of
 —X
power and different reasons for idealizing participation in public life twist and combine.
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In this sense, I start with normativity, or ideals of order and balance, as the basis for 
governance. These engagements highlight the importance of understanding what matters, 
how women and men make what matters count, and the necessity of playing the tension 
between formality and informality skillfully. It is for this reason that this study examines 
the analogies among illegal practices, formally legitimized practices such as elections, 
informally legitimized practices such as patronage, and practices, fed by ideals such as 
nationalism, that pull formal and informal legitimacy together. It is also why my focus on 
public life1 leaves state and society tangled. I do not approach them as bounded and 
homogenous, nor separate and opposed (Navaro-Yashin 2002). Rather, the people in this 
study highlight that there are no clear boundaries between informal and formal spheres, 
values and practices. In Trinidadian women and men’s lives, national government, local 
government, and economic, cultural, religious or residential groups appear as different 
publics that overlap and are gradations of each other.
In order to explore these gradations, I peel away the layers of correspondence among 
different catchments. For example, I examine market vendors in relation to the San 
Fernando City Police, mas makers in relation to the San Fernando Carnival Committee 
and squatters in relation to higher-ranking political party activists. I also discuss all these 
in relation to the San Fernando Jama Masjid. This latter site, like a foil to the others, 
comprises its own formalized bureaucracy and informal negotiations. I look at the extent 
to which, and ways that, conclusions drawn in relation to various levels of ‘the official’ 
are also relevant to ‘the popular’.
These catchments, while appearing disconnected, together create a picture full of 
parallels, nuances and reinterpretations of each other. This is what makes them 
homologous. Market vending highlights the reasoned acceptance of illegality. Meetings 
with mas makers show nationalism’s unexpected effects. Squatters’ attempts to get 
government jobs emphasise the interstitial way patronage functions and elections in the 
masjid reveal the meanings of enfranchisement. All show the gendered nature of 
participation and authority. I argue that these, not primarily constitutional and
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parliamentary observations, lie at the heart of understanding how citizenship is 
meaningfully lived.
Yet, a focus on practices and catchments are only outer layers. Reaching deeper, I detail 
why these practices play out as they do across catchments. Here, normative life provides 
the heartbeat pushing the flow. It creates an overall order or consensus based on shared 
customary experience, common sense and (moral) flexibility. Such everyday morality 
values empathy with others balanced with self-interest and is therefore seen as 
fundamentally moral. The study is, therefore, grounded in the norms emerging from 
market vendors’, mas makers’, squatters’ and mosque leaders’ lives. Further, it is 
embedded in the everyday ways these norms spring from what matters, whether concerns 
are meeting needs, expressing artistry, behaving piously or making and nuturing 
relationships.
Starting from concerns such as these, I highlight how the dispositions “everybody have to 
eat”, “love for mas”, “return to spirituality” and “contacts” express normative life and 
explain the various meeting points between lore and law. Chapter 3 more fully describes 
how these dispositions embody moral authority. Chapter 4 then highlights their interplay 
with formalized rules and processes, and their significance for public life. Chapter 5 
slices in from another angle to theorise about their implications for legitimacy and 
authority.
These values provide the basis for correspondences that cross popular spaces and reach 
across to official ones. They thickly demonstrate how Trinidadians’ participation in 
authority mobilizes popular notions of reasonableness in governance of public life, rather 
than simply abstract political ideals. Reasonableness is not determined only or even 
primarily by the law or formalized authorities}* but by the values underlying lore. This 




institutions and processes, and sometimes approaches to studying them9. As I show in 
later chapters, these attempts at a different normative order point to under-theorized 
aspects of relationships among people at different locations across the continuum of 
public life, in and out of the state. Lore is therefore crucially significant to deepening 
analysis of those state institutions, rules and practices, or law, typically studied in 
Trinidadian political scholarship. In fact, the ways formal processes of state and 
government actually work can hardly be understood without a grounded understanding of 
informal social life10.
At times, lore has greater legitimate authority than law and legitimates the flouting of 
law. At other times, it reproduces it through individuals’ and groups’ practices of self­
regulation. This is what occurs when some market vendors quarrel about others who give 
the police too much trouble. Women and men’s claiming and twisting of the meanings 
and intentions of law suggest it has some legitimacy. Such appeals may also aim to 
buttress their own stance, negotiation or interpretation of what is right and reasonable. 
This was part of male mosque leaders’ election wrangling. At times, law has greater 
legitimate authority. Yet, I also show how formalized rules and practices engage lore. 
This may be because officials also agree with the norms of lore, because they must appeal 
to it to bolster their own authority, or simply because it may make more sense or seem to 
others more reasonable in a particular instance.
Flowing continuously from intimate through social to state-centred spaces, women and 
men’s appropriations aim to enable them to recognize themselves, their habits, values and 
meanings in the world around them. Additionally, they aim to feel and be recognized by 
others, including law, and to create a sphere of public life that recognizes both lore and 
law. As Chapter 4 shows, negotiations between police and market vendors appear to do 
just this. Their practices attempt to mitigate the overly abstract and alienating
9 The concept of the state refers to those aspects of the governing, administrative, and coercive apparatus 
that have a coherent imposed quality while, nonetheless, being politically negotiated (Hague and Harrop 
2004, 7).
10 My perspective here and ideas about the concepts of law and lore have been deeply influenced by many 
conversations, beginning in 2002, with the late Trinidadian economist Lloyd Best and his analyses 
regarding Caribbean and Trinidadian society.
consequences of law with norms of sociality and reasonableness. In other words, this 
popular politics attempts to make public life empathetic to context, moment, relationship, 
meaning, and necessity. Authority, then, emerges not only as a negative constraint, but 
also as a positive emphasis on inclusion.
Women and men’s interventions create moments when their selves and ideas can be 
recognized and express power. The following chapters, therefore, examine the effects of 
power in terms of exclusion and repression. Yet, equally, they explore how power, 
mediated by situational context and human agency, produces reality and “rituals of truth” 
(Foucault 1979, 194). This intersecting result can be seen, for example, in San Fernando 
Carnival Committee meetings when the Committee asserts its hierarchical status and 
ultimate authority, yet must align itself with the power of love for mas and seek 
bandleaders’ complicit recognition of its legitimacy.
1.2.2 Ethnography o f Politics
A study of politics that examines lore and law in this way should be ethnographic. Lore 
emerges when everyday practice comes into potential conflict with other kinds of 
authority such as law, and is still legitimized. It is in the spaces of popular morality that 
lore can be encountered as it actually exists in the world. A study of language, letters and 
speeches would miss aspects o f the everyday, the taken for granted, moment-by-moment 
shifts that define lore. Dispositions, practices, relationships and even identities change 
meaning and significance depending on how they are framed from situation to situation. 
Ethnography mimics this acknowledgement of context. Similarly, it fleshes out the top- 
down gaze of much Trinidadian political analysis.
In exploring politics, this study therefore sketches how authority is negotiated through 
points of contestation, correspondence-^nd-consensus between lore and law. These 
negotiations shape and are shaped by specific dispositions and overall values of common 
sense, relationship and reasonableness. They give life to what is considered desirable and 
legitimate, and become the basis for people’s participation in governance. Rather than
state and elite-centred understandings, this picture highlights the significance of ordinary 
Trinidadians’ expressions of what matters.
While I more fully sketch aspects of the study’s sites in the next chapter, I would like to 
link them here to de Certeau’s discussion of the neighbourhood. It is a commonly 
traversed space appropriated by people whose lives cross each other. He is interested in 
its use and meanings as well as the connections between the private space of the home 
and this wider geography. The sites in this study certainly frame a connected, crosscut 
space. Yet, traversing San Femando’s hilly streets, I wasn’t interested in the area as a 
single neighbourhood. Rather, selecting from de Certeau’s approach, I treat each of the 
sites in this study like its own neighbourhood. The San Fernando Central Market, Lionel
squatting community are all ‘crossroads* or catchments in their own way. Somewhat 
differently, each is both private and particularised as well as open and accessible to others 
of the area and city. Each enabled me to see how intimate aspects of living together, 
consumption, production and worship inform how people appropriate space and express 
their politics.
As women and men’s politics are not always stated explicitly or are stated incompletely, I 
examine a combination of words, gestures and explanations. What do these show about 
Trinidadians’ social exchanges, and ways of living, using and transforming cultural 
messages? De Certeau’s concluding points about the way people do things and relate to 
one another are useful here. Practices have aesthetic, polemical and ethical aspects. They 
open up unique and transformational possibilities within imposed orders. They enable 
people to appropriate knowledge and bend it to their own taste. This creates a “path 
through the resisting social system” to “overturn the imposing power of the readymade 
and preorganized” (ibid, 254). Finally, they create “an interval of freedom” or moments 
when people “defend the autonomy of what comes from [their] own personality” (ibid, 
225). In embarking on a study of politics, I therefore start with “ordinary practices, their 
registers and their combinations” (ibid, 245).
Fernando Jama Masjid and King’s Wharf
Yet, this study is not only about low-level, informal or micro-politics. It is about the ways 
that a social politics, grounded in everyday life, reaches up and across a spectrum of 
ideals, regulations and relationships. Neither is it ultimately about the state, formal power 
or leadership. Rather, it is about the ways that a legal politics, or ways of doing things 
centred in rules and office, are experienced in practice across publics. Each kind of 
politics defines the options involved in appropriating public space. Together, they show 
how an “art of coexisting” involves complementarity as well as claims, compromises and 
contestations over propriety. Step by step in the chapters that follow, I therefore explore 
how they interlock lore and law, and create political order.
1.2.3 Centering A uthority
Students of political life can choose any of myriad points of entry. This study uses 
authority as a conceptual lens, governance as the discursive sphere of interaction, and 
participation as the entry for understanding women and men’s politics. My analysis 
centres on Trinidadian interactions in spaces saturated with various kinds jaf authority. 
These include City Hall, pavements, homes and tea parties. I’ve attempted to explain why 
a study of political life focuses so centrally on questions of authority. This involves the 
kinds of power that give Trinidadian women and men of all kinds access to authority and 
the ways stratification unequally mediates their access. Stratification can be understood, I 
argue, in terms of unequal capacities to legitimize different expressions of authority. 
However, as I go on to describe, hegemony doesn’t necessarily work from the top down. 
Clearly, dominant groups more greatly control how authority is defined and represented. 
Nonetheless, I show that other kinds of legitimation, such as simply seeing things as 
reasonable, contradict an elitist view.
This conceptual framework shows that governance of public life is marked by interlock 
of lore and law. At the heart of this nexus, I show how social politics and legal politics 
present competing legalities. This clearly suggests that Trinidadian civic ideals are not 
TheaBsfract ones assumedTn western discourses of civil society. In later chapters, I look 
at how key political concepts such as patronage, nationalism, enfranchisement and
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leadership are lived in Trinidad. I suggest that, largely, they gain grounded meaning in 
terms of their ability to move women and men up and down registers of authority..
How do women and men legitimize the kinds of authority they mobilize in their social 
encounters? From Chapter 3 onward, I begin to dissemble the forms of power they bring 
to various situations, and their meanings. These forms of power make their claims to 
authority and definitions of what matters seem reasonable and sensible. Women and men 
can access a diverse range of such forms. For example, they may be grounded in 
institutions, occupation, income, family, gender, religion, colour, ‘race’, sport, individual 
style, emotion and relationship or ‘who you know’. Taking such a perspective of power, 
Daniel Miller describes “boldfacedness” in Trinidad as a “dogged assertion of freedom” 
(1993, 11). He describes an “occasion when a Trinidadian is refusing to acknowledge a 
complaint, or is blithely ignoring the queue that has built up to pay for some goods” in 
terms of “the 'style' with which such behaviour may be carried out”. This style is “the 
manner by which they display their studied indifference to the pained 'looks' of those who 
have patiently queued and the 'cool' with which they assert their transcendence of social 
norms” (ibid, 6). In response, he notes, women or men may steups11 or pull a face.
Alternately, as Lisa Douglass writes of Jamaica, “When anthropologists discuss power, 
they may speak of individuals, a social class, or the state. When Jamaicans discuss power, 
they speak in terms of family” (1992, 1). CLR James’ analysis of cricket crafts it as its 
own autonomous field of activity with its own notions of power and legitimacy. Speaking 
of players taking bribes, he says, “‘it isn’t cricket’ to sell a game at baseball or basketball 
or whatever the game may be” (1983, 247). Here, he shows “a specific logic and 
historical tendency.. .not simply pre-scripted by economics” (Smith 2006, 109). As an 
aesthetic, cricket itself offers surprising possibilities for “alternative values, freedom and 
even defiance” (ibid, 110) both on and off the physical field.
11 A steups is an irritated or annoyed sucking of teeth.
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Drawing on the work of Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002) and Lisa Douglass (1992), I want to 
especially highlight affect or sentiment as “forms of both power and meaning” (ibid, 3)12. 
They deeply resonate with the power and meaning of dispositions such as everybody have 
to eat, love for mas, return to spirituality and contacts. These dispositions also illuminate 
how affect infuses and mediates social hierarchy, reproducing categories of distinction. 
Chapters 3 and 6, in particular, examine how sentiment informs social politics whereas 
Chapters 4 and 5 pay closer attention to the ways it shapes negotiations with state officials 
and legal politics. All widen an aperture, allowing politics to be spotted in a sense of hurt 
because of unfairness or elation from success in a standoff against dominance.
For Navaro-Yashin, it is fantasy and cynicism that are common and ordinary ways of being 
political and managing state power in public life. To understand how these work, she 
focuses on humor, rumor, imaginary stories, panic and irrational fears rather than rational, 
consciously articulated views and explanations (2002,4-5). Cynicism, for example, enables 
Turkish women and men to critique their alienation from the state and clearly see it as a 
farce. Yet, because they proceed cynically or as if corruption, fakeness and inefficiency 
don’t characterise the Turkish state, they enable its continual regeneration and recycling in 
everyday life.
Whether because of statism or survival, Navaro-Yashin argues, jokes, anxieties, pleasures, 
fears and sadness entangle people in entrenching the fantasy of the state. As she writes, “In 
what I would like to call its visceral (habitual, psychic, phantasmatic) effects on subjects of 
a political culture, is located an important and tangible site for ethnography. It is in the 
physicality of the political that the state attains an effect” (ibid, 181). Navaro-Yashin’s 
perspective usefully highlights that participation in politics cannot be entirely explained 
with arguments about discourse, deconstruction, ideology or false consciousness. For her, 
because “the political” is both available and not available at a conscious level, 
“consciously articulated narratives...are only partially revealing” (ibid, 15). Attention to 
affect and emotional states, as key to how power and meaning are managed, is therefore 
necessary.
12 Emphasis in original.
21
Closer to home, Douglass’ study of sentiment in White Jamaican families highlights its 
intersection with both structures and practices of kinship and those of power. The ideology 
of family is associated with a diffuse affinity, love, devotion, caring, trust and togetherness. 
On the one hand, these elusive and enduring feelings about others are part of daily life. On 
the other, they are also connected to particular orders of value, meaning and social relations 
(1992, 3). This means that sentiment also gains power and meaning through the 
significance of family name and ancestry, elite privilege and economic success, and social 
networks.
In other words, principles of distinction (Bourdieu 1984) and hierarchy such as gender, 
class and colour shape how women and men constitute, organise, practice and invest 
meaning in family (ibid, 1). Family gives sentiment its authority, legitimizes social 
differences, hierarchically classifies some over others and reproduces forms of 
domination. As Douglass describes, “I view gender, colour, and class not as descriptions 
of particular groups or persons, but as categories that act as principles of 
distinction...Principles of distinction serve both as analytic and as commonsense 
categories that inform the way Jamaicans relate to one another and affect the way they 
explain and experience the world” (1992,10-12).
Douglass defines sentiment as “historically derived and culturally meaningful embodied 
experience” (1992, 18). It has meaning in terms of love, loyalty, unity and distinction. It is 
related to power because of the ways it legitimizes social hierarchy. Yet, more 
fundamentally, it is both powerful and a source of power in its own right because of the 
cultural meanings invested in it. Douglass’ approach is useful for moving beyond sentiment 
as simply sociological construct (Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990), sphere of meaning (Rosaldo 
1980), ideological practice (Lutz 1988), methodological lens (Rosaldo 1989) or 
instrumental tool for material gain (Medick and Sabean 1988). Like Navaro-Yashin, 
Douglass is concerned that an emphasis on ideas, consciously articulated discourses and 
ideologies misses why women and men really do things and misreads the frequent 
disjuncture between thought and action. As Douglass writes,
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Ideology, when considered only as a type of cognition or consciousness (or 
its lack), fails to detect the moral content, the emotional effects, and the 
appraisal of values involved in social life. In social processes, including 
ideological processes, thought, practice, and sentiment come into 
play...They do so in ways that may be either mutually reinforcing or 
contradictory. Sentiment may reinforce or disengage the hegemonic power 
of ideas and practices. (1992, 20)
Strikingly, both Navaro-Yashin and Douglass reach similar conclusions about what 
Douglass calls “ruling sentiments” (ibid, 20). Conscious deconstruction of material and 
ideological power “may not be enough to change practices or to transcend the moral power 
of sentiment” writes Douglass (ibid, 21). Rather, we should acknowledge that various 
forms of affect have hegemonic power because they are “meaningful and of value in their 
own right” (ibid, 21).
This suggests that we should attend to the meaning^and value that different groups of 
women andjnea attribute to various forms of sentiment. It is on this basis that this study 
explores the power and meaning of key dispositions emerging from lore. It is also why the 
emotions that they signal, such as love, empathy and feelings of togetherness as well as 
disappointment, frustration and fear, are seen as expressions of and ways of engaging moral 
and political power.
Like sentiment, sources of power such as need, God, style, institutional clout or ‘who you 
know’, are hierarchically organised. Firstly, this is because women and men of various 
groups have differential and unequal access to them. Second, this hierarchy reflects the 
greater or lesser degree of authority associated with different kinds of power. In other 
words, like gender or class, these powers mark social stratification. Third, women and 
men’s differential access influences the extent to which legitimacies they offer are 
accepted or seen as reasonable. Finally, it shapes the meanings that women and men can 
claim, twist and resist when they do assert one kind of power or another. As Douglass 
puts it, “A person’s ideology is not determined by class position alone, for within every 
class there are other status differences and many varieties of experience” (ibid, 18).
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Nonetheless, as I show, everyone tries to access all forms of legitimacy regardless of their 
status or resources13. For example, despite its institutional monopoly over Carnival, the 
San Fernando Carnival Committee relies on the informal value “love for mas” to justify 
its authority. Looking up, female leaders in the masjid engage in Quranic interpretations 
even when they may not have the male authority to do so because ‘correct’ spirituality is 
so important. In these actions, women and men move up and down register where 
different kinds of legitimacy have varying levels of influence. Examining legitimacy, 
therefore, offers a way of understanding how stratification and power inequalities play 
out and how people play them with ‘style’.
Authority therefore operates as a hierarchical register. Individuals and groups attempt to 
access from unequal positions because they lost an election, know a generous patron 
personally or because of their gender. These positions and their meanings, combinations 
and effects are not static. Where women and men can enter the register changes 
depending on the context. In fact, the whole hierarchical register of authority itself is not 
stable. For example, institutions have different amounts of legitimacy depending on the 
situation. Even the Prime Minister may have to be a “true true Trini” (Eriksen 1992) in 
one instance, but not another. What can be done with this legitimacy, how it can be made 
to matter and even where it is on the hierarchy are all negotiated and shifting constantly.
13 While, here, I don’t fully engage Trinidadian analyst Lloyd Best’s influential reading of Trinidad politics, 
the study critically responds to his work. For example, Best argued that Trinidadian society, formed 
through the economically-driven transplanting of colonized people from many places, is classless. There is 
stratification, ranking, hierarchy and status, differences in occupation and wealth. However, for Best, class 
is associated with “a concept of responsibility”. He felt, “The thing about the Caribbean is that everybody 
has the same responsibility, which is no responsibility at all” (2001, 11)! Best was referring to a colonial 
history of absentee ownership, the lack of an indigenous capitalist class, and the effects of 
“proletarianisation” on the people brought to the region to labour. In his view, no one seemed to feel they 
owned the place and everyone was only concerned with what was theirs. Yet, no one accepted that anyone 
is better than her or him, and no one accepted being on the bottom. He described this situation as if 
“everybody in Trinidad is a second-class citizen, with no first and no third” (ibid, 11), and felt it was the 
reason government was dominated by a “maximum leader” style Prime Minister, who as an incarnation of a 
colonial Governor, was the only one really making decisions. Best felt that “proletarian conceptions” 
defined women and men’s relationship to nation and state.
However, this ethnography highlights a very different slice of reality. As I show, the ways all 
Trinidadians participate in claiming authority and devising bases for legitimacy suggest modes of asserting 
responsibility that don’t necessarily fit colonial, Weberian or Marxist ideal types. If a proletarian ethos is 
seen as including concerns grounded in labour, needs, dignity and relationship, then it can be considered a 
basis for the social politics emerging from lore and treated as central to understanding governance in this 
study.
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Additionally, different powers engage each other. Institutions may treat gender or colour 
as irrelevant or vulgar forms. Yet, they speak back, possibly putting down institutional 
power as too unfeeling or intellectual to fit common sense. In other words, there are 
competing ways of representing these powers so that those lower on the scale don’t 
always lose. A group lower down may frame a discourse in a way that gives them 
legitimacy. It may make them feel that they are right and those above them are wrong, 
but it may not have any effect on the situation. Instead, this device expresses how they 
continue to make sense of the world and, even, keep their self-respect. In this sense, it is 
how they make what matters to them part of the integrity of their actions and values. As 
Chapter 6 shows, return to spirituality filtered through the masjid election in just this 
way.
Conceptualising authority along a varying register enables me to explain how access is 
strongly mediated by both inter and intra group differences such as religion and gender. 
As Aisha Khan observes, “ In most colonial societies, economic and social boundaries 
are made to correspond with racial, ethnic, religious, and other communal groups that are 
differently incorporated into the stratification system of society” (2004, 9). Yet, by 
defining authority in terms of the power of family, need, knowledge, God, relationships 
and emotions as well as the power of more traditional markers such as gender and 
institutional location, I also treat it as a ‘tactic’ (de Certeau 1984) that women and men 
invest with meaning.
Popular participation in this hierarchical register is exactly how order is both created and 
undermined. It gives form to an aesthetic or overall approach to normative life in which 
an array of women and men participate from different social positions. What this shows 
is that politics is far less about formal leadership, rules and office than it is about 
normative life or what most matters. This is what I call aesthetic authority. A significant 
body of global and local feminist scholarship documents this almost “personal is 
political” interpretation (Hanich 1971, Smith 1987, Jaggar and Bordo 1989, Stanley and 
Wise 1990, Reddock 1994, Wolf 1996, Ribbins and Edwards 1998, McClaurin 2001).
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Chapter 5 further describes the significance of this concept in terms of legitimacy and 
authority.
The following pages somewhat surprisingly describe ordinary women and men’s 
hegemony over public engagement with authority. There are, of course, divergent 
political stakes. Yet, both women and men act discursively to “reshape the very ideas and 
institutions that make it possible for them to act as subjects” (Tsing 2002, 334). They act 
ideologically to articulate a system of meanings, values and beliefs that can be abstracted 
as a “worldview” and drawn upon for “collective symbolic production” (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2002, 210). Finally, they draw on culture for the hegemonic forms it enables 
them to cast and resist14.
Only partly following Gramsci, I therefore show their power “to control the cultural 
terms in which the world is ordered and, within it, power legitimized” (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2002, 11). By contrast, as I show in Chapters 4 and 5, bureaucracy, legislation, 
high-ranking politicians and abstract civic values are far from dominant. Reflecting on 
Jamaica, Obika Gray has similarly written of the power of the urban poor’s rebellious 
cultures to define statecraft and party politics, pose problems for political legitimacy and 
challenge obedience to law and official morality15 (2004, 2).
In the panoramic view this framework offers, national elections, parliaments, political 
parties and constitutions appear as only some specific, and not necessarily hegemonic, 
bases for legitimization - among many. As I outline below, international and regional 
discourses disproportionately magnify these catchments, their main participants, and their 
actions and ideals as the master symbols of politics. This study therefore contributes to
14 Jean and John Comaroff discuss culture as “the shared repertoire of practices, symbols, and meanings 
from which hegemonic forms are cast -  and, by extension, resisted. Or, in other words, it is the historically 
situated field of signifiers, at once material and symbolic, in which occur the dialectics of domination and 
resistance, the making and breaking of consensus..(2 0 0 2 ,2 0 8 ) .
15 Gray’s thesis is that Jamaican statecraft now involves the straddling of conflicting political values, such 
as formal-constitutional and the covert-illegal, because of a decisive shift in the social balance of power 
from the respectable middle class to the urban poor.
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social and political anthropology through an emphasis on aesthetic authority as lived in 
the ordinary ongoings of public life.
1.3 Politics in International Perspective
I became interested in these connections when noticing the gaps created by state- and 
elite-centred understandings of Trinidadian and international politics and governance. I 
was especiallylceen to focus on under-studied aspects of authority, and the ways it is 
democratised. Relatedly, I was interested in the ways informality and participation are 
lived, mobilized and given meaning. Recent political anthropology offers a variety of 
approaches to understanding negotiations over authority. Margins, sovereignty, spaces of 
exception and biopolitics have emerged as dominant conceptual themes.
I survey them briefly here to outline the conceptual framework presented by the 
international literature. I also summarise Partha Chatteijee’s concept of a “political 
society” (2005, 84). Finally, I discuss how the intersections of social life and ‘the state’, 
so central to this study, have been conceptualized. However, I return to these as part of a 
fuller discussion in the concluding chapter where I review my own engagement and 
contribution to this scholarship.
1.3.1 Margins and Sovereignties
In the last section, I culled a definition of the kind of politics central to this study from de 
Certeau’s writing about neighbourhood sociality. This set the context for understanding 
informal spaces and relationships, and their connections to the state. However, these can 
also be examined in terms of ‘margins’. In their introduction to Anthropology in the 
Margins of the State. Veena Das and Deborah Poole define these margins as “sites of 
disorder, where the state has been unable to impose its order” (ibid, 8). On the one hand, 
this means that these are sites where “the state is constantly refounding its modes of order
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and lawmaking” (2004, 6) so that “unruly subjects” are transformed into disciplined ones. 
On the other, they highlight moments when “law and other state practices are colonized 
by other forms of regulation that emanate from the pressing needs of populations to 
secure political and economic survival” (ibid, 8).
They argue that, to focus on margins of the state is to examine technologies of power that 
pacify through violence or pedagogy, the legibility and illegibility of state documents and 
the ways that life, health and bodies are normalized, neglected or negated. In other words, 
it is in the recesses of everyday life where the state is constantly being formed (ibid, 23). 
It is important to keep in mind that the practices that take place in and define margins are 
both “outside and inside the law” because the state and its representatives may 
simultaneously behave in licit and illicit ways. As well, authorities that are not state- 
defined may control governance and may even do it in ways that mimic state signifiers. 
This is the case in countries experiencing civil war where non-state authorities compete 
with the state to control territory, people, trade and violence.
In this literature, although local worlds are enmeshed unequally with the state, margins 
are both peripheral to and central to how the state defines itself and works. This is 
because states define their own qualities and scope in opposition to margins, use margins 
to indirectly rule, and create margins as an exercise of power. More relevant for this 
study, margins signal the pluralisation of disciplinary, regulatory and enforcement 
practices (ibid, 4). As the authors write, “the complexity of lived experience inflects 
notions of justice and law with different kinds of imaginaries from those available in 
official sites and representations of justice and law” (ibid, 22). This conceptualization has 
obvious relevance for how the informal sites and practices in this study can be framed. It 
also introduces the notion o f sovereignty to my own examination of how those within 
lore and law exercise authority.
Drawing on Giorgio Agamben (1998), Hansen and Stepputat (2005, 1) define sovereignty 
in relation to “the ability and the will to employ overwhelming violence and to decide on 
life and death”. It is both an effect and objective of state formation. Yet, it is not limited
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to states, but dispersed throughout and across societies. Sovereign bodies include states, 
nations, communities, leaders and individuals. In other words, any woman or man or any 
group can exercise sovereignty that competes with that of the state. This points to 
possible, continual tensions between popular (individual) sovereignty and that of nations 
and states. Essentially, sovereign power lies behind authority, whether this is the 
authority of law or those acting across or outside its boundaries. It is defined by the 
power to exclude others, deny their equality as citizens or their rights as humans, and 
reduce them to ‘bare life* (ibid, 17). In such a way, this de facto authority creates “states 
of exception” or moments when law is suspended.
Postcolonies are cast as “almost permanent zones of “exception”” (ibid, 18) because they 
were forged on “subjection, order, and obedience through performance of paramount 
sovereign power and suppression of competing authorities” (ibid, 4). In other words, 
colonial politics did not aim to create responsible and self-governing citizens. Rather, it 
denied (liberal-democratic) citizenship to colonial bodies and dealt power through 
violence. This was part of colonial biopolitics. Biopolitics refers to the way that 
sovereignty must be performed on bodies through violence as well as management of 
health and life. It is grounded in what authorities can do to bodies and the ways bodies 
can resist. Essentially, biopolitics defines which bodies and practices are ‘normal’ and 
which are exceptions, and what happens in margins (Das and Poole 2004).
Connected to this is Thomas Hansen and Finn Stepputat’s discussion of “informal 
sovereignty”. This concept describes individuals and groups who challenge state 
monopoly of violence, control identities and bodies, and arbitrarily flex their authority in 
the fissures in state power16. In other words, not only states have biopolitical power. The 
authors’ point is that colonial governance suppressed competing authorities, but led to 
territories defined by informal sovereignties anyway17. As such, a study of authority
16 As Hansen and Stepputat define, “They have managed to capture, privatize or make semi-autonomous 
territories, institutions, identity forms, and practices in the interstices of the fragmented configuration o f  
sovereign power in the modem city-scapes” (2005, 31).
17 This is because the informal sovereign who has become “a law unto himself’ provides a reason for states 
to perform their sovereignty, defend the social order and produce their own legitimacy. Both informal
should recognize how postcolonial states only partially rule habits, norms and bodies. 
These are, therefore, ideal sites for how exploring how de facto sovereignty should be 
conceptualized.
For Hansen, “repertoires of authority” are a good starting point. They “are founded on 
violence, or the threat thereof, but also structure distinct, if morally ambivalent, registers 
of public and political agency” (ibid, 170). This definition suggests that legitimate 
political action is defined and justified by shifting norms, and even illegality. Hansen, for 
example, examines how sovereignty is practiced and justified in the name of law, 
‘community* and ‘big men* (ibid, 170). The notion of sovereignty furthers rethinking of 
the relationship between centres and margins. It connects to this study of politics as 
negotiation among different registers of authority.
Similarly, the notion of repertoires provides a framework defining distinct ways that state 
power is invoked, mimicked and contested. Overall, these observations to the importance 
of examining historically produced and lived practices of community, citizenship and 
belonging (ibid 4-5). They connect to my own interest in the many ways that order is 
asserted, experienced and negotiated as women and men relate to things, ideas, 
institutions and others.
A politics of authority that stretches from close-knit to associational and community 
spaces and into the state clearly invites similar rethinking of the “boundaries between 
centre and periphery, public and private, legal and illegal” (Das and Poole 2004, 4). It 
suggests a comparative lens with which to view the dynamics of governance, citizenship 
and social order. As ethnography can privilege the lived experiences of those often 
marginalized by political, economic and gender strictures, it offers a unique perspective 
of how these are negotiated.
sovereigns and (rumours of) corrupt state officials further produce ‘the community’ as “the sovereign 
repository of moral values and authentic sociality” (Hansen and Stepputat 2005, 32).
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Yet, this study departs from some of the recent scholarship on sovereignty (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2005). I found the discourse about violence and biopolitics distant from the 
negotiations of market life, mas camp costume production, masjid elections and life in a 
squatting community. Issues of refugee status and migration, autochthony and aliens, 
militarism and border conflict just were not relevant to these specific experiences. 
Informal sovereignty does not work through the management of health, ‘bare’ life and 
death in any of these instances.
1.3.2 Political Society
Building on these ideas, Partha Chatteijee provides an extremely helpful concept that can 
be borrowed for this study. He defines “political society” as the sphere of direct 
encounter between the state and communities Imd'Tnttividuals from “popular” worlds 
(2005, 24). He examines political society in terms of “the relations between government 
agencies and population groups that are the targets of government policy” (ibid, 84). 
These relations are constitutive of democratic politics as “a constantly shifting 
compromise between the normative values of modernity and the moral assertion of 
popular demands” (2005, 86). Rather than the ideals and practices of bourgeois “civil 
society”18, this concept describes “pure politics”.
Within this politics, civil-social norms and constitutional proprieties are not certainties, 
sovereign power has ambiguous legitimacy, and rights and rules seem continuously 
negotiated afresh (ibid, 99). This results in creative “forms of democratic practice that, 
even as they retain the names given to them by Western sociology and political theory, 
have become unrecognizably different” (ibid, 100). Though focused on state-society 
interventions related to welfare, housing and health, this concept usefully signals a way 
that the irregular, illegal, informal and seemingly ‘inappropriate’ ways of participating in 
public life can be named and normalized. This suited my own desire to not ignore nor
18 Writing of India, Chatteijee defines civil society as “bourgeois society...as an actually existing arena of 
institutions and practices inhabited by a relatively small section of the people whose social locations can be 
identified with a fair degree of clarity.. .as an ideal that continues to energize an interventionist political 
project...as an actually existing form it is democratically limited.. .and restricted to a small section of 
culturally equipped citizens” (2005, 84-86).
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pathologise popular ways of doing things for inadequately meeting civil society virtues, 
relations and practices.
1.3.3 The State
Whereas scholarship emerging from the mid-1950s suggested studying “political 
systems” rather than states (Almond and Coleman 1960), recent political anthropology 
treats statism as endemic to social life (Mitchell 1991, Gupta 1995, Mamdani 1996, Hirst 
1997, Taussig 1997, Dean 1999, Aretxaga 2000, Kaviraj and Kilnani eds. 2001, Paley 
2001, Trouillot 2001, Ferguson and Gupta 2002 and Navaro-Yashin 2002). In other 
words, ‘the state’ can be seen not only in the obvious processes of Parliaments and 
elections, but also in mundane actions such as posting a letter, watching television or 
gossiping about corruption.
This more current literature neither abandons nor reifies the state. It does not approach 
‘it’ as unitary, discrete or distinct from society, nor as the supreme authority among 
localized and globalised powers. Rather, it examines how the state comes into being, is 
differentiated from other institutions, and affects the diffusion of authority throughout 
society. In this view, the state is a multi-layered, pluri-centred, fluid, fragile, 
contradictory and culturally specific ensemble (Sharma and Gupta 2006, 10).
Yet, citizens’ and officials’ everyday practices seem to reify it as the highest authority 
over social institutions and conduct, and as coherent, singular and legitimate. This is the 
basis for statism or ways individuals, institutions and communities expand government 
beyond the state through mundane processes of governance. Therefore, the state can be 
studied by looking at the play of hegemonic processes in social relations, networks and 
institutions as well as in banal bureaucratic practices. These can illuminate how women 
and men imagine, encounter and re-imagine what it does and means (ibid, 11).
By looking at how women and men perceive the state based on their locations and 
encounters with its processes and officials, it is possible to understand ways that it is
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routinely reproduced and contested, represented and limited. On the one hand, this 
engagement may institute inequalities. On the other, it offers opportunities for subversion 
by those outside of bureaucracies as well as at different points within. Both options may 
reinforce the line between state and non-state realms, redraw or blur them. As Aradhana 
Sharma and Akhil Gupta write, “Cultural struggles determine what a state means to its 
people, how it is instantiated in their daily lives, and where its boundaries are drawn” 
(2006, 11). This points to the ways that the state is culturally constituted (ibid, 11).
Ethnographies of the state examine its messages and their reception, as well as everyday 
bureaucratic interactions. Each shapes how the other is experienced and read by citizens. 
State signifiers and effects make the state real, reinforced and resisted in women and 
men’s lives. They highlight the centrality of social life to any understanding of 
governance, and its bureaucratic, gender, cultural, sociopolitical and everyday 
expressions.
As Sharma and Gupta summarise, ‘7/ovv official and non-official groups of people 
interact among themselves and with each other might illustrate the concrete ways in 
which the distinction between state and non-state arenas and social hierarchies are 
mobilized in everyday state practices, what kinds of social capital and power are 
associated with this work, and how this official status intersects with and feeds upon 
existing, contextually specific social hierarchies” (ibid, 20). This framing is useful for 
this study because it points to ways that gender, class and other differences are 
operationalised, challenged, reconstituted and altered (ibid, 20).
It is also useful because it shifts questions of governance from the state to 
“govemmentality”. This refers to “the direction of conduct toward specific ends, which 
has as its objects both individuals and populations and which combines techniques of 
domination and discipline with technologies of self-government” (ibid, 24, Foucault 
1991). In this view, governance is performed through webs of social institutions and 
arrangements. Power is exercised through these horizontal networks that encompass 
individual bodies and relationships as well as the state, which sometimes plays a
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coordinating role (ibid, 25). For some scholars, this shows the constitutive significance 
and ubiquity of “statist practices, interactions and representations” (ibid, 27).
Anthropology is presented as particularly suited to this framework because it often adopts 
a view “from below” (Trouillot 2003, 95) that also pays attention to “the multiple 
locations in which governmental practices are enacted” (Sharma and Gupta 2006, 32) and 
is interested in the subjects and identities state effects produce (ibid, 32). This way of 
understanding how the state is imagined and deployed through interactions among and 
between bureaucratic officials and citizens closely fits the negotiations I later detail. The 
concept of “govemmentality” is especially relevant because it directs attention to the 
kinds of governance that do not pivot on the state.
These concepts of margins, sovereignty, political society and the state valuably frame the 
sites and practices, as well as questions of authority, driving this study. Findings in hand, 
I return to engage with some of scholarship that applies these ideas in Chapter 7. 
However, my focus seems distinct from the thematic focus of political anthropological 
literature. First, this is not a work about the state and its margins. While I explore aspects 
of how the state actually works, I am more interested in understanding the ordinary 
practices that constitute informal and state politics.
In a sense, the study centres and works from the “margins” in. I therefore thickly detail 
women and men’s relationship to different kinds of livelihood and spiritualities, friends 
and family, leaders, decision-making and conflict resolution. It is precisely these 
relationships, things, ideas and practices that matter most that have been neglected 
because of scholars’ concern with government and state. Yet, they have implications for 
politics, the state and governance.
Certainly, the state is not marginal to any of the social spaces that I discuss. In fact, I 
highlight ways that “the conceptual boundaries of the state are extended and remade in 
securing survival or seeking justice in the everyday” (Das and Poole 2004, 21). Far from 
being ‘outside’, ordinary people’s lives and values encompass and appropriate state
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power. Yet, it is not the primary basis for the key political values that this ethnography 
reveals. It does not wholly permeate the disciplinary practices and reasons for belonging 
that are illuminated in subsequent chapters. Public life includes, but is not hegemonically 
defined by, the state. From this view, the state and its effects only sometimes appear 
relevant to people’s personal and political lives.
Literature that assumes all social life to be statist simply because an idea of the state is 
systematically reproduced, therefore seems presumptive rather than explanatory. As I 
discuss further in Chapter 7, for ordinary citizens, there is no clear opposition between 
informal and formal, social and state in Trinidadian political culture. This is because of 
the ways that authority is established, contested, negotiated, shared and balanced. Yet, it 
is the privatization of public life that more powerfully emerges from this ethnography.
1.4 Politics in Regional and National Perspective
Figure 3: Politics in the Landscape
Drawing from international anthropological literature, I have so far laid out a framework 
comprising concepts such as sociality, legality, authority, marginality and informal 
sovereignty. The following section contextualizes my approach within the regional and 
national literature on politics. It highlights the gaps that provided a rationale for the study 
as well as scholarship that I draw upon. I then outline how the study’s key concepts can 
be glimpsed in anthropological literature on Trinidad, and additionally provide a 
springboard for my own approach and emphases.
Politics and governance in Trinidad and Tobago, and the Anglophone Caribbean, have 
overwhelmingly and repetitively been studied in terms of elites19 and leaders20, elections, 
representative government and political party development , constitutional change and 
public sector bureaucracy23. Many of these studies have usefully interrogated “the 
distribution, exercise and consequences of power” (Hay 2002, 3). Yet, they infrequently 
evaluate assessments of the society made at election periods or at governmental levels 
against other, non-crisis moments and non-governmental spheres. The study of politics 
involves much more than the study of the state. It involves also examining ways the state 
and formal and informal groups, classes and institutions are mutually enmeshed24 (Held 
1989).
There is an especially clear neglect of the connections and overlap of formality and 
informality in Trinidadian political culture. This has limited what this scholarship can say 
about women and men’s beliefs about a range of rules, procedures, practices and
19 San Fernando’s Winston Mahabir (1978) is one of the many political elites whose autobiography 
contributes to this literature.
20 Oxaal 1968, Singham 1968, Williams 1969, Munroe and Lewis 1971, Robinson 1971, Gomes 1974, 
Wong 1975, Mahabir 1978, Deosaran 1981, Boodhoo 1986, Shaw 1986, Manley 1987, Agyemang 1989, 
Hintzen 1989, La Guerre 1990, Ryan 1990, Panday 1991, Hennessy 1992, Bhaggan 1995, Siewah and 
Rampersad-Narinesingh 1995, Ghany 1996, Cudjoe 1997, Ramadar 1997, Siewah and Arjoonsingh 1998, 
Collymore 2000, Ramdeen 2000, Allahar 2001, Boodhoo 2002, Figueira 2003.
21 Stone 1972, Midgett 1983, Stone 1986, Bern 1987, Ragoonath 1988, 1989, 1997, Emmanuel 1992, Payne 
ami Sutton 1993, Premdas 1995, Premdas and Ragoonath 1998, Abraham 1999, Meighoo 2003 and Ryan 
1972,1976,1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1996, 1999a, 1999b, La Guerre 2001.
22 Will 1970, Monroe 1972, Gocking 1975, Spackman 1975, Phillips 1977, Singh 1983, Ghany 1987, 1988, 
1997, La Guerre 2002, Lewis 2004a, 2004b.
23 La Guerre 1994, Garrity and Picard 1996, Ryan and Bissessar 1998, Ragoonath 1994a, 1994b, 2002.
24 For a Caribbean example see: Knight and Palmer 1989, Meeks and Lindhahl 2001, Payne and Sutton 
1993, Benitez Rojo 1996, Buddan 2001, Henke and Reno 2003, Ryan 2003a, 2003b.
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relationships. Trinidadian political scientist John La Guerre (2002, 23) summarises 
governance as,
...the sum of processes, institutions, norms and practices by which a 
collectivity agrees to govern itself. It accordingly represents the 
accumulated wisdom of continuing generations of the “living, the dead and 
the unborn.” What legitimates this order is the consensus on which it is 
based, especially between and among the contesting elites. Yet governance 
is not only an affair of the elites. The masses must to some extent or at least 
substantial sections of them, believe that the system on which it is based is 
legitimate.
Yet, much of Trinidadian politics appears as a top-down exercise. Politics and ' 
governance are principally written about as ‘government’, and elite egos, rivalries and 
styles of leadership (Ryan and Bissessar 2002). The historiography is full of sagas of the 
formal sphere, struggles among powerful interest groups, parliamentary wrangling, and 
conflicts between the civil service, state institutions, judiciary and male politicians . 
Shifting outside of formal politics, other studies are frequently about social movements 
and, essentially, organised “resistance”26.
When informal social life does feature, it is hardly theorized upon. Though a rich and 
detailed literature exists on Trinidadian politics, it overshadows the feelings and 
deliberations of ordinary women and men. As Sherry Ortner points out, “The importance 
of subjects (whether individual actors or social entities) lies not so much in who they are 
and how they are put together as in the projects that they construct and enact. For it is in 
the formulation and enactment of these projects that they become and transform who they 
are, and that they sustain or transform their social and cultural universe” (1995,188).
25 Although it is less relevant to my argument here, Carlene Edie’s (1991) criticism that the state is often 
studied as if disconnected to international conditions and pressures is an important one.
26 Post 1978, La Guerre 1980, Stone and Brown 1981, Pasley 1997, Reddock 1994, 1998, Boland 1997, 
2001, Campbell 1992, Craig 1988, Ryan 1991, Ryan, Stewart and McCree 1995, Beckles and Shepherd 
1996, Bolland 2001, Meeks 2000.
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Reading scholarship on Trinidadian political culture27, one is often left wondering about 
the ideals people articulate in their daily lives even as they respond to those of political 
leaders, parties and organized movements. Partly, this is because a state-society split 
defines much of this scholarship. In this vein, political analysts commonly make 
statements emphasizing that, “Constitutional reform lies at the heart” of a “consensual 
model of democratic governance”28. This study instead suggests ways that informal social 
life exemplifies aspects of consensual governance29. It highlights the pitfalls of scholarly 
lip service to who and what appear ‘non-political’.
1.4.1 Feminist Critiques and Approaches
Feminist scholarship has explicitly theorized aspects of life that were historically 
considered ‘non political’ and showed the intersection of spheres considered private and 
public (Moore 1988, 1994). Historical changes to social manners and domestic relations, 
for example, can provide a picture of changing ideals regarding public and private space, 
politics and civil society (Sennett 1978). These evoke the organization of public life 
itself. The behaviours and issues that arouse passion and are made personal point to 
moral codes, individual investment in society, and how different groups imagine and 
regulate themselves and each other. Studies that explore these themes and spaces 
‘democratise’ how politics is conceptualized (Paley 2001).
Anthropological and feminist writing on Trinidad and Tobago has often filled this gap 
because of an especial interest in the more personal politics of beliefs, social reproduction 
and domestic life. These literatures also attempt to comb out the knotted implications for 
governance of social and state relations. For example, Rhoda Reddock’s (1994) Women.
27 Pye (1995, 965) defines political culture as “the sum of the fundamental values, sentiments and 
knowledge that give form and substance to political processes”. It is the context for shared meanings and 
solutions, conflict and consensus.
28 Ghany, Hamid. “Case for Constitutional Reform”. Trinidad Guardian. April 20, 2003. In fact, since 1946, 
the constitution has been revised in 1950, 1956, 1962 and 1976. The Hyatali Commission recommended 
changes in 1990, but these were never submitted to Parliament.
29 This doesn’t imply the absence o f elite domination. Rather, consensus is reached in the context o f “a 
rather inchoate set of lived experiences, feelings, and relationships within a political and economic order of 
domination.. .in a constant process o f construction and reconstruction” (Roseberry 2002, 199).
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Labour and Politics analyses electoral, bureaucratic and legislative changes in relation to 
the sexual division of labour30.
Like Reddock’s study, feminist analysis of politics directs us to ask different questions. 
Who are the women and men involved? Who exerts authority? What makes it legitimate? 
How are men and women differentially included in private and public life? What gender 
ideologies shape power negotiations? How is the personal political? What is politics? 
Aside from regional and national feminist scholarship, scant attention is given to these 
questions31.
Elections, government and the state are not neutral choices for study32. Nor are they 
ideologically neutral practices and spheres of power. Although political analysis often 
discusses the significance of dualistic notions of ethnicity, class, sexuality and geography, 
the gendered nature of governance remains largely invisible. As Barbadian feminist 
writer Eudine Barriteau (1998a, 196) has written, “Caribbean scholars have not 
questioned whether the state is gendered” and “androcentric” in their focus on these 
hegemonic practices and spheres. This leaves unquestioned the extent to which the 
“postcolonial Caribbean state is not only masculinist in its personnel but also in its 
orientation and policy formulation” (Lewis 2002, 518). It also hides “the ways women’s
30 Reddock (1994, 2) defines the sexual division of labour as “the differential allocation of tasks, 
occupations and responsibilities to women and men respectively. For most of human history this has not 
been an egalitarian relationship but one in which those tasks and responsibilities assigned to women have 
usually been ascribed lower social, economic and political value than those assigned to men".
31 In the international scholarship, Barrett 1980, 1985; Cocks 1989; Collins 1990; Delphy 1984; Di 
Stephano 1990; Flax 1990; Folbre 1991; MacKinnon 1989; Okin 1979; Pateman 1989 have critiqued the 
androcentrism and misogyny in mainstream Western political theory.
32 As Trinidadian Keith Nurse (2004, 7) has aptly described, masculine values “are taken as the prototype 
for human behaviour. Masculinism, as the hegemonic ideational construct, achieves a logocentric posture 
and thus becomes “a pervasive, familiar and powerful narrative by which we organise our understanding of 
social reality” (Johnson 1991, 153)”. Masculinism is “an ideology which justifies and naturalizes male 
domination and power, accepts heterosexuality and the existing sexual division of labour as normal, and is 
resistant to change...” (Reddock, 2004a, xxiii). In relation to these, Barriteau (1998) writes, ‘To move 
towards gender neutrality the state must confront the hierarchies created with the construct of the masculine 
and the feminine....States should recognize the nature of their gender systems in the same way they take 
stock of their political or economic systems and attempt to address imbalances. If states refuse to do this 
then state policies are gendered, and will involve gendered power relations”. One could say much the same 
for scholarship on Trinidadian politics.
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economic, political, social and personal activities are perceived and constructed” 
(Barriteau 1998a, 196) in traditional scholarship.
For this reason, Barriteau (2003c) encourages us to examine the state as a player in 
gender relations and the way that sexual difference is constructed and valued. Thus, she 
writes,
We fail to view economic or political relations between women and the 
state, or men and the state as also relations of gender. Instead discussions of 
gender are often confined to the private sphere. This reflects a deep seated 
desire to view relations of gender as outside the scope of a state’s relations 
with its citizens (1998a, 190).
The concept of gender refers to “complex systems of personal and social relations of 
power through which women and men are socially created and maintained and through 
which they gain access to, or are allocated status, power and material resources within 
society”33 (Barriteau 2003a, 30). Across the Anglophone Caribbean, feminists have used 
this concept to highlight women’s political participation34, women and men’s differential 
experience of citizenship , gender bias in governmental policy-making , women’s lower 
levels of participation in decision-making37 and electoral leadership38, and feminist 
struggles for inclusion of women’s issues in constitutional reforms39. Participating in this 
literature, Linden Lewis (2000) and Neils Sampath (1993) have theorized the links 
between nationalist and ethnic identity, citizenship at personal and political levels, and 
masculinity.
33 Tsing (2002, 326) accurately refers to it as “an imaginative construct’ and “asymmetric point of 
divergent positionings”.
34 Clarke 1986, Duncan and O’Brien 1983, Peake 1993, Wells 1999.
35 Alexander 1991, 1994, Barriteau 2003c, Denis 2003, Reddock 1998, 2002a, 2002b, Peake and Trotz 
1999, Robinson 2000.
36 Antrobus 1988, Harris 2003.
37 Beilstein and Burgess 1996, Vassell 2003.
38 Barriteau 1998a, 2003c, 2004a, 2004b.
39 Robinson 2003a, 2003b.
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Caribbean feminists have also stretched the boundaries of what constitutes ‘politics’40. 
Instead, among other foci, they have treated labour force participation41, female 
poverty42, gender-based violence43, homophobia44, the myth of male marginalization45, 
and women’s challenges to the sexual division of labour46 and sexual mores47 as 
legitimate arenas for the study of politics. Recent work by Ama Tafari (2006) pulls 
together several of these themes in connecting the state, politics, community, violence 
and gender in Jamaica.
The literature raises often overlooked questions about the ideological relations of 
gender48 across spheres of power. Regional, feminist scholarship on politics highlights 
the importance of questioning masculine bias in governance, linking state and society 
through common underlying gender ideologies, and delving into households, 
communities and individual lives at all levels. Building on the concept ‘the personal is 
political’ (Hanich 1971), this literature challenges public-private sphere distinctions as 
themselves social constructions used to constitute gender.
Feminist scholarship therefore suggests that customary relationships and practices, forms 
of authority, neighbourhoods, practices of self-regulation and relationship to God are all
40 Barriteau (1992, 20-21) exactly describes this when she writes that postmodernist, Caribbean feminist 
theorizing “is not occupied with questions on why women do not participate in elections as men do, or why 
women are perceived as less interested in politics than men. That approach clings to explaining women in 
relation to men. It still maintains a liberal political definition of what is and is not political behaviour.
Instead the new theoretical frame shifts center to gendered woman and asks, What do [Caribbean] 
women consider political? What factors within her environment do women consider more important than 
mainstream political activities? The theory does not assume that women should be interested in political 
participation as defined [by men], neither does it assume that women rank, or should rank political 
participation on a continuum of priorities. The theory allows women to redefine what is politics and 
political participation. It validates women’s approach to die political process. The thurst o f this emerging 
construct is to, “explore aspects o f social relations that have been surpressed, unarticulated, or denied 
within dominant (male) viewpoints” (Flax 1989: 67)”. See also Barriteau (1995).
41 Andaiye 2003, Bailey 2003.
42 Andaiye 2003.
43 Pargass and Clarke 2003.
44 Atluri 2001.
45 Barriteau 2003b.
46 Hart 1989, Reddock 1994.
47 Alexander 1991.
48 While “material relations of gender” refers to the way women and men gain access to, or are allocated 
resources, “ideological relations o f gender” describe how society accepts or contests what is appropriate 
behaviour and entitlement for each sex. It is underscored by stereotypes, biases, blame and basic beliefs in 
women’s subordinate role (Barriteau 2003a).
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gendered realities for women and men. As Lisa Douglass observes, “distributions of 
authority, or legitimate power over oneself and others, and autonomy, or freedom from 
the control of others, vary by gender, colour, and class. Autonomy and authority are 
available to men and women in different ways depending on whether they are asserted 
“inside” the family or “outside” of it” (1992,254).
In this study, I explore the extent to which gender ideologies regarding work, space, 
leadership and spirituality explain women and men’s participation in forms and levels of 
governance. My interest isn’t in proving that the world is gendered, inequitable and ) 
patriarchal. Rather, the following chapters interrogate how and when women and men 
make gender a register of power. I therefore examine when notions of gender are 
mobilized or gendered behaviour made significant as well as how the contents of gender 
shift in different instances.
1.4.2 Anthropological Contributions
It is important to briefly situate this study within the anthropological literature on the 
Anglophone Caribbean region, and especially Trinidad and Tobago. This also provides 
some background for understanding ethnic, class and gender intersections in Trinidad, 
and how they have been studied. Finally, it dovetails with the discipline’s call for 
reflexivity about ‘Caribbean Studies’ and the perspectives it has produced (Trouillot 
1992, 1998, Khan 2001, Price 2001, Maurer 2002, Slocum and Thomas 2003).
Key themes in the study, including family, religion, Carnival, and work, resonate with 
those familiar to the region, and somewhat definitive of Caribbean area studies. For 
example, the Anglophone Caribbean has been particularly understood through family and 
kinship studies. Primarily focusing on Affo-Caribbean family relations, this literature has 
both romanticized and problematised ‘matrifocality’ ((single) woman-centred 
households) as a marker of what is ‘typically’ Caribbean (Clarke 1957, Smith and 
Jayawardena 1959, Jayawardena 1962, Massiah 1982, Mohammed 1988a, Smith 1988,
1996, Wilson 1989, Senior 1991, Lazarus-Black 1991, 1995, Morrissey 1998, Trotz 
2002, Rowley 2002).
Countering these, particularly with studies of Indo-Trinidadian households, others have 
similarly offered ‘persistance’ (Klass 1961) and ‘retention’ (Neihoff and Neihoff 1960, 
Smith 1963, Nevadomsky 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1981, 1983, 1984) paradigms that add 
interpretations about religion, geography and generation to those privileging ethnicity. As 
I have shown, Lisa Douglass’ exploration of family as a form of both power and meaning 
is more unusual.
Douglass’ (1992) ethnography of family life is also one of the few to shift focus from 
Afro-Caribbean, and partly Indo-Caribbean, labouring classes to elites and Whites. 
Anthropologists’ general thrust has been to understand Caribbean families in terms of 
family forms, sexual relations, informal kinship networks, struggles for survival, 
childrearing practices, and the status accorded to motherhood. The following chapters 
provide examples of some of these, but primarily explore how family becomes a basis for 
asserting and negotiating legalities.
A long interest in transplanted forms of African, Indian and Euro-Christian religions, and 
their syncretic combinations, has also characterized Caribbean literature (Klass 1991, 
Austin-Broos 1997, Vertovec 1992, Henry 2003). As Aisha Khan (2004, 4) points out, 
religious practices and identities shape and are shaped by discourses about ethnic identity 
and difference. Munasinghe (2001) also concludes that religions are associated with and 
often used as a marker for ethnicity. For example, Hinduism is read to mean Indo- 
Trinidadian and Orisha or Baptist signals an Afro-Trinidadian identity.
Work by Steven Vertovec (1989, 1991, 1995, 1998, 2001) further situates Hinduism in 
Trinidad within the wider Indian disaspora while Frances Henry (2003) argues that 
Orisha religious practices have increasingly become a symbol for pan-African 
nationalism in Trinidad. Globally associated with the birth of Rastafarianism, the 
Caribbean has also been studied in terms of the connections between religion and
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colonial resistance, and political and nationalistic mobilization (Campbell 1985, 
Chevannes 1995, Murrell, Spencer and McFarlane 1998). As I show in Chapter 6, the 
transnational scope of Islam also has implications for the ways that citizenship plays out 
locally.
A significant literature on forms of work, including market vending, work in factories 
and data processing EPZs (export processing zones) and sex work, has also made it a key 
theme in the way that the Anglophone region is understood understood (Katzin 1959, 
Mintz 1955, 1960, 1964 Comitas and Lowenthal 1973, Durant-Gonzales 1977, 1983, 
Nash and Femandez-Kelly 1983, French and Fordsmith 1984, Jordan 1984, Cuales 1987, 
1989, Mohammed and Shepherd 1988, Castells and Portes 1989, Chaney and Castro 
1989, Hart 1989, Enloe 1990, Largo and Plotkin 1990a, 1990b, Harrison 1991, Lloyd 
Evans and Potter 1992, Momsen 1993, Chrichlow 1994, Reddock 1994, Yelvington 
1995, Bolles 1996, Kempadoo 1999, Freeman 2000).
Often focusing on women, this literature has opened a historical and anthropological path 
for recognizing labour that is illegal, informal, public and private as work (Centre for 
Ethnic Studies 1993, Denis 2003). It has also highlighted the significance of survival 
strategies in the context of economic marginalization and workers’ interdependency, and 
the ways that ethnicity, class and gender are implicated in their social and economic 
relations. Women and men’s challenges to elite, male, state and capitalist control are 
frequent themes. Nonetheless, this study illuminates connections between the meanings 
of work and popular bases for legitimate action that are less often placed centre stage. To 
follow up on these points, Chapter 2 more extensively documents some of this regional 
and national scholarship on marketing, Islam, Carnival and patronage, and their ways of 
characterizing the region.
Overall, anthropology has been somewhat overwhelmingly concerned with ethnic 
identities and interaction in the Caribbean, and tropes of pluralism, creolisation and 
hybridity (Eriksen 1993, Maurer 2002, 2004). This is why the region has served, as Aisha 
Khan (2001) critically writes, as the “master symbol” of creolisation processes and
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discourses. Led by E. Franklin Frazier, one strand of thinking defined itself by the search 
for new cultural forms, founded out of loss, in the Americas. The other searched for 
retention, persistence and revitalization of ancestral ‘tradition’ amidst “conflict, trauma, 
rupture and the violence” of colonization, plantation slavery and indentureship (Sheller 
2003, 194).
Melville and Frances Herskovits’ (1947) ethnography of African cultural ‘survivals’ in 
the village of Toco, Trinidad was a watershed text in this focus on ethnicity (Yelvington 
2001). Their framing can be seen thirty years later in Sidney Mintz’ and Richard Price’s 
(1976) argument that Africans across the Americas still shared a “grammar” or 
underlying system and structures brought from West Africa. Morton Klass’ (1961), 
Arthur and Juanita Neihoff s (1960), and Robert Smith’s (1963) ethnographic work just 
before the post-independence period, on Indians in Trinidad, also emphasised 
‘persistence’ and ‘retention’ paradigms. Largely, this early literature championed a 
‘plural society’ thesis that cast ethnic groups as culturally distinct and socially 
segmented, even if internally stratified (Smith 1965). Leo Despres (1967), for example, 
argued that the colonial state was the aggregate that kept the plural society together and 
that its demise provoked the fall of any semblance of cohesion. Colin Clarke’s (1986) 
classic study of Indo-Trinidadians in San Fernando, which I further discuss below, also 
argued for a plural society model (also Clarke 1971).
Creolisation emerged as a counter-trope, instead defining the Caribbean by hybridity and 
mixing. In Jamaican Edward Kamau Brathwaite’s (1974) formulation, the Caribbean 
creole arrangement centred on the indigenization among all groups of African cultural 
forms, through processes of interculturation, and more privileged European ones through 
process of acculturation. To different degrees, creolisation touched all ethnic groups
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creating, among others, “hybridized”49 “Euro-creoles”, “Afro-creoles” and “Indo- 
creoles”50 (Braithwaite 1977; Ryan 2000).
Yet, some argued that the framework’s Afrocentrism left “Indian oriented culture” 
“peripheralised” (Sankeralli 1997) in conceptions of Trinidad and Tobago’s ‘national’ 
culture and identity (also Ryan 1999b). Others argued that while identities developed in 
a shared, culturally-hybrid continuum, intersecting notions of (ethnic) “tribe” and 
‘community’ continued to make racial ‘purity’, ‘difference’ and ‘authenticity’ salient 
countervailing discourses (Munasinghe 2001, Mohammed 2002, Khan 2004).
Anthropological concern with ethnicity and hybridity has had significance for another 
key Caribbean trope. Peter Wilson’s (1973) dualistic framework of “reputation” and 
“respectability” sought to resolve the debate over shared or separate European and 
indigenous value systems. Based on his fieldwork on the island of Providencia, he 
proposed a different way of understanding the groups of values and goals that guide how 
women and men act, behave and associate with each other. In Wilson’s work, reputation 
and respectability “draw boundaries” and are associated respectively with men and 
women (and masculinity and femininity), “poor people” and elites, and young and older 
men. They connect to discourses about creolisation because they signal the ways that the 
boundaries and content of categories such as gender, class and ethnicity are demarcated. 
This has implications for how these identities are mobilized and negotiated as forms of 
both power and meaning.
49 For example, Hemandez-Ramdwar (1995) writes of “blocks o f raced constituencies labeled “African” 
and “Indian”, each encompassing a variegated continuum of difference between them...” Though focusing 
on mixed race hybridity, she posits that seemingly homogenous identities can contain class, sexual and 
cultural heterogeneity. See also Ramcharan (1994, 7)
50 Ryan (2000) notes dissenting views about whether or not Indo-Trinidadian culture, which has survived in 
indigenized forms, can be called “creole”. From this perspective, distinctive Indo-Trinidadian foods, rituals 
and cultural forms, revitalised and re-established in the new Caribbean environment (see Vertovec 1992), 
add to the multitude of forms that could be considered creole. The concept continues to have multivalent 
meanings. For example, “Creole” variously refers to European descendants or French Creoles, African 
descendents or aspects of dominant Trinidadian culture. Scholars such as Stuart Hall (1977) and Ryan 
(1999, 2000) have also noted the ambiguity in the term. It may also be used to refer to globalised processes 
of interculturation as well as to describe the specific Caribbean case of shared cultural and historical 
processes (Khan 2001, Munasinghe 2001).
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Jean Besson (1993), in her case study of a Jamaican peasant community, challenged the 
Eurocentric assumptions and male bias in Wilson’s thesis. She argued that Wilson’s 
gendered dualism falsely constructed Afro-Caribbean women as “passive imitators of 
Eurocentric cultural values of respectability” and non-participants in a resistant, 
indigenous “counter-culture of reputation” (ibid, 30). Maarit Laitinen (1997) also argued 
that the dualistic paradigm used to differentiate between male and female socialization 
and values such as “reputation” and “respectability” does not work in Tobago. Women 
may voice values of respectability. Nonetheless, their everyday choices and behaviour 
suggest that the relationship between ideals and practice is complex, changing, fluid and 
context-dependent. Assumptions about how gendered, ethnicized and classed practices 
are linked to community and citizenship therefore need to be problematised.
Writing on Trinidad, Miller (1994) turned Wilson’s model inside out. Rather, than 
founding disparate value systems and practices in gender, class and ethnic identities, he 
described how dualistic values o f “transience” and “transcendence” work to create these 
in the first place. Transience is associated with ideals o f freedom, individualized 
expression and female sexuality, male mobility, spaces such as streets and licentious 
festivals such as Carnival. By contrast, transcendence is associated with family, religious 
observance, nostalgia, roots, property and the reaffirmation of an older, established moral 
order (ibid, 135-6). Miller’s discussion of, among other things, Carnival and Christmas 
sought to show how this dualism is mobilized in relation to time, space, people and 
things.
For Miller, transience and transcendence have opposing symbolic meanings that are 
claimed by those constructing and contesting group and individual identities. The dualism 
is particularly significant given his finding that few differences in material consumption 
and family life exist among ethnic groups in Trinidad. These are apolitical, stable, 
essential and neutral principles that are then “objectified in social distinctions” (ibid, 16) 
such as gender, class and ethnicity. As Stuart Hall (1990, 225) has described, “identities 
are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by and position ourselves 





For example, different ethnic groups may be associated with specific cultural retentions. 
As I show in Chapter 6, groups such as Trinidadian Muslims may self-consciously 
preserve transcendent symbols, such as dress, comportment and family forms, festivals 
and religious observances, to reaffirm their sense of ontology, otherness and legitimacy 
(Miller 1994,142). From a completely different perspective, as I show in Chapters 4 and 
5, ma^makers may also import, invent and rely on notions of transcendence to negotiate 
_ participation in Carnival, the very festival that typically epitomizes transience.
Brackette Williams’ study of ethnicity in Guyana documents how unseen ideological 
processes rooted in colonization naturalise ethnic categories (what she calls “ghost 
hegemony”). As Rhoda Reddock (1995) similarly observes for Trinidad, mobilising these 
discourses to set and maintain (one’s own) and challenging (other groups’) boundaries is 
a significant part of “contestations” over political power and national culture. Yet, 
“dynamics of fragmentation” and “flux” undermine attempts to construct stable identities 
and totalities (ibid, 70)51. In particular, “too much freedom” in society and “too much 
mixing” (Sampath 1993, 237) blur moral divisions premised on ‘difference’ and 
manifested in ethnic/gender representations.
Gender brings me back to reputation and respectability, and its intersections with notions 
of ethnicity. As Reddock (1999, 11) wrote of women in mas and the contestation over 
ownership and definition of culture,
In their rejection of Carnival as a national festival, Indian 
nationalists refer to this vulgarity and wanton display of 
sexuality which they argue is incompatible with the Indian 
or Hindu way of life52...Indian women who participate in
51 As Reddock (1995, 21) put it, “...in creole Trinidad and Tobago, the symbols of national culture and 
national identity emerged from a struggle over representation and citizenship of specific classes, genders 
and ethnic groups. This struggle continues as other groups seek to define their presence in the society. 
Through a continuous struggle and contestation, die authenticity of these symbols is being challenged by 
other groups and in the process are (sic) being transformed”. Despite the social and historical fluidity of 
ethnic group distinctions, established boundaries remain important because, as Kempadoo (1999, 105) has 
observed, “.. .people who live outside the boundaries of what we know as racial and ethnic groups, do not 
exist, according to dominant perceptions”.
52 In this regard, claims to the ‘sanctity’ of the Indian or Hindu way of life are paralleled by disparagement 
of Afro-Trinidadian women for their behaviour and Afro-Trinidadian men for not controlling them.
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carnival until recently were seen as putting a stain on their 
sacred womanhood. The debauchery of this festival is seen 
as another example of the decadence and low moral 
standards of creole society and the African population in 
particular and some have called for Indians to refrain from 
participation. In this situation it is the Indian women in 
particular who have to be watched for it is they who have 
the responsibility of maintaining the image of the culture 
(note added).
Processes of both cultural persistence and hybridity are gendered because women and 
men have differential access to status and legitimacy. For example, men of all ethnicities 
can access status from both honour or respectability and reputation while contesting their 
own and other patriarchies. By contrast, women’s ‘authentic’ gender identities are more 
greatly tied to a debate (among patriarchies) about ethnic difference and boundaries. 
Women of all ethnicities therefore access and experience honour and shame very 
differently from men of the same and other ethnic groups (Hosein 2004). I discuss this 
experience further when I look at the intersections of gender, enfranchisement and 
leadership in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2 provides a historical background to ethnic, class, gender and politics in 
Trinidad. However, I’ve outlined the significance of creolisation to the play of transience 
and transcendence because these notions cannot be understood outside of popular 
deliberations regarding ‘purity’ and mixing of gender identities, class practices and, 
especially, ethnic markers in Trinidad. At the same time, these identity categories cannot 
be made concrete without discourses of honour and shame. On this point, Aisha Khan 
(1995, 5) has written,
Linked most directly with genotype/ phenotype and religious belief and 
practice, the purity/ impurity trope also signals a concern with boundaries, 
authenticity, assimilation and subsumption. For racial considerations, 
ethnic “mixing” threatens the identity of distinct groups, leaving room for 
jeopardized political viability and aesthetic/phenotypical unpredictability 
which point to social-cultural boundary transgression.. .Purity is linked
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with morality in part through piety.. .Purity is also the point of 
convergence between religious and racial/ethnic identities.53
Yet, this study departs from both plural and creole society models that suggest ethnicity 
is key to understanding Caribbean, and especially Trinidadian, society. More recent 
anthropological and feminist scholarship has explored and problematised the raced and 
gendered assumptions and implications of these perspectives (Mohammed 1988b, 1998, 
Williams 1991, Kanhai 1999, Yelvington 1993, Reddock 1997, 1999, 2002, Hosein 2001, 
Puri 2004, Douillet 2005). Instead, I show that while various kinds of identities provide 
critical context and power, dispositions such as contacts or return to spirituality create 
significant intersections on other grounds. Beginning in Chapter 3, I more fully explore 
their content and significance. Rather than priorities decided chiefly by ethnic, class or 
gender locations, these dispositions turn out to be key to the ways that families, friends, 
police, state bureaucrats, political activists, religious leaders and associational members 
relate to each other across identity differences.
Perhaps, one could say that, in plural society perspectives, ethnicity was king. In contrast, 
creolisation perspectives stressed biological and cultural mixing, hybridity and 
ambiguity. This meant that other explanations had to be sought for continual, boundary 
marking practices, and the intersections of class and gender. Like Khan’s writing on the 
opposing demands of purity and “living good with people”, Miller used the concepts of 
transience and transcendence to identify core values that filtered into understandings of 
ethnicity, class, sexual and gender categories, making them significant.
53 Yet, as I have discussed, perhaps forms o f assertiveness such as style and “boldfaceness” enable 
women and men to manage how these respectability and reputation are defined and negotiated. 
Market vendors, for instance, feel morally strong about selling on the road, and both boldfaceness 
and style are key to how they manage illegality, institutional authority, reciprocal relations and 
moral suasion. Though newspaper reports may sometimes give roadside vendors a “bad 
reputation”, they prevent their action from being entirely cast as trivial, “doh care-ish” or 
shameful. This highlights why ethnic categories, and their class and gender intersections, can be 
easily layered by tactics for negotiating power that reflect other values that matter, and are often 
missed. For this reason, this study departs from much Caribbean studies’ scholarship to focus light 
on these.
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As I show in Chapters 4 and 6, notions of shame and reputation, purity and respectability, 
and transcendence and transience clearly shape how women negotiate decision-making 
with male community leaders and how squatters navigate the exchange of jobs and votes. 
As Shalini Puri points out, the “schematic opposition” between reputation/respectability 
or transience/transcendence is “useful in making visible two related and conflicting sets 
of cultural desires, practices, and allegiances that are elaborated to an unusual degree in 
the Caribbean” (2003, 23). Yet, such notions are not as dualistic as assumed. In 
particular, I want to build on notions of respectability and transcendence while pushing 
this argument further.
The dispositions focused on in this study cross both identity categories and the 
boundaries between transience/reputation and transcendence/ respectability. They 
highlight the ways that identities are experienced because of stratification, and the ways 
that different moral orders are drawn upon to achieve ends, make sense of events, 
articulate feelings and experience relationships. They highlight stratification because they 
provide a lens for seeing the ways that women and men assert and engage with authority, 
and the correspondences across different styles of action. They also illuminate why 
public life includes both lore and law and, necessarily, notions o^^sonable^iessrTffsls^ 
because everybody have to eat, return to spirituality, contacts and love for mas include 
practices, desires, relations and tactics that defy easy moral dualism.
The value attributed to everybody have to eat or contacts clearly suggests that vendors 
and squatters are invested in family, work, home, hierarchy and honesty. Mas makers’ 
commitment to their art and Muslim women’s to their religion and community also 
highlight this. The study essentially shows how tensions and maneuvering around 
authority, legitimacy and decision-making start to emerge from these concerns. Yet, 
practices stereotypically associated with reputation and transience, such as autonomy, 
mobility, trickery and display, are also mobilized to achieve these ends.
As I show in Chapter 4, squatter’s relations with high-ranking party activists or vendors 
with police provide good examples. The dispositions that animate my analysis not only
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suggest that Caribbean anthropology’s privileging of ethnicity may hide other key forms 
of power and meaning, but that order-making practices rooted in transcendence and 
respectability, rather than tropes of resistance, may usefully illustrate why negotiations 
over legitimate authority play out as they do.
Regardless of identity differences, women and men all mobilize notions of 
^  reasonableness  and all play reputation and respectability as they exercise and experience 
v different kinds of authority. Yet, what standout are not stories of resistance, though these 
document irreplaceable scenes. Rather, order-making practices catch attention. They 
show much deliberation about cooperation and fairness, participation on the basis of 
family, God, need and leadership, and contending powers and meanings attached to 
claims on respectability and transcendence.
On this topic, Shalini Puri argues that Caribbean studies has “emphasized and celebrated 
the antisystemic values of reputation to the exclusion of respectability” (2003, 24). 
Critiquing a “disproportionate” emphasis on Carnival (vs. Christmas) to understand 
Caribbean societies, she situates this “privileging of reputation in Caribbean studies” as 
“continuous with a fetishization of resistance and transgression in cultural studies more 
broadly” (ibid, 24).
Despite working class women’s participation in the transgressive spaces of street 
cultures, yards and dancehalls, reputation is dualistically masculinized. This has clear 
implications for how gender politics are acknowledged. As Puri writes,
For to the extent that respectability historically and discursively has been 
associated with the feminine, with mothers and wives promoting 
religiosity, economy, and the cultivation of domestic virtues, the current 
erasure or downright denigration of respectability as simply buying into 
dominant ideology devalues the feminine. In some senses, then, 
contemporary cultural theory’s celebration of reputation positions women 
as acquiescing to the status quo and men as resisting it. Ironically, then, an 
approach to resistance that initially sought alternatives to the heroic 
masculine subject may be reinstating it. (ibid, 31)
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Fetishizing resistance and reputation therefore narrows the continuum along which 
everyday engagements with power can be understood. This is because it lionizes the 
public and spectacular “over a quieter, less flamboyant daily reality” (ibid 31). Using 
Trinidadian no^list Earl Lovelace’s characters Fisheye and Aldrick54 as examples, Puri 
further argues that it ignores how much (masculine) performance of rebellion and 
reputation often relies on the (women’s) “respectable” labour.
Puri’s perspective suggests that attention to “the resources of respectability” (ibid 25), to 
performances of transgression as well as “desires for acceptance and assimilation”, to 
investments in work as well as in relief from exploitation can help Caribbean scholarship 
more equitably engage the range of ways that women and men participate in public life. 
Against Wilson (1973), respectability can also be about the drive toward equality amidst 
stratification. This approach fits my own observations and emphasis on women’s and 
men’s ways of claiming and asserting forms of power grounded in social politics, the 
progressive privatization of public space and desires for order, fairness, respect, survival, 
self-regulation and balance.
This study contributes to the political anthropology of the Caribbean from this angle. 
This scholarship often dated back to Archie Singham’s (1968) classic study of leadership 
in colonial Antigua. Despite a vast literature on elections in Trinidad and Tobago, there is 
strikingly little ethnography on elections, government and political parties. Yogendra 
Malik’s (1970) study of political elites is one clear exception. Mainly, one reads 
secondary data drawn from newspapers, speeches, official statistics, polls, pamphlets, 
reports, memoirs, government reports, autobiographies and biographies. Interviews 
^almost wholly with (political and bureaucratic) elites  ^are also common. However, they 
together signal an emphasis on what people say. Ethnography’s richness results, not only
54 Trinidadian writer Earl Lovelace’s novel, The Dragon Can’t Dance, powerfully charts the stories of 
urban, working class, Afro-Trinidadian male protagonists who in various ways reject and rebel against 
transcendent kinds o f demands associated with having responsibilities related to a job, family, partner or 
house. In addition to one male figure, an Indo-Trinidadian, only female characters seek these very markers 
of hard work, family union and success. Yet, as Puri notes (2003, 32), “the novel is more representative in 
that these “respectable’’ characters remain marginal to the novel, somehow not achieving the same 
representational depth, embodiment, sexuality, or physical beauty” as the male characters that animate the 
novel’s events.
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from “thick description” (Geertz 1973), but also from unarticulated connections often 
revealed by what people do55.
There is almost no political analysis that explores the city of San Fernando 
ethnographically or to any depth. When the spotlight falls on the city, it is cast as a 
character in the story of national political developments and not as its own play within 
this larger theatre of politics. By giving room to the meanings women and men attribute 
to the banal and mundane in their lives, as they work, live, vote, socialize and pray in San 
Fernando, this study seeks to fill this gap. Colin Clarke’s (1986) excellent ethnography of 
San Fernando, East Indians in a West Indian Town, is a study of ethnicity and pluralism 
in the city, and the only work o f its kind to date56. National literature on San Fernando 
mainly comprises histories57, commemorative booklets produced by the City Council58
Clarke’s study “is about East Indians in San Fernando, and focuses on their social status, 
cultural characteristics and relations with the larger Creole population” (1986, 4). Though 
published in the mid-1980s, his fieldwork uses electoral and demographic data spanning 
1931 to the 1970s. It is also based on surveys and participant-observation conducted in 
San Fernando and Debe in the 1960s. Grounding his analysis in the theory of pluralism, 
he concluded that San Fernando (and Debe) society is segmented along ethnic lines 
defined by notions of ‘race’. Within segments, it is stratified by colour, education, 
occupation, religion and caste. He argued that ‘racial boundaries’ remained important as a 
basis for social segmentation and political alignment. Thus, social or residential 
proximity, religious conversion nor class mobility had eroded “racial segmentation” (ibid, 
150-1). Formal electoral competition provided the context for his approach.
55 Much Caribbean literature emphasizes the importance o f ‘talk’ (Abrahams 1983) and, perhaps, this 
sensibility is shared by national academics.
56 However, ethnographies by Viranjini Munasinghe (2001) and Aisha Khan (2004) are situated in Central 
and South Trinidad respectively.
57 Anthony 1988, 2001, Clarke 1971, Ifill 1987, Ottley 1971, Richards and Sinanan 1946.
58 San Fernando Borough Council 1970, Mayor’s Office 1988.
and Mic I Anthony’s (1970) popular short novel, The Year in San Fernando.
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The picture detailed by Clarke is fascinating. It reflects both academic and popular 
concerns of the period. However, the present study is very different. It deliberately 
departs from foregrounding ethnicity in a persistence-change approach often used by 
anthropologists in studies of (Indians in) Trinidad. For reasons I have outlined above, it is 
also not primarily concerned with the debates regarding pluralism and creolisation, 
occupational mobility, endogamy, retention of ethnic traits, racial identity and racialised 
electoral competition.
Put briefly, this study is instead attentive to politics in terms of values, choices, 
contesting relations, conflict resolution, collective action, and experiences of governance. 
Focus is primarily given to informal connections, moral codes and public interactions. 
This is because earlier studies have not sufficiently addressed issues of how politics 
involves infonnal^ufiionty and because they didn’t sufficiently evoke the everyday 
meanings, feelings and relationships associated with how institutions and processes 
actually work.
Clarke documents migration to San Fernando, and an expansion of residential areas. 
However, he doesn’t discuss the city as a daily catchment area and crossroad. As the 
following chapters detail, this is an important aspect of San Fernando. It provides a key 
context for this study which focuses on catchment sites rather than residential groupings. 
East Indians in a West Indian Town clearly and expansively engages with informal social 
life. Yet, the spaces in which it is submerged are religiously- and ethnically-defined, 
based on residential area, primarily elite social clubs, and political parties. In contrast, the 
sites chosen in this study are based on illegal, democratic, informal and reciprocal 
practices that provide a glimpse of normative life or what matters, how what matters is 
made to count and how this is done skillfully. Where they appear along our route, I stop 
and look around to then begin to assess ethnic, religious, gender, class, residential and 
other factors.
To date, there is no ethnographic writing on the areas I begin to explore below. Not only 
is there no anthropological scholarship on the San Fernando Central Market, the ASJA
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San Fernando Jama Masjid, the Lionel Jagessar and Associates Mas Camp59 nor King’s 
Wharf and the Railway Line, but there is almost none on street vending, organizational 
elections, bandleading or squatting and patronage in this city. These particular sites are 
essential because they specifically highlight the intersection of informal and formal 
order-making practices, provide complementary and contrasting pictures of how 
nationalism, patronage, leadership and enfranchisement are made meaningful, and direct 
attention to the power and meaning of ordinary women and men’s feelings.
As the historical and literature background provided in the next chapter shows, San 
Fernando also presents a catchment site pulling together aspects of life typical of many 
parts of Trinidad. Trinidadian economist and writer, Lloyd Best once described Trinidad 
as a “one city state”, asserting that the capital Port of Spain in North Trinidad is the 
fulcrum around which island life pivots (2001, 15). To some extent this is very true. Yet 
as the nation’s second though largest city, San Fernando can also present ways to 
understand the nation that are centred in the less-studied South of the island, which stands 
slightly aloof from the social and political dominance of North Trinidad. In this way, San 
Fernando is also exceptional. Far from being a typical West Indian town, “along with 
Montego Bay, Jamaica, it is one of only two real “second cities” in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean” (Richardson 1988). It provides an ideal location for scholarship that works in 
from the margins. This study, therefore, complements, enriches and updates the 
ethnographic picture that Colin Clarke presented thirty years ago of San Fernando, 
Trinidad.
59 However, the camp is briefly highlighted in Bellour and Kinser, 1998.
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1.5 Conclusions of the study
St. Joseph Village 
San Fernando
Figure 4: Exit Here for San Fernando
Cross Crossing
The following chapters first describe the study’s key sites. They then detail how aspects 
o f life that most matter are articulated, and present different perspectives on how these 
aspects contour expressions o f authority. Chapter 3 delves into lore. Chapter 4 introduces 
law and shows how lore operates there. Chapter 5 moves from lore to bring the 
perspectives of those located within law because of office, legislation or leadership. 
Respectively and across three o f the study’s sites, Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
interrogate concepts of habitus, public life and legitimate authority.
Chapter 6 guides emphasis back to lore, but at another tier, and to show the operation of 
office, legislation and leadership there. In doing so, it pulls the key concepts and themes 
together in a case study of the fourth site. Chapter 7 takes a bird’s eye view of this terrain 
and its significance for normativity. Focusing on points of intersection between lore and 
law, such as emotion, state, nation, gender and democracy, it summarises Trinidadian 
experiences of citizenship and the belonging. This concluding chapter also suggests a 
number of implications and conclusions.
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In summary, values regarding authority emerge from the informal sphere and extend 
across official practices and processes. This means that Trinidadian public life is defined 
by a continuum that spans legalities, including those centred in Tore’. Within this 
continuum, and amidst forms of stratification, notions of reasonableness and sentiment 
are at work. These shape how forms of power, such as need, God or gender, are tactically 
mobilized, giving life to normativity and aesthetic authority. Negotiations, navigations 
and assertions regarding legitimacy, therefore, lie at the heart of how politics is lived.
These observations affirm the significance of what most matters to ordinary people. 
Analysis that starts from here challenges liberal assumptions of political and apolitical 
behaviour. Participation does not have to measure up to leaders’, political and economic 
elites’, masculine or institutional definitions to have implications for politics in public 
life. This approach also highlights how statist or eurocentric conceptions, of citizenship, 
nationalism, enfranchisement and leadership, may skew the meanings of what women 
and men do.
Pushed a step further, it illustrates how assumptions about the significance of ethnicity, 
class and gender may overdetermine understanding of why they do these things. 
Altogether, what appears are more diffuse, less singularly top-down manifestations of 
hegemony that problematise Caribbean studies’ distinctive taste for narratives of 
resistance and transience. Such florescence of meaning emerges, in the following pages, 
through attention to order-making practices amidst “the contingencies of local contexts 
and daily life” (Khan 2001: 294).
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C hap ter  Two: Locating Public Participation
Figure 5: Against the backdrop of Naparim a Hill
2.1 Introduction
So far I have outlined the study’s approach to politics and the considerations that led to a 
focus on informal social life. This chapter takes an ‘aerial’ view to the sites and groups 
through which I examine such public participation. First, it surveys the unfolding history 
of Trinidad and Tobago, and San Fernando. Then, it circles in to more closely appreciate 
an ethnographic and historical picture of the San Fernando Central Market, Lionel 
Jagessar and Associates Mas Camp, San Fernando Jama Masjid and Railway Line 
extension of the King’s Wharf. With this background, I then turn to the next chapter’s 
focus on the ways that habitus is created and reproduced.
Why these settings? A wide variety of sites could be useful for exploring governance in 
San Fernando. However, I particularly sought these because they provided clear 
examples of “margins” where practices both “outside and inside the law” (Das and Poole
2004, 23) occur. Each site highlights mundane practices that blur different kinds of 
authority. In each, there are constant assertions of legal politics. These catchments also 
typify the ways that social politics has been and continues to be created, layered, 
reproduced and refined. Therefore, each epitomizes continual negotiation over legitimate 
practice. Further, each setting presents a slightly different picture. In certain respects each 
complements the other, adding dimensions that would not necessarily otherwise be 
covered. In juxtaposition we can also see more general patterns and conclusions as 
certain effects are repeated across different sites or contrasted.
As they gain depth in later chapters, I show how lore and law coexist in very disparate 
ways, neither entirely overlapping nor replacing the other. Sometimes, women market 
vendors and male mas makers are engaged in a balancing act with police or mid-level 
bureaucrats. Sometimes, they are in outright contestation. In other moments, lore almost 
entirely eclipses law or different kinds of formal authority exist precisely because of the 
continuity of the informal terrain. These images develop focus in the squatting settlement 
and in the masjid respectively. Together, these settings illuminate the political 
significance of family, and economic, religious and cultural life.
Ideals regarding family, for example, help explain what goes on amongst all these 
catchments. This is also true for values of relationship and reciprocity more generally. 
Yet, while aspects of family and friendship explain patronage relations in the mas camp, 
squatting community and mosque, they are linked more directly to issues of public space 
around the market. In another twist, notions of spirituality and culture in the masjid and 
mas camp unexpectedly correspond. Yet, they create different configurations of 
nationalism and transnationalism. Crossed at another joint, issues of enfranchisement in 
national-level elections in the masjid correspond with concerns of squatters in national 
general elections.
Highlighting yet different intersections, livelihood concerns, or ‘food’, are especially 
relevant for female and male market vendors, mas makers and squatters. While they do 
not seem so crucial to male masjid leaders’ considerations, they nonetheless are
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surprisingly significant. From a different angle, while female marketing vendors are at 
the forefront of governance negotiations, it is men in the masjid who are most vociferous.
In fact, notions of gender, and especially masculinity, influence investments in leadership 
and authority in the masjid and mas camp, and in squatters’ lives. Essentially, each 
group’s women and men are negotiating their participation, whether on roadsides or 
roads, in meetings in City Hall and constituency offices, in associational and national 
elections, or in neighbourhoods and jobs sites. While there are clear differences, there are 
also parallels or homologies among these settings that suggest an interconnected 
normative framework. Before thickly detailing these, it is necessary to describe Trinidad 
and the City of San Fernando.
2.2 The City of San Fernando and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago L ^  ‘
After the capital Port of Spain, San Fernando is Trinidad’s second city. Fifty-six 
kilometres (Clarke 1986, 32) from the seat of government, it rises out of the sea along the 
South West coast of the island of Trinidad, and densely settles in hills that rise unevenly 
as they go inland. Its boundaries are marked by the Guaracara River to the North, the 
Oropouche River to the South, the Sir Solomon Hochoy Highway to the East and the 
Gulf of Paria to the West. The 18 km sq. city has its own pre-Columbian, colonial and 
post-colonial story lacing through the larger history o f the twin-island Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago, and especially the island of Trinidad.
Trinidad is 1, 864 square miles and lies 11 kilometres off the coast of Venezuela. After 
Columbus encountered the island in 1498, Spanish colonial control stretched from the 
sixteenth century until British take over in 1797 (Brereton 1979, 8). Prior to Spanish 
arrival, indigenous Venezuelans were settling and trading in San Fernando, and migrating 
between the two shores. Locally remembered as “Guarahoons” or “Warahoons” (from the 
Warao or Waraho peoples (Forte 2005)), they arrived at the wharf, in pirogues or dug out 
canoes, to sell hammocks, parrots, raw sugar (papelona), farine, plantains and tasajo until
61
the early twentieth century (Ottley 1971, 105). Over two centuries, colonization virtually 
decimated the population of indigenous people living all over Trinidad.
Repopulation only really began after 1777 when the Spanish government’s “Cedula of 
Population” (made official in 1783) offered incentives to Catholic, White and Coloured 
French planters to migrate and settle. They brought the first large numbers of enslaved 
Africans with them in their move from French-controlled islands. Local records say that 
San Fernando began as a fishing village in 1786 with an area of eleven acres (San 
Fernando Borough Council 1970). However, French migration meant that a market, a 
central square and a Roman Catholic church were soon established. Anglicans, 
Methodists, Presbyterians and other denominations were still to come.
In 1784, in recognition of the young king Ferdinand VII of Spain, Spanish Governor Don 
Jose Maria Chacon named the town San Fernando de Naparima1 (Ottley 1971, 167). The 
combined title emerged from “Anaparima”2 which was the name that native inhabitants 
had given to the area (Anthony 2001). When Ralph Abercromby captured Trinidad in 
1797, English settlers also took over land in San Fernando. In 1817, the Governor, Sir 
Ralph Woodford, built San Femando’s first wharf (Richards and Sinanan 1946). Three 
hundred feet long and wooden at the time, I return to it, in twenty-first century form, in 
later chapters.
Trinidad became a Crown Colony, directly ruled by Britain, in 1802 (Brereton 1979, 8). 
The British captured Tobago in 1814 and administratively joined the islands of Trinidad 
and Tobago as one Crown Colony in 1898 (Brereton 1981, 156). The town of San 
Fernando was established in 18453 and the first Town Council met in 1846. Just after
1 See also Anthony (1988, 249).
2 Anaparima is sometimes thought to mean a “single hill”. “Legend also has it that one Waraho hero, 
Haburi who was fleeing with his mother from the frog woman of Orinoco, entered Trinidad and they were 
transformed into the Mountain Anaparima. It is believed that this caused the Warahos to continue visiting 
San Fernando until the 1900’s” (Monday 17 November 2003, Welcome to the City of San Fernando, p40)
3 Port of Spain had municipal government long before San Fernando which, instead, functioned through 
public meetings and frequent petitions. The town was established on October 18, 1845 when the Legislative 
Council passed the first Municipal Ordinance for the town. It made provision for a Town Council of San 
Fernando with nine councilors and one of the group to be President. The Town Council was to depend on 
house rates and wharf dues for revenue rather than monies from central government, and was responsible
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1853,4 San Fernando became a Borough with a Mayor and a Town Hall. This marks the 
beginning of local government for this present-day city. Pavement vendors were recorded 
since 1842 (Ottley 1971, 17) and, as the practice continues, they appear again throughout 
this study. Interestingly, for we will be meeting police in upcoming chapters, the police 
station was established as early as 1869 (San Fernando Mayor’s Office 1985)
By the end of the nineteenth century, and following the abolition of slavery in 1834, 
Indians, Chinese, Syrians, Portuguese and others had been brought to the colony as 
labourers or migrated as traders. Indians were the largest group of these migrants. 
Between 1845 and 1917 (when indentureship was abolished), about 144 000 were 
brought to Trinidad as indentured workers for the sugar plantations5 (Singh 1988). Local- 
born and colonial British and French elites dominated the social order. Below were the 
“middle strata” (Reddock 1994) and educated “coloureds” and at the bottom were the 
African ex-slaves and Indians. Migration from other Caribbean islands to Trinidad 
continued throughout the early twentieth century to rapidly expand the population.
However, San Fernando remained relatively small in comparison to Port of Spain. Its 
population of 1 499 women and 1 384 men was almost six times smaller than Port of 
Spain in 1851 (Richards and Sinanan, 1946). Nonetheless, highlighting the city’s long 
history as an urban catchment area, Ottley (1971, 11) notes that freed slaves “flocked” to 
San Fernando from surrounding sugar estates throughout the mid-nineteenth century6. 
The sugar industry greatly contributed to the city’s expansion in the nineteenth century 
(1851-1881), while the oil industry played this role in the twentieth.
for cemeteries, markets, streets, garbage and water provision (Ottley 1971, 23). Interestingly, a San 
Femandian, The Honourable Maxwell Phillips, was a member of the Legislative Council in the 1840s when 
there were calls for separate representation for San Fernando in the Legislative Council.
4 An experimental system of local government had operated for seven years by the time the first Mayor, Dr. 
Robert Johnstone, was elected and the term Borough Council used in San Fernando for the first time. This 
followed the Legislative Council’s passing of a new local government law which established Borough 
Councils in both Port of Spain and San Fernando: Ordinance No. 10 of 1853, “Regulations of Municipal 
Corporations in the Island” (Ottley 1971, 19-23,35-38).
5 San Fernando is the site for the historic Thursday 30 October, 1884 Hosay crisis which resulted from 
violent and deadly colonial suppression of Indians’ commemoration of Husein, grandson of the Prophet 
Mohammed, who died in battle at Kerbala. This is a Shi’ite Muslim practice (see also Anthony 2001)
6 Migration into the city continues mainly from the counties of Victoria and St. Patrick which surround San 
Fernando (CSO 2000)
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Throughout the indentureship period, the disproportionate sex ratio between Indian 
women and men significantly shaped gender relations. These women came to Trinidad on 
their own as workers, but in far fewer numbers than men. Through migration, they were 
often able to escape stringent caste and religious rules. Indian men, planters, judges, 
Presbyterian missionaries and colonial authorities reinforced each other’s attempts to 
constrain Indian women, through legislation and other means, from leaving relationships, 
earning higher wages and acquiring property (Reddock 1994,42).
The ‘Woman Question’ remained unresolved throughout indentureship and contributed to 
its abolition. It was seen “as a system which, by leading Indian women to immoral lives, 
was bringing international disrepute on Indian womanhood” (ibid, 45). In the post- 
indentureship period, the conflation of European Christian ideals of womanhood and 
Indian ideals of ‘Sita’ continued to reshape existing patterns of social organization toward 
women’s greater dependency and home-based, unwaged, subsistence work and petty 
agriculture.
Similar efforts were being made with working class and peasant African women. This 
group had shown disinclination to marriage and popular will to participate in labour 
resistance (Reddock 1994). Primarily, they were engaged in waged and unwaged 
agriculture, petty-commodity production, trade, and work as domestics, seamstresses, 
laundresses and general labour. Urban African women were particularly seen as 
independent, immoral, polygamous, licentious, rowdy and part of street culture. This fed 
popular concern with the ‘deviance’ of the West Indian family. In the professional world 
of the civil service, nursing or teaching, there was a sexual division of labour with regard 
to women’s wages, jobs, occupational mobility and women’s marital status. Coloureds 
and others from the upper and middle strata more closely conformed to ideals of the 
housewife (Reddock 1994).
The period leading into the early twentieth century witnessed the first struggles for 
representative government. First, these were led by mostly local-born Europeans and 
mixed professionals. Nationalism in the early twentieth century comprised early facets of
64
Creole nationalism against colonial rule (it also included some local whites), African 
nationalism and Indian nationalism. Creole nationalism, which was to become dominant 
in the movement to Independence, was mainly linked to the development of race and 
class consciousness among middle strata coloureds, and educated and working class 
Africans. It was fed by African racial pride, the authoritarianism of Crown Colony 
government, and the exploitative nature of the plantocracy, merchant class and white t
e l i t e s - < v »  ^
Among working class women, there were high levels of participation in popular 
movements and organizations. In limited ways, these women were able to put their issues 
and positions on the trade union agenda (Reddock 1994). The Creole nationalist 
movement did not attract large numbers of Indians. Fearing domination by a Christian, 
African majority, Indo-Trinidadians were often at odds with its self-rule aims (Ryan 
1971). This group was clearly working out its own identity in relation to its internal class, 
caste and religious differences, Indian notions of patriarchy, and (in part the stereotypes 
of) other ethnic groups (Mohammed 1994).
1925 marks the introduction of the first elected representatives to the Governor’s 
Legislative Council7. However, by the 1930s, African and Indian leaders and working 
classes, particularly from central and south Trinidad, began to seize political leadership. 
In 1946, universal suffrage for all citizens over twenty-one years old was granted. This 
formally marked the ascendance of nationalist liberal style politics. A discourse 
emphasizing ethnic electoral competition began to marginalise worker-centred politics 
since this period. However, elected officials only began to enjoy a greater degree of 
executive authority after 1950 (Ryan 1972).
In addition to Indian and African nationalist movements, women of the “oppressed and 
exploited classes” participated in both trade union organizing and protests, and political 
parties (Reddock 1994, 155). In 1934, the Legislative Council accepted a motion (passed
7 Elite San Femandians who served on the council in the twentieth century included Gerrard Montano, 
Timothy Roodal, Jack Kelshall and Roy Joseph.
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in 1930 at the Port of Spain City Council level) to enable women to be representatives. 
Eighty-two years had gone by before the San Fernando Borough Council made provision 
for the enfranchisement of women aged thirty years and over8 (Ottley 1971, 135). The 
following year, in 1936, the age qualification was reduced to twenty-one for qualified 
burgesses. By 1937, they could the hold positions of Councilors, Mayor or Deputy 
Mayor.
In the first year that women were allowed to run as candidates, social worker Audrey 
Jeffers won a seat in the Port of Spain City Council (Reddock 1994, 181). Beryl 
Archibald Crichlow was the first woman to be elected Councilor in the San Fernando 
Borough Council. She served three terms (nine years). In 1949, she was elected Deputy 
Mayor in San Fernando and, briefly, held the position of Mayor. Both women were on 
the Constitutional Reform Committee that was established in 1947 after the 1946 
elections. Women have continued to be involved in labour and political party organizing 
since. These kinds of growing public participation in the post-World War Two years, 
provided a base (of African and coloured women of different strata) for later formation of 
the People’s National Movement9 (PNM) in the mid-1950s.
Ethnicity has, therefore, long shaped social and political organizing and relations in 
colonial (Brereton 1979) and post-colonial Trinidad and Tobago (Ryan 1972, Ryan 
1988a). Especially since the 1942 elections, notions of race have also intersected partisan 
politics. The main parties dominating government have been popularly associated with 
specific ethnic groups or alliances among them. For example, the People’s National 
Movement (PNM), which began to emerge in the mid-1950s, was associated with Afro- 
Trinidadians, Christians and, to a lesser extent, urban Muslims. Other parties were 
associated with an alliance of White, Portuguese and Syrian Catholics, with urban Indo- 
Trinidadian Presbyterians, with rural Indo-Trinidadian Hindus, and later with shifting 
configurations of these religious, geographical and ‘racial’ voting blocs. Though elite led,
8 This change occurred with the Borough Council’s approval of Ordinance No. 40 of 1935. It came into 
force on May 16th 1936.
9 The People’s National Movement (PNM), under the leadership of Dr. Eric Williams, led the country on 
the march for self-government and, finally, independence in 1962. The PNM won every election until 1986.
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parties that have won power have comprised cross-class support. Parties associated with 
intellectuals, workers, leftist politics and independents have rarely successfully fought 
elections.
The PNM led the country to independence from Britain in 1962 and to status as a 
Republic in 1976. Under the PNM, which ruled the country from 1956 to 1986, an 
assimilationist model determined the state’s approach to ethnicity (Braithwaite 1974; 
Ryan 1999, 5). PNM nationalists saw the emerging culture as a Creole one with all other 
ethnic groups adapting to it. However, ongoing cultural struggles and negotiation among 
classes, religious and ethnic groups, and geographically differentiated communities, were 
also transforming Creole culture in practice. Indo-Trinidadians, and particularly rural 
Hindus who were unwilling to ally with the PNM, felt excluded from power and 
representation in national politics. In turn, they were criticized for supporting co-ethnic 
leaders and practicing ‘communalist’ politics.
Government only changed hands in 1986 when the National Alliance for Reconstruction 
(NAR), considered the country’s first widely multi-ethnic and multi-religious party, won 
a landslide electoral victory (Ryan 1989b). Power was returned to the PNM in the next 
election, but lost to the Indo-Trinidadian, Hindu-led United National Congress (UNC) 
when the NAR and UNC formed a coalition government in 1995. Although the UNC 
won again in 2000, general elections were called again in 2001 and resulted in a tie. The 
President appointed the PNM to govern until elections in 2002, which the party won by 
four seats and 4.1% of the national vote.
In 1958, Trinidad and Tobago adopted the British Westminister10 model of government. 
Government is, therefore, organized along a bicameral parliamentary system, which 
consists of a Lower House or House of Representatives and an Upper House or Senate. 
Together, they exercise legislative power. The House of Representatives comprises the 
Speaker of the House and forty-one members representing single constituency seats. Two 
represent Tobago. The Prime Minister and Cabinet, whose members are often drawn
10 Ghany (1988, 1994) describes it instead as a Whitehall model.
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from among Members of Parliament, hold executive power. Of the Senate’s thirty-one 
members, the President on the advice of the Prime Minister appoints sixteen, six are 
recommended by the Leader of the Opposition and nine are appointed as Independent 
Senators. The members of the Senate and the House of Representatives elect the 
President11. Every five years, general elections are held under the ‘first past the post’ 
system.
The Ministry of Local Government guides the local government system.
i ^  .Administratively, there are nine regional corporations , two city corporations (Port of 
Spain and San Fernando), three borough corporations14 and one ward (Tobago). In San 
Fernando, the City Council, which heads the City Corporation, comprises nine elected 
councilors and three aldermen elected by the councilors. The Mayor is the chairs. This 
system of representation by electoral district and of elections every three years, was 
established in the Representation of the People Act No. 41 of 1967, which set the ^ 
constitution of the Council (San Fernando Borough Council 1970). ^  vA
Interestingly, the terrain traversed in this study constitutes two overlapping administrative 
divisions. One the one hand, it is part of the constituency of San Fernando West15. On the
■“ C  ^  »
11 There is an elected Tobago House o f Assembly which shares control of the island’s internal affairs, but is 
subject to the executive authority o f the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
12 Local government can be defined as “self-government involving the administration of public affairs in 
each locality by a body of representatives of the local community” (Ragoonath 2002, 75).
13 These are Couva/Tabaquite/Talparo, Diego Martin, Mayaro/Rio Claro, Penal/Debe, Princes Town, 
Sangre Grande, San Juan/Laventille, Siparia, and Tunapuna/Piarco.
14 These are Arima, Point Fortin and Chaguanas.
15 The city of San Fernando is divided into two constituencies, San Fernando East and San Fernando West. 
The West constituency, on its North boundary extends from the seacoast at the mouth of the Marabella 
River along the South bank of the Marabella River to the Southern bank of Pariag St., then Northeast along 
Pariag St to New City Ave., then Eastwards along City Ave. to its junction with the Southern Main Road.
The East boundary extends South along the Southern Main Road to the junction with Point a Pierre 
Road, then Southwest along Point a Pierre Road to the boundary between Lots 203 and 205, Southeast 
along the boundary line to the Northwest end of Ogeerally St., Southeast through Manjack St. and along 
Arch St. to Lambie St. It then runs South and West to Jarvis St., Southeast to Solomon St., Southwest to 
Circular Rd., then East to Royal Rd., Southwest along Coffee St. to Funrose St., South to Claire St., then to 
Austin St. and Southerly to Parry St. First, Easterly to Bertrand St.. It then continues Southerly along 
Rushworth St. to Cipero St. and Southeast to the point where it crosses the South bank of the Cirpero River. 
There it abuts the Southern Main Rd.
The South boundary goes from here to Church St., then Northwest to the South Trunk Road, 
Southwest to the point where it crosses the East bank of the Oropouche River, Northeast along the East 
bank to the mouth of the Oropouche.
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other, it is part of the City of San Fernando, which encompasses both San Fernando West 
and East16. San Fernando was declared a city on November 18, 1988 (Anthony 1988, 
257).
The constituency of San Fernando West has played an interesting part in Trinidad and 
Tobago’s electoral history. Though long considered a ‘safe seat’ for the PNM, it has 
increasingly been a ‘marginal’ constituency (Ryan 2003) since the Election and 
Boundaries Commission (EBC) changed the constituency boundaries in 1986 and 1991 
(EBC Reports 1986, 1991), adding polling divisions that previously voted against the 
ruling party. A marginal constituency is one where elections may not be easily predicted 
or are won by small margins (of less that 2500 votes), usually because of the religious 
and ‘racial’ demographic of the space. Nonetheless, San Femando’s politics have long 
defied a simple view of ethnic contestation between the almost equal populations ofIndo- 
Trinidadians and Afro-Trinidadians. Both before and after the emergence of the PNM, 
shifting alliances have involved different combinations of Muslim and Presbyterian Indo- 
Trinidadians, Hindu Indo-Trinidadians and Afro-Trinidadians17 (Clarke 1986).
In San Fernando, margins of victory have been shrinking since the 1986 elections when 
the NAR won almost 60% of the constituency vote. The NAR win reflected a more 
generalized, national disaffection with the PNM as well as the constituency boundary 
change. In San Fernando, the result was a previously PNM voting bloc, now split across 
two parties. In the 1995 elections, the PNM held onto the seat by 1 228 votes. However, 
the constituency changed hands from the PNM to the UNC in 2000. The UNC seized the 
seat in this election by a margin of only 943 votes. In 2001, it won with a margin of only
The West boundary goes Northeast along the seacoast to the mouth of the Marabella River. (EBC 
Report 2007, 50).
16 The area includes the electoral districts Cocoyea/Tarouba, Les Effort East/Cipero, Les Efforts West/La 
Romain, Marabella East, Marabella South/Vistabella, Marabella West, Mon Repos/Navet, Pleasantville, 
Springvale/Paradise (EBC, 2002. Map of the Municipal Corporation Electoral Area of San Fernando 
Showing its Division into Nine Electoral Districts).
17San Femando’s elite families have often put forward candidates at local government and national 
elections. Candidates have included Winston Mahabir, Roy Joseph, Lionel and Ruth Seukeran, Errol 
Mahabir, Robert and Gerard Montano and Satyakama Maharaj. San Femando’s electoral history is 
intertwined with the history of its elite families’, their political influence and business fortunes.
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434 votes. In the last election in 2002, the PNM won by a margin of 1% or 1, 775 votes 
with its candidate gaining 50.7% of the vote and the UNC candidate 49.3%18.
Table 1: Election Results: San Fernando West 1956-200219.
Election Year Electorate Party Votes Margin
2002 PNM 50.7% 1 775
UNC 49.3%
2001 22 059 UNC 8 244 434
PNM 7 810
TU 174
2000 25 828 UNC 9 176 943
PNM 8 233
1995 22 253 PNM 7 748 1 288
UNC 6 460
NAR 616




1986 VOTES CAST: NAR 8 958 (59.6%)
15 026 PNM 5 823 (38.8%)
NJAC 132
PPM 43
1981 VOTES CAST: PNM 6 231 (53.7%)




1976 VOTES CAST: PNM 6 575 (71.6%)





1966 VOTES CAST: PNM 4 577 (58.2%)
7 869 DLP 2 375 (30.2%)
WFP 469
LP 445
1961 VOTES CAST: PNM 6 441 (57.2%)
11 251 DLP 4 779 (42.5%)
1956 VOTES CAST: PNM 4 395 (52.1%)




18 Hamid Ghany, “Boundary Changes and Marginality”. Sunday Guardian, July 4, 2004.
19 This data is compiled from Ryan (2003, 121), 50 Years of the Vote and EBC reports.
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Census data published in 2002 give the total population of Trinidad and Tobago as 1 262 
400 and Trinidad as 1 208 282. Having almost doubled over ten years, San Femando’s 
population is now 55 419 (28 325 women and 27 094 men), and is larger than Port of 
Spain’s by just over 6 000 persons (CSO 2000). The city comprises about 4% of the 
nation. Nationally, the population is self designated as 37.5% African, 40% Indian and 
20.5% “mixed”. Less than one percent identify as White, Chinese or “Other”. In San 
Fernando, the population comprises 19 065 Africans (9 574 men and 10 031 women), 16 
658 Indians (8 012 men and 8 646 women), 11317 mixed persons (5 344 men and 5 973 
women), 310 Chinese, 45 Syrian/Lebanese, 340 Caucasian and 119 who identify as 
‘other’.
<p-
Trinidad and Tobago’s almost equal numbers of women and men are dispersed among 
many different religions. Nationally, 26% are Roman Catholic, almost 8% Anglican and 
3% Presbyterian. Hindus comprise 22.5% of the population and Muslims 5.8%. In San 
Fernando, there are 13 961 Roman Catholics, 5 649 Anglicans, 3 582 Orthodox Baptists,
3 447 Pentecostals and 3 724 Presbyterian Congregationals. There are 2 778 Hindus who 
are members of the Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha and just 627 who are not. Amongst 
Muslims, 1 457 belong to the Anjuman Sunnat al Jamaat and 1 365 belong to other 
Islamic groups. All other denominational groups number less than 2000 (CSO 2000, 37- 
39).
Table 2: San Fernando Population by Selected Ethnicity and Religion
Population Total Percentage
San Fernando 55 419
African 19 065 35%
Indian 16 658 30%
Mixed 11 317 20%
Christians 30 363 55%
Hindus 3 405 6%
Muslims 2 822 5%
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2007 marks over 30 years of complete self-rule for Trinidad and Tobago. Tension 
between classes and ethnicities, competition to dominate a “winner take all” electoral 
system (Ryan 1999), recurring promises regarding constitutional reform, patronage, and 
examples of “one-man” authoritarian-style leadership pepper this history. Strikes and 
rebellions against the government and upper classes throughout the colonial period and in 
the 1970 “Black Power” fervor (Ryan, Stewart and McCree 1995), and an attempted coup 
in 199020 (Ryan 1991) suggest a continuum along which power and authority have been 
and continue to be contested.
Generally in the population, women’s unemployment rates remain higher than men’s.
Additionally, women continued to be limited by a sexual division of labour that 
concentrates them in a limited range of occupations (UNECLAC 2001, 9). Politically, 
women’s participation in the election machinery of political parties has grown, though 
they continue to have lesser say than men at policy levels (UNECLAC 1995, 15-16).
However, trade union, pan-African, pan-Indian, religious, feminist, women’s and other / rv
movements continue to engage the state. . _ , ,
\ Nonetheless, Trinidad and Tobago has experienced relative peace and stability 
throughout the twentieth century. In San Fernando, policing, marketing, religion,
Carnival and community have all been historically significant, shaping women and men’s 
social, economic and political lives. They signal a long, popular engagement with 
consumption, production, moral codes, order and artistry. I now descend to just one spot 
within each of these fields and describe how they appear today.
20 The Jamaatjd j vluslimeen, a radical Islamic group with little popular support in Trinidad and Tobago, 
attempteTthe failed, violent coup.
2.3 Street Vendors Outside the San Fernando C entral M arket
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The San Fernando Central Market can be reached by any number of streets, but is mainly c/^f-
accessed from the top of High Street. The street is filled with the sounds of people
“hustling a dollar” and making their way to and from work. Just before the market, a long
disjointed row of vendors selling “produce” (fruit and vegetables) stands between and in
front of vehicles, calling out their prices and keeping an eye out for police. The road then
stretches past the San Fernando Jama Masjid and reaches to Sutton Street where not more
than two minutes walk away around the comer, the Lionel Jagessar and Associates Mas
Camp is located.
2.3.1 Life Outside the San Fernando Central Market
The Central market was first established in the early 1900s. It moved from near the top of 
High Street in 1912 (where the Carnegie Free Library now stands) and was rebuilt on its
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present site in 1916 (Anthony 1988, 256). The original iron beams still form the market’s 
exoskeleton. The market population of three to four hundred vendors is highly 
heterogeneous. Among other distinctions such as ethnicity and religion, goods sold, 
relation to space, and days spent selling there differentiate individuals and groups.
Throughout the history of the place, vendors have always sold on the streets, sometimes 
to a greater extent than others. Street vending in San Fernando in general has been noted 
since 1842 (Ottley 1971, 17). Vendors have congregated on the current stretch of road for 
about ten years. Nine of the vendors I interviewed have been selling out on this stretch 
between one and five years. Seven have been selling there for six to ten years. One 
reported selling sixteen to twenty years. She included the years when vendors also sold 
on streets along the side of the market. It is fascinating that this weekly ‘hide and seek’ 
play between police and vendors has continued this long.
The ground floor of the market transforms between 3.45 pm and 4pm from a colourful, 
undulating spectrum of goods to a flattened sea of stalls blanketed by brown crocus bags 
and tarpaulin. A few come out from the morning time to sell on the road. The majority 
have left the road to go home by six to six-thirty pm. On Tuesdays, Fridays and 
Saturdays, I observed an average of thirty or so vendors who regularly sell on the road.
The politicians, police, local government officials and law together represent formal 
power and they are the clear authority over the public space of streets and pavements. 
Regulation of public space is also based on particular notions of morality. The vendors, 
like those on the wharf, must rely on informal negotiating and personalizing strategies to 
find a place in the system. They manage to problematise the very notion of the road as a 
particular kind of public space and to stretch it to take on the other mores more 
meaningful to them. This heterogenous group negotiates legality both among themselves 
and with the police by continually testing where they sell alongside the road, times they 
can sell on the road, amounts they can sell, and how they interact with police while there.
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The City Police21 are empowered to stop roadside vending by a few key pieces of 
legislation. The majority of subsections are contained within the Municipal Corporations 
Act 21 of 1990. This Act governs Local Government in San Fernando and the City 
Corporation’s administration of the city. The Act does not also govern the Central Police. 
These officers cannot charge persons under the Municipal Act unless there are special 
circumstances or they are acting with or as the City Police. National legislation also gives 
the City Police power to regulate vending that they deem illegal. Both City Police and 
Central Police can charge vendors under these pieces of legislation.
Under the national legislation, the relevant sections and sub-sections include:
1. The Summary Offences Act, Chapter 11.02, Section 64 (l)n of 2000. This empowers 
the police to remove “footway obstruction”.
2. The Highways Act, Chapter 48:01, Section 54 (l)e. This makes “pitching” a stall on 
the road illegal.
3. The Highways Act, Chapter 48:01, Section 50 (1). This section regulates against 
street obstruction.
Under the Municipal Corporations Act, Chapter 21 (1990), the relevant sections and 
subsections are mainly:
1. Section 199 (1). This enables the police to regulate the selling of fresh meat and fish.
2. Section 199 (2). This section refers generally to other marketable commodities. 
“Marketable commodities” are defined under Section 187(1)
3. Section 200 (1). Here, the subsection specifically prohibits selling within a one and a 
half mile radius of the market.
The police manifest both legal and moral authority when moving the Mucurapo Street 
vendors. The majority view marketing on the street as unhygienic. Limited space is also
21 I interviewed a group of helpful City Police officers, consisting of one Indo-Trinidadian and three Afiro- 
Trinidadian men, and one Afro-Trinidadian woman for just over an hour. In contrast to the City Police, the 
Central Police are the San Fernando branch of the national police.
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left for pedestrians, many of whom riskily walk along the side of the road anyway. Police 
also argue that vendors risk being hit by cars and robbed on the road. v^
Generally, vendors are willing to break the law because they bring a different set of
   —   —    ■
values to their activities. In challenging governmental conceptions of appropriate use of ^
space, they also challenge its conceptions of public morality. When vendors successfully i . ■
negotiate with police, and (in this instance) make public space noisy, crowded or dirty,
they momentarily re-define the notion of public space and the contested space of the road
itself on their own terms. Newspaper reports suggest that politician-led police
crackdowns are inconsistent, and politicians and police are at best ambivalent.
Widespread ambivalence, and even tolerance, also exists among customers of all
economic strata22. All this suggests why vendors are able to negotiate with the police,
why other citizens patronize them, and why even politicians are aware of depriving them
of their “dollar”.
What makes the experiences of San Fernando Central Market vendors nationally \ w? ^
 -V ^ '
generalisable? First, market vendors in San Fernando reflect a much wider catchment
group than expected. The majority resides outside of San Fernando in more ‘rural’ or
‘semi-urban’ areas of South Trinidad. These areas include Hermitage, Monkey Town in
Barrackpore, Piparo, La Romaine, Palmiste, Siparia, Point Fortin, St. Madelaine, Princes
Town and, especially, Penal. They migrate daily to the city’s market. The culture of
marketing discussed here reflects a much larger population base than simply that residing
in the city. The market also exemplifies how San Fernando more generally acts as a
catchment area.
Second, not only are vendors very mobile, many sell at different markets on different 
days, or have immediate family members selling at different markets in Siparia, Point 
Fortin, Marabella, Princes Town, Barrackpore and Debe. This suggests great interaction 
among vendors from different parts of the country at main markets. Decades of
22 Norris Soloman. “Saturday Forum: Solution to highway vendors?” Trinidad Guardian, October 25 1989, 
p. 7.
\
newspaper reports present conflicts over street vending as a national issue for major 
population centres across the country23. The relationship examined here between vendors 
and the state may also compare with markets in Sangre Grande, Arima, Tunapuna, San 
Juan, Chaguanas, Mayaro, Rio Claro, San Fernando and Port of Spain. While the sample 
group for this study is small, aspects of their lives overlap with others and suggest 
relevance for a wider population.
2.3.2 Comparative Experiences Internationally and Regionally
,  L  1 v r  ^  «)
As in many other parts of the world, street vending in Trinidad has a bad reputation. State 
officials and national elites describe vendors as “disordered”, “bad”, “deviant”, a 
“plague” and “eyesore”, as wrongly occupying streets, and as creating unfair “disloyal 
competition” (Duneier 1999, 234). While I specifically look at market vendors in the city 
of San Fernando, a more international view therefore suggests that street vendors selling 
just about anything have similar experiences (Szanton 1972, Cross 1998).
23 1975 - “Police Plan Drive To Move Vendors From Pavement", Express, November 27, 1975, p. 27.
1985 - “ Vendors on the Run Again as City Police Resume Campaign", Trinidad Guardian August 9, 1985, 
p. 3.
1990 - “Motion: Stop Attacking Vendors", Express, October 31, 1990, p. 29; Patrick Soloman, “Give Them 
An Inch...", Sunday Express, April 22, 1990, p.4.
1992 - “ Vendor Has No Right to Sell on Streets Say S ’Fdo Mayor", Trinidad Guardian, December 12, 1992, 
p. 6; Stephen Boodram, “Judge Declares Street Vending Illegal\ Trinidad Guardian, December 8, 1992, p.
15.
1993 - Dominic Ali, “ Vendors Group Takes Protest to UN Office", Trinidad Guardian, May 25, 1993, p. 6;
“A/P: Give Vendors License to SelF, Express, December 12, 1993, p. 10; “Mayor to Vendors: I t ’s Out o f
My Hands", Express, December 21, 1993, p. 4; “Outsiders Making Life Hard For Us Say Chaguanas , '"r
Vendors", Express, December 20, 1993, p. 5.
1994 - Jimmy Andrews, “Tobago Vendors’ Booths Destroyed’, Express, June 6, 1994, p. 7; Rory Rostant,
“Drag Brothers Staying Put Until End o f  Negotiations", Trinidad Guardian, August 3, 1994, p.3; Maurisa 
Findlay, “Chaguanas Vendors See Hard Times", Sunday Guardian, December 4, 1994, p. 11.
1996 - Yvonne Webb, “ We’re Not Moving: South Vendors”, Trinidad Guardian, July 24, 1996, p. 3;
Trinidad and Tobago Chamber o f Industry and Commerce Column, “Zero Tolerance on Illegal Vending",
Trinidad Guardian, May 2, 1996, p. 7. £.
1998 - Jada Loutoo, “Vendors Defy Port o f  Spain Mayor", Newsday, December 23, 1998, p. 12.
1999 - “Minister Singh: Vendors Must Sell Inside the Market, Not Outside", Newsday, April 2, 1999, p. 6; 1 
"St. James Vendors Protest City Plan to ‘Empower’ Them", Trinidad Guardian December 12, 1999, p. 13.
2000 - "Roadside Vendors Still Struggling to Survive, Express, October 2, 2000, p. 3; -
2002 - Colin Modeste. “Tunapuna Vendors Defy Corp Order: We Not Moving [Tunapuna Regional " - u 1 ' ^
Corporation is a Local Government Body]”, December 19, 2002, p. 10; Editorial, "Playing Politics With 
Vending", May 12, 2002, p. 12. *
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Internationally, vendors are an extremely heterogeneous group. However, throughout 
their discussions, writers on the subject continue to note the tension between the more 
formal private sector and this informal sector occupation, and the common stereotypes 
used to justify regulating the latter (Witter 1989). These stereotypes are particularly 
applied to sidewalk vendors of all kinds. This is because their activities may not only We
Witter and
the rules imposed by political powers” (ibid, 75). Scholars seem to accept that vendors’ 
attitudes and values are influenced by mores that are rooted in their own lives. For 
example, Simmonds (1987, 4) described how Jamaican higglers “small up” and make
Lloyd-Evans and Potter (1992, 83) also see Trinidadian informality as a “way of life” and 
as “a lifestyle which has been pre-conditioned by colonial, economic and social 
traditions”. This work ethic values self-employment, flexibility of work hours, accessible
Vendors’ own views therefore present “competing legalities” (Duneier 1999, 231). Also 
reflecting competing authority, vendors may honour common, mutually-advantageous 
rules about sharing and claiming space, and keep police out of disputes by relying on 
shared bases for agreement. In such instances, vendors’ different strategies and power is 
significant. As in other Caribbean countries, there is a governmental concern with 
formality and order which is at odds with the nature of informal employment. Yet, as in 
other aspects of enforcement, implementation isn’t always consistent with what appears 
on paper (ibid, 244). The number of permanent, illegal structures along roads, highways 
and outside of markets suggests general governmental tolerance of or at least inconsistent 
government policy toward informal trading. This is particularly true for lower-income 
and rural areas (Lloyd-Evans and Potter 1992, 108).
24 “Lime” is a Trinidadian word meaning to socialize or hang out (Lieber 1981, Eriksen 1990).
Kirton 1 9 9 0 p < L  , I f ,  i . l  <
The informal sector is defined here in terms of “activities which are not carried out under
room for each other because they all understand that “each of us must make a living”.
entry, and the freedom to participate in social activities or to lime24.
C n l W
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2.3.3 Out on de Road: Ethnographic Considerations
j
Over a period of approximately eight months, I went to the market on Tuesdays, Fridays 
and Saturdays. I would go to the market at about one o’clock in the afternoon when sales 
slowed and chat with vendors until about 3.30pm when they started to pack up. Then I 
would stand out on the road with them until 5.30pm. I stood on the road with vendors, 
joked, fetched bags or drinks, and helped them sell.
Usually, I observed thirty to thirty-five vendors selling on the road. The majority were 
_ Indo-Trinidadian women. The next largest number was Affo-Trinidadian and mixed or 
‘Spanish’ (Khan 1993) women and then Indo-Trinidadian men. Afro-Trinidadian and 
mixed or ‘Spanish’ men were the smallest group. In all, eighteen market vendors 
participated in in-depth interviews that took place near the very end of fieldwork. The 
interviews generally took one and a half hours. Partially, this is because I only asked 
questions in between customers, and waited or helped when a vendor was selling to 
someone. Usually, I could interview no more than two vendors in one day.
I only interviewed vendors who sell on the road, but their stalls are scattered throughout 
the three market floors. They therefore reflect a self-selected cross-section of vendors. I 
interviewed fifteen women and three men. Of the thirteen Indo-Trinidadians, one was 
male. Of the four Afro-Trinidadians, an equal number were male and female. One woman 
was “mixed”. In the group, there was one teenager, one person in their twenties, five in
dsL
their (late) thirties, two in their forties, seven in their fifties and two in their sixties. The 'zjj.'z 'E
majority of the group were women between 40 and 55 years of age. This was the average  ^ ^
age of the group as well. Two of the three men were in their fifties and one in his thirties.
Six of the vendors I interviewed paid monthly for their ground floor stall. This included 
an Indo-Trinidadian couple, two Indo-Trinidadian women and two Affo-Trinidadian 
women. Twelve of the group were daily paid. Six of these were from the third floor and 
six from the second. The majority on the third floor were females and all on the second 
floor were Indo-Trinidadian females. While the ground floor comprised monthly paid
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stalls and the second floor daily paid stalls, daily paying vendors generally spread bags or 
tarpulin on the ground of the third floor.
I also conducted five interviews with one past Mayor, one past Deputy Mayor, the 
present Mayor, five City Police and the Market Administrator or Clerk. Other than two 
City Police, this group was entirely male. I also gathered secondary source material such 
as census data, City Corporation records and extensive newspaper clippings. Interviews 
with market vendors were essentially concerned with vendors’ values, their perception of 
roadside vending and their interaction with police. Interviews with persons in authority 
focused on their views of market vendors and roadside vending. I wanted to get a sense 
of each side’s view of themselves, the other and the contested public terrain.
2.4 Voters of the ASJA San Fernando Jam a Masjid
lA SJA®
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Figure 7: The Masjid on M ucurapo Street
Only a few hundred feet past the market, the San Fernando Jama Masjid represents a very 
different catchment site. The masjid is part of the national, Islamic, Anjuman Sunnatul 
Jamaat Association (ASJA). Muslims from all over San Fernando and outlying areas
attend Friday namaz here. Although Islam first came to Trinidad with enslaved Africans 
(Campbell 1974), by the middle of the nineteenth century their community presence had 
disappeared (Samaroo 1988). Its resurgence came with indentured Indians’ arrival in 
1845. Of the 144 000 Indians brought to Trinidad and Tobago during the indentureship 
period, approximately 23 600 were Muslim (Ali 1995, 7). These new immigrants brought 
an Indian Islam with significant differences from Middle Eastern Islam (Samaroo 1987). 
This shaped Islamic culture as it developed in Trinidad. However, as Brinsley Samaroo 
(1988, 7) notes, with the revival of Islam in the Middle East, missionaries trained there 
began attempts to “de-Indianize the faith” (ibid, 7). Indian Muslims brought a variety of 
practices and ideological differences to the colony. They later played a leading role in the 
movement for independence while remaining committed to community persistence and 
religious observance.
Samaroo (1988, 11) points out that key concern centres on question, “How do we 
preserve a Muslim identity in a predominantly non-Muslim state?” He highlights how 
this question has been addressed through the establishment of mosques, maktabs (Islamic 
classes), organisations and schools, singing of ghazals and qasidas, performance of hajj, 
and regular contact with international Islam throughout the twentieth century. However, 
he does not discuss the deep significance of gender relations to maintenance of 
community boundaries. In the following pages, I therefore dig deeper to see what links 
are revealed. I especially focus on this religious association’s Executive Council election 
and what it highlighted about conceptions of citizenship, community and 
enfranchisement.
2.4.1 Islam in Trinidad and Tobago: Historical, Community and Gender Dimensions
There are many Islamic organizations in Trinidad and Tobago. However, the ASJA 
represents the largest group of Muslims in the country. According to the 2000 census, 




a total 64 648 Muslims (30 723 females and and 33 925 males) in Trinidad and Tobago25. 
Within this, the ASJA membership is primarily Indo-Trinidadian, as is the Trinidadian 
Islamic population as a whole. Conceived as early as 1931, the ASJA was incorporated 
by an Act of Parliament in 1935. This new organisation prioritized propagation and 
practice of orthodox Islam, leadership of imams, and synchronization and strengthening 
of customary practices26 (Teelucksingh 2003).
There has been an elected President General of the ASJA since its establishment. Only 
men have held all Executive Council positions. There has been much contention over 
leadership and internal elections in the ASJA (Ali 1992). The San Fernando Jama Masjid 
was founded in 1913, but was officially established as part of the national ASJA jamaat 
in 1931. There is a functioning Mosque Board with elected positions such as President, 
Vice President, Treasurer and Secretary. The Imam of the masjid also sits on the Board. 
Voting is by consensus. Approximately 150 families currently belong to masjid. This 
community is primarily Indo-Trinidadian and middle-strata. Census data suggest that 
there are 2 822 Muslims in San Fernando (1 401 females and 1 421 males), and 1 457 
(734 females and 723 males) belong to the ASJA.
An “ASJA Ladies Incorporated”27 is recognized in the constitution of the ASJA. It was 
established in 1938 and has its complementary constitution (Ali 1995, 31). Its 
constituency comprises all women in the ASJA. Executive positions are elected. It is 
positioned parallel to the Executive Council while at the same time being under the 
oversight of the President General. This association has no formal right to representation 
on the ASJA Executive Committee. The group’s function is to have regional events and 
classes, and to help people. In the past, they have worked with other Muslim and non- 
Muslim women’s groups.
25 These statistics are provisional. The census has not yet been officially published. I believe this is 
response data, not overall data, only.
26 Interview Tiab Rahaman, August 23, 2004.
27 Reddock (1994) has suggested that the label “ladies”, “reflects the adoption from the British tradition of 
class-based and moralistic separation between ‘good ladies’ and ‘bad women’”. Kassim (1999) has 
commented on the contrast between this “ladies” group which was founded as an appendage to the ASJA 
male executive and the Young Women's Muslim Association which was formed independently.
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The Young Women's Muslim Association (YWMA) is based at the San Fernando Jama 
Masjid and was established in 1950. It is independent from the ASJA Ladies Incorporated 
and is in no way directly affiliated with the ASJA. It has no formal right to representation 
on the Mosque Board. The group has its own Executive with a female President, Vice 
President, Secretary, Treasurer and Members. Usually, decisions are made by open 
voting with a show of hands, but elections go through a process of nomination and secret 
ballot. Cliques, and personality and family differences may lead to subterranean tension 
or gossip. However, this is a very social group with some members involved over fifty 
years.
The group has no mission statement other than that contained in its letterhead: “God hath 
granted higher to those who strive and fight with their wealth and persons than those who 
sit (at home) (4:95)”. Traditionally, the YWMA has held events such as lectures, 
fundraising teas and dinners, iftar and Eid ul Fitr dinners, moulouds, qasida singing, 
Quranic readings and welcome back events for hajis and hajins returning from Mecca. 
This “caretaker and caregiver” role is quite typical. Women’s groups at other ASJA 
masjids also focus on what are described as “women things” such as “cooking and raising 
money”. Generally women are hesitant to suggest any activities that the Spiritual Leader 
or Imam would consider unlslamic.
The role of President of the ASJA and of individual Mosque Boards requires interaction 
with non-Muslims, Muslim men in the community, and male spiritual leaders. It involves 
leading the jamaat in prayer. These are all considered male roles. At different times over 
the Mosque Board’s history, representatives of the YWMA have been invited to attend 
meetings. These are short-lived and sporadic instances usually related to Ramadan or 
special dinners. Women have also asked to be invited without consistent success. When 
women attend meetings, they are usually family of Board member, or older and married.
Notions of headmanship among ASJA community members are based on ideas about 
appropriate gender roles in Islam, but also on larger non-Islamic ideologies that position 
men as the head of the home and the nation. The experience of women across secular and
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spiritual space certainly suggests an informal culture of headmanship that extends from 
the household to the community to national government institutions. This is key to 
understanding how dualistic definitions of secular and spiritual space provide only porous 
community boundaries. Essentially, ideals of spiritually correct leadership are buttressed 
by support for headmanship in secular life. The ideals of leadership as headmanship are 
not simply religious but are part of national political culture.
t
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2.4.2 Perspectives on Islam, Leadership, Participation and Gender
There so much writing on women, gender and Islam, exploring ‘the Woman Question’ 
yet again can appear cliche. Above all, feminist writing on Muslim women seeks to 
recognise their agency with the “patriarchal bargain” (Kandiyoti 1988). Following Butler 
(1997), Mahmood (2001, 203) defines this agency as “not a synonym for resistance to 
relations of domination, but as a capacity for action that historically specific relations of 
subordination enable and create”. S
,Qj> \
Traditional Islamic belief is that men’s primary religious obligation is to support, protect 
“and lay down the social rules for their women” and family (Hatem 1998, 91). 
Domesticity, family nurturance and obedience to men are women’s ‘natural’ and 
religious duties (Esposito 1998, ix). Women are considered to have “equivalent rather 
than equal rights within the family” (Hijab 1998, 50). Men have greater status, authority, 
mobility, social control and civil rights.
T
Gender has been politicised in the Islamic resurgence and reconstruction of ‘authenticity’. 
Women’s duty is to uphold this ‘authenticity’, propagate generations, and transmit
1J1 *
morality and social values (Seikaly 1998, 180). However, class, education and other
f ® 0
\ ^  differences greatly affect how gender complementarity is enforced in daily life (Hadad
1998, 11). Islamic regulations legitimise male domination of civil life. Even when they
have won the right to vote, women are rarely considered full citizens or possible
representatives. Control of women is central to how “Islamized space” is established.
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Yet, scholars document how women critically engage with the regulatory discourses that 
mark “their bodies and voices by habitual forms of gender subordination” (Ask and 
Tjomsland 1998, 3). Nonetheless, women’s critical engagements do not necessarily 
enable them to collectively enter governance structures. This is also true for the women 
in the San Fernando Jama Masjid.
New notions of femininity intersect reinvented Muslim identities. The literature, 
therefore, draws on notions of difference and “slippage” between dominant discourses, 
and individuals’ interpretations and self-presentations (de Lauretis 1987, 10). This 
illuminating scholarship underscores that is women’s and men’s choices, and power 
relations sliced and distributed in various ways, that are at the heart of our inquiry here.
The issue is not Islam, but the manifestations of authority that this discourse legitimates.
However, there are ways that the Trinidadian situation does not exactly fit some of the 
above discussion. The Muslim women in San Fernando all have basic citizen rights.
Islam is a matter for personal choice, not a prevailing legal and political system. The 
nation-state and Islamic community are not coterminous. Secular and national, and 
[ ' . A religious and transnational discourses (that pre-date the state) are at play here. These
women’s identities must be viewed as more than simply Muslim. The Trinidadian setting \
Q  T v  *  »
provides significant context for the construction of religious and other intersecting 
iC'f* ' experiences and identities.
Beginning in the 1980s, Trinidadian feminists began to make women and gender less 
“hidden from history” (Rowbotham 1973)28. They highlighted the significance of
28 In the traditional ethnographies on (or including) Muslims (Niehoff and Niehoff 1960; Klass 1961; Smith 
1963, Nevadomsky 1984), women feature mainly in relation to sexuality, marriage, ‘traditional’ 
responsibilities and aspects of cultural change. Yet, these writings give them no active voice. For example, 
in his study of Indo-Muslims’ cultural resistance, adaptation and assimilation, Smith (1963, 19728) 
emphasized valued ‘masculine’ attributes such as “strength”, “vitality” and “victory” to describe the Indo- 
Trinidadian struggle to “win” in “competition” with acculturative forces. He saw orthodox Islam and 
‘tradition’, primarily associated with the non-material sphere of family, women and spirituality, as crucial 
for “retention” (ibid, 195) of a distinct cultural identity.
Yet, Smith’s work almost wholly ignores Indo-Muslim females’ experiences and views28. 
Interestingly, Smith’s discussion describes how womanhood provided a symbolic marker o f internal 
boundaries, a site for retention of patriarchal religious culture and the basis for a distinct and defined Indo-
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discourses of reputation and respectability, and male honour and female shame. These 
were seen as central to understanding inter- and intra- ethnic relations, and “the 
competition among patriarchies” (Mohammed 1994). Following Mohammed’s 
theorization of interlocking processes of creolisation and modernity, Sampath’s (1993, 
250) analysis reinforced how “control of acceptable modernity” is set by terms 
“engendered by masculinity”. The persistence of the gendered spaces and roles must be 
understood in this historical context.
2.4.3 Inside Looking Out: Ethnographic Considerations
My initial observations and analyses are primarily derived from eight weeks spent with 
an election strategizing team based at the masjid. A total of ten men and women were 
part of this active campaigning team. The majority of men were leaders in their masjids, 
and sat on their Mosque Board or acted as Imam. The two women mainly involved were
•Rt:U
experienced political activists, and members of other masjids. After these weeks, I 
continued to attend events at the San Fernando Jama Masjid and some meetings o f the 
masjid's Young Women's Muslim Association (YWMA) for almost one year.
I took and typed minutes at campaign meetings, filed documents and was able to ask a 
limited number of questions. Access was made significantly easier through an extended 
family member’s friendship with the Masjid President, an invitation to participate 
extended by a politician involved with the mosque, and the high esteem with which my 
father’s brother, an Islamic scholar, was held among San Fernando Muslims. I was 
introduced both as student researcher and as “Maulana’s neice”. Both these designations, 
the first attributing a kind of male honour as a scholar and the second de-sexing me as
Muslim identity. He explores Islamic leader Ameer Ali’s (1930s-1940s) proposals for reform. Ali argued 
for women’s equality in religious and social life. Smith pointed out that Ali’s ideas became very unpopular 
because Indo-Muslims were not ready for changes that seemed to threaten their sense of ethnic 
distinctiveness (1963, 179). This is an early reference to the way that proposed changes to female mobility, 
public participation, behaviour and appearance were directly connected to feelings of assimilation and loss 
of cultural identity. Like the other ethnographers, Smith’s discussion only implicitly highlights how gender 
has been centrally located within Indo-Muslims’ notion of ‘belonging’.
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young, unmarried ‘daughter’ figure highlighted the significance of gender relations to my 
participation.
I did not enter the San Fernando Jama Masjid community intending to write about 
women. However, over the course of the election strategizing meetings, I began to 
observe who participated and was consulted, and how issues were framed. No women’s 
names were suggested for the slate of nominees for the election. Elections were not 
considered women’s matters. Further, no women could vote nor attend the election. This 
was not treated as an issue even as possible disenfranchisement of (men from) certain 
jamaats caused a great deal of bitterness and inflamed passions.
How could male masjid members so struggle and strategize for the right to vote in the
upcoming election, and yet treat women’s complete and historical disenfranchisement in
the ASJA as a non-issue? Questions developed as I observed the Young Women’s
Muslim Association’s meetings and regular voting over group decisions or to choose a j ^ 1
new Executive. In order to further explore women’s and men’s feelings regarding 
.
enfranchisement, I later interviewed eight men and nine women associated with the 
masjid, the YWMA, the ASJA or the election. I particularly included women and men in 
leadership positions and experience in community governance.
2.5 Mas Makers in the Lionel Jagessar and Associates Mas Camp
Figure 8: Bandleader Lionel Jagessar M aking his Mas
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Turning right on the comer just past the masjid, and then crossing Sutton Street leads to
the doorway to the Lionel Jagessar’s and Associates Mas Camp. Mas makers are women . i
and men who spend about half a year preparing costumes for their Carnival ‘band’ or
group of costumed masqueraders. There are hundreds of these ‘mas’ (masquerade)
bands29. Each led by their own bandleaders. In smaller bands, the bandleaders will often
‘play mas’, in huge, specially decorated costumes with wheels, as King and Queen of the
Band. Mas bands may each consist of a dozen, hundreds or a few thousand women and
men who will ‘play mas’ on the streets for two days.
While the biggest Carnival bands are in Port of Spain, San Fernando and smaller areas, 
such as Carapichima, are also famous for celebrations there. Carnival culminates on the 
Monday and Tuesday before Ash Wednesday, which marks the beginning of the Lenten 
period. The festival has long been the quintessential symbol of Trinidadian national 
culture and identity. The state is the primary sponsor of Carnival activities and 
competitions in addition to its regulatory role.
2.5.1 Look De Band Coming: Lionel Jagessar and Associates ’ Beginnings
In Trinidad, Indian mas was observed as early as the 1840s (Cowley 1996, 36). In the 
early twentieth century, it was one of the most popular bands (Crowley 1956, 205-21330). 
Red Indian mas emerged from “Warahoon” tribe of aboriginal natives of Venezuela who 
traded with Trinidad until the 1920s. Red Indian mas included red clothing and face 
paint. Fancy Indians derive mainly from Red Indians, but are associated with large, 
elaborate feather and wire headpieces.
29 Masquerading or ‘playing’ in a masque (locally described as ‘mas’) band does not necessarily involve 
wearing a mask but is based on wearing a costume “based on a theme from history, current events, films,
Carnival tradition, from the imagination, or from a combination of these” (Crowley 1956, 194). Mas man /
Peter Minshall describes ‘mas’ as, “portraying a thing, or idea, or mood, or character the costume or 
structure is meant to represent.. .moving in a mas, dancing, miming, presenting what is worn or carried.. .It
is performance.. .in an environment that is often spontaneous and chaotic” (Minshall 1999, 30). He goes on - ,
to add, “In Trinidad, we inevitably speak of ‘playing a mas’. We do not say, ‘What mas are you going to t*
wear?’ We say, ‘Wha’ mas yuh goin’ an play?’ And the mas we play even in the most fun of bands has a 
character, a sense of dramatic personage, or mood, or symbolic representation” (ibid, 30).
30 Crowley’s article comprises extensive description of various kinds of Indian mas and can be referred to 
for more than I summarize here.
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While Carnival has been associated with Afro-Trinidadian tradition and culture, Indian 
mas has always been popular with Indo-Trinidadians. Over the last century, Indo- 
Trinidadians would come to play in San Fernando from areas estates in areas such as 
Princes Town, Gasparillo, Point Fortin and Fyzabad. Since the 1980s, San Fernando has 
increasingly been considered the centre of Red Indian mas (Bacchus 1984, 143). 
Interestingly, no literature explores whether Indo-Trinidadian participation in this mas is 
heightened by their easy identification with the double meaning (Indo-Trinidadian and 
Native American) of word the “Indian”.
My own observations and the Jagessars’ telling of Indian mas history fit with Crowley’s 
(1956) view that the costumes reflect “comic books, National Geographic and other 
^  i magazine illustrations, and particularly cowboy-and-Indian movies”. Indian mas is 
currently considered “traditional” because the same masquerade is redesigned and played 
^  , every year. However^unlike Authentic versions, Fancy Indian mas is now designed in




American characters in New Orleans Mardi Gras, Trinidad’s portrayals largely have 
emerged independently. y o  ^  re  < c^l§ qX ^
The Lionel Jagessar and Associates Fancy Indian Band and camp officially started in 
1978 and celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary in 2003. Rose and Lionel Jagessar head 
an Indo-Trinidadian, Hindu family from San Fernando with two sons and two daughters. 
Some of the early friends involved in forming the band resided in areas outside of San 
Fernando such as Fyzabad, Debe and Penal. One ‘section’ was from Pleasantville. In the 
beginning, the band played Authentic Indian mas. The majority of mas players now wear 
Carnival style headpieces that could be typical of any band. Whole sections play “bikini
mas” with Indian mas styled arm, leg, neck and waist pieces. In contrast to the Jagessar 
band which does “fancy Indian mas”, smaller bands coming from La Romaine, 




The Jagesser’s describe their Indian mas as “Fancy” or “pretty mas” because they use 
colourful velvets and shiny sequins and foil. Fancy mas contrasts to Authentic mas31 
which uses less shiny materials and relies more on cloth, beadwork and feathers. Their 
authenticity doesn’t necessarily imply exact representation, but what Crowley calls 
“authenticity-plus”. This describes “costumes more beautiful than the originals but still 
authentic in detail” (ibid, 213). The authenticity of costumes can also be judged not by 
their original, but by their coherence with the Carnival tradition of mimicry, adoption and 
transformation of outside cultural influences, and relevance to contemporary society 
(Minshall 1985a, 12).
Figure 9: The Band Leads the King
•
The ‘mas camp’32 is family-run. It relies on family’s and friends’ ‘love for (Indian) mas’ 
to produce the annual San Fernando-based band. I show, how the state also attempts to 
harness and control this commitment to participation. Expression of ‘national’ culture
31 Crowley (1956b, 87) aptly notes that “authentic” mas designs are actually authentic to mas 
interpretations of the original, not the original itself.
32 A room or shed where Carnival masquerade costumes are made.
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therefore becomes a point of negotiation between mas makers33 and the state. As 
committed artists, mas makers not only participate, but lead, create and continuously 
redefine expressions of Trinidadianness. This role carries status. Mas makers 
continuously reappropriate the notion of Trinidadianness even while engaging with the 
state as it tries to do the same. These connections provide a basis for understanding the 
relationship, between the San Fernando Carnival Committee (SCC) and bandleaders. This 
is a scenario where authority based on Trinidadianness and participation contests 
authority based on patronage, legislation and facilitation of market imperatives.
 —
2.5.2 Repression to Regulation: State Approaches in Carnival History
{A
<^V  ^ The San Fernando Carnival Development Committee changed to the San Fernando
Carnival Committee (SCC) in 1987 when the national Carnival Development Committee 
changed to the National Carnival Commission (NCC)34. The SCC is ‘regional’ subgroup 
1 v ' | of the NCC. Since 1987, when the government decided to ‘zone’ various Carnival
 ^ Development Committees, those involved in governance of San Fernando Carnival have
resented being defined as a ‘region’. Past committee member Vernon Leotaud articulated 
a common feeling that San Fernando is not like other, smaller regions such as Princes 
Town or Chaguanas. This sentiment is still heard among current members of the SCC.
The committee is generally not satisfied with the amount of funding coming from the 
NCC and the city’s designation as any other ‘regional’ Carnival. Currently, the 
committee gets an annual subvention of TT$230 00035. The SCC’s grant only pays for 
prizes and the committee must seek out additional private sector support. The San 
Fernando Carnival Committee functions as a committee of the San Fernando City 
Corporation, which is the local government body. Among other responsibilities, the 
committee sets competition regulations, provides prizes, sponsors events, and regulates > ^
the flow of people and traffic on Carnival Monday and Tuesday.
33 There are a wide variety of people participating in Carnival including singers, musicians, producers, wire 
benders, seamstresses, bar operators and others. I focus only on mas makers in this chapter.
34 This change did not become legalized until 1991.
35 This is the 2004 figure when fieldwork was undertaken.6 L'L-V* X  y*
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Seen in historical perspective, there has been a clear change from repression to regulation 
of Carnival. Attempts to put down forms of masquerading and masking in San Fernando 
are noted as early as 1859, and again in 1871, 1876, 1881, 1884 (Cowley 1996). 
Revellers consistently resisted. There was a significant shift away from abolition and 
toward strict regulation of Carnival in 1882. Laws and Ordinances in both Port of Spain 
and San Fernando introduced between 1868 and 1895 increasingly aimed to reshape 
Carnival into more acceptable forms (Cowley 1996,131).
The Carnival of 1900 witnessed first steps toward it being accepted by middle and upper 
classes, and small numbers of Indians, Chinese, Syrians and Portuguese. This more 
“sanitized” Carnival was now on the road to becoming considered a “national” festival 
(ibid, 343). 1919 was the first year Carnival was officially in the hands of middle class 
organizers. By the early 20th century, organized competitions, letters to the press and 
Government-appointed committees were all directed toward making masquerading and 
music (ibid, 353) more acceptable to all classes. San Fernando officially celebrated 
eighty-six years of Carnival in 200536. Despite the long record of Carnival in San 
Fernando, it is striking that these celebrations begin its history from the moment of state 
and elite take over.
From the mid-1940s, government officials and merchants continued to consolidate 
middle class influence (ibid, 368). Some have argued that it is independence itself, and 
this associated expansion of democratic participation and cultural self-assertiveness, that 
weakened the confrontational nature of masquerade (Wuest 1990, 52). With the coming 
to power of the PNM in 1956, the Central Government appointed a state financed 
Carnival Development Committee. From 1957, this committee took responsibility for 
organizing Carnival and its competitions all over the country. 1957, therefore, marks the 
Central Government’s steps to officially take over and nationalize Carnival (Hill 1984). 
Government endorsement and sponsorship was tied to rules and regulations. It controlled 
all the major competitions and staged events, and universalised an “official” format for
36 Due to the efforts of the Borough Council and a special committee headed by L.C. Wharton, the first 
organized Carnival competitions were held on March 3, 1919 at Paradise Pasture. (Ottley 1971, 128).
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Carnival. It was concerned with bureaucratic efficiency, rules, control of venues and 
police security.
This emphasis collaborates with official pressure for “proper” and marketable visibilities. 
“Carnival is big business” competes with the saying “all ah we is one” (Aching 2002, 
78). The shift to governmental management, emphases on tourism and business, and the 
dominance of pretty and unthreatening mas marks a key historical change from 
discourses of resistance to those of commodification37. As Carnival is increasingly seen 
as a cultural industry, state discourse has also shifted to emphasise ‘development’, 
‘management’ and ‘facilitation’.
It is this contemporary thrust that I most fully explore by looking at the SCC’s 
governance of Carnival in the city. The festival’s designation as “national” is used both to 
give the state authority to make decisions and to promote nationalism itself - through the 
promotion of certain kinds of participation. However, as I show, notions of participation 
in fact facilitate other relationships to mas, nationalism, artistry, profit, culture and the 
state.
2.5.3 Scholarship on Mas Camps .
Usually, Carnival is explored in terms of tradition38, resistance39, mimicry and 
inversion40, national identity41, ethnicity, bacchanal42 and freedom43. As part of an /  ■' 
extensive debate, literature also looks at the relationship between Carnival and ‘national’
___________________________
37 Keith Nurse (1999, 672) colourfully describes this: “Since the 1970s the carnival has been promoted, at 
home and abroad, either as the ‘Greatest Show on Earth’ or a ‘Trim Party’ and, as such, much emphasis 
was placed on multiracial harmony (‘national unity’), colourful pageantry (‘carnival is colour’), fun-loving 
lyrics (‘soca party’) and body-revealing costumes (‘bum bum time’).
38 Brereton 1975, Hill 1972, 1984, 1985, Campbell 1988, Wuest 1990, Cowley 1996, Baptiste 1997, Riggio 
1998, Liverpool 2001.
39 Elder 1966, Rohlehr 1990, Branmark 1994, Stuempfle 1995, Thompson-Ahye 1997 and Grant 1999.
40 Wuest 1990, Alleyne-Dettmers 1995, Minshall (1999, 30).




culture44. More recently, writing has focused on commodification45, diasporic 
recreations46, state sponsorship47, masculinity48 and gendered performance49. Generally, 
Carnival is dualistically understood in relation to other times of the year and, especially, 
religiously defined periods. Scholarship has also frequently understood Carnival in pre­
independence terms when the state repressed rather than endorsed and identified itself 
and the nation with Carnival.
Clearly, the post-independence relationship between the state and mas makers is also 
about cooperation, sponsorship and consultation. Few works theorize contemporary state 
approaches to mas and mas makers’ responses to the state. Of these, John Stewart’s 
(1986) discussion of the Carnival Development Committee’s state control of Carnival 
overly portrays only one side of the story, and misses other elements of negotiation over 
authority that this study illustrates.
o
There is little theoretical work on Indian. ^ Scholarship on Indian mas has generally not 
explored mas making and mas carftpsTnor has much been said about Indo-Trinidadian 
participation. Bellour and Kinser’s (1998) exploration of Indian mas in San Fernando 
highlights its history and styles, and the significance of colour choices and notions of 
authenticity. Lionel Jagessar is mentioned. However, the article compares New Orleans 
and San Fernando within an African frame, as if local bands are not ethnically mixed.
Of the extensive literature on Carnival, there are only a handful of studies on mas camp 
life. Mostly doctoral dissertations undertaken in the 1990s, these include “Jump! Jump 
and Play Mas!” by Patricia Alleyne-Dettmers (1993), “Trinidad Masquerades: 
Performance, Play and Community in a Post-Colonial Carnival” by Chris Waite (1993) 
and Thomas Fleming’s (1998) “Rearticulating Tradition, Translating Place: Collective
vvU ^
e
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44 Deosaran 1995, Koningsbruggen 1997, McCree 1997, Sankeralli 1997, Riggio 2004.
45 See Johnson 1983, Minshall 1985a, 1985b, Rogers 1990, Alleyne-Dettmers 1993, Payson 1995, Nurse 
1999.
46 See Manning 1984, Burton 1997, Scher 1997, 2003, Nunley and Bettelheim 1998, Aching 2002, Ho and 
Nurse 2005.
47 Aching 2002, Stewart 1986.
48 See Lewis 1998, Reddock 1999.
See Puri 1997, Kanhai 1999, Franco 1998, 2000, Barnes 2000.
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Memories of Carnival in Leeds and Bristol”. One published paper, “Amerindian Masking 
in Trinidad’s Carnival” by Helene Bellour and Samuel Kinser (1998) compares Authentic 
Indian mas in San Fernando to a similar genre in New Orleans, and highlights mas camp 
life. These studies are primarily based on participant-observation of varying depth. The 
dissertation by Waite comes closest to examining work ethics, negotiations among mas 
makers for money or other forms of compensation, and concepts such as liming, hustling, 
loyalty and leadership. Mas camps have been largely studied in relation to playing mas, 
Carnival characters, other countries’ Carnivals and notions of memory and place.
2.5.4 Make Mas Den Talk: Ethnographic Considerations
The Jagessars agreed that I would help “work de mas” in exchange for research material. 
From January, I spent six weeks in the camp. Then, continued to visit camp members for 
months. The atmosphere in the camp was often loud and jovial. Soca, calypso and, often, 
chutney music was always playing loudly and people often visited to see the costumes 
and ‘ole talk’ with the bandleaders. I completed all interviews with camp members in 
August 2004 and with others concerned with San Fernando Carnival in September 2004.
r)
The family treated me like a daughter. Entry,was eased by the fact that their daughter was 
my age. I was also easily accepted because new people come to the camp each year to 
help. The majority of data for the chapter is drawn from several interviews with 
bandleader Lionel Jagessar, and to a lesser extent, partner bandleader Rosemary Kuru- 
Jagessar, and children Lisa, Larry and Lionel Junior. As well, I interviewed two other 
Indo-Trinidadian bandleaders, five past members of the Carnival Development 
Committee and SCC, three current members, and the head of the National Carnival 
Bands Association. I also interviewed the last elite Carnival organiser before government 
takeover in 1957. Finally, I collected minutes from almost one year of SCC meetings.
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2.6 Squatters on the King’s Wharf Railway Line and Patronage. J
(l
Looking toward the San Fernando King’s Wharf area, I focus on a neighbourhood of 
squatters who permanently reside on one end generally known as the ‘Railway Line’ (see 
Map 4). I explore the lives o f these residents who work in government programmes for 
unemployed people. According to the present Local Government Councillor, and past 
and present Members o f Parliament, Wharf residents have always been part of 
unemployment programmes. Fishing is the most commonly cited skill, but it doesn’t 
always provide enough or steady income.
In particular, I examine the nation-wide Unemployment Relief Programme (URP) and the S T^-^j 
Community Environmental Protection and Enhancement Programme (CEPEP). The first, 
administered by the Ministry of Local Government aims to provide temporary 
employment to those finding it hard to secure paid employment. In comparison, CEPEP 
is intended to be more than short-term employment relief. It is administered by the 
Ministry of Public Utilities and the Environment and aims to “clean and beautify the 
environment, provide employment for unskilled and semi-skilled workers and develop a 
cadre of micro-entrepreneurship and new business”.
Figure 10: A URP Worker Spends Time with Her Family
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Whereas negotiations over mas show a competition between formal and informal 
authorities to control and define the informal sphere, life on the Railway Line suggests 
the opposite. Here, both formal authorities and those in informal life attempt to 
appropriate and control the formal apparatus and resources of the state. This is a very 
different picture from the Masjid where parallel formal spheres of religious and state 
citizenship are created. As well, it departs from the market where neither formal laws nor 
informal practices appear to have ultimate authority over the space of the street.
2.6.1 Making the Railway Line Home
The Wharf lies at the very base of the city, and directly faces the sea front. It was once a 
bustling port and trading post for goods such as rice, sugar and wood. The area was 
historically famous as a site of Carnival, St. Peter’s Day and New Year’s Day activities. 
It was also famous for its railway from San Fernando to Port of Spain and to Princes 
Town50. A Public Transport Service Corporation (PTSC) bus system later replaced the 
railway. After the railway was discontinued, bus company workers and squatters replaced 
the railway workers who once lived in houses provided at the end of the line. The houses 
still had electricity and running water at this time, but soon both railway line workers and 
those from the bus service moved out. By the 1970s, with the railway gone and the 
decline of the Wharf as a port, dereliction began to set in. Squatting increased in the 
front, open section and at the very end of the Railway Line road. After amenities were 
discontinued in the early 1980s, only squatters were left living along the Railway Line.
The main Wharf and Fish Market area are quite distinct from the Railway Line 
neighbourhood. ‘Permanent’ residents and families primarily reside on the Railway line. 
The majority of CEPEP and URP workers belong to this group. Alternately put, many of 
those living on the Line survive because of CEPEP and URP. There are a few individuals
50 These routes were established over the last decades of the eighteenth century and tracks were extended to 
Siparia in the early nineteenth century. In the 1920s, the Trinidad Railway Service merged with the Cipero 
Tramroad railway company. However, the system only lasted until the 1960s. Its termination was eulogized 
in the Mighty Dictator’s famous calypso, “Last Train to San Fernando”.
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on the Railway Line working full-time or part-time and a number of people dependent on 
social assistance or family members.
The Railway Line road is narrow, badly pitted in places and ends in a cul-de-sac. All the 
houses are on one side as the sea is on the other. While there is only one parlour (as 
suggested by a large sign), a few other residents also sell cigarettes, rolling paper and 
such small items. The majority of the residents I interviewed live along this stretch of 
road which extends for a few hundred feet. One lives a little past the end of the road in a 
bushy area that can only be reached by crossing a large drain. From here, one can walk 
directly to the yacht club and the Marabella side of the Wharf. The smoke stacks of the 
Pointe-a-Pierre refinery are a little further distance. Houses along this stretch are 
similarly made out of wood, board and galvanize, but some sit on their original stone 
foundations.
Those that I interviewed generally first came on the Line through family or friends, or 
because they lived in Springvale and would regularly spend time on the Wharf liming or 
earning a living. Some belong to two extended families. Those who now live on the Line 
may have inherited their house, bought it for anywhere from TT$300 to TT$1500 or built 
it from bought and given materials. They may have ‘bought’ the land with the house, 
been given it by others holding an informal title or simply squatted. Though houses can 
be bought and sold, the entire community is squatting. There is neither electricity nor 
running water. Residents’ stories about how they ended up living on the Wharf 
essentially suggest that poverty is the common denominator. The majority of those I 
interviewed did not finish secondary school, but have primary schooling.
vf. faQsU
Approximately forty people, including about twenty children, live on the Line and there 
are about twenty houses. However, not all are occupied. The population mainly is Afro- 
Trinidadian. However, there is one Indo-Trinidadian family and an extended Dougla 
(mixed Indo- and Afro-Trinidadian) family. Before the opportunity for work with CEPEP 
and in between URP jobs, the majority of residents engaged in temporary employment, 
fishing-related activities, informal economic activities or were unemployed. In this sense,
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they also share income-levels and occupational mobility with a majority of those 
involved at the lower-end of the informal economy as well as those that are essentially 
(income) poor51.
In Trinidad, millions of dollars have been spent and continue to be (Ryan 1997), and 
thousands (Fraser 2004) have participated in variously-titled programmes over the 
decades. This group of CEPEP workers is from among two to three groups of seven in 
the San Fernando West Constituency and from among fifteen within the City of San 
Fernando’s jurisdiction. Having informally interacted with workers from a few different 
CEPEP contracting companies, I consider these interviews to reflect shared experiences 
and perceptions. URP workers I interviewed are only a small number of those 
temporarily hired in the city, but those that I knew from other areas have comparable 
stories.
2.6.2 Patronage in International, Regional and National Perspective
Unemployment programmes in Trinidad and Tobago are deeply entrenched in the 
nation’s political history. As with other Caribbean and Latin American nations, they have 
doubled as a source for patronage (Lutchman 1992, Mahabir 1979, Martz 1997). This 
continues. Even before the transition to independence, patronage programmes have been 
an influential aspect of Trinidad’s politics. They have been considered key to winning 
elections, subduing protest and crime, and rewarding supporters (Craig 1982, Ryan 
1997). Essentially, in a context of high unemployment, economic discontent, scarcity and 
difficulty accessing social resources, governing parties will be especially able and willing 
to develop patron-client relations. This occurs through distribution of welfare, 
employment and income along partisan lines (Stone 1974). Unemployment programmes,
51 Godfrey St. Bernard writes, “Families are assigned to lower class strata on the basis of their social 
position within a given social context. At the national level, this position is determined by family income, 
family heads’ income, occupation and education, the extent to which families consume luxuries, and place 
of residence. Poverty, on the other hand, is a function of the conditions under which individuals and 
families live, and their ability to access social amenities and opportunities that could enhance the quality of 
life of their lives” (St. Bernard 1997, 248). More simply, Bishnu Ragoonath (1994, 3) defines poverty as 
“the inability to achieve a decently acceptable standard of living”.
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such as the contemporary CEPEP and URP, are probably the single most patronage- 
identified practice in the history of the country.
A combination of loyalty and reciprocal obligation to paternalist party leaders has 
characterized Anglophone Caribbean politics (Stone 1974, 1986). As Jacobs (1978, 8) 
points out, this region is saturated with references to “contacts”, “pulling string”, “clout” 
(also Edie 1989, 7), “money talks” and “grease palm”. These indicate public familiarity 
with partisan administration. Party brokers at all levels maintained the system’s stability 
through bureaucratic favours. Control of resources is key to patronage, and moral or legal 
authority is not necessarily the basis for state legitimacy.
2.6.3 Patronage in Trinidad and Tobago
In 1957, the ruling government, and specifically the Prime Minister Eric Williams, 
established the Depressed Areas Programme. Also known as a ‘Crash’ programme, Susan 
Craig (1974) writes that it first began in sugar areas as an ad hoc measure to improve 
things like roads. It later expanded to urban areas such as Laventille and San Juan as an 
employment programme. Howe and Rennie (1982, 128) argue that it was started in 
response to warfare among steelbandsmen in areas of Port of Spain such as East Dry 
River. However, Tony Fraser disputes this and posits that the Crash programme began in 
Point Fortin to counter stark unemployment and to court voters away from Uriah Butler, 
a charismatic leader and opponent of Williams (Trinidad Guardian, December 16 2004, p 
29).
The Prime Minister’s key strategy was to cultivate a direct, personalistic and ad hoc 
approach to communicating with the population. It is in this context that the Crash 
programme that began in the 1960s was to become crucially important to the relationship 
between state, political leadership and the unemployed (Craig 1974, 33). MPs often 
influenced recruitment and the programme itself was vulnerable to the “caprice and 
power of individual politicians” (ibid, 50). This meant that workers believed they owed
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their employment to contacts and patronage (ibid, 49). However, writing of Jamaica, 
Harewood and Henry observe how those without economic capital may have political 
capital (1985, 72). This political capital describes groups’ ability to successfully make 
demands of elites, and to manage political relations to their benefit.
Party activists had the power to make decisions about who participated in Special Works 
Programmes and how many times they secured short-term employment, and they 
controlled use of the community centres. They were also the ones counted on to “coerce 
the constituents for support at election time” (Craig 1974, 64). The local government 
apparatus of County and Municipal Councils could be entirely sidestepped in this 
arrangement based on party contacts. Those in other parties or without contacts 
effectively withdrew participation.
This system of party infiltration also produced party activists who were low ranking 
patrons. Such persons could bring projects and resources to communities due to their 
place in the party hierarchy and their own contacts. This infiltration of party organization 
in communities was also noted, from about the 1950s, by Hauofa (1968) in 5th Company, 
Moruga, Freilich (1960) in Tamana, Morton Klass (1961) in Felicity, the Niehoffs (1960) 
in Penal and Grace Bason (1984) in her survey of the Caroni and St. David Counties. It 
led to open conflict in communities, withdrawal of some individuals on the basis of
‘race’, religion or party affiliation, formation of competing community groups or uneasy 
peace (ibid, 71). However, rural areas were clearly neglected while urban areas, and 
especially those along the East-West Corridor and in PNM-loyal constituencies, were 
favoured (Ryan 1997, 130).
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The same relationship earned different names over the decades. These include Special 
Works, Better Village Development and Environmental Works Division (DEWD), 
Labour Intensive Development Programme (LIDP), Unemployment Relief Programme 
(URP) and Employment and Training Programme (ETP). They were all “standpipe” or 
“parish pump” politics associated with buying votes and were “integrally linked with 
PNM politics” (ibid, 126). These “political resources” (ibid, 137) were associated with
101
corrupt practices, waste and abuse of public funds, poor work ethic, violence, mafia style 
intimidation and racketeering, idleness and low productivity. Up to September 1995, new 
programmes were being invented. The Urban Renewal Programme, which was to run 
concurrently with the Unemployment Relief Programme, began at this time. It involved 
allocating thirty contracts of TT$100 000 each to petty contractors in Laventille (ibid, 
139).
When the PNM lost the election a few months later, programmes such as URP continued 
to be associated with corruption, intimidation, “ghost gangs” and inefficiency (ref) under 
the UNC government. With the invention of Community Environmental Protection and 
Enhancement Programme (CEPEP), the PNM repeated an election discourse about 
sustainable employment creation and anti-corruption again in 2002. As I show in later 
chapters, virtually all political parties which have held government are considered to use 
patronage. However, given the PNM’s thirty plus years in office, its relationship with 
patronage is far more entrenched both in popular imagination and in Trinidad and 
Tobago’s history.
2.6.4 Liming on the Line: Ethnographic Considerations
I spent a year as a participant-observer in the King’s Wharf area. The latter two months 
were mainly spent interviewing CEPEP and URP workers living on the Railway Line. I 
began fieldwork on July 14, 2003. This was the day of Local Government elections 
across the country. Unsure where to begin in a city I didn’t know well, I divided the day 
between observing activities in the PNM and UNC constituency offices. I spent the 
morning sitting in the PNM Constituency Office observing the flurry of campaigning 
activities and chatting with people. One woman I met, and later became friends with, was 
a CEPEP worker. Several CEPEP workers, and at least two CEPEP bosses, were at the 
office. The workers were canvassing to see if people on their voter lists had already voted 
or if they needed transportation to the polling station. About a week later, I met my 
friend’s job foreman and the rest of her “gang” (officially designated as a “team”) when
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they had finished cutting and clearing the grass along the road in front of the Gulf City 
mall. At least four of her team’s workers, three men and one woman, lived on the Wharf. 
Another week or so later, the foreman took me to the Wharf to meet people he knew.
Some weeks after the foreman’s introduction to the Wharf, I started going by myself. The 
challenges of negotiating my safety and participation in male-dominated spaces, and 
managing notions of reputation and respectability were important aspects of my gendered 
experience as a researcher. After several weeks, I began to venture further in and to lime 
with other groups including young people, URP and CEPEP workers, young mothers and 
couples. I sought relationships with adult women who could act as friends and key 
informants as I was very aware of gossip that would develop if I was seen as favouring 
relationships with men.
Among the fifteen residents I interviewed, there were seven URP and eight CEPEP 
workers. Together, there are nine females and six males. Some CEPEP workers had also 
worked for the URP in the past. The CEPEP group comprised six Afro-Trinidadian males 
and two females (one Dougla and one Indo-Trinidadian). The URP workers interviewed 
were all female. However, they were an ethnically mixed group of two Indo- 
Trinidadians, two Afro-Trinidadians, two who identified as mixed and one Dougla. The 
majority of CEPEP and URP workers were between thirty and fifty years old. Members 
of both groups are mainly Christian (Baptist, Roman Catholic, Anglican and Pentecostal), 
but at least two persons in each group were Muslim. Combined, ten persons reported 
being in common-law unions. Family types were essentially nuclear, and centred around 
a couple and an average of two to three children.
Of the fifteen women and men I interviewed, eleven live on the Railway Line and four on 
the Wharf. Of these residents permanently residing in the area, five have been living there 
for seven to ten years, three for eleven to fifteen years, three for sixteen to twenty years 
and four have been living on the Wharf or Line for over twenty years. Of this group, 
seven consider themselves belonging to the Railway Line, four consider themselves
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belonging to the Wharf and four consider themselves belonging to another area. These 
areas include Fyzabad, Biche, St. Madeline, Rosillac, Princes’ Town and Springvale.
I conducted thirteen additional interviews with a female URP foreman, male officers 
from the Central Police and CID, one male CEPEP contractor, a female Executive 
Member of the PNM San Fernando West Constituency Executive, the past male Member 
of Parliament for San Fernando West and the present female Member of Parliament for 
San Fernando West, the male Project Manager at SWMCOL, a past Mayor and past >' v 
Deputy Mayor of San Fernando (both males), the most recent (2003-2006) male Mayor 
of San Fernando, a past female Local Government Councillor and the most recent female 
(2003-2006) Local Government Councillor for Springvale/Paradise. The Constituency ^v, - 
Executive member and present Local Government Councillor were also contractors. Five 
of this group were females and five were Indo-Trinidadians. This group encompassed 
politicians across a range of levels as well as individuals involved with the Wharf in a 
range of ways. „ y  p
Interviews with workers focused on aspects of life on the Line, experiences working with 
CEPEP and URP, and perspectives of patronage. Interviews with persons in authority 
focused more on perceptions of the Wharf, and CEPEP and URP. CEPEP contractors 
tended to give me a lot of official spin, to become somewhat defensive and to assertively 
justify both the programme and their involvement. Supplementary data included Hansard 
records, census data and newspaper clippings.
2.7 Conclusion
This sketch of four sites within Trinidad’s social and historical landscape provides the 
backdrop to this study. It points to the kinds of assertions and contestations I will be 
highlighting in subsequent chapters. Just looking from this ethnographic moment back 
across history shows the continual intersection of lore and law in questions of legitimacy
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and participation. The San Fernando Central Market, Lionel Jagessar and Associates Mas 
Camp, San Fernando Jama Masjid and King’s Wharf Railway Line are spaces both 
intimate and open. They exemplify a whole range of the economic, cultural, spiritual, 
familial, state-centred, gendered and emotional interactions that make up public life. In 
this way, they are ideal sites for showing how women and men in catchments and 
neighbourhoods experience and shape governance.
This study is about how women and men participate in public life, whether on roadsides 
or roads, in meetings in City Hall and constituency offices, in associational and national 
elections, or in neighbourhoods and jobs sites. These sites work well to illustrate that the 
issues explored in this study cross economic strata, gender, religion and ethnicity, 
range of internal and outer boundaries may divide these groups. Yet, the analogous ways
■ ,
they live, work, pray and socalise further emphasise how ASJA members’ negotiations 
over authority are not so distant from squatters, bandleaders or market vendors.
Alternately, the things that matter most to women and men in one space are expressed 
through different relations in another, but circle in constantly to return to the value of 
family, reciprocity, fairness, and participation ^
As I have shown, Central Market vendors’ tactics draw legislation and police into the 
picture, whereas mas camp life provides glimpses of how local government institutions 
and politicians at that level work. Squatters’ negotiations over patronage jobs pull the 
study’s lens right up to the elected MP and into several different places in state 
bureaucracy. Nonetheless, a connected, complementary pattern begins to emerge from 
these disparate sites. Each depicts politics from “the margins” where legitimacy is being
constantlyrefounded. Each illuminates different versions and combinations of lore and 
law. Together, they show that authority may be cast and recast by women and men’s 





le the dispositions emerging from each site repeat in varying forms in the others, 
each one epitomizes a space where the dispositions find their most powerful value, 
articulation and meaning. In this sense, these sites also point to the significance of their
differences. All four sites are necessaiy to understand the homologies among different 
spheres of social life and stratified groups. The four are also enough to establish a 
substantial case for my argument about the power of lore and social politics, the 
progressive privatization of public space, and the everyday workings of aesthetic 
authority.
These locations additionally illustrate the contribution that a multi-sited ethnography,
w V
which moves back and forth through varying spaces, can make. As Gilseij^n (1990, 187) 
observes, “Space is crucial in thinking about culture and ideology because it is where 
ideology and culture take on physical existence and representations”. In the next chapter, 
I move from this panoramic sweep to a more pedestrian view of the city. Keep in mind 
the ways that mundane pract^Hpalance, weave and blur different kinds of authority. This 
makes them an excellent starting point for discussing the political significance of habitus.
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C hap ter Three: Living Politics
3.1 Introduction
Indeed, their yearning fo r  an integrated model o f community that can 
acknowledge yet accommodate difference is an important aspect o f  the 
Caribbean’s cultural ethos. (Carnegie, 2002, ix)
^  v  .o r e  *
A
This chapter enters into the interiors of the sites studied. I now move off the
1 A*:
pavement and deep into the high-ceilinged market where vendors sell before 
moving to the street, away from the election and into conversation about God and
leadership, out of yCity Hall and into the musically-set, countdown pace of
Kcostume-making, arid beyond the job site to the steps of houses where talk is 
about the cost o f groceries for the week. These sites, discussions and concerns 
exemplify how normative orders and expectations shape public life. They show 
the relationships and actions that emerge from and reproduce customary practice 
and common sense. Actions to fulfill needs, express selfhood, care for others and
Figure 11: Crossing the City
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feel good about oneself are connected to popular notions about what matters as 
well as what is considered right and reasonable. They provide a basis for 
understanding the mix, overlap and flow of formal and informal power described 
in the next chapter.
Usually, after visiting the wharf during the afternoon hours, I would climb back 
up High Street and go look for Merlene, Miss Cleo, Dolls, Spanish or other 
vendors who might still be selling out on the road. After closing with the wharf in 
the last chapter, I therefore make this trip as I used to do and start again with the 
stories of market vendors I knew. After describing the different values that 
primarily appear in each site, I explore ways to understand why and how these 
organizing principles alter across sites.
3.2 Worlds within a World: Understanding Values, Practices and 
Relationships
Here, I illustrate the significance of dispositions such as everybody have to eat, 
love for mas, return to spirituality and contacts. They are involved in the ways 
that women and men make decisions, deal with power, negotiate rules and roles 
on the ground, and share and sort out conflict. They flexibly change meaning as 
they move through different sites, moments and discourses. Most importantly, 
these dispositions point to ways that women’s and men’s choices produce patterns 
of action.
Building towards an argument about aesthetic authority in Chapter 5, I want to 
show that habitus provides a basis for a moral order not necessarily centred in 
expectations that women or men will act neutrally, impartially or impersonally in 
everyday life. Chapter 4 then stretches further to point out how this also orders 
more formally defined relations.
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Read as a story, this study describes aspects of social life that I examine, where I 
look and who peoples those spaces. Over the next three chapters, I present what 
they do there, how their actions intersect state and institutional power, and what 
women and men at different locations say about what they do. The following 
pages therefore begin by ushering in a deeper look at women’s and men’s 
practices, and habifiisin relation to normative life.
3.2.1 Habitus
Writing in a tradition established by Emile Durkheim (1961 [1925]), Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty (1953 [1942]) and Marcel Mauss (1992 [1934]), Pierre Bourdieu 
(1984 [1990]) famously theorized social practices in terms of “habitus”. Less 
individualistic than ‘habits’, Bourdieu’s emphasis was on the formation of a 
habitus typical of a group. For example, “taste” is a habitus that creates 
distinctions1 within cultures and class groups through the cultural capital 
mobilized. Cultural capital refers to “practical attitudes, stances, and general 
schemes of classification that are usually “second nature”” (Valverde 1998, 237).
Bourdieu’s argument is that habitus is generative. It operates beneath the level of 
consciousness to influence actions and relations. Like language, the basic rules 
are used unconsciously, but intelligibly. How does habitus work? Starting from 
childhood, mundane experiences begin to create habitual layers that reference the 
past and family as well as a range of other concurrent relationships and activities. 
The schema that develops is therefore a social knowledge that differs across 
history, place and position of power2. It is not static, but can be reshaped and
1 Bourdieu’s (1984) argument, in Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, is that 
economic position and power, and cultural or symbolic power are sources of status, and 
hierarchical relations. “Symbolic capital” comes from a hierarchy of tastes. Taste is an acquired 
“cultural competence” that is naturalized and used to legitimize the social distinctions established 
between groups of people.
2 Bourdieu writes, “One of the fundamental effects of the harmony between practical sense and 
objectified meaning (sens) is the production of a common-sense world, whose immediate self­
evidence is accompanied by the objectivity provided by consensus on the meaning of practices and 
the world, in other words the harmonization of the agents’ experiences and the constant 
reinforcement each of them receives from expression -  individual or collective (in festivals, for
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shifted by particular experiences. For example, a masculine habitus is, perhaps, 
most determined by early experiences and relationships, but later experiences can 
make a man reinterpret these, choose to remember and identify with them 
differently, and even drastically change certain actions.
New experiences and new strata of dispositions may be overlaid over old layers 
differently. Many men like this may create a changed masculine habitus over 
generations. Yet, habitus tends to reproduce the dominant values of a group 
because early layers filter later experiences and new dispositions though 
collective embodiments such as genres of dress, socializing and conversation, not 
just individual creativity. The past shapes actions in the present. As Bourdieu 
writes, the past “functioning as accumulated capital, produces history on the basis 
of history and so ensures permanence within change” (1990 [1980]: 56).
A habitus is, therefore, a value system or cosmology that provides an underlying 
framework for women and men’s decisions while being actively engaged through 
their choices. It does not reflect only one set of norms, but is layered and 
dynamic, and influenced by diverse encounters and environments. I show how it 
includes contradictions as well as cohesion, and integration as well as incoherence 
because it is lived, known and given meaning through practice. In essence, this 
concept enables us to explore the implicit categories that women and men use to 
continuously assemble their lived world and these categories’ significance for 
individual lives and social relations.
Diverse kinds of social relations are, what Bourdieu considers, diverse forms of 
capital. Different positions are linked to social struggles over access to various 
forms of capital, including economic, social, cultural and political capital. These 
are actor-centred, relational forms of power that define women and men’s 
positions and the relations between them. Those with similar amounts and kinds
example), improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings) of similar or identical 
experiences” (1990 [1980], 58).
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of capital have similar forms and amounts of power (position). This creates 
collective recognition of identity and a sense of being a social group.
Some forms of capital can be converted into others, but they do not necessarily 
have equal exchange value. For example, cultural capital or good “taste” can be 
converted into economic capital through access to certain jobs that require this 
kind of classed knowledge. Symbolic capital, the final kind emphasized by 
Bourdieu, refers to the power to interpret the social world. Status and prestige 
create legitimate authority to name, speak for and define the official version of 
things. This produces an ability to dominate and, therefore, symbolic violence. 
The unequal value attributed to different kinds of capital enables relations of 
domination, subordination and equivalence, and stratification.
As I show in the following chapters, the kinds of capital that women and men 
vendors, mas makers, squatters and associational members access is more 
nuanced and negotiated than simply class or identity categories suggest. Clearly, 
even if ways of thinking and forms of power are imposed on more subordinated 
groups, they do not simply accept them and the social order as just. Similarly, a 
politics of authority works as it does because of such shifting and unstable 
registers of power.
The differences produced by forms of capital create “fields”. There may be, for 
example, educational or legal fields. There are many fields with varying relations 
to each other and forms of capital may be both general and field-specific. Women 
and men’s capacity for individual and collective agency is therefore shaped by, 
“the constellation of forces within the political field...the volume and 
composition of social capital...and...the possession of symbolic capital (cultural 
framing)” (Stokkes 2002, 21).
With these concepts in mind, I begin to look at regular happenings in and around 
the San Fernando Central Market. I have outlined how the key dispositions
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explored in this study are grounded in lore. Lore describes a habitus that enables 
women and men from a range of groups to participate in different fields and to 
bring different forms of capital to their interactions. One of my goals in this study 
is to show the forms of power that women and men bring to their order-making 
practices, and the extent to which they involve contending concepts of legality 
and legitimacy.
3. 3 Everybody Have to Eat
Everybody have to eat, a sentiment often articulated by San Fernando Central 
Market vendors, expresses the basic value system of marketing culture. Also 
expressed as “everybody out here to make a dollar” or “everybody have to live”, 
this concept encompasses other notions such as “looking out for each other” and 
“all o f we live as one”. It is both a social and business ethic and blurs the 
distinctions between these two. It provides a rationale for vendors’ decisions 
regarding sharing, cooperation, competition and conflict, and for the ways they 
negotiate with police and government policy regarding sidewalk vending.
Figure 12: Something for Everyone to Take Home
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The concept is a “disposition” which influences how women and men creatively 
respond to their circumstances (Bourdieu 1977, 261). Dispositions are the 
dominant and enduring beliefs and practices of a group. They are internalized, and 
shape how women and men think, feel and act. They are then externalized as 
women and men creatively and individually choose different responses. Choices 
are limited though by “the possibilities and impossibilities, freedoms and 
necessities, opportunities,, and prohibitions” set by social conditions (Bourdieu 
1990 [1980], 54). This whvds Bourdieu says that women and men make “virtue of 
necessity”. Agency must be understood within contexts set by class, gender, 
history, politics and economy3.
Similarly, dispositions such as love for mas, return to spirituality and contacts 
both structure women and men’s choices and are structured or reshaped by them. 
Women and men internalize and externalize their possibilities and prohibitions. 
They use them to make their actions meaningful, to engage their meanings and to 
express ideals of order and balance. The San Fernando Central Market provides 
the first site for exploring how dispositions are lived.
3.3.1 Cooperation, Competition and Conflict
With so many vendors selling such similar goods, the market is a very 
competitive space. The concept everybody have to eat comprises, among others, 
an ethic of cooperation based on the reality that “whole day you are here, you 
have to live like one”. Vendors will call therefore each other “neighbour” if they 
sell near to each other. Others are called “tantie” (auntie) if they are older.
3 In Bourdieu’s words, “The habitus, a product of history, produces individual and collective 
practices -  more history -  in accordance with the schemes generated by history. It ensures the 
active presence of past experiences, which...guarantee the ‘correctness’ of practices and their 
constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms...the habitus tends to 
generate all the ‘reasonable’, ‘common-sense’, behaviours (and only these) which are possible 
within the limits of these regularities...” (1990 [1980], 54-55).
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Vendors who sell next to each other or who have been selling in the market for 
many years, and who may know each other from their villages, treat the market as 
a community. In fact, it feels like its own community.
Vendors cooperate by helping others sell, doing little favours like helping a friend 
or neighbour “pack their stall”, watching each other’s goods, loaning money, 
bartering, buying wholesale goods together, sharing toilet paper, water, cigarettes 
or food, sharing scales and storage space, saving better goods for each other, 
sharing advice, contributing to a sousou\ providing small change for each other 
and comparing prices to establish a common rate. Vendors also engage in an 
informal economy amongst themselves where live chicks and ducklings, and 
sometimes wild squirrels and parrots that are caught, are sold. Use of one 
vendor’s scale would be informally traded for space on the other vendor’s stall 
when needed.
Vendors also barter with each other, sell to each other at cheaper prices and bring 
each other small gifts of produce. This can help them spend only a little so that 
they can save more5. Lloyd-Evans and Potter (2002, 162) note that working on 
behalf of others or to improve the overall position of the group is often based on 
feelings of solidarity and common values. These are particularly important in the 
informal sector.
Sharing is therefore also based on the usefulness of exchange and reciprocity. 
Gifts of produce to customers, the Market Clerk and friendly police are also part 
of this practice. Vendors I spoke to often talked about feeling proud of how they 
help each other and cooperate, and how that is part of market life because “all ah 
we come here to get some food to carry home”. If vendors bring young daughters
4 An informal, cooperative, rotating savings scheme.
5 Social capital is provided by networks based on trust, loyalty and reciprocity. Moser (1996) 
argues that economic crisis and structural adjustment positively and negatively affect social capital 
by strengthening it during hardship through reciprocity networks, but also by reducing the ability 
to help others. Decreasing reciprocity can erode the social networks upon which small informal 
enterprises are often dependent.
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or granddaughters to sell with them, other female vendors will often keep an eye 
on these teenagers and give them advice. Members of small groups may also get 
together outside of the market at weddings, funerals, religious occasions and 
birthdays. The market is clearly a place for both consumption and sociality.
Family members, including younger and elder sisters, mothers (and to a lesser 
extent fathers) and daughters (and to a lesser extent sons), sisters in law, 
grandmothers and their (usually female) grandchildren may sell together. Where 
women or men don’t sell with family, they often rely on friendship networks, 
particularly with elder women whom they may know through family or their 
village. Looking at very old (usually Indo-Trinidadian) women who continue to 
operate a stall even when their children are professionals who support them, it 
seems to be more about sociality than livelihood. *
Space is one of the key aspects of market life that is shared. In instances when one 
vendor sells for another, it is customary that the goods’ owner be given all the 
money. Of the forty or so vendors I knew very well, only Julia charged another 
for use of her monthly paid stalls on the emptier days of Monday, Wednesday, 
Thursday or Sunday. This Indo-Trinidadian vendor was in her 30s, owned three 
stalls, and at home owned two televisions, a VCR, a DVD player, a van, and a cell 
phone among other things. She represented a younger generation of vendors, but 
also an ethic not simply based on survival needs that everyone must meet.
It is the main custom to share stalls and space for free. However, vendors who do 
this face possible ‘confusion’ (conflict) from some kind of abuse of the 
relationship. A vendor may find that the other has left her stall dirty by another 
she has let share her space or she might not get enough space on her own stall 
when she comes to sell or she may find out that the vendor has been gossiping 
about her personal business to neighbouring vendors as they become more 
friendly.
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Vendors’ form relationships jp»e with each other as well as with customers. They 
trade picong (teasing talk) with customers and tell regulars that they miss them if 
they have not seen them for a long time. Regular customers also look forward to 
this atmosphere. Even on the road, while vendors sometimes offer cheaper prices 
to regulars, customers will also buy from their favourite vendors regardless of 
price and even tell vendors to keep the change. However, vendors complain that 
overall people will pay whatever price the grocery calls, but want everything in 
the market for a dollar. They feel shoppers challenge vendors’ prices as if the 
vendors don’t have to pay bills and also buy groceries.
Conflicts mainly arise because of jealousy, space, money, gossip, pricing and 
calling away someone’s customer. Vendors may experience others’ jealousy if 
their sales are fast or they have managed to sell a lot of their goods. Others talk 
about how “you are selling with a jumbie or a jinx” to be so successful. Vendors 
therefore mention squeezing lime on their goods to “cut the blight” caused by 
“maljo”6.
They may sell to each other, but a number had complaints about others who lied 
about how much the goods weighed and charged them more. Although they share 
scales, if too much use is made of the scale or it is borrowed too often, the vendor 
will complain how the other is “too miserable”. Space becomes an issue when one 
person’s goods may be seen as stacked too high and blocking customers’ view of 
a neighbour’s goods.
Money may become an issue when vendors sell for each other and one feels that 
she has not been given all their money. Petty theft between vendors, and others 
wandering through the market, also occurs. Underpricing is also an issue because 
it is seen as taking away someone else’s dollar or “trying to run down one 
another”. It is a complex issue, however, because selling prices are based on 
buying prices and quality, and the cheaper costs of one’s own garden goods. Una,
6 This means “bad or evil eye” and comes from the French words malyeux.
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an older Afro-Trinidadian vendor whose daughter now sells separately in the 
market, told me that she doesn’t “undersell” even if she brings food from her 
garden. Rather, she sells at the price of others selling the same goods because she 
knows “they have to make their dollar”. I never encountered conflict resulting 
from participation in a sousou.
Calling away someone’s customer is frowned upon, again, because it is seen as 
taking someone else’s dollar. I witnessed a discussion about this one day. An old 
male vendor quarrelled with a new younger woman and told her to wait until 
customers came to her stall. The women around me exchanged views about this, 
concluding that if the woman came “to make ah honest shilling”, she could sell 
how she wanted. However, the woman realised that she had to learn how to 
appropriately participate in a powerful marketing ethic. The idea of not calling 
away somebody’s customer conforms to the view vendors often articulate that 
“what is for you is for you”. In this context, this means that the dollar that comes 
to you is yours to make.
Vendors say there is not much conflict among them. This reflects both a reality 
and an ideal. Many maintain friendly, harmonious relations, especially with their 
group of neighbours, for many years. Many older women say they don’t like too 
much quarrelling. Even people who are vex with each other, soon start back 
talking. Aneela, an Indo-Trinidadian woman who sells with her husband on the 
third floor described this saying, “It have a helping hand always. If you have 
problems with someone, nothing don’t keep. Everyone cooperates together. 
Everybody is hustling, but women and men help each other sell because everyone 
is willing to see somebody get something when the day come”. Vendors will say 
race is not an issue on their floor for this reason. Vendors may “joke complain” 
about each other and talk about who is “miserable” and who “like to give 
trouble”. There may be much petty fuss and vexation, but serious or physical 
conflict is rare.
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Vendors aim to work and ‘live’ together. However, where conflict doesn’t appear 
obvious or direct, one can still observe undercurrents in the way women may 
ignore each other, refuse to sell next to each other, throw words, gossip about 
each other or give “cut eye”. Overall, a sense of vendors’ interdependence and the 
importance of relationship>merge.
This picture is very different from the one presented by Lloyd-Evans and Potter. 
They quote one Afro-Trinidadian woman saying that women “help each other” 
and that such relationships work (2002, 189). However, they conclusively state, 
“higglers have poor networks between themselves...are not willing to assist co- 
workers in times of trouble as one might expect. Mutual assistance among 
higglers only seems to be provided in a number of circumstances, mainly at a 
household level, but rarely in business” (2002, 188)7. In particular, for females 
that they interviewed, social networks do not lead to social capital without trust 
and reciprocity.
In contrast, my observations in this market suggest that business is not simply 
about being competitive. Vendors attempt to balance making their dollar with not 
taking away someone else’s. This value extends even to their relationship with 
customers who often get a little extra for free as encouragement to return. This is 
what Trinidadians call a “langniappe” or when a little extra or more than what is 
paid for is given. Even the movement of materials, such as cardboard boxes, 
which are recycled repeatedly around the market for different purposes (to bring 
in goods, to take home goods, to display goods on the road) highlights the 
importance of what vendors describe as “how you speak to people”. Even if they 
primarily sell because their other employment choices are limited, women miss 
the comraderie of the market when they don’t come and are, instead, by
7 They go on to write that, “By contrast, Indo-Trinidadian family businesses tend to operate on a 
totally different ideology. Families work together for the good of the whole unit, often combining 
the economic activity of several households in a patriarchal system of control” (2002, 188). Lloyd- 
Evans and Potter focused more greatly on an Afro-Trinidadian female sample than an Indo- 
Trindidadian one. They understood Indo-Trinidadian women’s roles within the context of the 
patriarchal family whereas this sample presents a different picture.
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themselves at home “with just the TV and the house”. Comraderie is also an 
important aspect of marketing for men. As Merlene, an Indo-Trinidadian vendor 
selling for thirty years in the market said, “Is like you home for the whole day, 
everyone live like one family”. The sociality of market economics cannot be 
ignored.
3.3.2 The Significance o f Economic Relations to Social Life
Figure 13: 40 Years Selling in the M arket and Still Going Strong
As the majority o f vendors that I interviewed were women, the responses mainly 
reflect women’s experiences and stories. The majority of market vendors are also 
women and, to a great extent, the common histories revealed through interviews 
suggest the experiences o f the much larger group in the market. Their most 
important reason for selling in the market was the need to supplement or provide 
family income and the importance of sending their children to school.
After family tradition, “life was tough” is the most common reason older women 
came to sell in the market. Survival of their family and education of their children 
was the most important goal. Women did not want to “stay home and cook and
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wash”. Many instead said “let me try and do something”, got some help in the 
beginning from someone they knew and began selling in the market. It was also 
very significant that now they did not have to tell their husbands how much they 
earned nor ask for help from those who did not provide.
More than supporting children and having unsupportive husbands, younger 
married and unmarried women emphasise the importance of “having my own 
dollars”, liking to work on their own and feeling they “can't be pushed around”. 
Even if a few younger women at first felt shame to sell in the market, their 
mothers often told them they were “making an honest dollar” and encouraged 
them to run their own business. Other women, like village “tanties” or older 
women known to the vendors also taught many that I spoke to “how to sell, how 
to buy, how to arrange goods, how to raise prices, when to drop prices, how to use 
the scale, how to understand the different prices for different seasons”. Being self- 
employed, able to support a family and build a house is also important to the men 
I interviewed and spoke to. A few had lost or given up their jobs or were 
employed part-time. The majority was employed in the market full time. 
However, husbands who sell with their wives are more likely to intermittently 
take on other jobs, e.g. in construction or according to their skill, to bring in two 
incomes.
Vendors like marketing because “even if you don’t sell out or make back your 
money, you always have things to eat”. As well, even if turnover is small, “you 
always have change in your pocket for what you need, you don’t have to wait 
until the end of the month, you always have something to give to others”. 
Marketing alldwjmem to save a little and have extra for family, schooling, 
groceries and a little leisure. They like “being your own boss”, being able to “sit 
down and get up when I want”, “standing on your own feet”, working three days a 
week (those who do), meeting customers and having conversations about life and 
troubles, making money, making decisions, helping out others and keeping 
themselves occupied.
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Usually, vendors like marketing more than they dislike it. As Miss Cleo, one 
older, Afro-Trinidadian female vendor explained, “I would have my little in my 
comer and he don’t have to know about that but if he crying you could pull out 
your money and make some style and give him some. You could buy without 
asking. You could make grocery, sousou, give him and the children some to hold 
because they helped in the garden”. Marketing also teaches women to be brave. 
My teenage friend Jackie affirmed, it teaches “how to deal with life on the 
outside”.
3.3.3 More than Money Matters: Dollar Sense on the Streets
Vendors cooperate in many ways on the road and share space, scales, small 
change, plastic bags and boxes. Vendors may also help each other make bags of 
goods on the road and try to entice customers to buy each other’s goods if they are 
selling different produce.
Figure 14: Blocking a Spot
However, sorting out selling places on the road is an especially important aspect 
of vendors’ negotiation with each other. They often compete for places and move
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each other’s bags or boxes set to “block” a spot. Most vendors “block” a space by 
laying a crocus bag or box on the road between and in front of the cars parked on 
Mucurapo Street. Alternately, they may rest their bag of goods where they want to 
sell. Most vendors go out before the market has closed to secure a place to sell or 
their friends will save them a spot if they go before. For this reason, vendors who 
sell near to each other in the market, often sell near to each other on the road. 
However, vendors try to make space for each other and will shift around, 
especially when an elderly woman comes with her goods. It is not a problem to 
find a little space if a vendor only has a few goods to sell.
Quarrels can still arise if a vendor takes up too much room or is hostile to another 
who wants to sell next to him or her. However, essentially, “it doh have nothing 
about holding a spot” and no one can really claim a spot on the road. When 
vendors move others off their regular and claimed spot, others quarrel saying 
“you don’t pay rent”, that “nobody can't claim a spot and those who put down 
their bag and box just playing boss” or that “the road is for everybody”.
Nonetheless, informal claims to space are part of the experience of roadside 
selling. If vendors don’t bring out their goods soon after blocking a space and 
others move their boxes or bags, most people will just find another spot along the 
road to sell. There would probably be a little grumbling, but most vendors will 
avoid conflict. All but one of the vendors I interviewed described relations 
between roadside sellers as “nice”, “okay”, “good”, “very good”, “quiet” and “no 
problem”. This vendor nonetheless pointed out that small conflicts only last 10-15 
minutes. This picture is true for the majority of vendors. However, once or twice I 
saw fights break out between roadside vendors, usually men who had been 
drinking alcohol and had then irritated each other.
\
Somewhat different from selling in the market, selling on the side of the road 
introduces its own competing value: hustling. This concept is shared with the 
wharf, but that area is seen as “a win or lose place focusing on every dollar”. In
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describing the relation between “everybody have to eat” and “hustling”, the 
Market Administrator (once Head Clerk at the King’s Wharf Fish Market) 
compared “some have a conscience” with “some conscience is their dollar”. 
Hustling is concerned strictly with making money. It emerges in relation to time 
and space. For example, in the afternoon when vendors are trying to “sell out”, it 
is more likely that they will call out prices to passing customers, even those 
looking at another vendors’ goods. Unlike the morning, which is for making back 
“capital”, the afternoon is for making profit or what vendors call “interest”.
Hustling, as a value, begins to emerge in the afternoon in the market and peaks in 
the afternoon on the road. It deeply influences how space is negotiated among 
vendors, and between vendors and police. “Everybody have to eat” is an informal 
value system which provides a legitimate basis for negotiation with governmental 
rules. The concept of hustling doesn’t negate this value but, at times, it alters the 
rules of competition and cooperation and goes one step further in legitimating 
vendors’ illegal actions. It is possible that the relationship between the 
“everybody have to eat” and “hustling” highlights value change over time. One or 
two older Indo-Trinidadian female vendors commented to me that, “Now 
everyone is running down money and trying to get for themselves”. Older 
vendors, in particular, feel that they didn’t learn to market like that and don’t want 
“to move so”.
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Figure 15: Hustling on the Road
Over several afternoons on the road, I asked vendors how they would define 
hustling. I usually didn’t ask vendors much on the road, but observed and casually 
chatted with them. I realised, as Lloyd, an Afro-Trinidadian man in his thirties, 
said, “While people’s money jumping up, is time to sell not talk”. In explaining 
the meaning of “hustling”, Shasha, one young Indo-Trinidadian, female vendor 
described how she has to be friendly with customers on the road or else they 
won’t buy. She also has to call out to them on the road and entice them with 
prices, by grabbing their attention (“dahlin, you want bodi?”) or through jokes 
(“sour orange and sweet grapefruit to sell!”, “Sweet sucking ting under the skin!” 
(referring to portugals), “Pepper so hot yuh have to fan!" (using a cardboard box 
cover to fan), “Slime for your husband to eat!” (referring to ochros) .
A “mixed” vendor from the third floor, Reds, agreed that hustling on the road “is 
like making noise, attracting customers, working hard, taking shit and making 
joke”. Vendors, and especially male vendors, try to dazzle customers with quick
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chatter, “sweet talk”, and prices that fly past them as they hesitate, and then find 
the vendors have already handed them the goods bagged. Lloyd, who usually sells 
on the third floor, felt, “Hustling is always toward a goal, it means going through 
hard times, trying to get back capital”. As Miss Cleo concluded, "Hustling is 
trying to get the goods out yuh hand”.
An older Indo-Trinidadian ground-floor vendor also linked hustling to road- 
selling culture itself. Merlene told me, “Hustling does have you real tired cus yuh 
busy busy busy because police making you move your goods”. An Indo- 
Trinidadian male, Lance, who sells fruit and com out of a shopping cart agreed, 
“Hustling is buying goods, selling it fast at a cheap price or under cost if you have 
to, is hard work too like when sun hot, police harassing yuh, you have to be on 
your toes, is a stress to make sure they don’t lock you up”. However, some 
vendors thrive off the thrill. “Spanish” (Khan, 1993), a male vendor, usually 
selling on the third floor, described hustling as a “pleasure, excitement, the street 
have kicksy (funny) characters, you making money fun, hide and seek with 
police, and if you know what you doing you could make plenty money”.
3.3.4 The Sociality of Consumption
Like a slowly turning kaleidoscope, everybody have to eat changes combination 
and guise as view filters through morning then afternoon, market stall then 
roadside spot, and older to younger vendors’ generational practices. It’s a value 
sensitive to the hum of market life. Clearly, both dollars and people matter, and 
understanding of one is looped through the other. For women, marketing enables 
them to have mobility, independence, friendship, economic power and a family. 
For men, it is also associated with excitement, risk and leisure. Ideals here pivot 
on labour and need, but also the value or dignity of labour.
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These ideals are practiced within spousal and extended family relationships, 
between neighbours from villages, and among neighbours at the market or on the 
road. They are even practiced with the police. It is almost as if everybody have to 
eat is about consuming public space for the benefit of self and family - within the 
limits set by them. The roadside becomes significant because of aspects of life, 
such as household income and decision-making, educating children, and saving 
and spending, that usually considered “private”. Here, however, everybody have 
to eat encompasses how these define public space, its talk-filled atmosphere and 
its rules. This helps explains the exchanges, witnessed in the next chapter, 
between police and vendors. /  . ^  ^  ^
This first look at how dispositions are lived shows why habitus is such a central j [. 7*^  ♦ i 3
concept to this study. Habitus refers to habitually practiced knowledge. Arising 
from growing up learning the expected ways of life, from the practical 
expectations implicit in everything from the position of furniture in the house to 
the ways people greet each other, habitus accounts for the inculcation of lore as a 
kind of natural expectation of how people will behave with respect to each other 
and contrasts with the more explicit and institutionalized foundations of law. This 
is how social politics is interlocked with lore or informal social life.
o p
As I go on to show in the next section, dispositions create an organizing order that 
can be applied across infinite kinds of tasks and fields (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]:
261). This is what Bourdieu means when he says that they function “as a matrix 
of perceptions, appreciations, and actions” which create a “schemata”. This 
produces, for example, coherence in consumption practices across music, sport 
and art, but also coherence between marital or political choices in an individuals’ 
life8. One of the most interesting things about this chapter is that, across the f o u r /  
sites in the study, it shows precisely these analogies.
8 As Daniel Miller (2006, 7) writes of his research in London, “We had found that we couldn’t 
start to consider [people’s] relationship to some genre of memory such as their wardrobe, their 
attitude to sexual relationships, their approach to the use of recipes, or how they dealt with the 
divorce o f their parents, in isolation. Each made sense of the other only in terms o f a larger habitus
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Habitus creates a social world because those with the same socialization and 
conditioning share norms and categories of judgment. This is what Bourdieu 
referred to as the “ontological complicity” and “implicit collusion” generated by 
shared categories of perception and appreciation (Bourdieu 2000 [1997]: 163). 
Yet, by embodying habitus, women and men also actively engage with the norms 
of their world. Habitus, therefore, also creates individuals who devise their own 
systematic contradictions and a unique approach to life out of widely shared 
social norms or dispositions. As Bourdieu (ibid, 261) writes, “practice results 
from “a dialectical relationship between a situation and a habitus”. This is why 
social politics plays out in such varying ways. Leaving the market, I now head 
down Mucurapo St. to the Lionel Jagessar and Associates’ mas camp. From here, 
I add the disposition love fo r  mas to this discussion.
3.4 Love for Mas
Figure 16: Family and Friends in the Mas Camp
akin to the use o f that term by Bourdieu”. As I discuss in Chapter 5, these observations underlie 
Miller’s use of the concept “aesthetic” in relation to “the ideals o f order, and balance people use in 
life, some quite formal, some impressionistic, some calm, some riven by anxiety and denial”.
127
Love for mas articulates an emotion fundamental to mas making and relationships 
in mas camp life. It creates a language for talking about work, family and art, and 
also blurs social and business values. Love for mas mirrors everybody have to eat 
in the sense that it expresses ideals that shape and are shaped by relationships to 
things such as money, practices such as consumption, ideas about what matters, 
and women and men of all kinds.
Love for mas is about imagining a mas band and its significance, making and 
selling costumes, reproducing a dispersed group that voluntarily comes together 
for no other reason than to go public, and managing cooperation, sharing, 
reciprocity and conflict. It contributes a rationale for the bargaining observed in 
San Fernando Carnival Committee meetings and described in the next chapter.
As with market vendors, it is about balancing governing and being almost 
ungovernable. Yet, somewhat differently, while everyone engages with marketing 
to earn a living, mas making is voluntary work for some. The fact that only the 
key players really rely on it for a livelihood makes it all the more surprising that 
mas makers have so much in common at all.
3.4.1 Mixing Love and Business: Negotiating Work, Commitment and Reward
Cooperation has always been important to mas making. Smaller bands are 
especially associated with shared labour among friends and neighbours (Crowley 
1956; Procope 1956, Alleyne-Dettmers 1993, Waite 1993). Husband and wife 
teams, and their circle of friends, complete the majority of work. Representational 
bands or those where individual characters are played elicit especial commitment 
from those “working the mas”. This is true for Indian mas as it carries elements of 
the spiritual and sacred. Yet, mas camp life shows how even when participation is 
idealized, coercion, encouragement, competing ideals of nonparticipation,
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negotiation for participation on redefined terms, and challenges to leadership are 
part of the experience.
P L A C E M E N  & TEDDY
Figure 17: Announcing the Band
Business and profit, rather than simply idealized notions of nationhood, self- 
expression and freedom, are significant to mas making. This is particularly true 
for large (comprising thousands of women and men) mas bands in Port of Spain. 
Being a “South” band, the Jagessars’ have always had to keep the costume prices 
much lower than in the capital city. If the costumes are unaffordable, then the 
numbers of those playing in the band would decrease. They try to keep the price 
o f the costume between $400 and $650 which is at least half of the price of a 
costume in Port of Spain. The smaller numbers of mas players in San Fernando, 
partly because of the smaller population and the larger numbers of people that go 
to Port of Spain to play mas, make a difference to the business of mas making in 
South. This is closer to the experience of other areas outside of the capital.
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Unlike in Port of Spain, large bands in San Fernando may rely heavily on 
unwaged labour and loyalty. Volunteered help is not so much a gift as a desire to 
participate and contribute, and to work out the terms of reciprocity over time. 
Friends and family know that the bands need help and their willingness is almost 
civic as it aims to put the band on the road. It also aims to make the Carnival 
happen. Yet, mas makers must make a living. Small profits derived from mas 
bands mean that they must also discourage helpers from asking too much while 
encouraging them to increasingly work longer and faster as Carnival approaches. 
Love for mas is the point on which negotiation swivels.
For Lionel, Rose and their children, making mas is both about love and business. 
Especially, for the members of this family unit, it provides a livelihood. Rose 
administers the band, Larry manages the mas camp, Lisa researches and prepares 
information about their portrayals, Lionel creates costume designs and the 
youngest, Junior, boisterously helps out. Rose is committed to the band because 
of “love for my culture, mas and my husband” (on a similar point see Mason 
1998, 85). She considers herself equally a bandleader and said that she loved the 
mas even when not profitable. In those times, they were able to rely more on 
people’s help. In the early days, Lionel had other jobs for extra income. He 
recollected, “So that is where the love come in. Because we love mas we stay 
with it, but I leave jobs for Carnival, for my culture since about 1979 or 1980”.
Lionel and Rose explained that mas makers working in the camp are “paid” with 
costumes or food on the days when they work. Lionel said, “Many times we will 
ask them what they want, if they want Rose to give them food, if they want pay. 
They come with their answer for theyself, whatever they desire to have. It’s more 
than a discount. They get their costume for free but if they want more like a 
bonnet and trail they have to pay”. This is because large costume pieces like these 
use a lot of materials, and are very time consuming for even skilled mas makers. 
Because of band sizes, makers in Port of Spain are more often waged workers in 
an industry. Similarly, if a band from Port of Spain commissions the Jagessar
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camp to make their ‘hats’ (headpieces), and arm, leg, waist and neck pieces, the 
family pays everyone who works on that job.
Sometimes, longtime band members have learned skills for which the bandleaders 
pay them. Yet, Lionel and Rose summarized, “People in this mas camp in San 
Fernando do it because they love mas and it is a hobby to them. One fella comes 
in the mas camp because he getting a place to live, another because he is getting 
rum to drink, another is getting cigarettes and food. And he not leaving until after 
carnival, he not leaving there. All them boys used to come bring their bags and 
sleep by Junior. They love mas and the bacchanal that is around a mas camp, one 
might drop ‘fatigue’ on another, but working at the same time. Then, meal times 
Rose cooking, they bathe here, everything. Some come for vices, some come for 
lodging and some come to learn to make the mas. Others might come around for 
personal gain or because they think the mas camp is where the action is. Some 
come for love of it”.
Life in the Jagessar camp has changed over time. There is less alcohol drinking 
and liming. Now, Lionel suggested, camp members have less time because most 
of the work starts in the months just before Christmas. It is not like Port of Spain 
where people are working throughout the year. They also get more help in years 
when band numbers are high. For example, in 1999 when the band was 
celebrating its twentieth anniversary, one thousand women and men played with 
them and more than usual came to help. In comparison, around five hundred 
played mas with the band in 2003. Friends, nephews, nieces, in-laws and original 
members of the band will come to help, sometimes through day and night. As 
Lionel explained, “They like Indian mas and like to work Indian mas. I don’t 
think they like other mas as much as Indian mas”.
Masqueraders are often loyal to a particular mas or to a bandleader (see also 
Waite 1993, 196). Loyalty to the mas is especially true for Indian mas as it is a 
renewed version each year. However, others enter the band because of the price,
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to play with their friends or because they like a particular year’s costumes. Aching 
(2002, 81) additionally points out that, “one’s association with a particular band 
is, for the most part, an open public statement about one’s allegiances, for 
example, to a certain neighbourhood, class, sexuality and skin colour range”. He 
doesn’t say this but, as in the market, allegiances to fictive and extended family 
are also manifest.
Lionel and Rose said that they never really have conflicts with women and men 
over what they want for work. However, both my observations and discussions 
suggest that mas camp workers quietly grumble amongst themselves about food, 
hours, how they are treated and spoken to, and terms on which they participate. 
The bandleaders say conflicts are small. They might occur with those who only 
come to hang around and not work, and who take up the place of someone who 
comes to help or who want food or a costume that they didn’t work for. Lionel 
said he used to “be rough” on people who didn’t work hard enough but is less so 
now. Sometimes people want more than they get or they steal costume materials, 
particularly if they feel unappreciated.
Despite the relaxed atmosphere of mas camps, a work ethic always prevails 
(Mason 1998). Peter Mason describes signs around the Peter Minshall camp 
saying, “no liming” and an atmosphere that also treats Carnival as serious 
business. The bandleaders felt that the experience should not be different if you 
are a family or non-family member. Lionel said, “We try not to make anyone feel 
less than anyone unless we teaching you in a way how to behave”. As Lionel said, 
“Every job you will have those who work hard and who don’t but we try not to 
discriminate, maybe we will joke with you, give you fatigue or a name to let you 
know, Dr. Do-Little or something”.
From about September to November, camp members work about three to four 
hours a day per week. From about November, work hours begin to increase. The 
fifteen or so men (and women) involved usually begin to leave between eleven
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pm and midnight. From January, they work twelve to fourteen hours a day. The 
camp begins to close between one and three in the morning at this time. In the last 
two to three weeks, the sons and other males may start sleeping in the camp, and 
working day and night.
Work hours are particularly long if many people sign up to play with the band or 
request costumes in a section that is already full. The day or two before Carnival 
may also be hectic as others come at the last minute to request costumes. Rose 
does not turn them down because the customer has chosen the band over the 
others and they hope they will play next year again. Working through night and 
day usually happens just before competitions as well. Friends, usually men, come 
in to help make and “pretty up” the King and, especially, Queen costumes. The 
men will work without sleep and then go home for a day or two before coming 
back out again.
Love of mas is also important to the Fireworks Promotions camp as friends and 
family members who “work the mas” with them are unpaid. About ten to fifteen 
come regularly to work and bandleader Wayne Hanuman says that, as his band 
comprises four hundred or less members, he doesn’t have to push them to finish a 
lot of costumes. However, he knows they come out of loyalty or to get a free 
costume. Like the other bandleaders, he feeds them cooked food on a weekend 
and sandwiches during the week. He said women are the majority of workers in 
his camp as many of them are his wife’s friends.
In the Kalicharan’s camp, mostly their sons’ friends come to help. They help 
because of their connection and loyalty to the family. Wendy Kalicharan thought 
it was not so much about a love for mas because many of them come to help for 
the first time. Older women and men come because of loyalty to family too and, 
secondarily, because of love for mas. Family and friends also come and work 
voluntarily in this camp, which has successfully produced both winning King and 
Queen costumes. Wendy will give them sandwiches and sometimes cooked food.
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She said that they give regular workers a free costume plus a few hundred dollars 
on Carnival day. As well, some may accompany the family on trips to different 
Carnival events around the country. However, as with the Jagessars, family 
members do the majority of the work. The Kalicharans try to finish their costumes 
two months before as less people work through Christmas. As Presbyterians, it is 
also a holy time for them. They also like to fete during Carnival season and try to 
finish the work so they have some time. For the family, in particular, making mas 
is underscored by the love of it rather than simply for employment.
Bandleaders may be able to make their living from mas but they have to do other 
kinds of work as well including weddings and making mas for other countries’ 
Carnivals. Three of four of San Femando’s large bands need other business 
activities to supplement bandleaders’ income. As Lionel acknowledged, “In 
reality, there is no way that profit can be a bigger impetus than love for mas”. His 
view expresses what I observed in the period that I worked in the camp. Love for 
mas is strengthened by a love specifically for the materials, appearance and 
representation of Indian mas.
Past mas makers and Carnival Development Committee members that I 
interviewed concur. As past member of the committee Vemon Leotaud agreed, 
“Costume prices are cheaper. Labour is usually unpaid. Profits are smaller. The 
value of our bands is that they can survive based on free labour, family and 
friends support for the love of it. A bandleader must love mas to make mas in San 
Fernando especially”. This is also noted by Peter Mason (1998, 81) who describes 
mas makers’ commitment in terms of “love of mas, the team spirit and 
camaraderie, and as an outlet for their artistic talents”.
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3.4.2 Chief o f the Band, King o f the Road: Identity, Spirituality and Leadership
The notion of the mas man as artist developed over time. Mas man Peter 
Minshall’s (1985a, 9) view that, “I make mas’. And mas’ is art”, was crucial to 
this shift. Minshall’s own work appears a “high” art that is modem, globalised, 
historically-informed and self-conscious. This contrasts to the popular “low” art 
that mas was considered when it was formed from scraps and emerged from an 
ideology of nonpossession and peripheralisation (Aching 2002, 83). Mas men like 
Lionel Jagessar consider themselves artists and this has cultural, national rank. 
Unlike Minshall, Jagessar doesn’t compare his work to those of great twentieth 
century European artists, rather his artistry is validated by family, friends, 
bandmembers and the mas itself. In 1999, the state even awarded him a 
Hummingbird Silver medal for his contribution to Carnival.
Almost inescapably, Indian mas is representational (see also Bellour and Kinser 
1998) As a “traditional” mas that primarily expresses male Native American 
warriorhood, full costuming, portrayal and individual characters remain 
important. Noting how traditional mas players enter the spirit of their Carnival 
characters, Liverpool (2001, 475) suggests that portrayals of warriors and chiefs 
were attempts by the underprivileged to “gain the status denied them by society”. 
Reverence for Indian mas may endure in “lower class persons...portrayals...to 
identify with the struggles of Indians and warriors all over the world” (Liverpool 
2001, 362). It may be about “escape from the drudgery of daily life...the fight 
against tyranny...the spirit of attack...the hopes and aspirations of conquered 
tribes (Liverpool 2001,409).
It may also be connected to desires to represent particular masculinities. Partly, 
Lionel was attracted to Indian mas because he saw it as “a more rugged mas”. As 
he put it, “Being a youth man and ting, your muscles is something to you at that 
time, you want to be a chief or warrior or some special guy”. The masculinity 
associated in Indian mas is also reflected in the costumes. As Lionel described,
135
“The men make the mas look more Indian. It’s hot, but in carnival you could pick 
up a house, it is the spirit in you”. Interestingly, in comparison to the masjid, men 
and masculinity are the markers of ‘authenticity’.
A few, mainly older women, will play in full costume like the men and will wear 
a long decorated skirt and poncho (called a “shawl”), moccasins or moccasin 
boots, a bonnet (large feathered headpiece), bustle (large feathered backpiece) and 
facepaint. They may even wear a “herring bone” chest piece and carry a stick 
decorated with feathers. However, these are only a few, usually older women. In 
contrast, many older and younger men wear decorated long pants and jacket, 
bonnets, bustle, face paint, chest pieces and may carry sticks or horns.
Figure 18: Lionel Jagessar as Chief
For mas makers such as Lionel, who play chief characters, the recognition and 
sense of accomplishment felt on Carnival days may also inform their identities at 
other times of the year. Crowley correctly observes that Fancy Indians have
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individual names such as One Bull. I found that these titles are mainly taken on by 
those who are committed Indian mas players, are also mas makers and identify 
with the spirit of the mas or costume. Those in small bands may all have such 
titles, but it is a minority of primarily men in a large band such as the Jagessars 
who take on “warrior” names. Willie, who has his own small authentic Indian mas 
‘side’, is called the “Black Elk” and his mas camp is named “House of the Black 
Elk”. Another player changed his name to “Crazy Horse”.
An Indian mas elder (known to him as “Satan”) named Lionel “Pontiac”, a chief 
name from the Seminole Nation. Lionel also explained, “Since I do Indian mas, 
the people around me call me Sitting Bull, I portray that mas several times. They 
call me that out of the mas camp”. Lionel also warned, however, that a man once 
told him to be careful taking the name of someone who has lived before. For these 
mas makers, both Carnival and Indian mas making are spiritually-experienced. 
For Indian mas bandleaders, leadership is also a spiritual expression. Playing 
Indian mas creates an affinity with the spirit of mas and the warrior character. For 
mas makers, in particular, these influence their identities on and off the road.
Lionel always designs the costumes and the band’s section leaders make them in 
their respective mas camps. When there is conflict over costumes, Lionel asserts 
his leadership as the bandleader and artist. He expects the section leaders to 
follow his designs and said, “I am the Chief in my band and people have to hear”. 
Indian mas bandleaders therefore consider themselves Chiefs in their own rights 
and leaders of people because of a lineage that has little do with blood, (ethnic) 
belonging or authenticity. Their leadership is emotional, spiritual, cultural and 
artistic. The band’s longevity attests to the loyalty and labour they can 
legitimately command. Many of those in the band have been playing mas with the 
Jagessars for a decade or more.
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3.4.3 The Sociality o f Production
Love for mas encircles ideals regarding labour, loyalty and leadership. It 
expresses desires for self-assertion and a commitment to making culture public. It 
highlights the limits of freeness, the importance of reciprocity and “how you talk 
to people”, and, even, wranglings with hierarchy. It is interwoven with family and 
business priorities and relationships. Here, labour is unwaged, but it is not given 
for nothing at all. Even if  mas makers idealize participation, they may still feel 
they have to and can remind, “buff’ (discipline), cajole and entice to get enough 
labour volunteered. Complementarily, loyalty of those “working de mas” is often 
deep and abiding, but also contingent and grudging about disrespect. Leadership 
is grounded in people, culture, Native American history and ancestors, 
masculinity, the neighbourhood, family unit and “lime” (open-ended group of 
friends). As explored further in the next chapter, these meanings powerfully 
contour mas makers’ approaches to state and nation in Trinidad.
Love for mas adds another dimension to discussion of habitus. Mas makers 
negotiate very differently with each other and the state than vendors. This is 
because Carnival comprises and enables specific kinds of power or “capital”. In 
this sense, it is its own “field”. Fields comprise different women and men’s 
positions, different kinds of power and the relations among them all9. They are the 
sites of struggle, and people’s strategies are shaped by their position in and 
perceptions of the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 101). Female and male 
mas makers’ practices, therefore, “are constituted by and constitute their
9 An oft cited definition describes a field as “a structured space of positions in which the positions 
and their interrelations are determined by the distribution of different kinds of resources or 
“capital”” (Thompson 1991: 14). Jenkins (1992, 85) writes, “A field ... is a structured system of 
social positions -  occupied either by individuals or institutions -  the nature of which defines the 
situation for their occupants. It is also a system of forces which exist between these positions; a 
field is structured internally in terms of power relations. Positions stand in relationships of 
domination, subordination or equivalence (homology) to each other by virtue of the access they 
afford to the goods or resources (capital) which are at stake in the field. ... The nature of positions, 
their ‘objective definition’, is to be found in their relationship to the relevant form of capital”.
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dispositions (habitus), the capital they possess and the fields within which they 
operate” (Stokkes 2002, 5).
Drawing on Beyond a Boundary (Janies 1983 [1963]) for another example, 
cricket is a ‘field’ (as also literally!) with its own specific struggles shaped by a 
distinctive form of capital, “ownership of which is recognized to bestow symbolic 
authority within that field” (Smith 2006, 99). In this context, success or failure is 
not universal, natural nor determined by “seemingly autonomous struggles”, but 
result from “unrecognized homologies between that field and the wider forces of 
social power” (ibid, 99).
In other words, the power of cricketing ‘genius’ has to be understood in terms of 
its own rules as well as the larger historical and colonial context. Those who 
accept and participate in a particular field validate the truth of those who 
dominate. Others may challenge those claims of power by asserting that they are 
relative. For example, women can question whether cricket is an accurate 
metaphor for postcolonial engagement given their exclusion and the invalidity of 
generalizing men’s experience and masculinities as representative of us all.
In San Fernando, market, mas camp, masjid and Railway Line work as their own 
fields. They are each autonomously constituted by their own participants, 
expected roles and habitual relations, power struggles, kinds of capital, 
dispositions and meanings, and creative ways of negotiating survival, selfhood 
and belonging. Each site is not only physical, but realizes habitus as practice. The 
women and men who make up these catchments also access generalized forms of 
capital because of their ethnicity, income or gender. All these affect their ability 
to determine the terms of their engagement in the world or their aesthetic 
authority. Together, the women and men in these sites show a politics of authority 
that manifests in various and corresponding ways across domains of practice. In 
this light, the next site shows yet another incarnation of such politics in daily life.
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3.5 Contacts
Figure 19: The San Fernando King’s W harf
Contacts are more than just people one knows or relationships. They are women 
and men who can advise and help because they have status within or access to 
particular networks. This is what some call “political capital” and some call 
“social capital”. This haziness alone squarely points to its ambiguity, and styles of 
action. Contacts are cultivated, closely protected, highly valued and, often, 
considered very necessary for securing even the most basic services and meeting 
needs.
This is because the networks they can tap into are often bounded or hierarchical. 
Contacts matter, especially if  you are on the periphery of institutions and elites. 
Like “everybody have to eat”, “contacts” expressb^values of reciprocity and 
relationship. Yet, in stark contrast, it highlights an acceptance that not everyone 
will get nor get equally. In other words, who hustles really eats. Residents on the 
Railway Line survive through hustling, sharing and depending on others for help. 
This is a combination of connections and contacts. Even when they idealize
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mutual cooperation, many different factors create obstacles that are only 
sometimes overcome, and then only by some.
3.5.1 Connections: When Who You Know Means What You Have
Whereas the wharf is especially characterized by ‘hustling’, Railway Line 
residents spend a great deal of energy tempering this with values of sharing and 
cooperation. Their connections with each other are essential here. Both female 
and male residents on the Wharf and Railway Line see the two areas as different 
and somewhat separate social space. The Wharf is seen as a place open to the 
public, for fishermen and for selling fish, hustling and being “busy busy” making 
a livelihood.
In contrast, the Railway Line is seen as “semi residential”, “more homely”, “a 
little more elevated” and more like a “family-oriented” area. On the Line, families 
bathe in the sea on a weekend, children are in school during the week, and there is 
“no noise or fighting or drugs” and “nobody cussing nobody or tiefing from 
nobody” as occurs on the Wharf. Wharf activities, including “hustling fish and 
drugs” and selling sex are not as accepted on the Line. In particular, men see 
themselves as responsible for keeping drug selling or stealing out of the Line.
There are no formal community-based organizations, social clubs, women’s 
groups or religious centres which a majority of neighbourhood members attend. 
Yet, even without formal organization, women and men have created a 
neighbourhood rich in family life. Line residents say that men who come to the 
area for illegal activities, from Marabella or Springvale, cause the reputation or 
“stain” of King’s Wharf.
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Figure 20: On the Railway Line
A number of women told me that it makes it harder to get a job if the employer 
knows you are from the Wharf. They often emphasised that if people come to the 
place to know it from being around it, they will see that it “ent [is not] that bad” 
and that “here is a part of the world”.
Those who live on the Railway Line consider it their own legitimate part of the 
world. Social networks, which aid sharing, are very important to residents’ lives 
and relationships exist with immediate neighbours who see each other each day. 
For the most part, relations among residents are cordial. Among CEPEP and URP 
workers, six report “okay” relations, four “good” relations and three “very good” 
relations. Only one (mixed) male CEPEP worker said that relations were “not 
good”. He was very critical of community gossip and people not wanting “to see 
others improve”. One person gave no response.
Residents say there is cooperation, but will also complain that it is not enough. 
Both women and men borrow carts to carry buckets to fill water, borrow money, 
share fruit, cigarettes, mariiuana. rolline naner. drinks, roasted fish and advice.
There are two extended family groups, one Indo-Trinidadian/^ougla and one
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Afro-Trinidadian, who live on the Wharf and Line. Usually, extended female 
family members will share food with each other and, only sometimes, with others.
Some neighbours may help if another is sick, especially an elder resident. 
Generally, the neighbourhood comes together for deaths or events in the area. 
Often, women and men will look out for each other’s children. They also 
cooperate for events such as family day or St. Peter’s Day when everyone 
contributes food or labour. On Carnival Sunday as well, they “have a lil lime 
going down to Jouvay”. As Josanne, one young woman working for CEPEP, 
explained, “we have to cooperate because everyone has to share together, when it 
have functions we cooperate with that. When we have a reason to cooperate, we 
cooperate”.
However, Mr. Ross, a male, Afro-Trinidadian resident working with CEPEP, 
complained that “we meet, talk, laugh, make jokes, but we are not really a 
community getting together to discuss things. I try once or twice and everyone 
says “yes yes” but then only two show up. We don’t have a sense of 
permanence”. Another, Bolo, complained that, “nobody looks out for you here”. 
URP workers tell the same stories. Lana told me about sharing clothes with other 
residents from a barrel her family sent from New York. The women working in 
URP also mentioned sharing advice about childrearing, “cooking”, “little 
household things” and what they could do to better the area. Women have gone to 
their representatives in small groups to ask for pipe-borne water and electricity. 
Residents’ friendships may also change as friends quarrel and stop speaking or 
start talking more to others.
Besides the quiet, peace, fruit trees, sea breeze and view of the sea, residents like 
having plenty^Tpartners” to roast a fish or cook with, mingle and talk. 
Nonetheless, they do not like many aspects of life on the Line. These include how 
men from other areas, but mostly Springvale, hide drugs on the Line to sell on the 
Wharf. Women especially believe that this puts them all at risk and makes the
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police “harass everyone”. A number of residents talked about how “cocaine spoil 
here” by bringing more violence, theft and drug dealing. Marijuana selling and 
smoking is hardly considered an issue. Life has also become more difficult as 
there are fewer boats now, fishing is not as lucrative and the “hustling is stiffer”. 
Also, at times, some residents feel there is not enough togetherness and 
cooperation and “if something is wrong with you, people act like they don’t care”.
Others complain that “people who feel they always here, always tell you ‘you 
now from here’ if you want to change things”. Some like that the shaded inner 
part of the Line feels “like country” but others complained of its “backward, 
dilapidated” look with “mash up” roads and “too much bush”. Yet, Baby Girl, an 
Indo-Trinidadian URP worker in her fifties, lamented that if they try to improve, 
for example by starting a kitchen garden, “whatever you plant somebody tief’.
On the one hand, lack of electricity, pipe-borne water and a properly paved road 
are the most major concerns, but people’s attitude to each other and gossip 
(“macoing”) are the aspects of life on the Line that women and men complain 
about second most. This vividly illuminates the importance of relationship. Even 
if there are a lack of amenities and police harassment to overcome, what female 
and male residents often wish for is simply more cooperation and reciprocity. 
These mitigate against^dmany difficult aspects of living on the line.
In fact, connections drew many of them to the Railway Line in the first place. Of 
the CEPEP interviewees, one came because he had family already living on the 
Line, another because he was given a piece of land on the Line and was able to 
move from Springvale to a small house he built for his family. A third had family 
who used to “hustle fish” so he began to live on the Wharf when he left his 
Springvale home because he was “sure to make a dollar selling fish and going in 
the sea”. A fourth man was brought here as a teenager by a friends’ father for 
them both to leam “fishining” [to fish]. Though he is now building his house
«•
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outside the community., he lived here for a number of years and sees it as a 
“blessed place” that feeds plenty. Women working for URP had similar stories.
Women and men stay because they have become comfortable, feel safe, like the 
place, have family around, or because it is close to work and school, and is 
affordable. The majority of residents I interviewed have also not had the 
opportunities or choice to move as they didn’t have land or money to build, rent 
or to move further away. In other words, in addition to valuing the Line’s social 
networks, they have “nowhere else to go”.
The eight CEPEP workers are equally divided between wanting to stay and not 
stay on the Line or Wharf. Similarly, half plan to stay and half do not. Of the 
seven URP workers, four want to stay and three do not. Of this group of mainly 
women, four do not plan to stay. This group also cites a lack of electricity, pipe- 
bome water and land tenure as reason to plan to leave.
Besides part time work, connections and hustling, residents on the Line are helped 
by limited remittances (mainly from the US), donations of money, food and 
clothes from religious groups, friends and contractors “sponsoring” (paying for) 
leisure activities, winnings from gambling in lotteries like Play Whe, public 
assistance allowances, other family members’ (usually temporary) income or 
welfare allowances, and credit from groceries, drug stores and other such 
businesses.
However, there is not always enough money to afford eating well. Families tend 
to eat more carbohydrates such as rice and flour and less expensive local 
vegetables such as bodi and pumpkin. They pick fruit from the trees on the road, 
and one woman grows plants such as paw paw and bodi. Usually, residents cannot 
afford to eat meat everyday, but can more cheaply buy or hustle (beg for) a fish to 
cook.
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3.5.2 The Significance o f  Social Relations to Economic Life
Figure 21: A CEPEP W orker and Proud Mom
As residents-tumed-workers, those living on the Line take their approach to 
connections with them to their job sites. Worker relations, therefore, tend to be 
harmonious. Workers will share food, juice, cigarettes, snacks and opinions. 
Infrequently, they will “make a cook” together to eat when they have finished 
their “portion” of work for the day. Two workers (and not necessarily the women) 
are likely to cook, for example, crab and dumpling, duck, chicken, iguana or 
“broth” while the others finish all the work. Then, they eat together.
In some groups, there is more “commess (confusion) like Young and Restless” or 
gossip, throwing words, cussing or ‘cut eye’ during work. Some women and men 
complain how others “carry news” to the boss about other workers and their 
behaviour on the job site. Other groups may not have these kinds of relations at 
all. Most workers like those they work with and some will “lime” together by 
going drinking in a bar after they get a fortnight’s pay. Workers do fall out with 
each other, but it usually passes soon and relations are restored within the 
workday. If they are caught cussing or quarreling on the job, workers can be sent 
home without pay for a few days or as much as two weeks.
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Similarly, URP workers say they like the relatively easy work, and the chance to 
meet other people and talk with each other. Lana described, “they don’t push you 
around and don’t kill you with work because the money is small”. Candice said, 
“you can leave early if you not feeling good or have your name down even if you 
don’t go”. This again points to the crucial role of friendship, fairness and 
reciprocity. Four others mentioned how much they enjoy the social interaction. 
Miss Mavis felt it “makes the working environment comfortable, we work more 
in unity”.
Workers complain, however, of “bad talk” and gossip, some workers’ laziness 
and the “pressure” of work in the sun or rain cutting grass. They don’t mention 
conflicts as an issue that makes them dislike work. Of course, they would like an 
improved salary. Still, this female-dominated group brings to their work the same 
personal approach that emphasizes family, friendship, familiarity and “how you 
speak to people”.
3.5.3 How You Speak to People: The Voice of Votes
Whereas connections are more egalitarian, workers’ contacts empower them to 
maneuver hierarchy and unequal status. Here, their vote is also a nuanced 
language listened for, reflected upon and responded to by those higher up. Votes 
both enable and affirm contacts.
A number of those who live on the Line vote in Springvale, and as the Local 
Government Councillor for the area acknowledged, their votes are significant. 
Votes and party loyalty are strategically deployed and determined by job 
opportunities and other benefits -  or who can give the most. However, it is 
noteworthy that, voters will say they are voting for one party and actually vote for 
another or campaign for one and vote for another. This occurs as they seek to 
maximise their chances of getting jobs they may desperately need. As an
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opposition politician pointed out, “Usually people will take you, drink you, eat 
you and vote you out. Like with CEPEP, it have some who will take the job and 
still vote for us”.
Six of eight CEPEP workers felt that belonging to a party was not necessary for 
their job. This group argued that “UNC people” were working with them. The 
minority two people who said party belonging was necessary felt that “a CEPEP 
contract is a politician something. They have to be sure you are a PNM”. These 
two workers also more often described the job as an exchange for votes. Four of 
seven URP workers felt that party belonging was not necessary. However, Aunt 
Leela, an Indo-Trinidadian in her fifties, added, “but you sense that if you support 
the party, they help you get work”.
The smaller group of three workers who felt that party belonging was necessary 
made statements like, “belong or vote for them. Your have to be in a party to get 
work or lie and say you in de party*’ and “yes you have to be seen as if you 
belong”. Baby Girl said, “we went and helped them [UNC] campaign and that 
helped me and my husband get regular 10 days”. While there is an overall 
perception that party belonging is not necessary to accessing URP or CEPEP 
work, there is a competing view that it could help. As earlier discussions show, 
even if you are not seen as a party member, having a contact within the party is 
often crucial.
In fact, six of eight CEPEP workers agreed that it does help if you are a known 
supporter. Only one said no. There was one no answer. Leroy, an Afro- 
Trinidadian man in this group, said, “yes, exactly because I don’t think they want 
any UNC in the people place”. Mr. Ross, Miss Merle’s husband, felt it helped that 
“people know personally I am a PNM” and continued, “the boss just wanted 
workers, but he knows I am a PNM. Since I bom growing up I belong to one 
party but you see where work concern, I don’t put politics in that. I don’t even 
argue politics”.
148
There is open acknowledgement of the usefulness of being political to getting a 
job at the same time as there is a sense that it can also negatively affect one’s 
working life. Five of seven URP workers agreed with the majority from CEPEP. 
Two of these women disagreed that it helps you get a job if you are a known 
supporter. Lana felt it does help because “the UNC guy kept asking me to vote for 
de party because he got me this job and I say yes I would vote for them, but I 
didn’t”. Clearly, workers perceive that both the PNM and UNC use state 
resources as a reward for their supporters and as a tool for the party.
Does it matter which party workers support? Are they only interested in 
supporting the party in power? Will they vote for any party? Four CEPEP workers 
said ‘yes’ and four said ‘no’. Mr. Ross responded, “I always believe that to me 
when it come to survival, when you thinking family-wise, once the work paying, 
yes is work and is legal money under the government, that is no problem...but 
still vote PNM”. Josanne replied, “why not, I would act like I switch. Is money 
we talking about, if everyone doing it, you have to leam to play the game or get 
left in the dark like a jackass, whoever giving work I with them. I putting on the 
rising sun jersey10. Hypocrite all of us but you have to live”. Baby Girl said “no, 
because work shouldn’t be in politics, especially this work for the community 
should carry, on despite the party”. Lana responded, “no, I would get a party card, 
but I wouldn’t vote UNC”.
Among URP workers, three said they would switch and four said they would not. 
Two of those four said, “because I belong to one party” and “I wouldn’t switch 
but I might say so”. These interesting responses show how female and male 
workers play the party system itself as they seek livelihood options, but also 
exercise loyalty to one party. For the majority, getting a job is not worth switching 
parties. This is a strong emphasis on loyalty. However, their willingness to play 
Tike yuh switch’ points to the far more compelling necessity of negotiating 
patronage, livelihood needs and party politics together.
10 The party symbol of the United National Congress (UNC).
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All the workers I interviewed voted before. Among CEPEP workers, except two 
persons who voted for the UNC in 1995, they all vote PNM. There are three main 
reasons for this. Workers will vote for the PNM because of their family 
background (“from my mother, growing up in a home that was PNM”, “based on 
how brought up”, “from growing from small, I know PNM, so I continue with my 
family tradition”, “I is a PNM, it comes from grandmother, grandfather and 
mother”). One said, since I know myself that is the only party I belong to.
Their vote is also influenced by the impression the two parties make (“depending 
on how I see government handle things, what they do in power to benefit poorer 
class of people in life”, “I like Manning, he looks like he is a straightforward type. 
I don’t like the grey hair one, he too underneath, he tiefing all the people money 
and pretending he don’t know where it gone. It remind me of my [CEPEP] boss”). 
Finally, securing a job is a key basis for support (“I voted UNC because I used to 
get regular ‘10 days’ work with them, then when PNM took over, I had to be a 
PNM to get a ‘10 days’ too”).
When these CEPEP workers voted, they were hoping their vote would help them 
get lights, road improvements, security, police patrols and “betterment” once their 
party won power. Generally, they have been disappointed. As Josanne said, 
“politics is about people coming around and telling people you would get 
everything and then you doesn’t”. They didn’t get the road fixed or lights and two 
said, “I still paying $25 for pitchoil and I done blacken my hand for you. Next 
time I not voting, PNM and UNC is a waste of time, not doing nothing for 
nobody”. However, others who got help with groceries felt their needs had been 
somewhat met. One male said they had no expectations when they voted for the 
PNM in the last election. Two persons didn’t answer.
The picture among URP workers is very similar. All voted before, and except in 
two cases, when in 1986 one voted NAR and in 1995 one Indo-Trinidadian and 
one Afro-Trinidadian voted UNC, all vote PNM. Generally, their reasons for
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voting the way they do included considerations such as “according to how they 
talk to you, where you working, what they promise, how much they fool you 
around, if they make you go in the office like dog to beg for a work”.
Miss Beryl, this time an Afro-Trinidadian, said, “I look at how if there is any 
progress, betterment in fife with the people in the country, see if it is hard for 
people to get jobs, but I doesn’t really support a party because I don’t find one 
better than the other”. Miss Mavis agreed that it is “plenty decision because 
sometimes you want something, one party or de other offer it”. But two workers 
were less ambivalent and made statements like, “you put your stamp back there 
again, you not changing that” and “I is PNM regardless”. Lana said “my family 
always vote PNM so I just go with the flow”.
Interestingly, about three said they planned not to vote next time because “each 
promising but after you vote you not seeing their face or anything”. Four women 
in the group said they voted because they had expectations that they would get 
amenities, a repaved road and jobs. Two workers said they had no expectations. 
One added that “the Member of Parliament promised lights but we didn’t get 
anything, still I always PNM even with unfulfilled promises, even if they don’t 
deserve it”. This suggests that people support those with power in the state 
hierarchy, or the chance to get that power, not because they are necessarily fooled 
but as strategic hopes, choices and loyalties.
Male and female workers connect with the party system both through voting, jobs 
and through help given by various political actors and institutions. For example, 
five of eight CEPEP workers said that workers go to the Constituency Office for 
help with things like better jobs, food giveaways, groceries, help with problems or 
for a ‘10 days’ (“if you know people, they will take out somebody to help you get 
a ‘10 days’”), to complain about their boss, and ask for electricity, water and 
favours like a pipe in front of their yard.
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Mr. Ross complained, “but I knows nobody, who I will go to? Usually is those 
who know people in de office. If we had bigshot people here, lights here already 
but, as it is low class of people, we don’t get same treatment”. Those who said 
‘no’ or ‘don’t know’ never went themselves or said they didn’t know about 
others. All seven URP workers also said that workers go for help to the 
Constituency Office. This is particularly true for female workers. Their list of 
needs was similar to those in CEPEP.
The majority felt that the office did help with things like groceries. However, 
Baby Girl complained that the office never helped them with a job and it made no 
sense to go. These responses mesh in interesting ways with the next chapter’s 
description of how women and men actually got their jobs and negotiated their 
needs.
3.5.4 Consuming Sociality
Figure 22: The Comfort of Family
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Having contacts is about forming and managing reciprocal relationships. It is a 
hustle. Governments are expected to help women and men or be voted out of 
power. An astute government doesn’t have to help everyone, but has to be able to 
count on the loyalty of enough voters to be returned to offi^CThere is a risk when 
both parties promise similar benefits that voters will turn tVwoever offers more. 
Or, there is the chance that if not enough money is spent or not enough people 
helped, that they will not come out for the party when it counts.
In contrast to the market ethic “everybody have to eat”, contacts appears to 
operate in a winner-take-all context best described as “who hustles eats”. In other 
words, parties that deliver patronage will win the state because voters who benefit 
return their loyalty. As the Trinidadian proverb aptly summarises, who have more 
com feed more fowl.
The goal is to be known to those in the political party as a supporter and to derive 
opportunities from the relationship whenever needed. These relationships enable 
informal access to formal structures and to opportunities. At the same time, 
political parties are aware that women and men may take what they offer and still 
vote for an opposing party. As the current PNM MP put it, “These are people 
thinking day-to-day, at the most dependent level of society and living at 
subsistence level or lower. If your opponent comes and offers more, it is a human 
approach to vote for whoever who gives you more”.
Of J
There is also the double-speak of those in politicians who on the one hand argue 
that “spending money wins elections” but, also assert that “money and even 
patronage don’t really win elections when you are able to communicate your 
message properly”. Still, they spend and are “eaten out” by potential voters who 
may still deny them state resources they need to control and consume. Inevitably, 
not everyone will eat in this spiraling give-and-take.
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Contacts underscores distribution of state resources through informal networks. It 
is also a source for joyful moments for most workers living on the Railway Line. 
Not only can contacts result in homes, jobs and benefits, but it also provokes 
feelings of success in being given a hug by an MP, recognized from a crowd or 
called by name. This ushers in feelings of respectability, and feels good. 
Similarly, Bourdieu’s focus on practice points to the significance of the body, ' 
emotions and actions, not just what women or men consciously do or say about 
what they do.
However, these ethnographic pictures also suggest that women and men do not 
habitually live out their everyday practices without consciousness or “thinking 
abstractly about their culture” (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 207). Instead, as Yael 
Navaro-Yashin suggests, there are “different and simultaneous kinds of 
consciousness: crisply articulate, hazy, or submerged”, “out of focus”, “hazy” 
“flowing” and “fleeting”, “spontaneous” and “enforced” (ibid, 16). In other 
words, individuals are not activated by patterns of social life that are ‘out there’. 
They actively pull on culturally-shaped meanings, to conceptualize space and 
transgress or adhere to norms, in everyday physical and emotional encounters.
This virtuosity, shaping when and how to interrelate, mobilizes key dispositions 
unseT/consciously11 even while articulating a clear, reflective public commentary 
about what can and can’t be taken for granted (Famell 2000, 408). These images 
reinforce the usefulness of starting analysis with women and men’s actions rather 
than just their identities (Valverde 1998, 217). As the next section shows, women 
and men’s needs, relationships, feelings and tactics mediate the forms of power 
and meaning associated with ethnic, religious and gender identities.
11 In Bourdieu’s words, “The conditions associated with a particular class of conditions of 
existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize 
practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in 
order to attain them Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of 
obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the 
organizing action of a conductor” (1990 [1980], 53).
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3.6 R eturn to Spirituality
Return to spirituality is an ideal often deferred to by members of the San 
Fernando Jama Masjid. It expresses a desire to ground practices and relationships 
in norms of goodness, rights and justice. It offers a sense of safe enclosure against 
the glare, impurities, dangers and confusion of everyday public interactions. 
During the weeks leading up to the ASJA’s election and in its aftermath, involved 
masjid members often affirmed its significance for business practices, leadership 
and gender roles. For them, it signified the past, elders, tradition and religious 
law, and it established honour, authenticity and community.
Like the other values explored above, it highlights how much relationship and 
cooperation are cherished. This may include relationship to God, to other women 
and men, to family, to leaders and to associational life itself. The values
Figure 23: Another Kind of Belonging
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emerging from the market, mas camp and Railway Line illuminate different 
approaches to correct livelihood practices, and the latter two especially point to 
bases for widely accepted leadership. “Return to spirituality” is not far different.
3.6.1 When Money Talks: Livelihood, Business and Correct Practice
Livelihood concerns include sanctions against selling alcohol or charging interest 
(riba) and using non-Islamic banks. Charges related to these were leveled against 
specific leaders throughout campaigning and at the election, and they typically 
provide gossip material in the community. Livelihood codes, however, are really 
targeted at the dangers of money to create deception, lessen faith, enable 
exploitation and legitimize business- rather than spiritually-oriented leadership. 
Money can create a lust for power rather than acceptance that, as market vendors 
say, “what is for you is for you”. Livelihood and even business-style leadership 
are important, but “return to spirituality” marks their limits.
One effect is an internal critique of the kind of “contacts” system witnessed on the 
Wharf and experienced in many other areas and aspects of life. The San Fernando 
Masjid-led team bitterly lamented the power of patronage to ensure support of 
those on the ground. As one put it, “Money convinces people even if they support 
you all the years...money talks”. The two women involved in election organizing 
also talked about the importance of having access to funds “for 
everything.. .canvassing, food, jerseys, etc”. Shazeeda felt their ‘side’ had less 
money for printing, travel and other costs whereas their competition had far more 
to make promises, sponsor dinners, travel the country and meet Imams.
Before getting involved in the election, Taimoon didn’t realize such struggle for 
power and prestige is created by control of mosques, schools and, therefore, 
communities. According to Tiab Rahman, one^the masjid*s oldest members, 
ballot-fixing, mis-counting and patronage began with the development of schools 
in the 1940s. Staffing began to not only reflect Islamic purposes but also a
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struggle for positions, and the Executive’s ability to bestow it. The Education 
Board had begun to be an important site for the assertion of power within the 
ASJA. Presently, government support for schools, various fees, and donations to 
mosque and schools are basically the association’s source of livelihood and 
provide authority and funds for those controlling the ASJA.
A past Secretary for the Education Board defined patronage as the ability to “get 
people’s children in school, give contracts to do work and make promises to help 
mosques”. He explained that these promises are “fulfilled by [excess] money from 
the Education Board” and felt it helped win the election. Shazeeda defined 
patronage as “funds, houses, transportation, contributions to a party, getting 
people to work for you, getting people to support who you support”.
Taimoon agreed that patronage keeps people obligated for later at the polls. She 
said she didn’t see accepting it as corrupt, but giving it to use for power as 
corrupt. She compared patronage in the ASJA to having to have a party card to 
“get a CEPEP work” in her area of Tabaquite, and having to deal with an 
administration that is biased toward one party’s supporters who, therefore, more 
greatly benefit. She concluded that patronage is about people asking, “What can I 
get from the controlling body? Give me my reason for supporting you?” In other 
words, “it is an attractive package that determines who governs us”.
Regardless of what actually occurred in the election, it emphasised how popular 
discourses about need, leadership, patronage and spirituality can be knotted 
together. Masjid leaders’ complained that “the other side” only won the election 
because Imams did not know that the increased benefits and stipends they got 
were due to them as long as ASJA had the funds. They did not require the sense 
of obligation that became so significant in the election. Taimoon concluded, 
“Upkeep of mosques and help to Imams is not a favour but a help ASJA is 
supposed to provide, but people felt they would be victimized and lose these 
benefits and so couldn’t act independently”.
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The team sought to politicize how money corrupts when used to create obligation 
and consolidate personal power. One great loss to the campaign was its inability 
to counter the friendship network that existed among some jamaat [community]- 
level Mosque Boards, Imams and the association’s administrative leadership. 
These personal networks provided the context within which women and men 
made their decisions during the election.
Yet, the election highlighted that even values of goodness and justice must cohere 
with women and men’s material needs. Taimoon was quite critical of the 
campaign slogan Return to Spirituality and felt “it was not called for as the whole 
organization and all its members were already dedicated to spirituality”. The 
Masjid President blamed some of their loss on “too much talk of spirituality and 
not enough about a new roof or increased stipends. We didn’t have a manifesto 
that spoke to people on both the ground and at a spiritual level. We couldn’t rely 
on moral authority”. He also blamed a lack of support and said, “Ground troops 
were not reliable and we didn’t have enough footsoldiers. We didn’t get the 
support from people who promised to be financial backers”.
3.6.2 Leadership in Relation to God, Constitution and People
Figure 24: Seeking Knowledge
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At one campaign meeting, one Imam present suggested that the team print T-
shirts for their supporters. They were to say on the front, “When choosing a
9
leader...” and on the back “Cho^e a return to spirituality!” In this way, the keenly 
contested issue of leadership was apparently resolved. Similarly, ASJA women 
and men list many leadership qualities they value, but the essential ingredient is 
spiritual “correctness”. This eclipsed and formed the context within which other 
qualities such as being a good Muslim, being educated in Islam, having 
communication skills, the intention to do activities uplifting to the general 
membership, agreement and good relations with everyone, and being supported 
with cooperation from others, are judged. There is general consensus that any 
leader should be (gpd-fearing, lead according to the teachings of the Prophet 
Muhammad and be chosen on the basis of character rather than wealth. Yet, 
below the surface, there is much ambivalence about what is spiritually correct and 
who can lead.
Debates revolve around a hierarchical order of leaders and their authority. Who 
has" ^ final say? (It/is Yhe Spiritual Leader, known as the Sheik ul Islam, or 
Administrative Leaaer, formally titled the President General? What would God 
want? What does the constitution say? How do Muslims feel about it? This is 
precisely what the election sought to solve.
In the bacchanal, one ‘side’ accused the Spiritual Head of “being out of touch” 
and in “an ivory tower” while the other ‘side’ accused the Administrative Head of 
being a dictator. Each was an attack on the other’s height in the order. Some 
women, such as Muniba, argue that none is higher than the other. Others saw the 
Spiritual Head as the higher authority, but felt the division of power should not 
cause conflict. The President of the YWMA attributed the tense undercurrents in 
the election to “ignorance about leadership, community, honour, respect and 
Islam”. Others simply saw it as a battle of personalities.
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Certainly, my observations suggested that the President General felt that his own 
post of Administrative Head held ultimate decision-making power over 
disbursement of funds, future plans, constitutional change, election protocols and 
associational life generally. Not surprisingly, the Spiritual Head was critical of the 
idea of non-spiritual leadership, and the division between church and state that 
exists in the society and influences even the ASJA community. Believing 
leadership and spiritually-correct leadership to be the same thing, he felt the most 
important qualities of a leader are piety, capability and a good understanding of 
Islam. He did not see the constitution creating a division of power between two 
equal Heads. To him, the administrative leader is a functionary. However, he 
recognized that since the administrative leader acts as the chief representative of 
Muslims in Trinidad and Tobago, and is given resources, he is able to act as the 
Head of the organization. The Sheik ul Islam becomes, then, a figurehead which 
the Spiritual Head compared to “the President of Trinidad and Tobago”.
While it certainly seems as if God would make the Spiritual Head have highest 
authority, the ASJA constitution presented a different picture. Incorporated into 
the ASJA is the idea of having a Spiritual Head who interprets correct practice on 
the basis of the Sharia (divine law as practiced by the Prophet Mohammed), and 
who is a spiritual authority. Over the history of the ASJA, there have been periods 
when different individuals have filled these two positions and when the President 
General has acted as both Administrative Head and de facto Spiritual Head. This 
occurred either when no Sheik was appointed or when the Sheik did not reside in 
Trinidad and Tobago.
As power is divided in the ASJA constitution, spiritual leaders are employed by 
the Executive Council. The President General therefore becomes the de facto final 
authority. The control of organizational funds and the administrative structure 
have, since inception, given the President General and Executive Council 
decision-making power never held by the Sheik ul Islam. The Council can even 
prevent a Sheik from exercising functions of the office that are outlined in the
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constitution. Here, personality and the personal wielding of power become 
significant. As the Spiritual Head felt, control of funds garnered support through 
disbursements to jamaats for their mosques and stipends to Imams. 
Administrative leadership, therefore, did not have to appeal to the community on 
an Islamic basis.
Essentially, the masjid's rebellious campaign heavily relied on affirming the 
concept of a Spiritual Head as the highest authority. According to Shazeeda, “We 
ran a clean campaign and never spoke about the President General. We just asked 
people about what is going on, what they want and what they saw as the role of 
the Spiritual Head”. Regarding his own views, a politician involved explained,
Based on my own belief and my own recognition of the 
importance of spirituality to me and everyone else, the spiritual 
leader is the fountain, the head of the organisation and whatever 
administrative mechanisms he chooses to implement or policies 
and directives for the organisation, he should be in command, 
conflict should not arise. So if the Spiritual Leader thinks 
education is on the front burner and his goal is to reach other 
communities, he could designate the Administrative Head or 
organisation to proceed. I do not see that as separate from the 
guidance of the Spiritual Head.
The masjid ‘side’ advocated for spiritual leadership and concomitant change to 
the governance structure, and increased money for Imams. The campaign slogan, 
“Return to Spirituality”, was intended to emphasize that community spirituality 
itself was at stake.
Shazeeda felt the team over-emphasised following a leader in comparison to 
emphasizing particular Islamic laws and practices based on the Sharia, which 
seemed to really be what the men involved wanted. Similarly, Taimoon wanted to 
emphasise the importance of the best people being selected and she wanted to talk 
with women and men about what to expect of people at the Executive level. The
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campaign sought to reawaken the idea of personal leadership based on spirituality 
rather than money, patronage, constitutional power and votes.
Yet, they lost on all counts. Ironically, this could be because their pivotal slogan 
had far wider meanings than they anticipated. Its perfect resonance articulated 
more than they bargained. Rather than simply being about leadership, it also 
spoke to concerns about Imam’s livelihoods, maasajids’ needs for fans or a PA 
system, members’ admiration for efficient and helpful administration, antipathy 
about dividing the association through ‘confusion’ rather than cooperation, family 
networks, willingness to negotiate reciprocity and the power of personal ties. The 
surprise was that social and economic connections were also voters’ return paths 
to spirituality. This illuminates the nuanced analogies between return to 
spirituality and everybody have to eat.
3.6.3 Inclusion, Accountability and Fairness
While for male campaigners, return to spirituality was clearly about the right to 
question and participate, administrative accountability and brotherly fairness, it 
was also about reaffirming Islamic masculinity. Gender remained at the heart of 
spiritually-correct leadership. Although women never collectively nor vocally 
critiqued this position, their views were a subterranean flow beneath the drama of 
the election. In their own ways, many women claimed the basic value of the 
campaign.
Religious leaders and male campaigners’ priorities reproduced fundamental 
conceptions of gender complementarity. Women and men have separate roles, but 
each has an important place in the community. One Maulana argued that, “women 
might be disenfranchised in this system but there are no clear cut rules on 
women’s participation” in state or community elections and governance. As the 
state is interpreted to be kufr or corrupt, women’s (and even men’s) limited
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participation is more widely accepted. Within wider society, women would have 
to interact with non-Muslims and men. This view holds weight despite many 
women’s interactions with non-Muslims and men in the grocery or at work, 
getting gas for their car or in conversation with neighbours.
Within the ASJA and Islam, as the Spiritual Head explained, women’s suffrage is 
considered to be new and the organization has remained traditional and “not yet 
taken the leap”. The issue is presented as one of “Sharia law versus secular law”. 
As the Sheik ul Islam continued, “You could use a secular method to set up 
structures for governing a religious organization, but this is the wrong approach 
because the Surah should determine everything”. Yet, there was no clear 
consensus among men about women’s participation in voting or governance.
Haji Ralph Khan, also a long-standing member of the ASJA in his seventies and 
past Executive Council member, thought that women should not have been told 
not to go observe election because “Islam is about equal rights”. He felt women 
should be able to run for election and vote. As he concluded, “There are women 
with good Islamic training, who do a lot of work for the organization and have 
good qualities. But it is up to the women to fight for that right. Because if you 
follow custom and tradition, where are you going?” Nonetheless, the majority 
concurred with a Past Present General who felt that suggested that “women have 
never been part of the ASJA decision-making, but we need their input and their 
help, and we need to consult them”.
Among both men and women, some chose to interpret revitalized spirituality as 
both maintenance of and challenge to tradition. There was no consensus among 
women. Some argued that an expanded role for women more greatly reflected the 
original practice of the Prophet and women’s equality in early Islam. Others 
pointed out that not all male leaders\ conduct themselves correctly. This leasee- 
room for assertions that women’s participation in leadership roles cljfr'encourage 
greater morality.
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This argument relies on the idea that females embody moral codes. It seeks 
participation for the sake of religion, family and community, not on the basis of 
equality. Despite the custom that women don’t attend community elections, 
Ruqaya decided to go to observe. Responding to the argument that women should 
not attend the election because of the “rough and tumble nature of politics”, 
“hooliganism” and “men’s behaviour at elections”, she insisted,
They are not behaving according to the Sunnah, their practice is 
unlslamic and maybe women should discipline them. Meetings 
should not be rough and if they are, the entire format of the 
meeting is corrupted.
Men somewhat weakly countered that elections should become more “dignified” 
before women participate. Ruqaya also dismissed male leaders’ statements that it 
would be inappropriate for a woman, if she were the only one elected to the ASJA 
executive, to sit at a meeting among men. Instead, she argued, “If there are fifteen 
men and one woman there is no problem. The problem is with one man and one 
woman alone. If there are other men there and they are honourable, they are 
witnesses and if a women is properly attired, she can speak to anyone”. “Yes, 
leadership means headmanship”, she challenged, “but I do what Allah not my 
husband tells me. Women are certain to speak to issues men won’t speak to. They 
have an opinion and a role to play”.
She criticized the YWMA for “leaning to the domestic side of women’s role like 
helping with food and decorations.” She explained,
This bothers me. Women were relegated to that role in the 
beginning, we didn’t just initiate this role. Also, it was easy to turn 
to. But women have to support women and show a presence apart 
from men. We have to be consulted and have opinion.
Rather, she would like the women’s group to support those who want to leam and 
practice Islam so that women can read and interpret teachings for themselves. Her
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concern with interpretation reflects modem values regarding women’s 
achievement and progress as well as purified Islamic practice based on formal 
study. These indicators of knowledge are “also significantly about empowerment 
through clarity of purpose and precision of enactment” (Khan 1995, 118). As she 
concluded, “Betty Friedan is now happening in Islam all over, but it has to happen 
in a Muslim way”.
Figure 25: Girls Playing While Mummies Pray
Conceptualisations of women as nurturers, sources of moral teaching and primary 
care givers defies many of the actual lives of Muslim women who may work, be 
involved in a range of organizations including non-Muslim ones and even be in 
politics. Yet, it has a powerful influence on how women see their role in their own 
community and in Islam. Partly, “return to spirituality” encompasses these roles. 
It therefore also empowers those who use it to affirm particular religious rights, 
traditions, interpretations and responsibilities.
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3.6.4 Sanctifying Sociality
Return to spirituality is an ideal of continuously revitalised Islamic associational 
life. Like love fo r mas, it provides a language for reaffirming the importance of 
family. It also speaks to the protection of women and female honour, male 
headship and responsibility for leading the religious community, fraternity, equal 
rights, piety and cooperation amongst the jamaat. It guides relationships to God, 
money, women, men and organisational activities. It is both a spiritual and social 
ethic and provides the basis for negotiations over governance within the ASJA. 
While it seems to reinforce ideals of headmanship, it also empowers competing 
interpretations of gender, equality and justice. Ultimately, it is about situating 
livelihoods, labour, leadership, loyalty, reciprocity and networks in a spiritual 
cosmology. It is a cosmology that affirms sociality as necessary, right and, even, 
holy.
3.7 Conclusion
The stories and perspectives that emerge here speak against assumptions about 
“true” inner selves. Just because some San Femandians are Muslim or middle 
strata Muslims or Muslim women doesn’t mean they all think or behave the same 
way. An individual may also behave differently depending on the situation or 
setting. In the same election, one male Muslim campaigner argued for justice and 
equality when talking about brotherhood, but returned to the safety of ‘tradition’ 
and headmanship when talking about women. Similarly, a female market vendor 
may give another ‘cut eye’ in the morning time for taking away her customer, but 







Essentially, this chapter sought to uncover the social politics governing conduct in 
San Fernando. I have shown how the dispositions explored here are situated in 
daily practices and relationships, and both reflect and shape norms. While each 
reveals different cosmologies, it is also possible to see how they collectively 
create a larger approach defined by a range of angles, emphases and layers. 
Consistent with the concept of habitus, scenes from the sites such as the market 
X - and mas camp show how habitual layers are created through sharing of 
knowledge with others, newcomers and younger ones. This stimulates shifts and 
changes, struggles and strategies.
These dispositions are deeply founded in what matters to women and men. What 
most matters is then woven through their connections to goods, money, time, 
illegality, emotions, leisure, space, leaders, bureaucracies, spiritualities, gender 
ideals, the nation, rights, elections, reciprocity, amenities, and other women and 
men. In other words, women and men’s relation to money, women or God are not 
isolated, but homologous. Behaviour and relationships in one situation affect and 
legitimize those in another. They show sharing of similar values and parallel ways 
of working out their contradictions. All these values include notions of reasonable 
or fair practice. They are limits to behaviours that may be exploitative, 
exclusionary or advantage. What matters, therefore, deeply informs the many 
points along which a politics o f  authority is negotiated. It is through the habitus 





C hapter Four: Political Action in Public Life
Figure 26: In the Shadows of Public Life
4.1 Introduction
The last chapter’s ground-level view, o f negotiations over participation and governance, 
showed social politics in action. In the following pages, I add another layer by exploring 
the tangle of lore and law. It is here that legal politics really makes its entrance. 
Questions of legitimate authority are worked out along points of interplay between social 
and legal politics. It is this politics o f  authority that I argue shapes public life. As I go on 
to show through ethnographic detail, public life is marked by the connections, overlap 
and continuum between social life and the state. Ordinary women and men’s voices are 
given more attention here whereas state officials’ explanations feature more prominently 
in Chapter 5. It is crucial to understand some of the interactions that characterise public 
life before moving on to the next chapter’s discussion of aesthetic authority and its 
chameleon character. In this light, this chapter pulls state actors and bureaucracies into
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the frame, and evaluates how the concept of “public life” helps to explain what is going 
on in these pictures.
4.2 Publics and Public Life
Defining those working out ‘appropriate’ forms of roadside vending, Carnival leadership 
and patronage as ‘publics’ draws on German scholar Jurgen Habermas* (1962) concept of 
the “public sphere”. For Habermas, a “public sphere” was defined by participation in 
deliberation. It was an arena created by the production and circulation of ideas and talk. 
It enabled him to elaborate a theory of political morality or ethical life. Habermas was 
concerned with a specific phase in the development of liberal democracy, and new kinds 
of democratic participation and elite hegemony. The relevance of his conceptualization is 
clearly limited by this historical and European context, and the exclusionary, sexist1 and 
classist aspects of his formulation (Fraser 1992, 113; Ryan 1992). However, as other 
scholars have done, I’d like to tease out some aspects that usefully connect to this 
ethnographic material.
Habermas’ critics have argued that the bourgeois public sphere was never the public 
sphere. There were always multiple publics continuously contesting its hegemony. 
Subordinated or peripheralised groups created their own public spheres. These 
alternatives could be understood in terms of the “constitutive stratification lines”2 
(Dawson 1994, 199) that set out the possibilities available in their societies. Within these 
constraints, these counterpublics (Fraser 1992, 116) elaborated alternative styles of 
political behaviour and created their own arenas and ways to access public life. Civic 
associations, mosques, newspapers, parades and coffeehouses are all examples of settings
1 It was constituted by a “masculinist” ideology and the “formal exclusion of women” (Fraser 1992, 114). 
It provided an associational base for elites to seek markers of distinction (Bourdieu 1984) and to exercise 
authority. Exclusion combined gender with ethnicity and class. As Nancy Fraser highlights, “new gender 
norms enjoining feminine domesticity and a sharp segregation of the public and private spheres functioned 
as key signifiers of bourgeois difference from both higher and lower social strata” (Fraser 1992, 115).
2 As Dawson (1994, 199) defines, “constitutive stratification lines refer to how societies have been 
systematically organized to provide favourable outcomes for privileged groups”. These outcomes may 
include material goods, life chances, status, individual autonomy and ideological privileging.
and institutions that enable citizens to discuss questions of common concern (Dawson 
1994, 195). Similarly, roadside vending, mas making and ways of securing government 
work create spheres where discourses, common concerns and politics are worked out. 
These discourses create common interest, participation, agency and feelings of belonging. 
This is precisely what I describe below.
In public life, statist forms of politics including electoral and bureaucratic authority are 
far from hegemonic. I demonstrate that the state is only one among many different kinds 
of publics and, as I show, it is shot through with diverse forms and meanings of law. In 
her study of statism in public life, Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002, 3) suggests that the 
political is “unsitable”, “fleeting and intangible”. In other words, public life is not about 
institutions or sites, but about the more messy arena where women and men both critique 
the state while their “simultaneous practices of reproduction, regeneration, and reification 
keep re-dressing it in a variety of garbs” (ibid, 4).
Navaro-Yashin rejects concepts like “public sphere”, “public culture,” “civil society,” 
and “the state”. She instead suggests ““public life” as a site for the generation of the 
political”. She argues that this concept merges the stereotypical distinction between 
domains of “power” and “resistance”. In her useful framing, “public life” encapsulates,
...a precarious arena where it is the public (ambiguously referring to both 
the people and the state) that produces and recasts the political. When 
configured as such, the notion of the public in public life enables us to 
analyze people and the state, not as an opposition, but as the same domain.
(ibid, 2)
I show just how the overlaps and interconnections among vendors, police, bureaucrats, 
political activists, mas makers and squatters create public life. Yet, against Navaro- 
Yashin’s reading of all participation as statist, I show that law works to recast the 
political in surprising ways.
4.3 The Shifting Shoreline of Legality
Figure 27: Law Meets the Shoreline of Lore
On a Friday afternoon under beating, 4.50pm sun, a jeep with police pulls up in front of 
the market vendors selling on one side of Mucurapo Street. Two Indo-Trinidadian males 
emerge. Selling has been brisk and vendors are irritated that they have had to start 
covering or packing up their goods, or at least pretend to, since they saw the jeep 
approaching. The policemen tell the vendors to move their stuff back and the elder one 
says, “This selling on the road have to stop. If you had a little thing to sell is okay but not 
if it becoming like a market!” He watches vendors continue to sell while keeping one eye 
on him. He walks up and down chatting with them. Many only move their goods back a 
little and some older women complain about how customers do not buy from inside 
where the goods are more expensive. Some continue to sell in smaller bundles on the 
pavement. These police clearly have good relations with the vendors and vendors 
consider them the “genuine” ones. Perhaps, if the market was still open, they would have 
been more likely to be strict and threaten to charge them for selling.
Vendors sell on the road because they consider it a “faster hustle”. Vendors even have 
regular customers who look for them on the road. Women and men coming from work
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know that prices are cheaper there than in the market. This produces a steady, thick trade
along the line of vendors. Fast turnover compensates for lower prices and the chance to
“sell out”. Many also like the excitement of Mucurapo Street. Most vendors who sell on
the road do so because they have perishable goods that will spoil before the next selling
day. Vendors will especially sell on the road when the market has been “slow” and they
are left with a lot of goods. They may have recuperated their “capital” in the market, but
are now concerned about making “interest” or profit which they will use for household
needs, “paying sousou”, buying fresh goods next market day or paying money owed to
A
wholesalers for “trust goods”. Those vendors who may not sell again for a few days, like 
from Tuesday to Saturday, are especially concerned about selling out.
Coming out too early is a risk and, if police pass by often, vendors will go back inside 
and wait until fourjprfi to return to the road. Even if police pass by then, they feel more 
justified in staying on the road because the market is already closed. As one woman told 
me, “We are willfully wrong to sell during market hours because the market is open and 
we denying vendors inside a sale but after market closes it is fair to sell outside even if it 
is not legal”. Vendors don’t feel they pose a problem because, as one man said, “we ent 
blocking nowhere and we there to the edge of the road”. Also, they feel that if they have 
invested a lot that day and “market is hard”, they are compelled to earn some extra 
income. As one female vendor said, “supporting we family is more important than 
supporting the law”.
When police arrive, the majority of vendors step back and wait for the police to go. A 
few will deliberately take a long time to pack up or pretend to start packing and hope the 
police will be satisfied, move away and then leave. Sometimes, the police then tell them 
to hurry up. Others “scramble” their goods fast and hide it between or behind the parked 
cars. Then, some will go for a walk, some will go in the bars and others will stay on the 
pavement to watch their goods. The police, usually two or three Indo- and Afro- 
Trinidadian men, alight from the vehicle and begin to walk up and down the road in front 
of the vendors telling them “pick up, pick up, move your goods”. In lesser instances, they
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tell them to move their goods back so that the road can be less congested . Even more 
rarely, they arrest people. However, these are usually vendors selling from vans. The 
police feel that those selling on the ground are not selling a lot of goods whereas those 
with vans have a larger amount and stay on the road all day.
Vendors respond, “Officer tings hard inside”, “give we a chance”, “Officer what we go 
do with these goods, where we go get money?” Most of the vendors are women and most 
are older women. Not wanting a confrontation with police, they may just “give them a 
little cut eye [bad look] and then don’t entirely pack up your goods but put them aside 
and then come back after a while”. Vendors get irritated if the police stay too long 
because they feel they are taking away their sale. They “bad talk” the police and quarrel 
about how they are just trying to make “ah honest living”. However, I never saw any 
vendors refuse to move or defy police orders.
Open defiance is obviously discouraged by the force of police authority, fears of being 
locked up or charged and the risk of losing your goods. Reds, a mixed female vendor, 
told me that she has seen police take up people’s goods and throw them aside. 
Sometimes, vendors will just decide to go home after police have passed, especially if 
they expect them to pass again or if they only have a few goods left to sell. Mums, an 
Indo-Trinidadian with bright fushia hair, responded, “sometimes the police give so much 
trouble you can't sell so you pay extra [to a taxi] and take the goods home. What will you 
do? You can’t fight”.
However, in addition to fear, vendors repeat this ritual with police out of what they call 
“respect”. The majority I interviewed and others I chatted with agreed that police were 
just doing their job and their duty, and that should be respected. They felt that the police 
“have their rights and we wrong doing what is illegal”, but reminded me that “we have to 
put out money for the goods so we have to sell what wouldn’t stay”. Yet, they don’t sell 
in front of the police because it is considered “unmannerly to their job”. One woman
3 The City Police said that none of them tell the vendors only to move back and maybe that was the Central 
Police or Traffic Patrol.
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explained, “We have a right to move when they are doing their job so they would not 
rough and buff we. We understand the police doing their job and we doing we own”. 
Essentially, vendors realize that any negotiation with police first rests ofrespecting their 
authority and recognizing that they have to be seen doing their job because those are their 
orders”.
However, vendors also complain that some of the police are “insulting”, “like hogs” or 
“talk to you like beast” and threaten to take vendors to the station. Vendors say some 
police tell them “they would show you the other side of them if we play harden” and 
“they will move your goods for you if you don’t want to move them”. Angie, a young 
Indo-Trinidadian, complained that the police don’t tell the vendors “good afternoon”, just 
“rough up vendors because they want to make us fear higher authority”.
Others might just tell the vendors to move back or to pack up, that they know they are not 
supposed to be selling on the roadside and that the law says no selling near the market. 
Some police reportedly tell vendors that they can come back after, but to move while they 
are there. I observed the police once turning up after a fight over space had broken out 
between two male vendors. It wasn’t too much of a fracas. The stronger vendor simply 
cuffed the other who wouldn’t make some space on the road for him, the other vendor 
fell, and retreated saying he would get the police. They came, talked congenially with 
both and arrested no one.
They left after telling the men that all of them have to sell on the road and to make sure 
that they did not make them have to come back. Vendors around the men openly 
commented and later joked about what had happened. The police often tell vendors to get 
a stall in the market, but the majority sell somewhere in market already. Those that need 
to sell out because they are daily paid vendors selling three days a week do not want a 
monthly paid stall both because of the expense and because they don’t necessarily want 
to have to work in the market everyday.
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Figure 28: W atching for Customers and Police
The majority of vendors felt the police talk to them good “except when vendors are 
stubborn and don’t want to move”, when vendors take up too much space or go on the 
road too early. In comparison to their brusque threats, police do not often take vendors to 
the station or take their name down. Rather, vendors felt they often gave them “a chance” 
because they know them after all these years selling on the road and know they are trying 
to “make a dollar”. Mums, who felt that police didn’t really harass vendors after market 
hours, said, “I find them very good because we not supposed to be selling on the road 
especially when market open. That is part of their job so anybody vexing for that fooling 
theyself, we not supposed to be selling on the road and we taking a chance so when they 
say “pack up”, pack up”.
Miss Cleo agreed, “We can’t jastle (jostle) police, we doing our job and the police doing 
theirs. You have to respect the police and doh sell right in front dem”. Her goods were 
still in boxes in a tight comer between parked cars, and she was looking to see if the 
police would walk back past her before putting them out. Vendors will comment on 
others who start to sell too soon after the police have walked past them and agree that 
they were “disrespecting the police because you not supposed to sell when they are 
there”. Basically, obey in front of police, disobey only behind their back, and negotiate
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however and whenever you legitimately can. Other than interrupting their sales, few 
vendors I interviewed had any problem toward police.
Most vendors try not to have personal interaction with police and will quietly pack up 
and move back. The vendors say that sometimes the police understand, sometimes they 
have family selling or they see how the market runs [meaning they understand vendors 
have “to eat” too]. They also report that when some police retire, they start selling in the 
market. Neither police nor vendors mentioned this, but I observed that about one third of 
the vendors looked between fifty and seventy years old. How can police really “rough 
up” these aged, hard working, mostly Indo-Trinidadian “nanis”4?
However, there is also a great deal of talk about police taking bribes from vendors who 
offer them goods, drinks or even money that a few “put up” together. Lance said he saw a 
policeman “hustle two bags of ochro”. Clevon added that he has seen police taking 
money. An Indo-Trinidadian woman, who sells with her daughter Janine, said she and 
others contributed to money they “put up” to give police. In another instance, she 
described how she “put in a lil $10 with others to buy Mackeson (stout) for the police”. 
This is clearly not equivalent to handing the police money. However, as she put it, “Well, 
it come like a bribe because the police then let you stay”. Another said that they fill up 
their bag and leave it and pick it back up when they are ready to leave work.
Less than half of those I interviewed said they had never seen police accept bribes. Others 
said they never see them take money, only beer and goods. These sightings cannot really 
be confirmed, but they are part of the folklore of the road and an accepted story. Vendors 
didn’t have strong feelings about police accepting drinks, goods or money. It was a 
source of juicy gossip more than anything else. When it helped them maintain good 
relations with police or get a chance to sell longer on the road, it satisfied some of 
everyone’s needs and gave them greater bargaining power.
4
“Nani”, meaning grandmother, is a common Hindi word used by Indo-Trinidadians.
176
Vendors appear basically law-abiding. They support the idea of having police and, 
usually, even agree that police are correct to move vendors selling on the road before 
mid-afternoon. Some have no problem with how police deal with them, but criticize other 
vendors who “play harden” and deserve police officers’ buff [rebuke]. They consent to 
legal authority, perhaps in many aspects of their lives, but not all the time. When vendors 
start selling on the road after 4pm when the market closes, the authority of market life 
begins to rise like heat off the sweltering road.
In this atmosphere, “we doing we own” expresses what they feel is necessary and 
reasonable. A too brusque attitude by police is considered advantage. It is excessive 
because it denies the higher morality of need and it ignores vendors’ basic agreement 
with the law in other instances. It does not make sense because police officers relate to 
market vendors in the wider context where they may know them for years, from their 
villages or as family, where they too may end up selling when their retire or where they 
accept gifts from vendors. Their relationships with vendors make their roles as law 
enforcers porous and, complementarily, make respecting vendors’ illegal practices 
legitimate.
Everybody have to eat creates a public that includes both vendors and police. It marks the
existence of women and men who see illegality as reasonable within the “field”
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 101) of market life. In this sense, this disposition creates
a public that crosses distinctions between social life and the state. This public is made up
of women and men who not only sell or buy vegetables, but who may have once been
police, who may have family who are police, or who may make mas at Carnival time.
v 0Their belonging in this public, therefore, also has implications for their participation'a 
range of other fields. In other words, publics are made up of women and men with a 
plurality of perspectives, with internal differences and antagonisms, and with a publicist 
orientation that enables them to participate in different publics and different publics to 
overlap (Fraser 1992, 127).
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Interactions between vendors and police work out aspects of illegality because they 
mobilize discourses, for example, of need, empathy and friendship. These discourses are 
not only limited to these meetings at the roadside, but are open-ended, accessible and 
have “infinite axes of citation” (Warner 2002, 63). This is how come they appear in 
homologous form in other dispositions such as love for mas and contacts. It is also how 
come women and men don’t have to know each other personally or even at all to share 
discourse in a context of routine action. This is what Michael Warner calls “normative 
stranger sociality” (2002, 56). This means that participation, and not ascriptive identity, 
creates commonalities (Fraser 1992, 127).
The commonalities shown in this chapter exemplify how even the exercise of state power 
appears to be more defined by sociality than legality. At the same time, forms of state 
power clearly infiltrate social life. Both police and vendors draw on bases for legitimacy 
grounded in marketing or law or their participation in publics that have nothing to do 
with either. Intersecting counterpublics are on display here, allowing a view of women 
and men’s c^hcefflS7 commonalifies7 competing sources of authority and styles of 
political action. This roadside moment pulls together women, men and the state in ways 
that highlight the many faces of law in public life.
4.4 Competing for the King of the Road
Like scenes on Mucurapo Street, meetings between bandleaders and state bureaucrats 
show how talk, discourse and negotiation make multiple publics. In these publics, some 
participants, such as the San Fernando Carnival Committee, have an institutional base 
and others have other strengths. Not all publics include or empower everyone. This is 
especially so in stratified societies and explains why there are counterpublics or 
subpublics. As Nancy Fraser suggests, therefore, a critical eye should be directed to “a 




Figure 29: King of the Band
Women and men in a counterpublic are particularly aware of its subordinated status. 
Counterpublics’ aims are transformative. They put forward alternative, rather than simply 
replicative discourses that may be generally regarded with hostility. Such response 
reflects the context of a “hierarchy of stigma” (Warner 2002, 87). Yet, as meetings in 
City Hall show, it is far more than official roles and rules that make publics of differing 
authority.
San Fernando Carnival Committee meetings are usually held in City Hall. In this 
nineteenth century British colonial style building, official pictures of past mayors encircle 
the large meeting room. A rectangular formation of heavy wooden tables sits atop a 
raised platform at the far end of the room. This is where San Fernando City Council 
meetings are held. During Carnival Committee meetings, a couple of the long tables are 
placed in front of the platform facing an audience in rows o f wooden chairs. This is 
where bandleaders sit.
When bandleaders met at San Fernando Carnival Committee meetings, they usually 
talked about how they don’t exert their bargaining power enough and never threaten to 
boycott Carnival. Afterwords on the pavement, they constantly discussed forming a union 
because they feel the National Carnival Bands Association (NCBA) doesn’t look after
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South bandleaders’ interests. They complained that the committee doesn’t respect them 
enough, and should try to get bigger prizes and fix a route that works for the bandleaders. 
They generally expressed a lot of skepticism toward the committee and dreamt of running 
the Carnival themselves.
In meetings, the Mayor congratulated himself and the committee, for example, for paying 
prize monies early, holding early planning meetings for Carnival and concluding their 
Carnival post-mortem early in the year. The City Corporation Councillors at the head 
table often wore formal clothes and suits. They comprised the Mayor, Councillors, 
Aldermen and the Secretary of the committee. In contrast, the usually twenty or so 
bandleaders dressed informally. Typically, there were few women. This underscored 
continuing male dominance of the carnival industry (Mason 1998, 145). The Mayor 
mainly conducted the meeting and the following is a typical example of its tenor:
Mayor: Everyone knows each other here by first name and we need to work together.
Bandleader A : Who decided the route this year?
Mayor: Me and the Police Commissioner. The route can't be changed. We brought you 
all here to discuss it with you 
Bandleader A : Why it can't change?
Mayor: We getting business people on Carib Street involved and we can't blank them. 
What was taken into consideration was plans so I don’t have to apologise to the Muslims 
and Hindus like what happened for City Week5.
Bandleader B: We agreed last meeting not to pass on a route that has no prizes. This is 
we not the Mayor’s Carnival. They letting him dictate and interrupt the culture. 
Bandleader A: This is not a discussion when we come here, is ah domination. Meet the 
bandleaders halfway with the route they want. We are the veterans, we know what we 
and the bands feeling.
5 City Week, re-established in November 2003 as the Mayor’s state- and city-centred personal project, 
included Camival-style Mud Mas and large trucks blaring soca. Taking an unplanned route, some trucks 
and revelers passed in front of the San Fernando Jama Masjid during Ramadan evening prayer. Muslims 
present were offended and the Mayor publicly apologized. He then applied his City Week lesson to 
Carnival regulations.
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Secretary: Yes, you presented a route, but His Worship [the Mayor] and the Police 
Commissioner decided on a final route. Yours wasn’t considered.
Mayor: I never saw the route put forward.
Police: Well, I never met before to discuss this. Let’s have a post mortem after Carnival. 
Consultant on committee: We working hard to return life to the Carnival. We are 
promoting San Fernando internationally but we are not getting a sense of the reciprocal. 
We are talking about presenting [Carnival as] a product. All the demands are coming 
from you. What are bandleaders bringing for when people come here?
Bandleader A: What if we produce no mas? What if we take our mas to Port of Spain? 
Mayor: [Walking out] I cannot take this.
Convener: We need to protect people who come out to see the carnival and bands might 
cut the route if there are no points there. It makes control, safeguarding easier. We want 
to facilitate the masqueraders and bands. You are the stakeholders.
[His approach changed the mood].
Consultant: But we cant make everyone happy.
Convener: I think the bandleaders have a case and should be assisted. We will sit down 
and plan Carnival 2005 early [general agreement to this suggestion]. The NCC treats us 
like a village. Yet, we have stickfighting finals, Soca Monarch semis, Chutney Monarch 
finals, National Small Band finals etc and we as a Council feel proud of our plans. 
Bandleader C: How much is the prize money, how come we don’t know in advance? 
Bandleader D: We are a young band coming up and all we hear is problems with big 
bands dominating things. Making me think to leave them. So if the police make a 
structure, let’s follow it.
Convener: We are trying to make things work for the betterment of San Fernando. 
Consultant: Make San Fernando your priority. You have to show your commitment. 
Bandleader E: If you make it lucrative we will come back [from Port of Spain Carnival]. 
Bandleader B: Let’s make plans that work for San Fernando bandleaders.
Regardless of what other committee members felt in that meeting, according to one, “it 
was too late to do anything” and “we had to support the Mayor”. The Committee itself 
did not appear to make decisions based on consensus. Apparently, committee members
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felt they “could not stand up to the Mayor and tell him he is wrong” about the route and 
his approach to bandleaders. Certainly, they would not break rank publicly.
In fact, on Carnival Tuesday, two bands and their King and Queen costumes had to pass 
each other on a road that could not fit the large costumes. It was also a bad plan because 
trucks and masqueraders from different bands also had to cross each other on the street. 
Later, the Mayor pointed out that it didn’t work out, but that they were new to the 
Committee and mistakes would be made. He dismissed bandleaders’ concerns about the 
route saying, “One mas leader who you know well would like to have that small route in 
San Fernando so that he can finish by 2pm and go to another location to play mas. They 
go to other areas to play and that is why they don’t care if San Fernando mas grows. They 
care about money in pocket and being able to hustle Carnival in Port of Spain, Arima and 
Chaguanas because of they type of mas they play. The loyalty is not there. He does not 
only play mas in San Fernando so don’t come to inflict rules and conditions here because 
of an ulterior motive which is to go somewhere else and hustle. I will not have my city 
pulled down and stagnated because of greed”.
This characterization of mas leaders as participating not out of a cultural virtue, but only 
for self-interest enables the SCC to position itself as the legitimate public voice for 
Carnival. The Mayor cast mas makers as not caring about San Fernando Carnival, other 
masqueraders or people of the City. However, positioning them as, “only being driven by 
money” ignores that bandleaders do not make huge profits from Carnival. All the San 
Fernando bandleaders supplement their income in other ways. Yet, they remain involved 
precisely because of loyalty to mas, to San Fernando and to Trinidadian national culture.
At other times, the committee and the bandleaders reach agreement. This usually happens 
when their interests coincide. For example, the bandleaders were happy to participate in a 
City Week launch of Carnival when the SCC was arranging to give them some space on 
Coffee Street to show off their costumes. Also, meetings tend to progress more smoothly 
when the Convener, a steelband leader himself, negotiated with the mas bandleaders, 
called them stakeholders, described the SCC members as facilitators and told those in the
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meeting to make decisions by a show of hands. It is significant that his long involvement 
in the steelband movement gave him greater credibility and trust than the recently 
involved Mayor and some of the Councilors.
Ck
In meeting following Carnival 2004, the Mayor attempted to convince bandleaders that 
A
the route one bandleader presented was insufficient and could get the Mayor “thrown 
out”. He asked, “How could you bring all the carnival in San Fernando West and not go 
into an equitable part of the Prime Minister’s community in [the constituency of] San 
Fernando East? I come from San Fernando West, I was campaign manager for the MP. 
They will say I only looking after there. I am a politician. I have to consider everybody”. 
He underscored his view with that of that police present who thought the suggested route 
crowded too many women and men into a small area. Further cajoling, the Mayor told the 
bandleaders to consider passing the poor house so that the elderly and poor could see the 
masqueraders. He emphasised, “Let us think of where most of us are going”. He 
concluded that they shouldn’t “study money but give something back”. He often 
reiterates this point that they should give back to San Fernando, and by extension, the 
committee.
The route discussion ended with the Mayor telling the bandleaders to go back and talk 
amongst themselves and agree to his route. He wanted them to consider his position as a 
facilitator of many different stakeholders and as a politician. He told bandleaders they 
had to make a sacrifice. As he put it, “This is not about you. This is about San Fernando’s 
Carnival”. A bandleader grumbled that, “We were here doing our thing for 20 years for 
only so much profit each year and plenty family and friends’ free work and here he is 
telling us how if we don’t come into his project we are bad people not supporting San 
Fernando Carnival”. Others on the Committee didn’t blame the bandleader for his view.
When one bandleader talked about another, famous for many years in San Fernando, who 
had played mas in Port of Spain that year, the Mayor responded, “that is because he is not 
a patriot”. In desperation, he even tried to convince the bandleaders to give him a “bligh” 
(an easier chance) because he had paid their prizes by borrowing from the City
183
Corporation because the NCC didn’t yet send money. He went on, “This is a give and 
take situation. Why don’t you all work with me? All you want is money, money, money”. 
There appeared to be a clear attempt by the committee to harness what already exists as 
the festival for what will end up being prestige for the Mayor, the committee, the PNM 
and the government.
Loyalty to San Fernando was a central theme in meetings with bandleaders as he cajoled 
them to cooperate. He felt bandleaders should oblige because it makes the work of the 
police and other state branches easier when it comes to preventing theft, vandalism or 
violence. He admitted that the turnover of power every three years, when there is an 
election at the Local Government level, makes it hard to maintain continuity in the SCC. 
In interviews, mas maker Lionel Jagessar agreed, “These new people feel they know how 
to run Carnival and they would not discuss it with the bandleaders, people who really in 
the Carnival business. After they make their faults and realize their mistakes, then they 
come to us. Then, about the third year we would get them settle down, and we can't even 
talk about money because we still trying to get them to understand what Carnival is”.
Amidst protracted disagreement, the Councilors, Secretary and Mayor looked visibly 
frustrated with the bandleaders. They openly shook their heads at their non-cooperation. 
Some Councillors covered their mouths with their hands and laughed at ideas they 
thought were unrealistic. Some openly rolled their eyes. Even the Secretary, who works 
the hardest to raise money and to organize activities, expresse^her opinions while taking 
minutes. She shook her head when she thought bandleaders are raising frivolous or over­
demanding points or misrepresenting some information. She directed quite disciplinary 
looks to those speaking when she considered them wasting everyone’s time.
In contrast, the bandleaders turned around to talk to someone next to or behind them or 
shook their heads vigorously in disagreement. However, far less did I observe them 
slumping in frustration, laughing at what the SCC members said or rolling their eyes. 
This behaviour of the Council appears to be a clear exercise of power by those who think 
they deserve cooperation and deference.
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Generally, bandleaders do not offer a unified position to the SCC’s plans. Primary 
concern is to lobby for increased prizes and expanded opportunities to win prizes. 
Bandleaders are truculent about the route. They are also ambivalent about the committee 
and National Carnival Commission generally. As Mason (1998, 123) notes a member 
complaining, “They want the NCC to guard carnival but they also accuse them of 
bringing it down”. The San Fernando Carnival Committee does not always offer a unified 
voice. However, members ritually invoke notions of loyalty to San Fernando and to 
Carnival, and ideas of sacrifice and duty. Carnival participation is turned into an 
opportunity to validate the SCC’s authority. The SCC assumes its state-derived authority 
should be recognized, and that Carnival’s “purpose” is to make everyone happy.
As Eriksen (1992, 67) points out, successful nationalism must legitimize state power 
while simultaneously making citizen’s lives appear inherently meaningful. When 
bandleaders remain unconvinced, the SCC resorts to various forms of domination. Legal 
authority, appeals to all popular bases of participation, and even to informality (“we all 
know each other by first name”) may fail. Bandleaders may give in publicly, but they do 
not give up. Points of disagreement may therefore remain unresolved over decades and 
successive governments.
In its attempts to appropriate, regulate and ‘facilitate’ Carnival, the state relies on the 
authority Of patronage, developmental objectives and law. However, the bandleader, King 
or Queen of the private space of the mas camp and the public space of the road, is already 
legitimized by those who work and play with the band. Bandleaders clearly feel that, as 
artists and experts, they hold equivalent moral ground and that the state is not the 
legitimate authority over Carnival. They must, nonetheless, negotiate because of state 
prizes and penalties. Carnival also provides a livelihood. Bandleaders may unequally 
participate in decision-making, yet they are not simply ‘weak’ publics with no decision­
making power. They make their own decisions, and bring competing styles and norms in
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which even some committee members (who are also involved in mas and steelbands) 
participate6.
Figure 30: Rosemary K uru Jagessar as Queen of the Band
Like the City police, Committee members have clear legal and institutional power in this 
skirmish over authority. Yet, it is those whose authority is popular and potentially 
unlimited (as any number may play in the band from year to year) that informally lead 
Carnival. Bandleaders prioritize discourses o f equality, cooperation and autonomy 
despite their many other ways of relating to workers and Carnival itself. They carry this 
“rhetorical action through which a post-colonial Trinidadian community is symbolically 
constructed” (Waite 1993, 195) to their interactions with state actors. These informal 
modes of culture therefore have implications for their negotiations with the San Fernando 
Carnival Committee.
Leadership of women and men, kind of mas played, affiliation with the nation and the 
making of “national” culture contests authority based on law and patronage. This clearly
6 Even the Mayor can be seen in a jouvay band making fun o f public bad-talk about himself. Jouvay is 
derived from the French Jour Overt. It marks the beginning of Carnival in the pre-dawn hours of Monday 
morning with bands of revelers covered in mud and paint, and costumes making fun of popular issues and 
personalities.
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speaks to the authority that counterpublics can potentially wield. Mas makers clearly treat 
the state as a patron. However, this role doesn’t necessarily confer legitimacy. Unlike the 
picture emerging from the San Fernando King’s Wharf, here the relationship between 
patronage and authority is split. Patronage provides only one of several competing bases 
for authority because bandleaders repudiate obligations based on patronage. They 
welcome state participation, but not state domination.
For its power to be legitimate, the Carnival Committee must, somehow, also become a 
King of the Road. It must, therefore, capture leadership of the spirit of Carnival, not just 
its bureaucratic organization. In this context, state actors resort to appropriating 
bandleaders’ loyalties to the nation and culture. Committee members engage in 
stickfighting styles of striking, retreating and “grandstanding” (boastful or threatening 
talk). In doing so, they find themselves forced to appeal to informal conceptions of 
participation that, ironically, separate nation and state. Attempts to substitute state- 
centred versions aim precisely to manage and market how these two are brought together. 
Committee meetings, therefore, show authority darting through “infinite axes of 
circulation” as it is continually manipulated in the parry and thrust of negotiations.
Negotiations in City Hall parallel those on the road just as Carnival creates another kind 
of public. Yet again, it is useful to acknowledge that mas makers may also sell in the 
market or live on the Railway Line and committee members may also be bandleaders or 
members of the San Fernando Jama Masjid. Within public life, publics overlap. The state . 
again appears as one among many publics, but with greater institutional and legislative j 
power. Yet, it remains unclear where legal politics and social politics end and begin, i 
This is why the interplay of lore and law has chameleon effects. I
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Figure 31: Prices at the Entrance to the Railway Line
Drawing on Navaro-Yashin’s (2002) conceptualization of public life, I have been 
illustrating the contestation between different publics and the ways some are 
subordinated to others (Fraser 1992). Subordination may be due to socio-economic or 
gender inequalities. Or, some publics may be “weak” while others “strong”7. It may also 
result when some issues are labeled ‘private’ and cut off from legitimate public 
discussion and contestation (Benhabib 1992, 91). Masjid leaders’ religious interpretations 
about women’s disenfranchisement, the Carnival Committee’s marketing of Carnival, the 
police authority of law, and even the privatizing of patronage as “individual 
entrepreneurship” all exemplify specialized attempts to enclave issues from being 
legitimate public or political matters. Sites such as the market or masjid present formal 
restrictions, but others such as the Railway Line express a rhetoric of privacy or 
discursive privatizing that is negotiated by everyday practices.
7 Strong publics have decision-making authority. For example, Parliaments that function as a public sphere 
within the state are strong publics. Weak publics participate in more than “mere autonomous opinion 
formation removed from authoritative decision making” (Fraser 1992, 136). Yet, as Fraser concludes, “any 
conception of the public sphere that requires a sharp separation between (associational) civil society and the 
state will be unable to imagine the forms of self-management, interpublic coordination, and political 
accountability that are essential to a democratic and egalitarian society” (ibid, 136).
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The workers that make their appearance here participate in public life as members of a 
neighbourhood of squatters who often petition their political representatives for basic 
amenities. They also participate as women and men whose area of residence carries a 
social stigma in the city. Additionally, they are members of religious groups and other 
areas of Trinidad, participants in informal saving schemes such as a sou sou and 
customers with monthly payment plans with furniture giant Courts. They are also a 
segment of a larger public that participates in general and local-level election campaigns 
and voting. They do not participate out of civic virtue in its impersonal, neutral and 
universal sense. Rather, voting and campaigning enable them to be a part of wider publics 
that include parents with children in government schools or families that can afford 
groceries at the supermarket.
Through informal actions such as talking to a known party activist or formal actions such 
as registering for a party group, they establish communication networks across 
stratification lines. These are personal, reciprocal and bound within relationship. They 
also normalize alternative, informal styles of political behavior and ways of accessing 
public life. These workers-voters constitute a public in relation to higher-level party 
activists who formally and informally weave themselves into different government 
offices and practices. They are a public in relation to voters who cannot get or do not 
need government jobs. While they are not a strong public in Nancy Fraser’s (1992) sense, 
they do make binding decisions -  they vote. As exemplified below, the meaning of their 
vote also traverses “infinite axes of circulation”. It is significant not just in terms of 
politics, but also for notions of family, neighbourhood and work.
Among those in CEPEP, two got their job through knowing someone in PNM politics, 
four were hired because they knew a CEPEP contractor who was looking for workers and 
who was also involved in PNM politics, and two got their jobs through someone already 
employed with CEPEP. Therefore, for the majority, contact with a party activist enabled 
them to access this employment. For example, Leroy explained that an extended family 
member was “expecting PNM to be back in power and told me I could get a CEPEP work 
because he knew people and was in the campaigning thing”. Henrick, an Afro-
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Trinidadian who sold fish after work replied, “I was working a ‘ten days’, my niece was 
the foreman and told me how CEPEP was a everyday job for a year. She is a member of a 
PNM party group and could recommend who need the work. She arranged it for me and 
carried in my ED card photocopy and she filled out the form for me”. A fortnight later, he 
started work. Four workers knew the contractors informally, and this contact rather than 
simply one through the party, enabled them to be among the first picked. The majority 
began to work when the programme began in September 2002. Only one first joined in 
March 2003. Everyone had to fill out an application form and a National Insurance 
Scheme (NIS) form if they had no NIS number.
Interestingly, six of eight of the CEPEP workers previously worked with the URP. Most 
of them got the work through someone “coming and picking up names” and were able to 
work between two and twenty jobs per person. Those with contacts secured the higher 
number. In one extreme example from the CEPEP workers, Henrick confided that he was 
able to work about sixty ‘10 days’ through a woman he regularly sold fish to on the 
Wharf who worked in “a place where they could get it for me”. He did ten one year and 
twelve the year after. A CEPEP contractor, who was the man residents go to when they 
need a ‘10 days’ and who they described as “running URP”, later secured CEPEP jobs for 
two workers. This contact between political activists and marginalized women and men is 
very important and presents a reciprocal relationship. The activist knows who needs work 
and whom she or he considers a good worker, and the workers look up to her or him as a 
low level patron and give them their loyalty.
Writing in 1974 about patronage over the past two decades, Susan Craig describes 
political activists’ style of leadership as “highly personalist” and reinforcing PNM control 
in districts (1974, 61). Party infiltration of state bureaucracy also produced party activists 
who themselves became low ranking patrons. Such persons could bring projects and 
resources to communities due to their place in the party hierarchy and their own contacts. 
Their power was also “patronizing” in the sense that these leaders saw themselves as 
doing things for others, and they expected gratitude. Patronage to party supporters and 
clients therefore also acted as a medium for controlling dissidents (ibid, 51). Craig (ibid,
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38) notes that their approach would effectively “by-pass all existing institutions and, 
indeed, seek to be a substitute for normal democratic process”. As Carl Stone concluded 
over thirty years ago, in a context of high unemployment, economic discontent, scarcity 
and difficulty accessing social resources, governing parties will be especially able and 
willing to develop patron-client relations. This occurs through distribution of welfare, 
employment and income along partisan lines (Stone 1974).
Middle-ranking party activists I interviewed said that one can get a CEPEP job through 
“filling out a form”, but the process requires far more networks than that and in practice 
relies on a contact system which is interwoven with party politics and control of the state. 
For example, one contractor said that he hired workers by going to various parts of the 
community and asking people, and by looking for influential community women or men 
who could recommend persons to be considered. Another said that workers came to her 
asking for a job. Yet, a third explained that staff in the PNM Constituency Office chose 
her teams of workers as she was busy overseeing the Local Government Election. 
Another staff member in the office explained that she chose several of the workers hired 
by a fourth contractor. She also assigned herself a foreman position, but the contractor 
soon replaced her with his wife.
Among URP workers, two got help from a member of the PNM who has influence in the 
URP system, three got help when the URP person, a low level political appointee, passed 
around taking names from the area for ‘10 days’ work. Women and men interpret the 
opportunities this person offers in racial terms and argue that if it is a UNC person, only 
“Indians” get the jobs and if it is a PNM person, it is only “Negroes”. One person felt that 
she secured work because they campaigned for the PNM. As Baby Girl told me,
The URP was passing around to get names, they was using a voting list 
and asking people if they were voting or not. I say why vote if I not 
getting work and just before the election I get a ‘10 days’. I took it and 
then for the election helped them campaign by going around with a list 
asking people to vote and organising a car for them. They gave us 
breakfast, lunch and even dinner. All campaigning people got a promise 
for a ‘10 days’. I got mine and they told me I would get one every other
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fortnight. We had to wait to see who won the election, but the result was 
18-18. UNC and PNM wasn’t giving each other’s group’s jobs who was 
seen in a PNM or UNC rally or t-shirt or with a flag.
Only Baby Girl reported going to the URP office to sign her name on a list. None of the 
other URP workers reported going to the Constituency Office, but this a common practice 
generally. Baby Girl had secured many successive URP jobs through campaigning for the 
UNC, but could not turn around and openly support the PNM. She, therefore, had no 
contacts to turn to when the UNC lost power. However, she felt she secured a URP job 
under the PNM because she told party activists she would vote for the party.
As Craig points out, while patronage overlaps with state-funded welfare, it essentially 
cultivates clients’ obligations to a patron and feelings of continued dependence. As well, 
it undermines formal state channels (1974, 9). It is not simply about assuaging poverty 
and destitution, distributing income and providing social security. Rather, patron-client 
relations operate through reciprocal obligations between those in authority and those that 
need their help. These become the very basis for government legitimacy. A legitimate 
government meets women and men’s needs, is able to rely on their reciprocity to win and 
control the state, provides loyal supporters with administrative rank, and functions 
through direct, personal relations between political parties and voters. The stories of the 
women working with the URP suggest that both the People’s National Movement and 
United National Congress secured support and distributed patronage through the state and 
its resources.
The majority of URP-working women that I interviewed applied for a URP job because 
they needed an income to survive. One woman’s husband, the main breadwinner, became 
sick, another couldn’t afford her son’s booklist, a third because her husband was “not 
working and not making tide [fishing]” nor looking for work so her daughter could not 
afford “passage” (taxi fare) to school. A fourth woman simply needed economic 
independence. The number of fortnight jobs that these women worked was usually due, 
not only to “who you know” but, to several factors. For example, it depended on whether 
a woman had often asked for her name to be put on the waiting list, if her partner was
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unemployed regularly and what the money was needed for. Miss Mavis infrequently 
requested a ‘10 days’, but always tried to get one in September when she had to buy 
schoolbooks for her two sons. Gail always tried to get a ‘10 days’ when she has to buy 
her Carnival costume. Her sister, Aunt Leela, said that she “was good” with a particular 
party activist “running URP” and “sometimes I was getting back to back jobs but found 
that unfair because somebody was getting take off the list so I wanted only two back to 
back”. Gail added that Aunt Leela “used to make sure I get regular 10 days by getting put 
me on the list”.
Among CEPEP workers, only three of the eight I interviewed said they had worked for a 
political party before getting their job. This group said they put up posters, carried 
women and men to vote and helped in campaigning. Of this minority who helped the 
party, Mr. Ross stopped because he began to feel “politicians are liars”. Renegade, 
Josanne’s common-law partner, worked for the UNC in 1995 because he knew the 
candidate for his voting area (outside San Fernando) and, in the next election, for the 
PNM because he was “bom in a PNM house”. Among URP workers, three of seven 
helped a political party before getting their job. Most of them were part of campaigning. 
Overall, the majority of workers were not involved with a political party before getting 
their jobs. However, as highlighted earlier, their contacts with political activists were key 
to securing employment.
The elision between squatters, voters, party activists and workers plays out in CEPEP and 
URP work teams. Four of the eight CEPEP workers, comprising one Dougla woman, one 
Indo-Trinidadian woman and two Afro-Trinidadian men, agreed that workers are “mainly 
PNM”. As Leroy reflected, “I feel working CEPEP, if a person want to say he belong to a 
different party, he will keep that to himself. Either belong or keep silent. You supposed to 
hush your mouth if  you are a UNC on the job”. Renegade agreed, “you have to act like 
you belong to one party, that is how de contractor puts it to you. He tells you “is PNM 
gave you this work and if  you don’t support them, your job could be jeapordized”. He 
tells us we have to go to rallies. He told us we had to join the party, but that was nice to 
now have a card and number”. Listening in, Josanne agreed that workers are “mainly
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PNM, but half the workers are UNC playing PNM to get a work. If they a UNC we run 
them out”.
Generally, the consensus was that workers are “mainly PNM, but people change parties 
and you never know how they vote”. Two workers felt that the teams comprise a mix of 
political loyalties, not mainly PNM supporters. Two men did not know. In comparison, 
five of seven URP workers felt that the majority of workers are from one party. All that 
said “yes” said, “mainly PNM”. Two of this group added, “but a few UNC” and one 
more of the group ended, “openly UNC people are less likely to get a chance”. Only Miss 
Beryl said “no” and Miss Mavis said she didn’t know.
Interestingly, six of eight CEPEP workers said that they joined a party or helped a party 
after getting their CEPEP job. Those that said “yes” said that the boss told them they had 
to join the party, that they helped out in the local government election, that they were “up 
and down night and day” with the party and handed out fliers before the local 
government election. They wanted to help because they both supported the party and 
have a job through them. Other reasons for joining the party after included, joining “just 
to help the party”, “was always PNM anyway so joining the party wasn’t a big deal”, 
“workers feel they have to show support to the party to keep their work”, “because de 
way how it was looking, you get a job and it seem as if you require to do this”, and 
“through the boss to support him”.
Josanne admitted, “it felt like you had to do it, everyone in de job was helping out. What 
if they send you back home, tell you not to come back in the morning?” As Mr. Ross, 
now a CEPEP worker said, “when I was doing URP, they were asking for party card -  it 
was party card business”. He did about 15 URP fortnightly jobs after going to put down 
his name in a URP office. Another male worker added that he was not going to be 
campaigning for the party again. Only two of the seven URP workers did not join or help 
the party after getting their job. Four of the five who joined said they did that to improve 
the chance of getting more ‘10 days’. One was always a supporter and another was 
working a ‘ 10 days’ just before the election and so wanted to reciprocate by helping.
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According to workers, joining a party and helping them campaign is common practice 
among those in CEPEP and URP. All eight CEPEP workers said that workers generally 
help at party events. Their reasons included, “they came round and ask but, CEPEP 
workers on whole are strong PNM supporters so in whole aspect of it, they want it, if  it is 
a rally they coming”, “people have been asked to come help set up tents for rallies”, 
“some are party lovers and in party groups, especially the women, so they always in 
activities”, and “yes for election, they encourage workers to canvass and make sure 
people vote”. Five of the workers were regularly involved in party activities. They put up 
posters, brought people to vote, canvassed on local government election day or went to 
rallies. One said they help “for benefit to their family and kids” and don’t feel they have a 
choice.
The picture is the same among URP workers. All seven said that workers help at party 
events. Two added that “is who want to help and get the work” and that “workers help 
out on their own”. Usually, they describe the work as including campaigning, sticking 
posters, telling people about the party, going to rallies and being in a party group. As I 
observed in party group meetings I attended, the Constituency Executive will encourage 
workers that are members of or join party groups to see themselves as “agents of the 
party” and as “PNM representatives there everyday in the wider community”.
Figure 32: A CEPEP Worker Rests on the Wharf
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Poverty and lack of income place groups such as these squatters in a dependent 
relationship. Yet, as shown below, while women and men may appear powerless in 
certain ways, they clearly maneuver registers of authority as they try to survive. Like 
market vendors, they negotiate their peripheral status by attempting to personalise the 
state and to directly access levels of hierarchy. They consistently use informal means to 
influence or access authority. This is how contacts constitutes a source of power. 
Residents on the Railway Line and King’s Wharf use their contacts to negotiate their 
belonging in a range of publics, and to improve their location within them. They therefore 
manage being squatters, neighbours, parents, workers, party activists, Carnival 
masqueraders and voters using the kinds of power their relations, practices and pretences 
can mobilize.
Just like market vendors, these workers rely on informality within the state system’s 
formal structures. In this case, they want to know their political activities will make their 
jobs more secure. Relatedly, therefore, they will also value limited non-participation of 
opposing groups. In other words, not everyone can equally access specific kinds of power 
even if it appears open to all. As Carl Stone (1986) points out of Jamaica, this means that 
those not belonging to the party in power lack equitable access to representation and help. 
Partisan allocation of scarce opportunities, therefore, creates the threat of resentment 
among those excluded, and fears of loss of power among those who benefit. This leads to 
political party representation mainly through electioneering, rather than through policy, 
consultation and related activities. It also works against political participation and 
organizing in its widest expressions.
Workers’ participation in elections and campaigning appears as a hustle based primarily 
on needs, desires to play Carnival, aspirations for savings or simply hopes for economic 
independence. Participation does not simply correlate with civic virtue or permanent 
identities. Rather, relations based on personal obligations, reciprocity and networks 
between individuals are foremost. However, these women and men also look for the best 
rewards and will present any face to the party offering. They may say they will vote for 
the party to get a job when they enter office, and then not necessarily vote. They may
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campaign for one party and vote for another. Workers’ informal actions shape and create 
public life by empowering a party to secure state resources, create jobs, label some 
practices “private” and reinforce alternative ways of accessing public life. This is another 
example of the switching, twisting and mimicry involved in playing a politics of authority 
skillfully. There is no established hierarchy of legitimacy, and the range o f possible 
registers, including need, family, fun, clothes, friendship, promises and profit, are 
certainly not wholly dominated by law. .
Today, all sorts of groups from pensioners to single mothers can potentially form 
influential groups of lobbyists or voters so that there is very different potential for 
interface with the state. This means that the nature of the state has itself changed to now 
accommodate, and as I show even appropriate, the kinds of political action that I describe 
in these sites. This does not mean I argue that market vendors or mas makers are vying 
for influence over the state. Rather, I use Habermas’ notion of the public sphere in a 
wider, less institutional sense than originally intended. Instead, this study explores a 
variegated, decentred and democratic array o f public spaces with diverse and intersecting 
practices. It also elucidates how they overlap or, as Dawson describes, form “overlapping 
sets of discourse communities” (1994, 207). As I show, the state appears as one o f these. 
Its intersection with other publics highlights that, like the diversity of lore, law ends up 
looking like a good deal more than one thing.
market vendors’ informal values explicitly challenge formal rules by seeking to narrow 
their scope. They accept police authority, but their talk, action and negotiations work out 
different ways of and reasons for obeying or disobeying law. As I discuss further in the 
next chapter, although police do not need to appeal to these values, they nonetheless 
appear to share a sense of their legitimacy because both they and vendors have to eat. 
This shows one incarnation of the power and meanings that have the face of law.
4.6 Conclusion
Interestingly,'; practices and relations differ slightly in important ways. For example,
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From another angle, mas makers can compel local government officials to legitimize 
their power through an appeal to informal values. Officials, therefore, attempt to 
appropriate, control and ultimately replace mas makers’ love for mas with their own 
meanings. In a way, these bureaucrats try to do with lore what vendors try to do with law. 
This registers a second version of how the state comes to behave and look like a variety 
of other publics.
Somewhat differently, patronage workers share with political authorities of all strata the 
practice, entrenchment and legitimizing of informal relations. Lore shapes deployment of 
state resources far more than law, though at this point it is hard to separate one from the 
other. CEPEP and URP programmes seem to function almost like a mas camp driven by 
need, reciprocity, leadership and loyalty even while they are motivated by elections, 
voting and office. As interactions among police and vendors or San Fernando Carnival 
Committee members and mas makers also suggests, weak and strong publics may be 
hybrid. Even squatters who have no official rank have strong decision-making power as 
voters.
These different pictures exhibit public life in San Fernando. It is made up of many 
competing and overlapping publics interacting under inequitable circumstances. State 
actors form only one of these and still they are constantly stepping into other publics for 
one standpoint or another. These interactions, and the bargaining that defines them, are 
part of continuous processes of redefining what is admissible for public deliberation and 
what values underlie relations among and between groups. They are also part of how 
women and men work out the range of legitimate meanings expressed by concepts such cc$ 
nation, legality, enfranchisement, patronage and leadership. These pictures direct one’s 
gaze beyond legislation and institutional authority, but also beyond informal actions.
v
The discourses underlying legitimacy are far from sitable or corralled to specific fields. 
They morph as they move and become attached to different practices and meanings. Each 
of the dispositions discussed here, everybody have to eat, love for mas and contacts,
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offers a mixed bag of sources of legitimation. In other words, each brings unexpected 
kinds of power to negotiations over public space, the public purse and public culture. 
Each reproduces similar kinds of power, but gives them different significance and 
meaning across a range of sites, interactions, ideals and moments. They, therefore, work 
within and across fields creating parallels even among groups and encounters that seem 
to have nothing to do with each other.
Publics overlap because women and men have many identities, bases for belonging, ways 
of doing things and perspectives. They also overlap, however, because habitus creates 
homologous contradictions and consistencies in the encounter of lore and law. Although 
mas makers appear to be bargaining because of love for mas, this is another version or 
interpretation of everybody have to eat. Concomitantly, contacts works like love for mas 
to make informal leadership powerful. As I show further in Chapter 6, return to 
spirituality is far closer to love for mas and even everybody have to eat than first appears.
The ethnographic material in this study does not suggest that women and men’s 
engagements with and appropriations of law are a sign of statism or reverence for the 
state. I think this part of how they survive rules as well as enable rules and a range of 
legalities to survive. Statism as “something beyond nationalism, as an identification not 
only or even necessarily with a nation, but with a reified and exalted state” (Navaro- 
Yashin 2002, 201) does not explain how vendors, mas makers, government workers at all 
levels and voters of different kinds deal with legislation or state institutions.
Navaro-Yashin suggests that state practices generate power productively (in addition to 
repressively). To this end, she argues that “statesmen” mobilize ““self-generating” or 
“spontaneous” sites within society in order to reproduce and enhance state power. This is 
a historically specific and contingent synthesis of Foucault’s repressive and productive 
hypotheses...” (2002, 132). Her critique of state-society dualisms is based on the role that 
the mundane, banal and quotidian sphere of civil society plays in generating state effects. 
It also reflects the ways that statespeople claim to represent civil society in their 
contestations over legitimate (control of) state power. For her, anti-state and “will of the
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people” rhetoric is part of statecraft. Here, civil society becomes the symbolic ground on 
which legitimate state power is based.
Her approach to public life closely fits the interwoven experience of vendors and police, 
mas makers and government bureaucrats, squatters and party activists in San Fernando. 
However, their political actions do not seem to be about statism and they don’t 
necessarily enhance state power. Instead, they are more appropriately located in the 
interlock of lore and law, and their implications for shifting registers of legitimate power.
While all Trinidadians must interact with different manifestations of the state, the 
strategies, ideologies and consequences they also activate are highly variable. For 
example, one striking observation that emerges from the mas camp is that women and 
men are constantly creating a ‘nation’ that i s ^ n o t  beholden to the state. In a way, this 
reinstates the social and informal even in official domains of authority. Yet, keep in 
mind, this doesn’t happen in a pre-determined, systematic way, but pragmatically and 
tactically. This is also why specific publics, such as the state, can today look so much like 
any Trinidadian market vendor and tomorrow like a San Fernando costume designer or 
squatter.
State domination can thrive in this context. Yet, there are many forms o f power and 
meaning associated with law and many instances when it looks much like lore. These 
illuminate the nuanced ways that a variety of publics fundamentally recast an idea of the 
state and the terms of state legitimacy and authority, as well as their own. The 
negotiations I describe do not suggest that all those in whose imaginations the state 
circulates are “faces of the state” (ibid, 2).
Rather, they are social actors who move through the world as if there is no clear 
separation of social and state, and no non-negotiable boundaries on the flow of 
informality. Their activities enhance, perpetuate, fraction, infiltrate and transcend 
different spheres of public life, only one of which is (the state. Participation by 
subordinated groups in subaltern counterpublics or even in hegembnic publics engages
* yisL^XrM' $
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with participation by dominant groups in both spheres. It is the tugs, weavings, 
appropriations and boundary-making practices defining their negotiations that make 
action in publics and counterpublics political. They show how typically powerful 
authorities are "contested, modified, and occasionally overthrown” (Fraser 1992, 140).
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C h ap te r Five: Legitimizing Aesthetic A uthority
T ¥ P i
Figure 33: Licensed by the Lord
5.1 Introduction
In the last two chapters, I have shown how habitus explains negotiations within and 
among publics. Issues of legitimacy and authority have dipped and surfaced alongside 
this discussion. Legislation, formal rules, officials and law generally do not have 
uncontested say. Instead, informality flows through formality in assorted ways at various 
gradations of power. The possibilities offered legitimize unconventional kinds of 
authority based on personal style, emotion, common sense, family, need or friendship. 
Publics of all kinds rely on the interlock between lore and law to manage their 
participation in governance o f public life. This relation, therefore, creates a continuum 
where state officials at times appear not so far removed from those with less formal 
power.
Dispositions such as everybody have to eat or contacts offer up unexpected bases for 
power. They muddy and twist any clear hierarchy of authority. They merge and overlap 
publics of women and men who may never even have met. As well, they suggest the
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underlying validity of informality, and even illegality, when considered reasonable. Each 
of these dispositions infiltrates social life and the state, taking on meanings situated in 
either or both spheres. This is why vendors, mas makers, squatters, police, bureaucrats 
and party activists appear as guises or versions of each of each other despite their location 
at different positions within social life and the state.
Chapter 3 showed how habitus emerges from lore. Chapter 4 showed this habitus within 
law because lore also operates there, reproducing the intersections and flow between the 
two. Whereas the last chapter continued to highlight the faces of those participating in 
lore even as angle shifted to the state, this chapter gives more space to officials’ take on 
governance of public life. What are the perspectives from within law? I detail how 
officials create and maneuver a continuum along which they can justify the kinds of 
authority they wield. What are their implications? I first outline a conceptual scaffold that 
connects the relationship between law and lore to legitimate authority. After this, in the 
next chapter, I move back to informal social life, though I continue to focus on aspects of 
law there.
5.2 Legitimate Authority
Debates in modem political philosophy have pivoted on issues of participation, consent, 
freedom, trust, self-interest, the public good, obedience, representation, and the role of 
state branches and bureaucracies. Marx, for example, argued that state bureaucracies are 
“class instruments which emerged to coordinate a divided society in the interests of the 
ruling class” (Held 1989, 33)1. Max Weber, however, critiqued the view of state 
organization as only “‘parasitic’ and a direct product of the activities of classes” (ibid,
1 Another view, in his early writings, instead emphasizes “that the state generally, and bureaucratic 
institutions in particular, may take a variety of forms and constitute a source of power which need not be 
directly linked to the interests, or be under the unambiguous control of, the dominant class in the short 
term. By this account, the state retains a degree of power independent of this class: its institutional forms 
and operational dynamics cannot be inferred directly from the configuration of class forces -  they are 
‘relatively autonomous’ (Held 1989, 33). This view supports an idea of the state “as a potential arena for 
struggle which can become a key force for socialist change” (ibid, 36).
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39). Instead, he maintained that bureaucracies were indispensable in all (and not just 
capitalist) large organizations and societies. They were, therefore, also necessary for 
modem statehood based on rational rules and legal regulations.
Nonetheless, Weber has been critiqued for neglecting the ways that those in subordinate 
positions in bureaucracies can increase their power. As Anthony Giddens (1979) 
highlighted, bureaucracies “may enhance the potential for disruption from ‘below’ and 
increase the spaces for circumventing hierarchical control” (Held 1989, 43). Marx would, 
of course, have also replied that bureaucracies are enmeshed in social and civil divisions 
and struggles. This suggests that struggle is itself ‘inscribed’ into state administration. 
Sociologist David Held agrees with Marx’s earlier, more nuanced view of the state as not 
simply “an unambiguous agent of capitalist reproduction” (ibid, 76). This is precisely 
because of the multiplicity of influences, as well as electoral and economic constraints 
that affect those in state bureaucracies.
In Held’s excellent critique of Habermas’ book, Legitimation Crisis (1975), he argues 
that theories of social cohesion and legitimation should not rely on an “internalized 
value-norm-moral consensus theorem” (cf. Giddens 1979, 87) to understand “the 
production and reproduction of action” (ibid, 88). Rather than normative, consensus- 
based approaches to legitimacy, he emphasises lack of consensus (dissensus) about 
norms, values and beliefs, and a “dual consciousness” among particular classes2. Held 
disagrees that compliance means people accept state mle as legitimate. He instead 
highlights ambivalence, instrumental compliance, and pragmatic acquiescence. In other 
words, people attempting to make ends meet participate in the status quo because it offers 
some degree of comfort and security, and appears inevitable (ibid, 91).
2 This argument is based on Held’s more fundamental critique of Habermas views of social integration as 
necessary for social and state stability. Instead, he highlights the moral approval of dominant groups, and 
the politically powerful and mobilized, as most important for the continuation of a social system (Held 
1989, 88).
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State power and political stability are, therefore, linked to patterns of values and norms, 
strategies of displacement and fragmentation3, continuing attempts to legitimize the 
authority of those comprising ‘the state’, economic compulsion and the depoliticisation of 
public-private relations, among other national and international factors. Rather than 
simply common values and general respect for state authority, discussions of legitimacy 
should take account of “a complex web of interdependencies between political, economic 
and social institutions and activities which divide power centres and which create 
multiple pressures to comply” (ibid 151).
5.2.1 Weberian Conceptions
One cannot discuss notions of legitimacy and authority without referencing German 
scholar Max Weber’s writings on leadership (1947, 1958, 1962). His concern focused on 
the ways that authority, as leadership and domination, is legitimized and stabilized. For 
him, authority is, essentially, legitimate (use of) power. His famous schema included 
bureaucratic-rational-legal authority, charismatic authority and traditional authority. 
These categories often overlapped and combined in reality. Bureaucratic and legislated 
power, recognized personal and, even, spiritual power, and traditional practices were the 
key sources of legitimacy for each ideal type.
Bureaucratic and administrative power describes officials’4 legal domination based on 
generally agreed-to, formalized and written rules. This kind of authority is widely 
described as ‘rational’ because it includes standardized procedure, formal division of 
responsibility, hierarchy, technical knowledge and impersonal relationships5. People obey 
rules partly out of agreement, but also because legal domination is backed by legitimate 
use of force. In Weber’s view, administrative and legal order backed by legitimate use of 
force defines the modem state. On the other hand, traditional domination is based on
3 Held argues “that stability is related to the ‘decentring’ or fragmentation of culture, the atomization of 
people’s experiences of the social world” (1989, 89). These limit understanding of “the organizational 
principles determining the allocation of ‘value’ and ‘meaning’ and alternatives to them” (ibid, 93).
Weber differentiated between bureaucratic officials and politicians. Whereas the first should impartially 
and impersonally exercise authority, partisanship and independent action mark the second.
5 However, while autonomy, neutrality and equality are supposed to be the hallmarks of bureaucratic 
practice, in reality such practice may be highly political, partial and personal.
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authority that is immemorial, routine or handed down. It can be personal (but not 
personality-dominated), arbitrary, unorganized or informal, and what Weber would
and, historically, often patriarchal power.
Theoretically, while charismatic authority is between rulers and followers, bureaucratic 
authority consists of rules rather than rulers. On the other hand, traditional domination is 
defined by hierarchical relations shaped by established forms of social conduct. Not only 
do these overlap, they may dynamically and cyclically merge into each other. For 
example, charismatic domination may become routinized into bureaucratic power. Weber 
described an historical process towards rationalization. This perspective has received 
much critique. Writing about leadership in the Caribbean has often referenced Weber’s 
characterization of charismatic authority6 (Singham 1968; Allahar 2001). Followers’ 
relationships of loyalty and obedience, and their belief in leaders’ qualities has been 
considered key to Caribbean leaders’ domination. Trust, faith, informality, and a sense of 
vision and collective mission, rather than precedent, ritual and tradition, are given centre 
stage.
5.2.2 Contemporary Legal Anthropology Approaches
Key questions the field who makes rules, who can undo them, how they are
normalized and enforced, and how they are morally justified” (Moore 2005, 2). There is 
much that can be read into this literature for my own approach to law as wide-ranging, 
formally-empowered rules, positions, processes and practices. It’s worth noting that 
while I am interested in aspects of formality rather than in jurisprudence, legislation is a 
pier affording police and local government officials a concrete height of power. As I 
show in the next chapter, written constitutional and Sharia (Islamic) law similarly shape 
social institutions, economic practices and cultural forms in the AS JA.
6 In his Introduction to an edited collection of studies on charisma in Caribbean leadership, Allahar 
nonetheless notes that the male politicians who have led the Caribbean “were modem leaders, whose 
authority and legitimacy resided in their rational appeals to their followers, and the fact that their leadership 
was legally constituted” (2001, xii).
consider ‘irrational’. It can exist at all levels, and includes cultural and religious habits
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There are times when law has abstract value and is considered justifiable on its own 
terms or for ideals, such as equality or human rights, which it enshrines. However, these 
sites show important instances when law gains meaning only in relation to lore. It is not
offered by lore and law are inseparably intertwined. What most matters to women and 
men is worked out through homologous connections to things, people, spaces and 
practices. Thus, their ways o f relating to family and legislation, artistry and office, 
masculinity and leadership, and spirituality and enfranchisement are like chameleons 
blending, mimicking and darting across or away from each other. What matters shapes 
the way they navigate such different forms of power, creating a kind of legitimacy that is 
neither one nor the other because it is based on the value given to reasonable 
combination of the two.
provides a porous, irregular, unfixed and even slippery sphere of
negotiation snaking within and across law and lore. It enables navigations that legitimize 
all sorts of conventional and unconventional forms of power, which may be justified by 
sociality, legality, leadership or simply efficacy. Popular participation in hierarchical 
social relations continually reworks ideals of order and balance in this way. This overall 
aesthetic or approach to normative life is what I call aesthetic authority.
5.2.3 Aesthetic A uthority
Authority, for anthropologist Daniel Miller, is grounded in forging, maintaining and 
conducting relationships. It emerges from the ways that people, amidst great social 
heterogeneity7, make “highly integrated meaningful worlds, carefully crafted lives, with 
considerable consistency or clearly worked through contradictions” (2006, 3). People’s 
relationships may be to their bodies, people, things, practices and ideals. These shape and
simply that women and men have a “dual consciousness”, but that the bases for authority
7 Miller would agree with Held that contemporary economic, political and social life, or modernity, creates 
heterogeneity, dispersion and diversity. However, his position is the opposite of Held’s that theorizing 
about legitimate authority should be rooted in fragmentation and atomization.
are shaped by what matters to them, and the narratives they reproduce to make sense of 
their past and present.
Following Bourdieu (1972), Miller argues that early parental influences, later 
relationships and the wider cultural order build on each other. They create meanings that 
people work out daily. Past and present influences may be widely divergent and 
completely contradictory. People, therefore, choose to sometimes emphasise some 
influences more than others. The sense that they seek to make through their practices and 
relationships creates an overall, totalising order in their life. Miller calls this 
“cosmological architecture” (2006, 23), an “aesthetic”. This aesthetic is, in essence, a 
habitus. It expresses normativity, ideals of order and balance, and the centrality of 
practice. But while habitus denveslfom the normative social order, Miller is concerned 
witfrthe order individuals or households partly create for themselves within a modem de­
centered and relatively apolitical space, such as within the private home.
Within such an aesthetic, many different factors shape the meanings that people create. 
Their aesthetic is, therefore, multiply influenced or “overdetermined” (ibid, 8). There are 
the “vertical” influences that come from early childhood and through adolescence to 
adulthood. There is also a complementaiy “horizontal” dimension. This creates 
Bourdieu j^an homologies or the logic between different areas of practice. In other words, 
ways of dealing with one aspect of life may be consistent with ways of dealing with other 
totally unrelated aspects. Similar meanings order and explain different practices. As 
Miller writes, “At any given point of time the aesthetic is distributed through a series of 
relationships to different material genres or aspects of one life” (ibid 15).
An aesthetic merges vertical and horizontal dimensions of order. In the context of this 
study, the norms and meanings created through family, village and agricultural life may 
influence market vendors’ relationships to money, police and public space while current 
economic demands and difficulties may shift these relationships or reproduce them in 
new ways. These influences are the basis for vendors’ aesthetic authority.
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Miller’s focus on the household and private sphere is a critique of the typical sociological
A
categories of society, community and individual; Nonetheless, key ideas can be returned 
to the study of public spheres, religious and family networks, and associational groups. In 
other words, unrelated vendors can behave like family members. CEPEP workers who, in 
their head, constantly shuffle and add to the list of party activists they can turn to for help 
behave much like a man constantly reorganising his email as he affirms his place in his 
world or a woman who collects and moves her furniture around to feel she has some 
means of controlling her life.
Desire for and practice of relationships mark those experiences, values, people and things 
that are considered inalienable. This is because notwithstanding their relations to wider 
social norms up to and including the state, much of their emotional and personal concerns 
are centered on a few primary relationships, most especially those people they love. It is 
in the connection between these close relationships and the wider public sphere that 
women and men make both conscious and unconscious decisions about what really 
matters to them, and what they feel makes sense. They highlight the ways they order their 
lives. All these create an aesthetic that women and men use to legitimate what they do in 
the present. From this perspective, aesthetic authority, therefore, underlies the 
relationship between law and lore.
5.3 Legitimizing Practice
This discussion highlights a range of approaches that can be useful for interrogating 
legitimate authority and which also help attach people to various levels of social 
engagement. I draw on them as I explore the views of state officials, and what they 
suggest about how lore and law are negotiated along gradations of power.
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5.3.1 The High Ground o f Law in relation to Roadside Lore
At successive bureaucratic stages, everybody have to eat provides a source of traditional 
authority that is taken into account by representatives of law despite their legislative 
power. For example, past and present Mayors I interviewed felt that vendors should be 
prevented from selling on the street and should be moved by police if they do. They 
blamed vendors for creating confusion in the flow of people and traffic. Women and men, 
who would prefer uncongested sidewalks, and storeowners, who face competition from 
streetside vending, are cast as “taxpayers” whose needs the state should answer to.
However, Mayors generally empathise with vendors whose livelihood is in marketing as 
they realize it involves hard work and long hours. A past (NAR) Deputy Mayor (1986 to 
1989) blamed the state for not sustaining the “proper and sustainable policing” needed to 
curb roadside vending. He admitted to knowing of police who take “bribes” from vendors 
and that some vendors feel obligated to give to police or feel that there is then less chance 
of them being taken to court and their goods seized. Yet, he understood that vendors saw 
themselves as using what he called “survival strategies” to “make a dollar”.
Figure 34: Patrolling the Packing Up
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The (PNM) Mayor (2003 to 2006) reiterated a common perception of market vendors as 
being secretly well off and said, “Many of these people are quite successful because they 
do not pay rents and they do not pay business taxes. They are pretty wealthy”. To the 
vendors’ argument that unless they sell their extra or perishable goods outside of the 
market, they will waste, he responded, “If they conduct themselves appropriately and 
people do need the goods, they will go inside. But if you want a quick fix and know 
somebody will be outside, you can go about breaking the law, causing traffic to backup, 
it’s the mentality we have adopted and the lawlessness the society is showing”.
He felt that these people are “freeloaders” who want to be “in front of the rates and taxes 
that keep the city alive”. He argued that the business community even came to him to 
privately complain about their storefronts and pavements being blocked, and the illegal 
competition. Generally, the past and present members of the state, including Mayors and 
police, view High Street and Mucurapo Street vending as the same. The Mayor also 
blamed a lack of constant police vigilance. This suggests that what is wanted at the top is 
not necessarily what guides state actors’ actions at lower levels. However, it seems that 
inconsistent responses start at the very top where political will may today decide to 
eradicate street vending and tomorrow turn a blind eye8.
At lower levels, police do not form a homogenous group. It is the City Police, operating 
under the City Corporation and as part of Local Government administration, who regulate 
vending around San Fernando. Therefore, vendors have a different relationship with them 
than with officers who are part o f the San Fernando based-branch of the national police 
force. Vendors will also continue to sell if “Traffic Police” from the Central Police force 
are walking along Mucurapo Street on the lookout for cars to ticket. It is the City Police 
jeep turning from High Street onto Mucurapo Street that ruffles vendors settled on the 
road. There is clearly no homogenous view of policing or a state, but rather one that 
appreciates gradations and varieties of state authority and responsibility. In fact, the City
8 Lloyd-Evans and Potter (2002, 108) state that government regulation is not as stringent in areas where 
traders provide a much needed service to local residents, for example, along the Eastern Main Road. 
Enforcement is stricter near or in areas o f high-income housing and more lenient in lower-middle income 
housing or rural areas.
Police report that the Central Police tend to informally delegate issues of roadside and 
pavement vending to City Police jurisdiction. They strongly disagreed with this informal 
division of authority and felt that the Central Police should at least also enforce the 
national legislation.
Quite apart from the institutional divisions of the police, there are the personal 
relationships that may or may not develop between individual police who regularly have 
responsibility for the area and those they are responsible for dealing with. I showed this 
in Chapter 4. The interaction between people and state is not always impersonal nor 
without relationship. On both sides, factors such as ability to make jokes or appear hostile 
can be decisive.
In addition to legal regulations, police highlight ‘moral’ concerns related to hygiene, 
safety and security as reasons to discontinue vending. Their empathy is limited by their 
perception that the “market is real profit” and vendors are not simply “making a dollar”. 
In the^eyes of the law, vendors should not be on the road. Yet, to some extent, police 
empathise with vendors’ attempts to earn a livelihood and they recognize that there is a 
demand for roadside sales. Disempowered by the rules regarding public space, vendors 
bargain, ‘sweet-talk’, bribe and keep up pretence in the hope that police will recognise 
their obedience in the face of the law and ignore their disobedience when they think no 
one sees. Yet, everyone 1----------  ^
Police, therefore, are also involved in bargaining, cajoling and a somewhat scripted 
pretence. This is one of the reasons why, despite both police and politicians’ 
championing of legal authority, their practices and statements suggest that they 
accommodate instances and degrees of illegal vending. As Lloyd-Evans and Potter (2002, 
108) conclude, “Within Trinidad, levels of police regulation over the informal sector 
reflect popular and political opinion”.
In describing their interaction with vendors, the police began by saying that they try to 
educate them by telling them that it is against the Municipal Corporations Act to sell on
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the road. They advise them to get a stall from the Market Clerk. However, most vendors 
already have stalls. The key reason for selling on the road is to get rid of perishable 
goods, to make profit or at least make up the cost of the goods and to be where the 
customers come looking for deals - to meet a demand - in the afternoon. Reliance on 
rules can only hurt vendors’ economic opportunities.
Market vendors are clearly subordinate in their relationship with the police and 
politicians. Their way of negotiating selling on the road -  times they sell, moving when 
they see police, not directly challenging police, telling them to give them a chance, 
explaining the need to sell out perishables -  suggests that they recognize their overall 
lesser power in the relationship. In fact, attempts to negotiate with police through talking, 
moving only for the moment, delaying moving and bribing, treat police as vendors and 
encourage them to see the vendors as their own police. This is the chameleon effect of 
making and maintaining relationships around what matters.
Interestingly, because police know vendors through village relations or years on the job, 
their informal ties with roadside sellers may make it seem morally alright to accept gifts 
of produce or to have a drink with vendors who are friends. I was wary about asking the 
police about bribery. On the one hand, vendors highlighted its significance. On the other 
hand, asking the police about vendors’ claims could have made vendors’ lives more 
difficult if the police responded by punishing them with stricter enforcement of the law. 
Or, they could now refuse to take bribes (thereby cutting an informal point of 
negotiation) and make greater efforts to protect their reputation.
The police denied knowing any police officers who take bribes, but said they had heard 
that rumour as well. However, they also said that if off duty, un-uniformed police accept 
gifts from vendors, it is okay. One long standing member of the City Police said that 
many vendors are his friends and their gifts, as long as they are not money, should not be 
seen as bribes. One policeman seemed shocked that any would take food, drink, produce 
or money from vendors. However, he said that police officers often receive gifts from 
vendors they know, from many years in the force or from their villages outside of the
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city, when they are out of uniform. He felt that was okay. There is without a doubt no 
clear line between those on different sides of the law. While there appears to be obvious 
hierarchy, those officially empowered to enforce the law clearly practice an idea of 
reasonable authority.
Shared legalities explain why vendors are even able to negotiate with police, why they 
are patronized by other citizens, and why even politicians are aware of depriving them of 
their “dollar”. Vendors see police as vendors -  as people just doing the job they have to. 
Conversely, police see vendors like police -  as if there are reasonable grounds for what 
they are doing, as long as they don’t attempt to advantage them, the law and public space. 
Having contacts with persons in authority doesn’t really help one vendor over another 
when all have to move from their illegal selling spots. Vendors, nonetheless, attempt to 
establish personal relations with police overall.
Everybody have to eat highlights women and men’s attempts to personalize the state and 
to negotiate a relationship basically determined by law, force and fear. This disposition 
enables vendors, politicians and police to legitimize a variety of kinds of power. On the 
roadside, the spectrum of forms of power at play includes hustling, legislation, pretence, 
bribes, conversation and friendship.
Like vendors, both police and politicians espouse outward obedience to state authority. 
None of these groups challenge the entire legitimacy of law. Yet, they also operate 
according to another set of values, priorities and perspectives regarding the public space 
of the street. Like vendors, they are selective and strategic about declaring these. They all 
operate within a range of notions regarding authority. Here, though perhaps not 
elsewhere, illegality is considered reasonable and legitimate by vendors and state officials 
to different degrees. This public politics is in formal spaces and normative practices. As 
David Held points out, state power comprises the intentions and actions of those at 
different tiers of government within the “parameters set by the institutionalized context of 
state-society relations” (1989, 74). Bureaucracies are part of a state deeply interconnected 
with civil society (ibid, 49) and modem negotiations of might and right.
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The authority behind terms, such as reasonable or commonsense, e^^atns liowTawinay 
be interpreted, practiced or ignored by local government officials and police. 
Contestations over public space may be a class issue, read in moral terms and seen as 
resistance against an impoverishing economic system. They may also be seen as shifting 
stances regarding the legitimate use of public space because of the relationship between 
law and lore.
Holistically seen, law operates through domination, taken-for-granted habits and self­
regulation across overlapping formal and informal arenas. Formal practices, processes 
and sources of authority can be appropriated to enforce, rather than overrule, informal 
ones. This does not negate ways that they may legitimize particular ideologies and 
asymmetrical power relations. Rather, formal authorities can similarly appropriate 
informal norms to layer their power. In translating each into the language or garb of the 
other, however, new possibilities for affiliation, alignment and action may be created 
(Galanter 1989). In this way, the “decentred”9 (Vincent 1994) exercise of law creates 
different meanings and unorthodox outcomes.
As I continue to show in the following pages, neither lore nor Jaw  is hegemonic. 
Hegemony refers to “power that “naturalizes” a social order, an institution, or even an 
everyday practice so that “how things are” seems inevitable” (Hirsch and Lazarus-Black 
1994, 7). It limits what is openly and collectively contested. In Jean and John Comaroff s 
(1991, 24-28) conceptualization, it is one end of a continuum while ideology is the 
other10. Ideology is contested, hegemony operates almost unseen. Both are continually
9 It is not simply that practices legitimizing authority are decentred, it is also that there may be many 
invoked rules rather than simply “an exclusive, systematic and unified hierarchical ordering of normative 
propositions” (Griffiths 1986, 3). The exercise of formal administration is marked by internal diversity, 
multiple directions, and struggles and competition among parts for authority. Among those with and 
without formal power, there is also choice-making, and discretionary, arbitrary and manipulative actions 
(Moore 1978, 3). Diverse and contradictory ideas of justice, and reliance on different sources of authority 
all contribute to this plurality. In other words, rules alone do not rule.
10 Comaroff and Comaroff (1991, 30) define hegemony as “a product of the dialectic whereby the content 
o f dominant ideologies is distilled into the shared forms that seem to have such historical longevity as to be 
above history... .they do not appear to have any ideological content. They belong to the domain of fact, not 
value. They are just there ineffably. People are conscious of ideology, but not of hegemony. Ideology refers 
to a worldview or system of beliefs and values that underlie the practices of a society, class or group, its 
place in a hierarchy of power and knowledge, and its relation with other societies, classes or groups.
negotiated and transformed by people conscious of dominant ideologies’ contradictions 
and alternatives. Law simply does not have enough popular legitimacy to be taken for 
granted or seen as inevitable. Nonetheless, it has compelling ideological, material and 
coercive power, and is considered one valid source of authority among others.
5.3.2 In the Name o f Lore: Assertion o f Law by Local Government Officials
As I show in the next two sections, love for mas works much like contacts. Officials also 
use the language of legitimate governmental regulation while simultaneously resorting to 
culture to justify their control. Party activists attempt to blend the language of law and 
lore so that it is difficult to tell one from the other, or even to tell the difference between 
social and legal politics. In another twist, Carnival Committee members attempt to give 
law two meanings so that it stands for both lore and law, and justifies state domination on 
both terms. Love for mas is contentiously invoked in its leadership disputes with 
bandleaders for this reason. Government officials, in this instance, brandish their formal
Figure 35: City Hall
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authority while attempting to wield the meanings that they give to love for mas. 
However, interestingly, the result is the operation of a variety of forms of power, and 
clear exercise of authority, with only contingent moments of legitimacy.
Generally, the San Fernando Carnival Committee (SCC) sees itself as balancing the 
interests of business people, mas makers and players, steelbands, performers, taxpayers 
and other state branches such as the police. Their overall mandate is derived from the 
National Carnival Commission. The composition of the committee primarily reflects 
those linked to the party in power. Committee members are elected and nominated City 
Corporation Councillors who together comprise local government. Generally, these are 
middle-strata experienced political activists who may also be friendly with market 
vendors, play mas, buy fish on the Wharf, worship at the masjid or have CEPEP 
contracts.
Although there was no mission statement, a Carnival development plan produced by past 
ASJA schools Principal, Fyze Hydal, guided the Carnival Development Committee’s 
(CDC) work under the NAR. The then government felt that focus should be, not simply 
on facilitation, but on developing Carnival as a sustainable industry. Knolly Huggins, a 
committee member from 1978-1984, saw the committee’s role as providing a forum for 
competitions, providing judges, seeking business sponsorship and “making the Carnival 
better”. Huggins didn’t think that the CDC was able to really “improve” Carnival, but 
didn’t feel this was the fault of the community or committee11. Like the present SCC, 
they used a language of loyalty and localized patriotism to keep people playing mas in 
San Fernando.
Bandleaders (and others such as steelbands) have never had representation on the 
committee. They are included through consultations held before and after Carnival. 
Usually, they only attend meetings to which they are invited. When bandleaders do not 
feel consulted, it is particularly offending because they see themselves as experienced 
‘experts’. Their exclusion is often blamed on bandleaders’ conflicts and inability to
11 The CDC was also derisively known as the “Carnival Destruction Committee” (Mason 1998, 123).
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decide on a representative. Competition mitigates against them consistently working 
together. However, as Knolly Huggins explained, members often feel that the committee 
shouldn’t be “dictated to by bandleaders”. When he was in the SCC, they “leaned 
backward” for the bandleaders. He felt this was wrong because “mas is for San Fernando 
not just the bandleaders’ interests”.
Huggins felt that bandleaders would stymie the process and undermine the decisions of 
the SCC if they were included. This suggests that the two groups have different priorities. 
However, nonetheless, past member Vemon Leotaud felt that the CDC had a good 
relationship with bandleaders. They were also willing to cooperate. Torrence Mohammed 
(a choreographer, PNM City Councillor for sixteen years and Deputy Mayor from 1999- 
2003) also remembered “good relations” between the SCC and bandleaders. Yet, it is 
notable that judging, prizes and regulations regarding the route and competitions have 
remained perennial sources of acrimony between bandleaders and the state (see also 
Mason 1998, 93). It is striking that those involved in Carnival in San Fernando have 
never been able to establish a permanent route.
Ultimately, Huggins felt that the Committee “runs” Carnival in San Fernando and 
compared it to the father being head of the home. He didn’t see this father figure as 
having to dictate all that should happen and said sometimes he can be wrong. Like a 
father figure, he pointed out that the bandleaders had to trust the SCC for the relationship 
to work. He said that they assessed the success of the Carnival Committee depending on 
how the bandleaders responded, but there was never a defined basis for evaluation. Allan 
Sammy, a past NAR Deputy Mayor, described the state as having a genuine interest in 
Carnival, but also in being able to claim “paternity” of Carnival because it can be seen as 
“ours”. He said that explains why so much “political money” is spent propping up 
Carnival, steelband and calypso “as if national culture is still alive”.
The National Carnival Commission and its ‘regional’ extensions were established to 
organise and promote Carnival for local and foreign consumption (Rogers 1990). Its 
legislated role in Carnival privileged “official” cultural values and “moralistic regulatory
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applications” (Sampath, 1997, 159-60). As Aching (2002, 74) summarises of 
Parliamentary Act 9 (1991),
The act not only constitutes a watershed in the historically troubled relations 
between popular culture and the post-independence nation-state, but also 
provides government with a hegemonic role as the primary facilitator of the 
country’s most important public site, event, and display of national culture.
For the first time in the country’s history, both the regulation and the official 
promotion of carnival have been legally assigned to one body.
The present San Fernando Carnival Committee regulates people and traffic using the 
competition judging points. These enable them to force mas bands to travel particular 
routes around the city. Politicians can therefore ensure that various constituency areas are 
equitably included. Its members feel they have a clear mandate to decide how Carnival 
culture will play out. This means that they sometimes dismissed bandleaders’ own ideas 
as self-interested, uninformed or narrow. Since the 1950s, government endorsement and 
sponsorship was tied to the authority of rules and regulations. Sponsorship enabled the 
state to control all the major competitions and staged events, and universalised an 
“official” format for Carnival. This reflected a concenyad’"With bureaucratic efficiency, 
rules, control of venues and police security.
The (2003-2006) Mayor described state regulation of mas in San Fernando as making 
decisions about the route, attempting to forestall bottlenecks which attract criminals along 
the route, paying a stipend to judges who otherwise act independently of the SCC, 
organising competitions and giving prizes. He described himself as a “facilitator” and 
added, “I make sure Carnival comes off top of the line”. He complained that not all the 
Councilors give full support and not all bring a vision to the table. Entering his second of 
three years in office, the Mayor described a need to counter declining numbers of 
masqueraders in San Fernando’s Carnival. He blamed decline in the standard of mas over 
time. As a result, many San Fernando people, including himself, played mas in Port of 
Spain. He said that in the past, there were no visionaries to bring back that loyalty and 
commitment to f^ie city. He aimed to do this through Carnival, City Week and other 
activities. Indirectly claiming some responsibility, he asserted, “It was said that San
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Fernando Carnival this year was biggest and brightest for many a year and you have to let 
people know that being a part of home means something”.
As Carnival is increasingly seen as a cultural industry, state discourse has also shifted to 
emphasise ‘development’ myd ‘management’ and ‘facilitation’. Thus, the committee also 
feels it has to satisfy isthe business community. Businesses will ask for a mas band or 
‘pan side’ to be rodted past their business, and in return offer prize money. Coffee Street 
businesses offered enough sponsorship for 2003 Carnival for the Mayor to tell 
bandleaders that the Coffee had to be included to accommodate the business people of 
San Fernando. Bars are major sources of profit for Carnival and committee members 
have themselves been accused of routing the parade past their own businesses. 
Bandleaders, therefore, not only negotiate with the state, but with elite business interests. 
Both dedicate their great resources to taking advantage of Carnival’s money-making 
potential. Allahar and Zavitz (2002, 139) have commented,
Not only are the profits for this seemingly nationalist agenda tied to 
capitalism, but the ideology of Carnival as a national festival symbolizing 
Trinidadian “unity” serves to mask and distract from greater class 
inequalities, not only within Carnival, but within the larger society. 
Therefore, when class is added to the analysis, Carnival is not simplistically 
an “African” event, based on African culture and traditions, but is an event 
that signifies and is connected to Trinidad as a nation with a capitalist 
economic structure.
In examining how the nation is being marketed, Green (2002, 283) has also argued that 
commodification of culture serves the interests of both “international culture industries 
and the hegemonic international order of nation-states”. This is what is at stake in 
struggles over this source of national pride.
Some past and present committee members argue that race or party politics do not 
influence mas judging because the SCC allows judges to act independently. Others 
describe favoritism, tokenism, nepotism and patronage regardless of the party in power. 
Both Torrence Mohammed and Allan Sammy admitted that there is a popular perception 
that when one party is in power, the bandleader associated with the party wins. Some
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bandleaders also expressed this view. Although the committee is PNM controlled, the 
Convener disagreed that there is ethnic or party politics in Carnival governance. 
However, he added, “things are better when the PNM is controlling because PNM people 
are less corrupt and know carnival better”. Yet, he acknowledged that, “mas people don’t 
trust the Committee and think there is politics in it, no fair play or transparency”.
Sammy also suggested that politics plays a role in Carnival, and that while “the Coffee” 
was an important street for San Fernando Carnival, the Prime Minister’s constituency 
was also served by bands passing on that street. In fact, when a band is passing, the Prime 
Minister comes down to the front steps of the PNM San Fernando East constituency 
office and waves, hugs people and shakes others’ hands. It is a significant moment 
suggesting he is part of the people, supports mas in San Fernando, is a proud San 
Femandian and recognizes that the people look forward to seeing him. As Eriksen (1992, 
156) describes, “One cannot be recognized publicly as a true-true Trini unless one 
masters informal aspects of public life, even if one happens to be prime minister”.
While Huggins disagreed that political actors benefit from their control of the Carnival, 
he recognised that astute political actors, such as the Prime Minister, benefit from being 
seen by the bands on Carnival day. Sammy was not suggesting that political actors 
themselves benefit from control of the SCC. Rather, because a successful Carnival 
contributes to a Mayor’s status in the City, and in his or her political party, “it is easy for 
a politician to think that they caused Carnival to be a success” and to forget both the big 
bands and the small ones which highlight San Fernando people’s independent spirit and 
community participation.
SCC members consistently exert authority over final decisions. The relationship between 
them and mas makers is distinctly hierarchical. However, the Mayor did not agree and 
presented their relationship as one among equals. He said that the committee showed 
bandleaders respect by giving out prize money early and managing the Carnival 
differently. Lionel disagreed, “We communicate with them but, they don’t treat us as 
equals. At certain times, I feel we were equals with them and they understand us how we
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used to speak to them. We used to speak to them in equal terms and really discuss 
Carnival, but right now these people are new and they have a problem speaking on that 
level with us”. Wayne Hanuman of the mas band Fireworks Promotion agreed that the 
Mayor and SCC “control Carnival in South”. He felt the Mayor and the SCC had made 
improvements through the increased number of events they organized, such as City 
Week. As well, despite some conflicts, he felt they consulted bandleaders.
Wendy Kalicharan, a bandleader from another camp, agreed with the Mayor’s route and 
felt judging in the city is fair. However, like other bandleaders, she wanted a 
representative on the committee. This is because she felt the committee “calls the shots 
and can pull the wool over our eyes because bandleaders are weak as a group”. However, 
she admitted that it would be hard to decide whom to send as the representative. When I 
asked about the committee’s relationship with bandleaders, she responded, “They see 
themselves as above us, certainly”. While bandleaders are willing to work with the state, 
they often resent the hierarchy imposed on the relationship. They are, therefore, very 
unruly when ready and concerned about subverting state control for their own priorities. 
As Lionel agreed, “The people is the Carnival. The people in Town Hall just 
administering, distributing, telling you what time to come out, but the people, the pan 
men, masqueraders, the vendors is the Carnival”.
Here, even if local government officials have legislated control, it is simply not good 
enough. Law must be asserted as if it is really legitimated by lore. This is different from 
the situation among party activists where law and lore both offer legitimate (though 
different) reasons for spending resources and meeting needs. It is also different from the 
approach of City Police. The Mayor and Councillors on the Carnival Committee must act 
as if love for mas is the basis for what they do. When handled well, bandleaders’ interpret 
this as a recognition of their leadership, expertise and importance. In essence, lore makes 
law seem reasonable. It forces officials to reproduce some minimally consultative 
relationship with bandleaders and, in essence, to de-centre the exercise of law. It presses 
spirit and culture rather than simply rationality and efficiency into bureaucratic practice.
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Yet, these politicians get impatient and irritated because they feel legislation and their 
position on the Committee is enough to justify their hierarchical control. Also, 
frustratingly, love for mas stops conveying legitimacy once an official (or even regular 
person) who is not involved in producing mas or music for Carnival seeks to claim and 
over determine the artists’ domain. This only partially works for bandleaders because, 
often, Committee members proceed to make decisions whether or not popularly 
sanctioned. However, as long as prizes are offered, bandleaders appear willing to 
continue to negotiate a continuum of command. Like contacts, love for mas works 
downwards to make compliance a source of power.
These dispositions enable negotiation over leadership and its bases for authority. While 
police and higher-ranking political activists have clear forms of power over vendors and 
squatters, legislation, office and resources do not give the Carnival Committee such 
legitimacy. This shows another twist in the nexus of law, lore and legitimacy within state , 
practice. In police’s relationship with vendors, law and lore infuse each other’s practice j 
and meaning. Among the hierarchy of political activists, lore or contacts masquerades as ; 
law. However, in this instance, law can only be seen as legitimate when it manages to be 
camouflaged as lore and not appear as a stark expression of the state’s material, legal and j 
coercive power to dominate Carnival. Here too, there is bargaining, cajoling, sweet talk,  ^
quarreling, legislation, empathy, cooperation and pretense.
This fluidity of informal and formal power and moral authority can be understood by 
paying attention to the “unspoken axioms, ideologies, and aesthetics” that underlie the 
idea of a just and reasonable political world (Comaroff 1994, xi). As John Comaroff 
describes, power is created by the “relative capacities - of human beings and habitual 
processes, of social institutions and cultural practices -  to construct reality, to shape lived 
worlds, to give form to perceptions and conceptions, to beat out the polyrhythms of 
everyday life” (ibid, xii). Power relations cannot be understood simplistically as 
negotiations among statically positioned people. Rather, they “always entail multiple 
representations, multiple subjectivities, multiple realities” (ibid, x). This helps clear up 
why law is empowered to construct reality while being the ground where this is also
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disabled and reconstructed. Some engage with its power by claiming it, by resorting to 
informality or illegalities, or by doing both.
For this reason, law cannot simply be seen as an instrument of ruling classes. Instead, 
formalized kinds of power are exercised differently at different tiers of authority -  
including within lore. Their exercise shifts and sets the boundaries of what is possible12. 
They produce (not just control) relationships and practices, and operate through 
disciplinary practices of all kinds. Therefore, an approach to legitimate authority that 
pulls together perspectives from both Foucault and Gramsci would go further than 
Weber’s categories of consent to domination. It would include the nuanced ways that 
hegemony operates.
5.3.3 Playing Like Yuh Switch: Law and Lore Among Party Activists in Power
Figure 36: CEPEP Wuz Here
While police and local government officials champion the language of law while 
admitting to have to accommodate lore, party activists in positions of power show 
sophisticated discursive play with both kinds of authority. Everybody have to eat also
‘2 This is how power is central to discourse. It sets “the parameters of what can be said, thought, 
challenged, struggled over, and achieved in a given historical moment” (Hirsch and Lazarus-Black 1994,
3).
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works as a source of higher authority among officials at another tier in state power. At the 
same time, they wield the informal authority of contacts in a way that affirms the needs 
of some rather than all.
Depending on whether they are in or out of power, politicians will describe patronage as 
welfare and distribution of resources or as corruption. All those I interviewed agreed that 
welfare provision is important. Yet, all acknowledged the link between spending money 
and winning elections. Here, spending is both aimed at gaining voters and rewarding 
those already involved. The past UNC Member of Parliament for San Fernando 
complained that there was no difference between URP and CEPEP, that both were 
“wholesale patronage” and that the “government wants to control all the patronage”. A 
past NAR Deputy Mayor agreed and criticized the lack of a development or training 
programmes within the URP. He added, “These programmes are not sustainable. They 
are premised on the idea that the state has money and they are geared to winning 
elections”.
As journalist Tony Fraser (Trinidad Guardian, December 16, 2004, p29) reported of a 
march: “Hence the chants on the streets and the public squares, Lord Harris and 
Woodford on Tuesday last: “No CEPEP; no PNM government””. Ryan notes massive 
electoral swings in nations like Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago because of incumbent 
parties’ inability to sustain patronage. The ensuing decline in party loyalty, also described 
as “no work no vote” leads to greater possibilities for governments being voted out or 
what Selwyn Ryan calls a “coup de ballot” (1990, 12).
Some contractors define the programme as social welfare rather than patronage. This is 
because workers tend to be those who would find it difficult to get jobs, who are 
unemployed or whose trade cannot make ends meet. Others claim that CEPEP is not 
welfare because “we work for our daily bread”. The foremen and boss evaluate workers 
on a fortnightly basis and, as one contractor said, look at “how hard they work, their 
sense of commitment, if they are called upon to attend CEPEP centre motivational 
seminars how interested they are”. My observations suggest that the majority of workers
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are not interested in CEPEP as anything other than waged and regular employment. 
Contractors are expected to encourage workers to “develop themselves” and workers are 
expected to develop into entrepreneurs. Some, therefore, call it “social intervention” 
rather than welfare.
Whether or not those involved describe the programme as welfare or social intervention, 
many I interviewed were unwilling to describe it as patronage. Only those in opposition 
called it corruption. One CEPEP contractor asserted, “Though it began around the time of 
elections and many contractors are PNM, it is not a patronage thing”. Another said, “We 
work for our daily bread and the salaries we get are not huge. We pay bills, VAT, NIS 
every 15th of the month13. We have to buy machines and gas and all of this is cost. We 
put out the money so there is no way that this is corruption”. Those opposing the 
programme argue that it doesn’t lead to micro-enterprise as it remains dependent on state 
resources and direction, and it doesn’t generate economic growth. Expectedly, they also 
criticise the administrative overlap between those in the ruling party and those in the 
programme.
It seems accepted that when a party takes power, the state becomes its instrument for 
governing all, and for looking after its own. Jobs are the most important way. As the MP 
explained, “I do things for the PNM so that five years down the road, I can put my head 
on a block that they will go to the polls and vote for the PNM”. It is accepted that those 
who helped the party get in power would get employment right up the line. At the same 
time, it suggests a notion of what is considered corrupt, unnecessary and excess. 
Contractors are embarrassed by stories of others openly making their workers form party 
groups, attend family days or buy gifts for the MP. One contractor noted that his own 
accounts were in place and he had taken another to his accountant so his could be too.
Contractors only reluctantly agreed that workers see their jobs in exchange for votes, and 
that these programmes were significant to the results of general and local government 
elections. They admit that the CEPEP and URP lists overlap with voting lists, but say that
13 Value Added Tax, and National Insurance Scheme contributions for state pension.
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voting lists are not used to decide who can be a worker. Contractors also give 
contradictory impressions. One argued that workers help for elections because they want 
the party to stay in power so that they could keep their job. He said, “Workers take it 
upon themselves to help on election day. It is not that we use workers for our events, but 
that they are keen themselves to work for the party”. We agreed that it helps that workers 
know they wouldn’t lose their job, as if they were taking the day off en masse to 
campaign for the other party. A female contractor similarly stated, “CEPEP workers 
involved in party groups will be involved in campaigning, but in their free time. The 
party group is the heart of the party. It is them who walk the road. Yes, party members 
are employed with me. It was in the PNM office my team was set up”.
Not only the party, but individuals and their relationships with those who need them 
come to define government. From the Prime Minister to low ranking URP “foremen”, 
what gets dispensed is seen as a benefit or gift of having particular individuals in power. 
As the MP pointed out, “In a way, there is some patronage. Let’s say that there are five 
contractors and I chose them, you could say I am their patron. But then they can be seen 
as the patrons of sixty workers each and they don’t owe their loyalty to me, but to the 
contractor. So that contractor begins to wield a patronage if they want to. But it depends 
on the person and how they wield their power”. In this way, leadership can cultivate 
obligations and hero-crowd relations using patronage. To quote Tony Fraser (Trinidad 
Guardian, December 16, 2004, p 29) again,
In one of the three electioi^ between 2000 and 2001, this columnist 
witnessed a core of the black-shirted ETP workers in almost militarised 
fashion being marshalled by a government minister at a pre-election meeting 
in Arima. The parties, the PNM in particular and in the current dispensation, 
have ridden the tiger; they dare not dismount any time now. The result has 
been that the Manning Government has pumped billions of dollars into 
political welfare in the last three years.
While one contractor I interviewed claimed, “The middle class is back because of CEPEP 
and my workers have been offered a way of life by the PNM government”, she still 
disagreed that workers see the job in exchange for votes. Taking a different tactic, the MP
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also argued that CEPEP is not important to votes. She explained, “Let’s say we have five 
contractors in San Fernando West with sixty workers each. What is sixty votes? You can 
find ways of employing them. You can close CEPEP and find other jobs for these people 
in the morning. It is not significant for votes”. Yet, in a ‘marginal’ constituency like San 
Fernando West, where the last election was won by a one percent margin, every vote 
appears to count. However, the Programme Manager for CEPEP presented an opposite 
view saying, “Yes, this programme is important to votes, but that is how part o f how 
politics is”. As the Local Government Councillor pointed out, “CEPEP and URP is really 
to get something for people to do. It is not primarily to trade jobs for votes. But, of 
course, if you belong to a party, you will have a better chance so both person and party 
benefit”.
Those in the Opposition and other past politicians that I interviewed agreed that 
programmes such as CEPEP and URP are related to votes. As a past NAR Mayor noted, 
“People feel obligated to the government who gave them a job. The MP is the patron”. 
Yet, politicians are aware that even providing jobs may not guarantee voters’ support. As 
the female URP “foreman” observed, “Yes, is important to votes. That is the whole thing 
about it, but many people get jobs and don’t vote at all” . Politicians know that winning 
requires more than election canvassing. Thus, one contractor pointed out, “To win an 
election you must satisfy your people in the five years you are reigning. You need to win 
an election while in office. You need to make sure people are happy. You can’t have 
money in a treasury and don’t have CEPEP. Right now we need CEPEP two, three and 
four”.
In interviews, contractors at times justified the political party’s role in administering 
CEPEP. At other times, they claimed a neutral process. Officially, applications for 
contractors were in newspapers. People were interviewed and then short-listed. All those 
applying had to have established their own company. All the CEPEP contractors, also 
publicly called “entrepreneurs”, were adamant that the process was open and anyone 
could apply. None thought that there was any reason for criticizing the number of middle- 
ranking party activists who were finally awarded contracts. It is^if ‘the process’ implies
neutrality and itself justified the ways that parties infiltrate the state. One contractor 
argued,
Because you are on the Constituency Executive you can’t have a contract?
What makes us so different? It was in the papers, I was interviewed and 
selected. I went through the process. I don’t think it is political patronage 
because I am qualified. I’m looking for some of others who are high profile 
around the government and have business. They get government contracts.
Is that political patronage? No, they bid and there is a paper trail. There is 
transparency in everything. So what if someone from the PNM gets a 
contract, what is so damning about that? They upset they didn’t have the 
idea, so because its PNM idea they say is reward for political patronage, 
because your reward would have gone to three rich people and not filter 
down to smaller man. Mr. Manning [the Prime Minister] is making sure 
even if it is patronage, it is filtering down. The small man will get 
something.
The Programme Manager explained that PNM activists ended up being contractors 
because “you can't get away from the politics”. One contractor argued that they had to 
look for people they could trust to get the programme started and successful and that it 
made sense to “quicker take a chance with PNM people”. He felt that, later on, when the 
programme is running and “can't be stopped”, others would become more involved. 
However, he noted that, “you would want people of your persuasion in the beginning to 
ensure that the programme looked good”.
This suggests how political parties use the state to mediate relations with party activists 
and voters. The contractor also said that the overwhelming involvement of party faithful 
is not about repaying them, but about not neglecting “those who went out of their way to 
keep the party in power”. As he pointed out, “trying to win more friends can lead to 
ignoring those there all the time, your core support who is doing work and getting 
nothing”. Awarding party faithful CEPEP contracts is also presented as not taking “your 
people” for granted while attending to the government’s responsibility to the country.
The Mayor similarly asserted that, “every government helps the people who help them”. 
Pointing fingers at the “previous government”, he concluded,
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If the PNM does it now, that is not a problem as far as I see it. What is good 
for one has to be good for the other. The UNC gave money to their party 
people, but they did it differently because the people did not work for their 
money. To help those who help you is not a problem. You have to 
understand. It is prudent to put a PNM activist who shares the vision and 
consistency of what the party is trying to achieve. Civil disobedience. They 
can come in there and spoil the thing. And that is what is happening in 
Trinidad and Tobago today. The violence that is coming out is because of 
civil disobedience. If you have political leaders speaking ill and showing 
disrespect to your Prime Minister, others will emulate them. So, you can't 
put people there who will not perform to make the thing not look good. I 
would hate to think the PNM put me here and I am a UNC activist.
I said I believed, perhaps naively, that millions in taxpayers’ money should go to a 
programme open to all. He retorted, “I would say more than kind of naive”.
The (2002 to 2007) Member of Parliament was even more specific when I pointed out 
that while the programme may benefit the country, it does so overwhelmingly through 
benefits to the party. She described how MPs exercise influence in the selection of 
contractors. Openly, she talked about choosing to recommend traditional PNM activists 
who “put the party in power and have been involved year after year, canvassing and 
walking the road for elections, and not getting anything from the PNM”. She justified her 
choices by concluding that, “I have decided to say thank you and if that is patronage and 
that is payoff, I have no problem with that. Here, I am an MP, not a Minister”.
The MP, in fact, recommended five of the eight contractors in the constituency. Four of 
the eight are part of the PNM Constituency Executive, one is a current PNM Local 
Government Councillor, two are past PNM Local Government Councillors, and the 
others are involved with the party as activists. Four are female, four are male and one
male is an Indo-Trinidadian. One of the past Local Government Councillors has no
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formal position, but ac the Field Officer for the San Fernando West Constituency
Executive. He often get m dates from the URP foreman and acts as an informal point of 
information exchange between the MP and those closer to the ground. The MP continued, 
“I believed in saying thank you, these people have been working for years for the PNM,
some have also been Councilors and CEPEP empowers them to do things they couldn’t 
do as Councillors who found it hard to service their areas”.
The politician who chooses contractors can help determine work sites to be cleaned, and 
they cooperate for the good of the constituency and the party’s reputation. The MP meets 
with the regional coordinator of the URP, and checks with the Mayor and the City 
Corporation. She then makes recommendations based on what she perceives is going on 
in the constituency and where needs to be serviced. In this way, the political leadership is 
involved in decisions regarding CEPEP and URP.
There is a close relationship among the MP, those involved in the URP and CEPEP 
contractors. Activists with largely paternalistic and populist styles of leadership therefore 
remain focal points for party loyalties and popular relations with the state. However, 
more than this, bureaucracy itself is personalized. As Bishnu Ragoonath (2000) observed, 
this keeps local government “at the realm or mode of delegation”.
It is common for MPs to able to recommend constituents for short-term welfare if they 
are in need. Susan Craig (1974), for example, describes past Members of Parliament and 
Local Government Councillors mobilizing political support in exchange for limited 
resources or promises to maximize the economic self-interest of the poor. In 
contemporary practice, the URP foreman for Springvale gives the names she has selected 
for the next URP roster to the CEPEP contractor who is also the Field Officer. He takes 
the names to the Constituency Office and then makes recommendations to the URP 
office14. The foreman felt that the most important link in the chain of command was the
14 The foreman said she was asked to take this job as she had acted in this capacity before. The same 
CEPEP contractor asked her. She authorizes the names that get included on the URP list every fortnight. 
She said that the names have to be on a voting list, are first looked at by the Constituency Office, must be 
from persons living in the area and sometimes includes names recommended by the Local Government 
Councillor. It is important for the foreman to be known both up the hierarchy and below as she or he needs 
to be seen as someone who knows people in the area and can provide recommendations. It also therefore 
helps workers if the foreman knows them and they can approach her or him about being put on the next 
URP list. The foreman collects names by walking around and asking if anyone wants their name put on the 
list. Alternatively, people will approach her. She and the Constituency Office have the power to stop people 
from getting too many TO days’ or getting them consecutively, and can choose to replace someone on the 
list with someone who has never had a chance. It is therefore useful to know and be friends with the
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Constituency Office and that “everything passes through there”. She described this to me 
openly and appeared to accept this as it is, and to think it reasonable and legitimate.
Across levels of power, party activists and politicians claim that CEPEP and URP are 
about welfare, social intervention and entrepreneurship. This is the language of 
everybody needing to eat. Yet, contacts expresses alternative justifications. Jobs are 
needed, but so are votes and party supporters. Having the resources to create relationships 
between party leaders and those in economic need is key. Patronage is, therefore, more 
about the authority of reciprocal relations than it is about simply servicing need. It is who 
hustles that really eats.
These various justifications flow through each other and through the practice of 
government creating largely informal reasons for what appear as formally legitimate 
practices. Workers living on the Railway Line similarly maneuver through informal 
requests for help and promises of reciprocity, in addition to engaging in the formalities of 
voting. Informality fluidly navigates and utilizes modes of formal power just as 
institutionalized individuals and groups rely on the power of contacts. This disposition 
also highlights attempts to personalize the state, and to legitimize overlapping informal 
and formal powers.
Contacts adds a personal twist to everybody have to eat. It legitimizes patronage because 
it enables parties to be partial to their voters and to disguise partiality with talk about 
legitimately responding to a general need. Fancy discursive footwork enables higher- 
ranking party activists to create worker-voters while denying this relationship. Like 
police, party activists are selective about declaring their participation in lore and their 
view that political patronage is perfectly reasonable. However, squatters, workers, 
contractors, government officials and party activists at all tiers of power accept it to some 
degree depending on whether they can or cannot access this form of power. This is how 
location within or outside of the state is significant.
foreman. Those who feel they haven’t been given enough jobs or complain of favorites being chosen are 
the very aware of this.
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Even more than vendors, these women and men can be found busily “hustling a dollar” 
with bribery, cajoling, sweet talk, pretence and attractive deals, as if elected leadership 
and bureaucracy have little substantive authority at all. There is no established hierarchy 
of legitimacy, and the range of possible registers, including need, family, friendship, 
promises, office and profit, are certainly not wholly dominated by law. Everyone, from 
the lowest-ranking URP foreman and party activist to the MP and even CEPEP 
Programme Manager and Prime Minister, is combining registers of authority. Contacts 
expresses this struggle over the practice and meanings of law and, ultimately, legitimacy.
Preoccupation with making ends meet and fulfillment of one’s needs “is both a product 
of, and an adaptive mechanism to, contemporary society” (Held 1989, 92). Women and 
men “have to go to work, get ahead, and make the best use of the opportunities with 
which they are presented; otherwise, they find themselves poor and marginal to the whole 
order” (ibid 105). This may create obedience, compliance and even consent for varying 
reasons, but not necessarily normative agreement or legitimacy. It does not mean rules 
and laws are considered correct or worthy (ibid, 102). Neither does it imply revolutionary 
responses.
Yet, people do not simply lose their politics because there is decreasing conflict, 
increasing consumerism, powerful ideological forces or even extensive national pride. 
Relations to production and reproduction, ability to access and influence government, 
degrees of trust and disillusionment all continue to inform people’s pragmatism regarding 
legitimacy. Held suggests giving weight to “the autonomy of working-class traditions”15, 
the importance of gradations of governmental power to ordinary people’s sense that their
1 f \  17needs are fulfilled , and widespread conditional and instrumental consent , (ibid 127).
15 These “tend to emphasize the virtues of collectivism and community over and against ‘bourgeois 
individualism’ (‘getting ahead’) and the naked pursuit of private property (‘the drive to accumulate’)” (ibid 
127).
16 On this point Held notes that, “while local councillors are not thought of as very significant in the 
determination of political outcomes, they are conceived -  in relative terms -  as more ‘reliable’ to look after 
people’s interests...more aware of ‘ordinary people’s needs’ -  even if it is admitted that such 
representatives are powerless to do anything about them” (ibid, 130).
17 He writes, “people’s relationships to party, government and the state are becoming ever more 
instrumental; that is, consent or loyalty is tied increasingly to the promise and actuality of better political 
and economic performance” (ibid, 128).
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He contends, “The possibilities for antagonistic stances against the state -  prefigured or 
anticipated in people’s distrust of politicians, respect for the local and common sense of 
ordinary people, rejection of ‘experts’ -  are there, as indeed are germs of a variety of 
other kinds of political movement which seek to reassert the authority of ‘the state’”18 
(ibid, 132).
Against Weber, evidence from the market, mas camp and Railway Line in San Fernando 
suggest that administration based on formal agreement is not historically inevitable. 
Officials’ comments, discussed below, retain a mix of technocratic thinking and human 
values associated with fairness and human happiness19. In this instance, they are 
influenced by the habitus emerging from informal social life. Not just families, 
communities or religious groups articulate these. Values associated with efficiency, profit 
and formal rules therefore combine with those associated with more traditional moral 
authority20 (Elwell 1999). The case studies here suggest that mixed bases for legitimate 
authority operate along gradations of power. They, therefore, bridge and blend its 
informal and formal expressions. This creates a space for understanding the “actual 
relationships that govern political interactions of power, influence, and authority within 
the political community” (Stone 1986, 48).
18 This is part of a larger quote outlining how “...the cynicism, skepticism, detachment of many people 
today fails sometimes to be offset by sufficient comforts and benefits as the economy and successive 
governments run into severe difficulties. The often expressed distrust has been, and can be, translated into a 
range of actions. The possibilities for antagonistic stances against the state -  prefigured or anticipated in 
people’s distrust of politicians, respect for the local and common sense of ordinary people, rejection of 
‘experts’ -  are there, as indeed are germs of a variety of other kinds of political movement which seek to 
reassert the authority of ‘the state’. That there should be antagonism and conflict is not surprising: 
conditional consent or pragmatic acceptance of the status quo is potentially unstable precisely because it is 
conditional or pragmatic” (ibid, 132).
19 As Sally Falk Moore writes, in this way “institutions themselves are seen as sorting out their own 
political place and powers, and having an impact on the shape of the polity, and its “culture” (2005, 177). 
Her concept of culture here is not innocent, but defines it as “a consciously mobilized collective identity in 
the midst of a political struggle, and it arises in relation to constitutions, collective inequalities, insiders and 
outsiders, and other aspects of national and ethnic politics” (Sally Falk Moore. 2001. Certainties Undone: 
Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 1949-1999, Huxley Memorial Lecture, Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 7, 1: 95-116, p96).
20 Ironically, Weber contrasted technocratic thinking or formal rationalization with substantive rationality 
or thinking anchored in considerations of the whole. This second kind could actually mitigate against the 
irrationality of rationalization or bureaucratic decisions that did not actually benefit society, workers, 
women, etc (Elwell 1999)
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5.4 Conclusion
Building on the last chapter, this one shows how state actors such as City Police, Local 
Government Councilors, successive Mayors and party activists rely precisely on the 
interlocking authority of law and lore. This suggests that the ‘state’ is not far different 
from vendors, mas makers, CEPEP and URP workers, and citizens generally in the ways 
it participates in public life. Clearly, bureaucracies do not simply enable domination. 
Rather, they appear enmeshed in a range of divisions and struggles.
Differences in police and Mayors’ practices show how formal and informal authority play 
out in diverse ways along tiers of power, sometimes creating contradictory responses. 
The intentions, values and actions of individual police or politicians at different tiers 
connect bureaucratic power to ordinary women and men’s lives in personal, pragmatic, 
empathetic and reciprocal ways. State authority is clearly about more than force, rules 
and domination because of the ways that legitimacy is withheld, accessed, mimicked and 
navigated. Even within the state, a politics of authority means mixing, switching and 
twisting social politics and legal politics.
The ambivalence, instrumental compliance and pragmatic acquiescence to rules, 
discussed by David Held, seems surprisingly appropriate to officials’ practices. They 
clearly maneuver an array of truths, ideologies and aesthetics. Not only is the state far 
from homogenous, officials’ views and actions also exemplify multiplicity. These 
officials both claim law and resort to informality and, even, illegality for a wide and 
varied range of reasons. This complements how vendors, mas makers and squatters 
reproduce (the legitimacy) of law in their own ways. Rather than simply repressing, 
power does produce particular alignments and actions through shifting combinations of 
law, lore and aesthetic.
Law sets up abstract rules, but in practice always has to be manifested in actual contexts 
and practices. These are already infused with lore, social politics and notions of 
reasonableness. This may mean that law becomes reasonably contained on roadsides by
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vendors, police, customers and passersby, managed in terms of fair exchange between 
squatters, party activists and elected politicians, and navigated across the competing 
demands of commercial sponsors, the aesthetic demands of successful mas and moral 
obligations of nationalism in Carnival Committee meetings.
In each instance, law is expected to work in ways that coincide with and express these 
normative approaches to behaviour. The practice and meaning of legislation and office 
only emerge when lore determines how different forms of power are actually manifested 
in specific situations and what kinds are dominant. The demands of legitimacy, however, 
continue to validate law. It remains its own reason for power when women or men seek 
to justify their stances by drawing on abstract law, and not just lore or the habitus 
emerging from reasonable mix of the two.
At another level, there are understandings reached within the personal relationships 
formed amongst women and men involved in this array of interactions. Character, 
personal style, and “how you talk to people” all influence how individuals and groups 
make sense and judge what police, politicians and bureaucrats say, do and mean. This is 
because these vendors, mas makers and government workers’ personal experiences, 
teachings from their parents, grudges and fantasies give strong credence to one form of 
legitimation or can delegitimize a claimed authority. This is how neighbourhoods and 
cities are privatized.
Relationships, especially those of love and care, influence women and men’s connection 
with the officials, ‘the state’, political ideals and authority itself. They relate to them as 
they might their CD collection, home, pets or shopping. An individual might seek out 
subordination to the state for reasons that have to do with her relationship to her parents. 
Or, she might resist the state for reasons that connect to her marriage.
While gradations of power within state bureaucracies are important, so too are the kinds 
of relationships worked out amongst those meeting at different tiers. The necessity, skill 
and ideal of making and maintaining relationships around what matters suggest that the
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practice and meanings of authority are hardly abstract. Like reasonableness, relationships 
legitimize action. Moving further down from institutional gradations and inter-personal 
connections to the individual level, aesthetic authority involves the virtuosity of 
acknowledging law, knowing when is appropriate to ignore it and having the personal 
character to do it with style and, therefore, legitimacy (Miller 1993).
In an overall normative approach, aesthetic authority moves chameleon-like across 
different registers of power. Its legitimacy emerges through practice, relationships, 
leadership and efficacy, as well as abstract forms and rules. Its significance here is in the 
“ways of operating”, “styles of action” and tactics (Giard 1998, xxiii) it enables officials 
to interject into state practice. This is how dispositions underlie politics as it occurs 
within the individuals, families, friendships, associations, neighbourhoods, workplaces 
and bureaucracies that comprise public life. Just as vendors, voters and mas makers call 
on different sources of authority by turning to police if  they need to, or refusing to vote 
because they think it makes no difference or asking the San Fernando Carnival 
Committee for greater prize monies, so too officials maneuver relationship through the 
kinds of authority they wield at different tiers of power. Police may mix lore with law, 
political activists may masquerade lore as law, and Carnival Committee members may 
masquerade law as lore. These are the actual manifestations of law in practice.
Both practices in informal life and officials’ view also emphasise the importance of 
forging and maintaining relationships. Together these cases point to the ways that 
contradictions as well as ideals of order and balance are worked out. The ways lore and 
law are negotiated with regard to use of roadsides resonates with negotiations over, for 
example, jobs, votes and prizes. The logic between divergent areas of practice forms an 
overall, totalizing order. This makes unconnected things make sense in relation to each 
other. It creates an aesthetic that legitimises what people do.
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C hapter Six: M aking Publics Private
It is our duty as Muslim women to have a say in the politics o f our 
country and the politics that shape our lives as women. Politics is not 
only the realm o f men, as many men want to propagate. On the 
contrary, it has been made our primary concern throughout Islamic 
history since 1500 years ago, when the women gave the Prophet their 
vote (Baiya) personally. We were equally addressed, and were equal 
partners in matters o f the state.1
6.1 Introduction
Figure 37: Celebrating Community
One October morning, Ruqaya, a motherly-looking woman wearing a hijab met me and 
drove us to the site of the ASJA election. I had seen her petition against women’s 
disenfranchisement circulating the masjid. A short paragraph at the top of the page had 
asserted that the ASJA constitution did not bar women from voting and sought signatures 
of support below. I could not have gone alone to the election. Comfortably, neither could 
she. I was wearing loose jeans and a long sleeve shirt when Ruqaya picked me up and, as
1 These are the words of a woman from an Egyptian Islamic women’s group. She went on to add, “This is, 
however, not the notion most Muslim men carry. Somewhere, the perception of women being only bodies 
fit for the kitchen or the bed lingers in the back of their heads” (Duval 1998, 58).
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we chatted along the way, she suggested that I adjust the scarf over my head as it was 
falling back to reveal my hair. When we arrived, there were about 150, mainly Indo- 
Trinidadian, men milling around. Many wore kurta shirts and headwear. Fewer wore 
Western clothes. This dress signaled this event as both an administrative and sacred space 
and exercise. Ruqaya appeared slightly uncomfortable about leaving the car. However 
Waliyudeen, the Masjid President, called me to fold and hand out fliers. This gave us 
both an opportunity to get out.
We obtained ‘observer’ stickers with no problem. This was surprising because it 
suggested the ban against women attending was arbitrary, ill communicated or not shared 
by all in the Elections Committee. A podium was in the centre of the school hall, chairs 
in a semi-circle around it, and a space at the right for observers. We sat here, in chairs 
closest to the door. It made us more visible, but enabled easy access if we had to leave. I 
was happy to have this assertive and knowledgeable woman’s company as I keenly 
wished to observe the election. As an ‘outsider’, new to the San Fernando Islamic 
community in many ways, I felt it would have been disrespectful and boldface of me to 
attend the election alone and uninvited. In contrast, Ruqaya was a long involved member 
and felt she was setting a precedent being there.
The Chairman of the Electoral Committee soon came to tell us to leave. Ruqaya said 
there was nothing in the constitution to make her leave. He said it was “custom”. She 
asked, ‘Am I doing anything wrong? Am I offending anybody?” He asked where she was 
from. She told him she was from the San Fernando Jaamat and that she paid her $10 to 
the ladies group. He responded that they didn’t recognize those payments. Eventually, 
another man with an official sticker came to tell us to leave. She refused and quietly 
reassured me that they could not (physically) touch us. He seemed to give in. She said, 
“Well I am glad you understand”. Vexed, he responded that he did not understand our 
point and didn’t support us being there.
He went away and sent a hesitant young security guard to tell us to leave. She again said 
to tell her why and who said so and that she wasn’t leaving. Grumbling about “all these
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men who want to decide my life”, she explained to me, “I am here because if my God 
asked me what I did when the ASJA was in this state, what can I say, I was home 
cooking?” Said she asked three other women to come but they were afraid of censure, 
afraid of the President General and “afraid of the men”. Constitutional rules did not 
prevent women from attending, but the habitual practice and pressure women felt did.
The community is small so women and men generally know each other well. Women 
didn’t fear individual men’s responses and, in fact, would have been surrounded by men 
who were neighbours, family, co-workers and friends. The election moment highlighted 
more generalized, gendered fears of social shame, community leaders’ censure and 
gossip amongst men. In this instance, Ruqaya invoked the ASJA constitution to challenge 
norms regarding gender segregation. She also invoked the higher authority of God, over 
the traditional authority of religious and administrative leaders, to justify women’s 
participation in an Islamic public sphere.
The event began with a dua (prayer), but the atmosphere was tense. The election officials 
stood next to us looking displeased. However, much confusion quickly took over and 
they appeared to forget about us. At one point, the President General said that observers 
had no right to speak or participate in the meeting. As we were the only visible observers, 
this was interesting. A letter had been circulated a few days earlier declaring that 
observers could participate, but not vote. At one point, the President said, “Sisters were 
not allowed and I don’t know who invited them, but they are here”. He didn’t publicly 
tell us to leave. Ruqaya declared, “I guess the Chairman accepts us” and was pleased that 
his opening address began “Brothers and Sisters”. She felt that, momentarily, he 
acknowledged she was part of the meeting.
For the next hours, there was quoting from the constitution and from the Qur’an, much 
protracted fighting for the microphone, shouting, interruption, accusation, heckling, 
disagreement, condemnation and rebuttal. In the midst of this rowdiness, there were 
quieter periods when various reports were read. On the podium to announce the election,
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the man who first tried to make us leave addressed the assembly as “My beloved Sisters 
and Brothers”. Ruqaya noted this ironically.
After the election, men we knew from various masjids came up to joke about our temerity 
and how “they wanted to throw all yuh out”. Many were supportive of us staying. They 
also came to discuss the election. During the process, there were no controls over 
delegates, no voters lists, no numbered ballots and no idea how many people voted in 
relation to how many were eligible to vote. No one even knew if any men voted more 
than once. Juxtaposing the voting process to the initial atmosphere of spirituality, several 
complained the ASJA election was conducted like a “carnival”. In the end, the San 
Fernando Jama Masjid-led campaign team failed to get more than one third of the votes 
cast by the men of the ASJA community.
6.2 The Sacred and the Political
These morning hours spiraled together perspectives on women’s participation in 
governance, men’s competition over leadership, and the relationship between the sacred 
and political. In the following pages, I unravel these threads to show how negotiations 
over authority create further configurations of social and legal politics in public life. 
Spiritual ideals of order and balance pitch religious law against secular and non-Islamic 
state forms. At the same time, the economic, legislative and pedagogical interlock 
between the AJSA and the state, because of government-supported and ASJA-managed 
public schools, shows another face of the diversities of law.
The kinds of habitus associated with women and men in the San Fernando Jama Masjid 
also contribute to the diversities of lore. Nonetheless, values of headmanship in informal 
social life provide continuity to negotiations over authority across a range of seemingly 
dissimilar publics. The significance of masculinity, to ideals regarding participation in 
ASJA associational life, is more homologous to the mas camp, San Fernando Carnival 
Committee and Railway Line patronage networks than appears from afar.
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The last two chapters looked at the interactions among varied publics, including the state, 
and showed their fluidity and overlap. An aesthetic architecture that hinged together law 
and lore explained how women and men navigated gradations of power extending from 
national legislation to middle-ranking state officials to market vendors. I illustrated how 
everybody have to eat, love for mas and contacts inflected livelihood considerations with 
elements of need, legality, culture and relationship.
The scenes presented, and talk about them, also highlighted wrangling over the notion of 
public itself. Market vendors, under the eye of police, packed and unpacked different 
ideas about legitimate use of public space. Their moves informally publicized authority. 
Mas makers and the Carnival Committee deliberated over competing bases for public 
leadership. In that case, the committee attempted to formally publicise authority by 
defining ‘public’ as state-led. CEPEP and URP workers and party activists maneuvered a 
range of reasons for public spending. In doing so, they informally privatized power. 
Analogously, as depicted below, women and men in the ASJA were working out terms of  
public participation. Here, theological and administrative leadership, and the ASJA 
constitution, formally privatized authority.
As other sites showed, what is considered public or private is not static but shifts. In the 
masjid, ‘public’ is associated with non-Muslim spheres considered to be impure and 
immoral. Women’s non-participation in such spaces aims to protect them “from the 
influences of non-Muslims who might degrade them”. By contrast, Islamic social space is 
cast as protected and ‘private’. Yet, masculine spheres within Muslim social space mark a 
potentially dishonouring inner ‘public’. This situates spheres associated with women as 
private and private spheres as appropriate for Muslim women. Such gradation illustrates 
the significance of women and men’s struggle to live according to their beliefs and 
values. Gradations of state and social power also show struggles among women and men 
in official positions, on pavements or in the mas camp.
Overall, it seems that such gradations do not simply reinforce hierarchies or inequities 
while enabling them to be challenged. Rather, they allow women and men to create a
242
layered continuum of different registers of authority. This means that there are more
possibilities as well as more ways that contradictions can be systematically worked
through. In the end, a reasonable balance among competing ideals is sought. The goal is -
to live in ways that fulfill what most matters, depending on the context and moment. In
attempting to fulfill theological expectations, women and men make politics another
place where gendered roles and identities can be established. It therefore becomes
another site for establishing normativity or the world as their God intended. I have shown
how an aesthetic approach shapes vendors’ or squatters’ relations with police or political
&
activists. It also informs both the way that power is ordered in the ASJA and the reasons 
this order is contested.
Male masjid members involved in campaigning prized notions of participation, fairness 
and equal rights because of their Islamic cosmology. In meetings, they would comment 
that “Islam is political” or “Islam is about democracy”. Defense of the faith was also seen 
to be a call to action. There were heavy fears prior to the election that some jamaats 
would be disenfranchised and barred from voting for what they considered to be various 
illegitimate reasons. While distrust flowed as an undercurrent to all campaign strategies, 
strategists were always concerned about not damaging the reputation of the ASJA in the 
public eye. Masjid leaders contrasted their higher good with others whose strategy they 
accused of being about “empty promises” or “deception, money and fear”. Nonetheless, 
their campaign was carefully crafted to highlight their loyalty to and protectiveness over 
the organization. They imagined themselves “fighting a battle of spirituality” while “the 
other side was trying to gain power by any means”.
While for male campaigners, “return to spirituality” was clearly about the right to 
question and participate, administrative accountability and brotherly fairness, it was also 
about reaffirming Islamic masculinity. Gender remained at the heart of spiritually-correct 
leadership. Although women never collectively nor vocally critiqued this position, their 
views were a subterranean flow beneath the drama of the election. In their own ways, 
many women claimed the basic value of the campaign.
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As I described in Chapter 2, women and men belong to sex segregated groups. The 
“ladies’ groups” have their own democratic election and decision-making processes, but 
have no formal right to participate in the “men’s groups” which oversee the entire 
community. This is true at both the national association and jamaat levels, and explains 
why women do not usually vote in associational or Mosque Board elections. Yet, male 
masjid leaders work with women, including Muslim women, in national, parliamentary 
election campaigns. The two politically experienced women who worked on the masjid's 
campaign were brought in because the men needed help and knew them from past 
national elections.
Some of these men even encouraged Muslim women to run for various levels of political 
office. Many women in masjid also vote in national general elections, suggesting that 
approaches to democracy are more complex than first glance conveys. Women and men’s 
engagement with different levels of organizational bureaucracy can be seen as attempts to 
legitimize how they participate in Islamic public life and other publics, and the kinds of 
authority they access and wield. However, the story doesn’t end here.
As this chapter exemplifies, there is a great deal of deliberation about whether or not this 
hierarchy and the kinds of leadership exercised really are ‘correct’ practice. In this 
community, Allah is the ultimate source of both authority and aesthetic. Women and men 
have their own ideas and interpretations sown by experience, reading, parents and 
extended family or maktab teachers. Female and male masjid members are also political 
party activists, business people, workers, neighbours and lawyers. They have attended a 
variety of schools, have non-Muslim friends and may like to watch Carnival bands play 
mas on the road. Notions of reasonableness therefore also influence this debate. As Aisha 
Khan points out in her study of Muslims in Trinidad, although ‘timeless’ practice 
originating from a source is juxtaposed to ‘inauthentic’ adaptations, “overzealous 
correctness has the danger of conveying intolerance or exclusivity, which are contrary to 
the social ideals of acceptance and “living good with people”” (1995a, 101).
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Larger tropes of racial/ethnic and cultural/traditional purity must also reconcile with 
others emphasising equality, cooperation, modernity and progress (Mohammed 1988b).
In other words, those concerned about legitimate practice and advantage interpret the 
forms and meanings of power offered by Islam or God in a spectrum of ways. Here, as 
with vendors or mas makers, normativity underlies aesthetic authority. Yet, as I show in 
the following pages, there is in fact less consensus than expected on issues of 
enfranchisement, leadership and gender.
This way of engaging order reflects masjid members’ debates about the spheres of 
humanity that are compatible with theological law, and the kinds of practices that enable 
authority to be transcendent. In other words, questions of legitimacy are anchored to 
concerns about fulfilling a higher purpose. I showed in the last two chapters how lore . 
made need, family, culture, art and friendship the most powerful bases for authority 
among vendors, squatters, mas makers, state officials and political activists. The masjid 
election, in contrast, illuminates the ways that law can be valued and infused into 
informal social life. It highlights the power, for example, of knowledge, gender, \ 
leadership, rules and bureaucracy. These connect to women and men’s attempts to access 
various kinds of authority and to affirm an aesthetic sanctioned by God.
Governance practices within state bureaucracies, informal social spaces such as the 
market, associations such as the San Fernando Jama Masjid and sites that are a bit of both 
such as the Lionel Jagessar and Associates mas camp therefore show different ways that 
lore and law mesh. In this instance, law or ‘correct’ practice is associated with ‘tradition’, 
associational rules, dictates of leaders, scriptures and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad2, 
as well as other times and places3. Interestingly, it is also backed by gendered values of
2 Islamic ideals are derived from the Qur’an and traditions of Prophet Muhammad (Hadith), the example of 
the Prophet Muhammad (Sunnah) and the divine law (Sharia) as understood (fiqh), interpreted and applied 
by male religious scholars {ulema) in the past and preserved in legal texts and manuals. While the 
emergence of Islamic laws brought many progressive changes for women, historical and cultural 
interpretations and practice perpetuated women’s inequality. Many changes began to occur in the 20th 
century with decolonisation movements, legal reforms, and expanded educational, employment and 
political opportunities. The inpact of social change on gender relations has sparked much debate around 
reconstituting ‘tradition’.
3 Khan’s (1995b, 94) analysis of authenticity, legitimacy and place situates the community in the context of 
diasporic nostalgias and displacements, new junctures involving displays of “correct” piety, and the “the
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headmanship that are grounded in lore. At the same time, spiritual law, national law and 
everyday practice legitimize questioning and challenging dominant interpretations.
This bargaining over meanings of ‘public’ occurs across gradations of power in the 
ASJA, and along gendered lines, just as it does in state bureaucracies, patronage 
programmes and roadsides. Women and men’s experiences in all the study’s sites are 
gendered. However here, governance practices explicitly demarcate gendered spheres so 
that religiously informed ideals of order and balance can be achieved. This parallels 
artistic practices that are influenced by Native American spirituality, and mas makers’ 
idealization of masculine leadership and identities. Sometimes, return to spirituality 
looks like love for mas. At other times, its authority looks like that of contacts or even 
everybody have to eat. Overall, these aspects of the election were my entry points for 
exploring the intersections of leadership, enfranchisement, gender and normativity in 
associational life. The following sections survey women and men’s views about women’s 
place in the theology of Islam and in the practice of Islam. They then situate these 
perspectives in the context of ongoing international and theoretical debates about these 
issues.
6.3 Leadership and Gender
Whether at national, local government or institutional levels, politics is gendered. This 
shapes the personal characteristics seen to be ideal to participation. It helps determine
cultural politics and uneasy ethnic group relations among Indo-Trinidadians and Afro-Trinidadians”. 
Building on Gupta and Ferguson (1992), she essentially concludes that “remembered places” such as India 
and Mecca are “symbolic anchors of community”. These reflect “nostalgias without memory” (Appardurai 
1990) or a return to places never been. Nonetheless, they are essential to how secular and sacred space is 
constructed. This is especially true in a place such as Trinidad where the non-Muslim community presents a 
“frontier” (Bowen 1989) defined by religious observance. In this context, the “correct model” (Asad 1986, 
15) of visible piety becomes a key site for controlling community boundaries and internal identities. 
Authenticity and legitimacy involve gendered notions of purity. As Khan (1995b, 97) observes, “The 
ability to determine the prevailing interpretations is, to a significant extent, what empowers an individual or 
group”. In this sense, Khan follows Lowenthal’s (1985) view of the social uses of the past. Here, the past, 
purity and authenticity are constructed as other places, not simply other times. However, easy “reification 
of culture” (Kapferer 1988) is not possible when there are many, perhaps competing, referents for diaspora. 
For example, where India presents a cultural mooring and Arabia is a religious locus in identity 
construction (Khan 1995b, 112).
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who participates and how they participate. In fact, notions of leadership both within Islam 
and the wider society support each other. Both reproduce male-female hierarchies, but 
not necessarily for the same reasons. As Taimoon, a (UNC) Local Government 
Councillor involved with the masjid campaign described,
Being a Muslim woman has never been an issue for me in politics. But 
being a woman, you are always seen as being lesser in the game. Men 
don’t see you as a decision maker or your contribution as important. Most 
people in the politics are men. You are looked at as one of the boys, but 
you are also not recognized. Women are forever getting left out. Maybe 
men are afraid of allowing women to be in power.
In terms of the ASJA, she felt that “there is a sense that women don’t need to be in 
leadership positions and women don’t know they can be”. Thinking it through, she added, 
“Yes, men are seen to be relied on to be the leaders, but even in the regular Regional 
Corporation4, men are afraid of what will happen if women get too much leadership”. 
Allan Sammy, past male Deputy Mayor of San Fernando (1986-1990) agreed,
In politics, leadership is really headmanship. This is particularly so for the 
UNC with its Hindu and Muslim male leaders. It is male oriented and 
dominated. Lots of women participate, but women do not bring up gender 
issues and men are quite traditional.
He felt that women have been more involved in the PNM. However, literature (Taitt 
1990) suggests that they have similarly been crowded into low-level participation.
In the San Fernando Jama Masjid, some women and men feel that men are the legitimate 
administrative and spiritual leaders of their community. They think that community 
governance should be left to men. This is because the guardianship or superiority, and 
greater rationality, of men is considered to be part of nature (jitra) (Esposito 1998, xvii). 
The essential idea is that women and men have separate and complementary roles. 
Women should, therefore, be more involved with the family and in helping the 
community.
4 As outlined in the Introduction, this is the institution responsible for Local Government.
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Figure 38: Helping Out at a Tea
Muniba, a 2003-2004 ASJA Ladies Association Vice President and past President of the 
YWMA5, explained, “this is how it is supposed to be just as in a household with the man 
as the head of the house and women having a supporting but important role”. Laughingly, 
she joked, “In a way, men can take the blame”. She was glad “the men organize their own 
activities” (such as the election) because “women don’t have time to get involved” and 
“they often can't make night meetings or have kids at home”. Rather, women could send 
husbands and sons to represent their views instead.
However, as Lateefa, a YWMA member for fifty years, rationalised, “Women should be 
able to run for Executive positions because they make decisions and have the economics 
from running the house”. Here, Muniba and Lateefa associated different kinds of power 
with women’s household role. On the one hand, women’s traditional function is seen to 
empower them within the family. On the other, it is a source of power they can bring to 
participation in governance. Muniba pointed out that there were bi-annual AGMs that all 
jamaat members, including women, could attend. She had attended in the past and voiced 
an opinion, but felt “it wasn’t taken on”.
Drawing on her political experience, Taimoon elaborated, “Society is male dominated 
and when men alone run a system they seem to eliminate an understanding of women.
5 The Young Women’s Muslim Association is the women’s group of the masjid.
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This excludes women further. Women should be able to sit in a room with any amount of 
men and make decisions”. Wryly, she noted that change is particularly difficult to 
achieve at election time when “the conflict is over how everybody wants to be boss”.
Notions of headmanship do not alone explain why women are barred from lower 
Executive or sub-committee positions at the masjid or national level. Here, combined 
notions of tradition, spirituality and female, and therefore male and community honour, 
are important. In a sense, notions of honor create gender. In other words, they rely on 
gender to demarcate a sphere oT purity"^d trahscendence that is protected from the 
corruption and “carnival” of politics. The very conceptualization of women in Islam is 
one that is bound to duty to husband, children and the home. Theologically, honour is 
derived from the elevation of this relationship, its moral role and the respect it is 
accorded. Amongst other things, respectability is therefore marked in gendered ways.
This is true across the Caribbean (Wilson 1983, Besson 1994), but has especial 
significance for female, Muslim, Indo-Trinidadians. ‘Correct’ practice is not only 
religiously defined. It is also given meaning in opposition to the transience and 
‘reputation’ stereotypically associated with Carnival (Miller 1994), Afro-Trinidadians 
(Hosein 2004), non-Muslims and men (Sampath 1993). Global debates on gender and 
nation (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989, 1992, Jayawardena 1986, Mohagdam 1994, 
Mohanty and Mohanty 1990, Parker, Russo, Sommer and Yaeger 1992, Yuval-Davis and 
Werbner 1999) have long pointed to the effects of such oppositions on control of 
women’s bodies and sexuality.
Here, such effects also extend to democracy and leadership because politics is considered 
potentially and powerfully corrupting, especially if it becomes detached from the sacred. 
While Muslim men’s honour is also vulnerable, having a ‘reputation’ does not 
necessarily cleave them from community belonging because they do not lose masculinity 
or the status it affords, even if their behaviour is associated with ‘othered’ kinds of men.
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More narrowly, Muslim women can less risk ‘reputation’ or access other femininities 
while maintaining honour, (moral) status and belonging. This is because Islamic 
femininity is meaningful on these terms. As Weiss (1998, 28) has observed, “It is the fear 
of losing respectability that drives most people to suppress their women’s freedoms”. 
Given this normative order, honourable practices involve protecting women from the 
demeaning and polluting effects o f politics, just as they involve protecting Islam and 
community from the exercise of authority without the ascendance and beauty of an 
Islamic aesthetic.
ale organizations and forms of
^emance levels and practices 
maintains its place as a central community tenet. This is why clear distinction is made 
between women’s community and state-level participation. Women and men have first 
responsibility to protect the purity or privatization of an Islamic public from its non- 
Islamic counterparts. Maintaining an Islamic sphere keeps clear the path to accessing the 
power of Allah, and all God offers to those whose forms of power and participation make 
the world as it should be. Struggle against this distinction is therefore defined as a 
flouting of community ideals, ‘correct’ spiritual practice and Islamic identity itself. It 
risks shame, exile and relationship to God (Espinet 1992, Razack 1999). Together, these 
concerns work to discourage, disinterest, alienate and intimidate women, shaping their 
engagement with gradations of governance.
Women have enough individual mobility and autonomy in public life to choose to vote in 
general elections. However, largely, challenge to male Islamic terrain requires collective 
trespass. Ideas of citizenship as an individual right but belonging as community 
controlled are important here6. Community governance, and perceptions of the correct 
relationship between the state, a community and its leadership are therefore interlocked 
with headmanship practices. Consequently, a normative space which affirms women’s
6 Talad Asad (1993) points out that the British state, while stereotyping the Muslim minority community as 
a collective, appears to encourage minorities to participate in British life as individuals. The cultural 
diversity of individuals does not threaten British identity. The politicization of religious tradition by 
Muslims does, however, for it questions loyalty to the nation-state, its totalizing cultural project and the 
hegemony of its ruling-class culture.
\  /
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and men’s highest ideals is demarcated by regulation of women’s enfranchisement. The 
limits of their citizenship mark the outer boundaries of Islamic authority.
Captivatingly, ‘authentic’ spirituality, Islamic purity and Muslim women are all 
perceived to be in need of men’s protection. Helie-Lucas (1994) observes that when 
women accept the notion of a community in danger and fear betraying their identity, male 
leadership is more able to order priorities and indefinitely postpone issues of equality and 
empowerment As Waliyudeen, the Masjid President concluded, “They are women first, 
before they are someone who holds office”. His response highlighted the importance of 
maintaining a sense that Islam in Trinidad was ‘traditional’, ‘pure’ and hence ‘authentic’. 
Here, Islamic law and lore combine. Leadership itself is about preserving religious rules 
and customs. Therefore, the issue is not whether governance is patriarchal, inequitable or 
gendered, but the extent to which this is necessary to protect community ‘purity’, 
spiritual living and God from corruption. Return to spirituality sought to infuse the 
“carnival” and “kuchoor” of politics with a higher aesthetic centred in honour.
For a similar reason, women cannot fill Executive Council positions, such as President or 
Vice President, that involve meeting with non-Islamic men and members of the public. It 
is also seen as potentially dishonourable for women to sit at ASJA meetings with men, 
and for men and women to mix socially. This danger is resolved through segregation and 
through women’s exclusion from spaces, activities and registers of authority associated 
with men.
Yet, contesting perspectives within the community (and internationally) suggest that 
women and men differ on the ideal relationship between gender, honour and governance. 
Interestingly, notions of equality both within Islam and the wider society contest official 
conceptions of appropriate leadership. For example, Saleem, a politician involved in the 
masjidAed campaign involved women in his own general election campaigning and relied 
on them as part of the ‘Muslim vote’. He asserted,
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I don’t think that people in community feel that women shouldn’t be at the 
head of executive positions. I think they can participate across the board 
whether in religion or industry. If we deprive women of executive 
leadership roles, we exclude 50% of our human resources. I don’t see their 
disenfranchisement as natural or right whether in the context of a general 
election or the ASJA.
Nonetheless, he didn’t consider the election an appropriate time to raise ‘the Woman 
Question’. Nor has he advocated generally for change in ASJA practice. An Imam and 
past Secretary of the Education Board claimed to support the idea of women participating 
on the Executive and felt that ASJA could not propagate Islam in the country while 
excluding women. He boasted that women vote and participate in decision-making in his 
jamaat, and talked about the Spiritual Head looking up to past Pakistani Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto.
However, he reminded me that according to both the Sunnah and the ASJA constitution, 
the leader of the community and the jamaat is always a male. Another member of the 
election strategizing team, a past ASJA President felt that “women have never been part 
of the ASJA decision-making, but we need their input and their help, and we need to 
consult them”. During his tenure, he held biannual meetings and invited women to 
participate and present papers. On some occasions, women sit on his jamaat’ s Mosque 
Board meetings. He added, “Not only when dinners are being planned”.
Partha Chatteijee (1993, 127-131) shows how emergent nationalism in India similarly 
bifurcated the social world into an external, material, immoral, impure, modem, Western 
and masculine domain, versus an inner, spiritual, familial, cultural, virtuous, Eastern and 
female one. As Hansen (1995, 87) notes, the gendered implications meant that,
In this new nationalist construction of a modernised and ‘classicised’ 
culture, from where the popular elements had been purged, the woman 
was constructed as a goddess, and as an upholder of tradition. But the 
‘new Woman’ of the nationalist era was also enlightened, educated and 
disciplined...
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Naila, a married woman in her thirties who helps run the family business and who was 
the 2003-2004 Vice President of the group, similarly explained,
They preach in Islam that men and women are equal. But Maulanas might 
tell you things women can't do and sometimes you disagree. I sometimes 
feel women are kept down in Islam. Sometimes, I feel we don’t have equal 
rights. Telling women about staying in the home doesn’t encourage them 
to further and improve themselves. How can that be equal rights? Plus we 
are not living in an Islamic state and you have to live with others and your 
neighbours. I listen and decide for myself. You have to have it up here 
[pointing to her head] to know what to do and not be brainwashed.
More than others, this youngest member of the YWMA emphasised questioning
leadership and making choices. Similarly, she felt women should be able to contribute
4 ^
more to decision-making in the jamaat and the ASJA. There is also general feeling that 
male leaders should consult women and be open to their views. Some men claimed that 
joint meetings take place between the ASJA Executive Committee and the ASJA Ladies 
Association, and between the San Fernando Jama Masjid Mosque Board and the Young 
Women's Muslim Association. Other women contested this, saying it only happened a 
few times in the past and was stopped by the early 1990s.
Both women and men consider it inappropriate for one or two young, unmarried women 
to attend meetings with men. Even if women attending were dressed “honourably” and 
both men and women there could act as witnesses, people fear gossip about illicit 
intimacies. Younger women I spoke to about the problem of a woman attending meetings 
with men simply responded with the solution to make more places for women. Besides 
safety and strength in numbers, this optimistic solution for more feminized public space 
redefined meetings in terms of women’s moral authority.
Transnationally, Islamic women’s veiling, and other pious self-representations, have 
enabled them to tactically assert desires for education, employment and mobility in 
public. As well, they have helped them negotiate religious discourse (and space) and 
daily realities (Torab 1996). Conforming to rules against public visibility of women’s
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bodies re-establishes strict sexual mores to compensate for the loss of sexual control 
associated with women’s public lives. Women, and, increasingly, younger women, have 
used this religious idiom and these symbols to achieve personal aspirations (Jansen 1998, 
88).
Yet, overall, women from the YWMA agreed that it was better to stop joint meetings to 
protect women’s reputation. Nonetheless, some felt that women should be able to sit and 
talk with men and that this could happen once the Imam is present. One suggested that 
they could even meet earlier than the Mosque Board meeting. Looking back over her 
long experience with the YWMA, Lateefa skeptically noted that only a few elite women, 
who were on the YWMA or ASJA Ladies Executive or family to men on the jamaat of 
ASJA Executive, were ever really invited in the past and that, “Women only talk among 
themselves about not liking exclusion”.
The 2004-2005 YWMA President, Muneera, didn’t “want to go so far as to say we want a 
woman President”, but would have liked to see a woman on the Mosque Board. 
Interestingly, she was concerned about not picking a “token” woman for the board 
because, for example, the men perceive that she wouldn’t give trouble. Concomitantly, 
she did not approve of women being disallowed from observing the ASJA election, but 
laughingly commented, “We are not allowed to do anything anyway”. Like the majority 
of other women I interviewed, Muneera had her own nuanced take on gender, leadership 
and governance. However, like others she was unwilling to openly challenge the current 
order, especially without male religious and administrative leaders’ approval. Women do 
not have an official, collective reaction to gendered forms of power and participation. 
None ever mentioned any strategy or initiative they might begin. However, many spoke 
of change as a “wish”.
Naila most forcefully felt that women should be able to sit on the ASJA Executive 
Council. She reflected,
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The women are not sleeping with the men, can't they sit and discuss with 
them? What am I there for, just to make children and be at home? It makes 
you angry when you think about it. Makes you feel like less of a person.
Like the other women I interviewed, she concluded, “Yes, it’s a man’s world. Women 
don’t seem to be needed in leadership positions”. How then are women supposed to 
exercise influence? She laughed,
I guess that’s why we have a little ladies group so they could say we have 
power among us women and say we don’t need it in the men’s 
organization. Or, so we would be out of the way and they can use us when 
necessary. They tell you that you have rights, but you don’t have any.
As I discuss in later sections, many of the men I spoke to also thought women should be 
able to vote, and run for limited positions. Women and men, therefore, have mixed 
feelings about participation as both a form of meaning and power.
Enfranchisement is greatly valued as a right and as a technique for constructing ethnic 
identities (Ryan 1999b). Here, I observed its role in demarcating religious and gendered 
identities in Trinidad. Men’s leadership and control of this transcendent sphere 
underscores their attempts to tramp the sovereignty of state law with Islamic law. In this 
sense, Muslim headmen’s relationship with the state is gendered and experienced as a 
competition among patriarchal authorities. Islamic election rales clearly mark the 
boundaries of state authority and non-Islamic norms of citizenship.
Yet, Islamic and state law do not merely lock horns. Instead, notions of headmanship in 
lore give these parallel legalities an underlying continuity. As Eudine Barriteau (1998, 
11) aptly describes, ‘The difficulties women encounter in gaining full participation in 
governing structures in their countries are part of an historical continuum of an uneasy 
relationship between women and political participation and leadership in the Caribbean. 
The fact that the AJSA is incorporated by an Act of Parliament and gets state funding for 
its schools attests to the complementary forms of law that cross publics because of
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informal values present in lore. This is a different relationship between law and lore than 
presented by the market, mas camp or Railway Line.
The ASJA community, other spheres of social life and the state rely on conceptions of 
leadership that reinforce each other. Past Senate President and ASJA member, Dr. Wahid 
Ali (1992, 30), has depicted the politics in ASJA as reflecting “godfatherism” in national 
life. This is why there are parallels with the mas camp where leadership is also a key 
aspect of power and headmanship is an expression of aesthetic authority. As Lewis 
(2000, 262) has observed, the assumption of leadership “by men in the nationalist project 
appeared both to men and women as a natural evolution, given the relation of men to 
power, access to resources and privilege”.
Ideological relations of gender mediate and differentiate women and men’s access to a 
range of forms of power and gradations of authority. Non-Islamic publics, including the 
state, deal with women’s participation in contradictory and inconsistent ways. As on the 
Railway Line, non-participation by some is also considered significant for public life. In 
this context, return to spirituality marks governance practices that sought to privatise a 
sphere of patriarchal sovereignty without state interference or, perhaps, with state 
collusion. Although about the varying guises of law, this picture also parallels police 
collusion with vendors because of shared lore.
6.4 Elections, Enfranchisement and Participation
As the last section highlighted, ASJA women and men value many leadership qualities, 
but the essential ingredient is spiritual “correctness”. However, not all male leaders’ are 
seen as conducting themselves correctly. This leaves room for assertions that women’s 
participation in leadership roles can encourage greater morality. An argument like this 
relies on the idea that females embody moral codes. It seeks participation for the sake of 
religion, family and community, not because of a discourse of rights or equality. 
Responding to the argument that the election was not “a suitable domain for ladies”
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because of the “rough and tumble nature of politics”, “hooliganism” and “men’s 
behaviour at elections”, Ruqaya insisted,
They are not behaving according to the Sunnah, their practice is unlslamic 
and maybe women should discipline them. Meetings should not be rough 
and if they are, the entire format of the meeting is corrupted.
Men somewhat weakly countered that elections should become more “dignified” before 
women participate.
Women’s mixed responses reveal both the significance of enfranchisement and its limited 
value. Muniba did not feel disenfranchised because she did not think women should be 
involved in the kuchoor (confusion) of men’s elections. However, notably, she added, 
“We have no influence there anyway”. While women may argue that they have no direct 
influence, they frequently claim that they influence their husbands. Lily, the 2004-2005 
YWMA President, maintained, “Our husbands take into account what we feel when they 
vote. Unofficially we have great say. We let people know if there is somebody we don’t 
like.”
Successful strategies may not directly challenge and some feminists (Ripenburg 1998, 
147) have suggested that the political significance of women in the private and informal 
sphere cannot be overlooked. They may play an invisible political role influencing 
decisions taken in the ‘public’ sphere through their husbands and sons. Women may (and 
perhaps must) respond in subtle ways to the sexism in their cultural and political 
organizations, but clearly they would like other options. Even women leaders who do not 
resent disenfranchisement would vote for the masjid and ASJA Executives if given the 
opportunity. They may also choose women for these bodies if female candidates were 
permitted.
Interestingly, while Ruqaya, who attended the election with me, agreed that women 
should be able to vote in any election because “we have that right”, she didn’t feel that 
this right was important at a jamaat level. Instead, she preferred to see her opinion
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“tabled on the ladies side”. Rather than thinking it necessary to vote for or sit on the 
“men’s Executive”, she wanted to be heard by the women’s Executive and have her 
views communicated to the men. She continued,
Women can exercise influence through opinions from the ladies section 
being communicated to the male Executive, for example, if they have an 
issue with an imam’s khutbah appearing chauvinistic. A formal complaint 
can go forward.
She acknowledged, however, that this happens less than it should because “when women 
meet they are afraid to deal with contentious issues because of cultural and social 
patriarchy”.
Other women completely disagreed with their disenfranchisement. “Knowing how the 
men behave there”, Lateefa did not want to attend or participate in the election. 
Nonetheless, she viewed voting, both nationally and in the ASJA, as her “right”. She 
signed F ’ petition advocating this. Her explanation shows her own notions of
leadership] misunderstand the Qur’an. We are equal in the Qur’an. We are part of the 
jamaat, men alone shouldn’t have that right [to vote]”. In addition to an Islamic discourse 
on equality and rights, Naila also described a distrust of men’s decisions. She asserted,
If we have equal rights, we should be able to vote. Women should have a 
say in decisions men make because it affects you one way or another. We 
can’t rely on a man to not vote in a leader they know is bad. Name and 
wealth is a big thing in who people choose as leaders.
The women involved in campaigning championed a more constitution-based critique. 
They referred to the fact that nothing in the ASJA constitution stipulates that women 
cannot vote. Shazeeda thought that women’s participation on the ASJA Executive 
Council would improve its functioning and felt women should agitate for this change. 
Taimoon wanted to see Imams “take it on and take to the ASJA meetings and to the 
election”. In contrast, accepting their disenfranchisement felt, as Shazeeda described, like 
“accepting a role as housemaker, responsible for children only and not being able to
correct spiritual practice. She protested, “Women can't vote because they [male
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move around on our own or not voting because your husband told you not to”. While 
Shazeeda said she did bring it up with the Spiritual Head, the other didn’t raise it in the 
campaign meetings because she thought the men saw “women’s place as second in the 
Islamic community and male decisions as final and to be accepted”.
Not quite accepting this, Maulana, the Spiritual Head reasoned that, “women might be 
disenfranchised in this system but there are no clear cut rules on women’s participation. 
There is a culture in a place and you apply the rules of Islam and the combination varies 
across culture”. He considered women’s suffrage to be new to the culture and the ASJA a 
traditional organization that has “not yet taken the leap”. He admitted that, in an equitable 
and uncorrupted voting system, women should be able to vote. This is negated by his 
view of both national and ASJA elections as corrupted practice.
Some men in Executive positions also thought that women should not have been barred 
from observing the election because “Islam is about equal rights”. One community elder, 
Haji Kareem, felt women should also be able to run for election and vote. He concluded,
There are women with good Islamic training who do a lot of work for the 
organization and have good qualities. But it is up to the women to fight for 
that right. Because if you follow custom and tradition, where are you 
going?
I asked Saleem, the politician, why they didn’t include women. He responded,
I didn’t feel that way because the core group had women -  including 
yourself. I don’t think the male leaders part, which you are putting in what 
you write, in terms of the election, is fair. The male thing might have been 
in the election generally so it is to our credit that we even had women in 
our group.
His response didn’t acknowledge that the male Imams, Maulanas, past Mosque Board or 
ASJA Executive Council members and the President of the masjid were the decision 
makers. Yet, he admitted, “Well, they made the decisions and we [himself, the Masjid 
President, the two women and myself] did the work.” As a result, he concluded, “I submit
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to you that we had more female participation than is normally considered possible.” Yet, 
his further comments suggest underlying ambivalence throughout about women’s 
participation. He continued,
I am not sure whether the Maulana wanted any women involved at all. I 
got the impression that he wasn’t too keen. Did you notice that there were 
hardly any women there when he was in the meetings? He was fully aware 
of why you were there — you were like family, because you were another 
Maulana’s neice, also you were observing, but I could see the natural 
discomfort.
His final argument was that women were “not ready” to participate. This is because he 
unexpectedly approached the YWMA one day during their meeting to explain the 
campaign and its challenges. He asked them to speak to their male family, to write to 
newspapers or help in other small ways. The women were a surprising combination of 
skeptical and disinterested. One exclaimed, “Why should I help? I pay my membership 
and I cannot even vote”. Others threw in, “Too long ASJA has been a boys club!”, “Why 
are women thrown out of meetings?!” The women also disliked the ad hoc way they were 
approached and were a tougher crowd than the politician anticipated. He retreated 
suggesting they should put forward a policy for women in the ASJA.
The Masjid President (2002-2005), Waliyudeen, also felt women should be able to vote, 
but did not consider it the best way for women to make a difference at the jamaat level. 
Instead, he idealised how “wives let men feel they are the bosses” while in reality they 
run the jamaat “using hikmat” (wisdom). In practice, this describes influencing decisions 
by “not directly challenging or rocking the boat because you will be sidelined or thrown 
off’. He felt this ‘wisdom’ showed women they didn’t need to be President of the masjid 
to exercise power. He suggested the women accept feminized sources of power because, 
“It is Sharia law versus secular law. You could use a secular method to set up structures 
for governing a religious organization, but this is the wrong approach because the Surah 
should determine everything”.
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A Past President General of the ASJA admitted that interpretation of Sharia law is one of 
the main barriers to women’s participation. He suggested that women should be able to 
sit on the ASJA Executive (in appropriate posts) if they are capable of the work required. 
This is unlikely to occur at the masjid, as its Imam doesn’t favour women’s 
organizational participation. Lily, a past YWMA President, felt it significant that the 
Imam is Pakistani and not Trinidadian, and that he wouldn’t share the perspective of 
Trinidadian Muslim women who can participate in the rest of society. The Imam’s 
response highlights male fears that women’s participation could lead to gossip and 
dishonour (particularly directed against women). He also doesn’t support women’s 
involvement in non-Muslim organizations. However, spiritual leaders have not 
consistently held this position.
Yet, without formal right to representation, women must rely on letters to the Mosque 
Board or informal means of access to spheres of male power. In particular, family 
networks enable this. Family is itself associated with protection of women, morality and 
headmanship. Therefore, it facilitates a great deal for women by being a ‘safe’ space 
legitimating their participation in public and male domains.
6.5 Family and Informality
Figure 39: Leadership in Action
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Letters from the women’s ‘side’ to the men’s ‘side’ and telephone conversations are the 
primary means of formal communication. This is true both for the ASJA Ladies Group 
and the YWMA. Women’s access to decision-making and information is far more limited 
in this more formally exercised relationship. As well, they are less likely to participate in 
discussions with men over matters related to the ASJA or masjid. YWMA members 
complain that the Mosque Board doesn’t respond to their letters. Mosque Board members 
complain the group harasses them about trivialities, and it is too time consuming to 
respond in writing. Frequent breakdown of formal communication channels often leads to 
greater division, misunderstanding and mutual diffidence. This seriously questions the 
argument that women do not need formalized representation on the Mosque Board 
because, at this jamaat level, men and women leaders can easily meet and chat.
In the past, when female family members of the Masjid President have held the 
leadership of the women’s group, informal communication is more effective. For 
example, in the YWMA’s last election, Lily, the Masjid President’s sister became 
President of the women’s group. This greatly facilitates women’s knowledge of and 
participation in decisions regarding the masjid as they can listen in when informal 
discussions are held at their own or a family member’s home. In rare instances, they can 
attend a meeting as a male family member will safeguard and affirm their honour.
Their informal and direct access to decision makers means that they can exercise greater 
influence and make suggestions. Lily described it as having “to be fas (inquisitive) 
enough to find out what going on and give advice too”. She said she learned from her 
uncle (a past ASJA President General) and her father (a past Masjid President) that 
women’s participation was important when necessary. Yet, without good informal 
relations, communication between the Mosque Board (seen to be the men’s Executive) 
and the Young Women's Muslim Association (the women’s Executive), and women’s 
influence, is significantly limited.
Men cast the YWMA as a space where “women can do what they want”. They claim that 
the organization has “influence and power in decision-making because they can make
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suggestions to the President General if they want, and he will listen”. However, women’s 
responses suggest this is easier said than done. Muneera, the 2003-2004 YWMA 
President complained,
The Mosque President never responds to our letters and he makes plans 
without consulting us. Sometimes, it feels like there is no cooperation, no 
love, no thanks. Sometimes I feel they use the women when they need us 
to decorate or fix the tables and plates. But we are not invited to meetings 
of the Board and they don’t always let us know what is going on.
She described wanting to see the YWMA as more a part of the masjid where “they 
involve us in their projects and planning and meetings, and we have better 
communication.” Some of this feeling stems from women’s sense that their activities and 
concerns are not seen to be as important as those of the male-run Mosque Board. The 
Masjid President, feeling somewhat harassed by the YWMA’s letters, criticised them for 
both acting autonomously and wanting to be consulted. He commented,
If they want to be involved, they shouldn’t take attitude to the Board as if 
they have a right to be part of the process. Bringing such attitude is like 
looking for licks one time. They should come to help, not demand. If they 
come thinking they can muscle their way in, it is not going to work. What 
they have to do is work nicely with the Masjid Board.
He was quite critical that the women’s group did “teas, but not dawa or community 
work”. A past Young Women's Muslim Association President agreed that the groups 
should proactively call the President or Imam and find out how they could help. She also 
saw the YWMA’s role as one of Islamic education and supporting the Mosque Board. 
However, for her, the group was additionally “the women’s place of power”.
6.6 Place and Power
Women mobilize amongst other women and from places of power such as within the 
family because this is a normative ideal. Their challenges are also limited by fear of 
shame and loss of community. As Naila described, “Maybe nobody would go for it and
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you would get pelt out”. As someone who values her right to vote in national politics, and 
has always voted, she was frustrated at the discrepancy in women’s acceptance of their 
rights at national and community levels. She responded,
Women accept that because they are stupid. We don’t know our rights. Is 
it that we are afraid of religion or the men in our religion or just from time 
immemorial do you have it in your head that you are supposed to be like 
that? Is it the influence of history? Maybe no one cares. Maybe we are 
intimidated by men and religious politics, you know, the male aspects of 
the organization.
Muneera also observed,
To exercise influence, you would have to be drastic, and demand to be 
heard. Otherwise, I don’t know. Maybe you would have to be like the Vice 
President who is able to talk to her father and brother who are on the 
Mosque Board and then they may bring her views to the meeting.
As interviews with these women suggest, most are not willing to be “drastic” or to make 
demands for representation for fear of male and female community members’ response. 
Women also don’t challenge because, larger than themselves, is the jamaat and the 
masjid, and the need to respect their religion, community and leaders. These are always 
put first because they together symbolize an aesthetic of order, balance and honour. As 
the group President continued, “There is something about women, they don’t always 
stand up for their rights. Their husband’s view is important and, even in [general] 
elections, if they tell them not to vote, some women wouldn’t”.
In the community, both women and men that I interviewed claimed that women can talk 
to their husbands or their Imam when they want to exercise influence. However, a woman 
in the Association, who has been participating from its beginning, felt that “women have 
no right or voice because talking to your husband makes no difference because he will 
think just like his brother”. She felt writing letters didn’t make them listen either. Instead, 
she advocated, “Ladies have to get up, form themselves in a group, have a meeting and 
that will lead to us making decisions at the top. More people will come out because now
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women want to have a say”. “But”, she admitted, “Some women will say we not 
supposed to do that”.
More than one woman explained the discrepancy between women’s rights at national and 
community levels as “a cultural thing” or “more historical than natural or right”. Some 
reasoned that, “the community had not yet evolved”. Ruqaya similarly argued,
The traditional Muslim woman has been timid and she has not paid attend 
to the role she is supposed to play in the community. Also, there are forces 
pushing them not to participate. Education in Islam makes a difference, 
gives them a different sense of their role rather than those who only know 
about the articles of faith, fiqh (laws) and the bulk of daily living 
education such as the names of angels and duas. Unless women feel they 
can make a statement about scriptures, they are likely to challenge less.
She felt grounded in a knowledge of Islam and felt she knew the laws and “when men are 
talking stupidness”. “Plus”, she added, “I fear Allah more than I fear men.” These 
perspectives build on an older tradition of critique by Islamic reformers who distinguish 
between religious observance and social regulations and relations (Esposito 1998, xiv). 
As Leila Ahmed (1992b, 122) has pointed out, “reformers and feminists repeatedly try to 
affirm (with remarkable tenacity and often too with ingenuity) that the reforms they seek 
involve no disloyalty to Islam, that they in fact are in conformity with it, and if not in 
conformity with the letter and actual text of the culture’s central formulation, then in 
conformity with what nevertheless is still there somehow, in the spirit not quite caught by 
the words”. Ruquya, and other women’s responses, also highlight that the closer women 
feel to God, the more powerful they feel they are and can potentially be.
More than one woman spoke about wanting to see change, but being too afraid to 
challenge male leaders or their disenfranchisement. Even women, who said they would 
vote in general elections even if their husband did not want them to, were unwilling to 
publicly defy current practice. One woman who also wanted to attend the election 
claimed fear stopped her. She related how a man she knew from the ASJA, and from her
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jamaat, called and said that police would be at the election stopping women from going 
inside. He said that ASJA Executive Council members heard that a couple of women 
were planning to attend the meeting. He called her “as a friend” and said, “You will be 
embarrassed, police will not let you inside”.
Similarly, women felt change was difficult to achieve at the national executive level 
because “the ASJA Ladies as a group don’t want to rock the boat”. Even women involved 
in other ASJA masjids complain, “That is how we are taught it must be. We are taught to 
be subdued”. Muneera agreed, pointing out that the women disagreed quietly, amongst 
themselves because “we see ourselves as playing a role in decision making in the 
mosque, but they don’t see it that way”.
Taimoon, the Local Government Councillor, suggested that women consider their 
enfranchisement as citizens important because “Muslims are a large part of the Indo- 
Trinidadian population and Muslim votes are important in an ethnically divided political 
system”. However, the ASJA constitution is posed in opposition to the national 
constitution in terms of its fundamental premises, and the distinction between the 
spiritual and secular. Thus, she felt, “the two are seen as different and women are 
disciplined to follow”.
Another woman explained,
I think the small size of the Muslim population makes a difference. We 
have been contented to let the disparity go as it is. If there was a larger 
support section we might be braver. Also it is part of the Sunnah, if you 
believe your challenge will cause the destruction of your belief, then do 
not challenge, just practice what you want for yourself. It is better to live 
than fight and be destroyed especially if you are a minority, better to 
preserve your faith for your children and maybe they might make that 
change. Better to stay quiet than be destroyed and crushed. I see this as a 
strategic choice of women.
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Interestingly, fear of gossip, ostracism or blame doesn’t stop all Muslim women from 
questioning and challenging. Though rare, there are women on the Mosque Board at 
other masjids. Other women are involved in political parties. It is clear that women who 
are involved in political parties, state governance structures, full-time independent 
employment and non-Muslim organizations are more likely to contest disenfranchisement 
and marginalisation in their communities. It is this small group that most often raised 
themes of equality and rights. Aside from this group, younger women in their teens to 
early thirties also used this language.
In striking contrast to women in the ASJA, women in other Islamic organizations, such as 
the Nur ul Islam, overtly challenge attempts to marginalize them. Partly, this is due to 
their leadership by a high-ranking, female PNM politician. Her political experience has 
strengthened her willingness to confront sexism. However, this is also because the 
constitution of the organization incorporates women’s right to representation on the 
Mosque Board. Finally, male family members, involved since the organisation’s 
inception, support the women. This helps to legitimate their actions in response to re- 
interpretations of correct Islamic practice. The group continues to have their own 
elections and events, but no inclusion in overall decision-making. Women’s organizing 
itself is discouraged as it is argued that the women’s events encourage mixing among the 
sexes. The politician passionately related,
We have been fighting them. Sometime ago, they moved the partition 
reducing women’s space, relying on a fatwa that says men read in front 
and women at the back. We as women had to kick brass. Our mosque was 
very progressive with women and men reading side by side. The women 
confronted the men and were prepared to move and push down the 
partition. We were on the verge of having to push it down on the men ten 
years ago and they are doing it again.
More orthodox “ASJA practices and policies” of disallowing women from the Executive 
have influenced new approaches over the decades. Even in this organization, there are 
men who support women’s participation. However, they are not outspoken.
Yet, this woman strongly argued,
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You can’t be intimidated. It is a lot of dotishness. It requires a lot of 
sensitization, networking, supporting. We have to remove the gender bias.
That is something the Muslim community has to address. They have to 
decide where they see themselves in a Trinidadian society. I come from a 
background of being involved in many Indian cultural activities. They said 
you can’t be a Muslim and involved in Islamic affairs and be doing that.
But for a national perspective, we have the right to retain our cultural and 
religious practices.
Regarding her sense of being discriminated against, she reasoned,
This goes against every tenet of the government and the culture of the 
country. We have been part of Beijing and all these conferences for gender 
equity and equality. There is a ministry to ensure mainstreaming. Some 
organizations accept it and go along with it. Some have a problem with it.
Did you know ASJA had representatives at the women’s conference in 
1975? To be progressive, to move forward in the jamaat you need to 
involve the women. Women are not donkeys.
This woman considered disenfranchisement to be based on a “chauvinistic”, “tribal” way 
of organizing the community, and a strategy to keep women out of power. She felt that 
this way of thinking has been adopted by women so that they their enfranchisement in 
national politics and their limited participation and disenfranchisement in community 
politics become two separate experiences.
Halima Sa’adia Kassim’s (1999) history of community organizations and education 
among Indo-Trinidadian Muslims provides an historical view to women’s and men’s 
values and practices. Kassim’s research emphasises the role religion and gender play in 
demarcating intra-ethnic and organizational boundaries. In particular, Muslim women’s 
struggles against various consequences of sex segregation and purdah since the 1950s 
signal their negotiation with constitutive aspects of the Muslim community. They were 
remarkably absent from masjids until the 1930s and from Muslim organizations almost 
up to the 1950s. When they began to access greater secular and Islamic education, they 
were seen to be (silent) receptacles, but not deliverers of knowledge (except to children). 
Their admittance to mosques, meetings, lecture podiums and publications was a source of
I 268
intense inter-organisational and ideological conflict. Issues of their organizational 
enfranchisement, participation and leadership have been contentious for decades.
Yet, the establishment of the women’s groups discussed in this chapter and Muslim 
women’s expanding visibility is testimony to their rising consciousness of their 
marginalisation. It highlights their success in wrangling concessions. Kassim’s study 
illustrates how Trinidadian Muslim women variously supported patriarchal ideas and 
men’s attempts to ameliorate their conditions. Yet, they slowly undermined patriarchal 
stronghold throughout the early decades of the twentieth century. This was particularly 
significant because of the ASJA’s (continuing) orthodox and “dubious protection” 
(Kassim 1999, 47) of women from participation in mixed and public spaces. The 
persistence of the gendered spaces and roles is part of a decades-long story.
I have shown how aesthetic authority explains governance practices amongst market 
vendors, mas makers, squatters, police, political activists, Local Government Councilors 
and, now, Muslim women and men. Within and between all these groups, normativity or 
what most matters has grounded their practices and relationships. However, there is often 
contestation over what it is that really should matter most, who gets to decide and how 
this plays out within families, friendships, associational life, livelihood practices, 
government and democracy. Relationship to God, knowledge, religious prescriptions, 
need and family facilitates an often-submerged debate about governance in the ASJA.
Male leaders must make an effort to maintain the hegemony of their own interpretations 
of legitimate authority. These efforts played out in campaigning and voting during the 
ASJA election. At another tier, some women and men remain skeptical that the current 
organization of authority truly serves an aesthetic rather than excessively patriarchal or 
bureaucratic ideal. The debates here are, therefore, about the limits of advantage. This 
includes advantage of women’s gendered roles, male leaders’ cooperativeness, 
interpretations of what God wants, imams’ needs and democratic processes.
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Many homologous versions of lore and law have flowed through the negotiations and 
navigations witnessed in these sites. Here alone, varying forms of civic and Islamic law 
and custom connect women and men’s lives to Trinidad, the Middle East, India and 
specific kinds of Islamic practices in these places. While gender is a constitutive aspect of 
women and men’s experiences, in this instance it is considered key to protecting what 
most matters.
Rather than Islam being about democracy, return to spirituality highlighted an emphasis 
that democracy should be about Islam. Relationships among men, between women and 
men, and between each and politics or money or the sexual division of labour are 
ultimately about affirming Allah and umma (community). The relationship between 
political authority, lore and the aesthetic of individual practice twists across sites. Past 
chapters showed the ways that pulling authority downward through formality to 
individual practice preserves order. In this chapter, the concern centred on preserving 
both higher authority and lore from the vagarities of the merely contingent or the much 
lower authority of human choice, both of which are represented by democracy.
6.7 The Challenges of Legitimate Authority
Figure 40: Together as Women
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This chapter has shown how citizenship rights, habitual practices from homeland and 
motherland (Khan 1995a), loyalty to traditional leaders, and competing interpretations of 
Islamic law all thread through men’s and women’s experiences of governance and 
participation. I explored the ways that governance establishes religious and gender 
identities, and the boundaries between ideals of ‘public’ and ‘private’.
Mostly I have been concerned with charting connections and contradictions in relation to 
law, lore, aesthetic and authority. For example, the masjid-based election team involved 
two Muslim women, from other ASJA jamaats, who were both experienced political 
activists in national elections. One had been a leader in union organizing and campaign 
manager for many years, and the other held a seat in Local Government. These women 
contributed expertly and immensely, as the politician who asked for their help knew they 
would.
Men were willing to work with women for ‘democracy’ and Islam. Yet, neither the team 
nor these women ever seriously raised the issue of how women would gain from their 
efforts. Several men on the team also felt that women should be more involved in the 
election and in governance generally. Yet, this view was never considered for public 
attention. Many women felt the same way, but were disinterested or unwilling to publicly 
contest current logic. Both men and women held widely diverse views about the extent to 
which women should be more involved, suggesting little clear consensus.
Democracy was also valued by both women’s and men’s groups. Elections and voting 
over decisions were regular practices, and many felt that “Islam is about democracy”. 
Yet, among both groups, traditional authority exercised tremendous influence. This was 
so even while some men and women disagreed with traditional spiritual and 
administrative leaders’ views. In their responses, the Qur'an and Sunnah variously 
limited women’s participation and leadership, and justified equal participation.
Similarly, for some, living in Trinidad emphasized the importance of Islamic 
distinctiveness. For others, it provided a basis for recognizing the porous ethnic, religious
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and cultural boundaries of their community. Still others, such as those who had made 
hajj, were acutely concerned about the respectability of (Indo) Trinidadian Islam amidst 
more international Islamic movements. Consensus was constantly negotiated using 
appeals to various sources of authority, challenges to the legitimacy of different people’s 
interpretations, habitus and shifting rhetoric regarding ‘public’ decision-making. Return 
to spirituality alternately connected to all of these. Like love for mas, it presented a 
higher spiritual authority that is connected to traditional leadership, habitual practice and 
a deep commitment to sociality.
6.7.1 Legitimate Authority in Muslim Women’s Debates
My own interpretation of women’s experiences in the ASJA is grounded in the ways that 
these negotiations have been framed by Islamic feminisms of various kinds7. The term 
“Islamic feminism” is quite contested. It labels a heterogeneous grouping of women’s 
organisations and activities. Largely, these aim to improve women’s status and meet 
their practical needs8. They may overtly challenge a range of rules and social norms or 
seek to reinforce nationalist and religious prescriptions. In the view of secular feminists9,
7 Some main themes define the relevant literature. These include academic and Islamic interpretations of 
women’s rights and roles in Islam (Memissi 1991; Afshar 1992; Ahmed 1992; Stowasser 1994; Wadud- 
Muhsin 1994; Afkhami 1995; Hassan 1996; al-Hibri 1997; Barlas 2002), Western-influenced feminist 
readings of Islam’s incorporation of women (el-Sadawi 1980; Memissi 1985; Kandioyoti 1991a, 1991b, 
1991c; Keddie and Baron 1991; Tucker 1993; Moghadam 1994a; Afkhami and Friedl 1997), and studies 
about women’s organisational, religious and domestic lives in Islamic countries, non-Islamic post-colonies 
and in migrant settings in the West (Toubia 1988; Y. Ali 1992; Kaplan 1992; Moghadam 1993; Badran 
1995; Angeles 1998; Duval 1998; Kamalkhani 1998).
There is also writing on Islam, globalisation, and gendered economic and political participation (Khoury 
and Azzam 1985; Khoury and Moghadam 1995; Hijab 1988; Doumato and Posusney 2003).
Key issues dominating the literature include education, seclusion, rape and violence, comportment and 
sexuality, family laws regarding marriage, divorce and inheritance, and country-specific struggles for 
greater political participation. Much is written exploring a long history of Islamic feminisms and their 
relation to Islamic theology and Western feminisms (Ahmed 1982; Ghoussoub 1987; Moghadam 1994b, 
1994c, Moghissi 1999; Yamani 1996; Brand 1998a, 1998b; Bardan 1999; Cooke 2001).
There is also comparison to other religiously-defined feminisms and fundamentalisms (Christ and Plaskow 
1979; Hussain 1984, Caplan 1987; Cooey, Eakin and McDaniel 1991; Sagal and Yuval-Davis 1992; Asad 
1993; Marty and Appleby 1993; Hawley 1994; King 1994; Moghamdam 1994a; Brink and Mencher 1997; 
Roald 1998; Keddie 1999; el-Teske and Tetreault 2000; Tohidi and Bayes 2001).
8 Such is the heterogeneity that, to provide two examples, while Western feminists seek to abolish the 
gendered division of labour, Islamists consider this to safeguard women’s interests and prevent them from 
being overly exploited. Whereas feminists advocate state-provided childcare, Islamists fear this will 
contribute to family breakdown and affirm that childcare is women’s primary concern (Haddad 1998, 23).
9 Such as Juliette Minces, Mai Ghoussoub, Haideh Moghissi and Haleh Afshar.
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these prescriptions may offer women some agency, but they impede women’s systemic 
advancement. Secular feminists advance a (heavily scorned) “westocentric” (Yuval- 
Davis 1997, 310), global human rights discourse. Their fundamental premise is that 
secular thought, institutions and civil society best protect women’s rights.
Other feminists11 have rebelled against western feminism. They advocate re-interpreting 
Islamic codes to emphasise the Quran’s egalitarian and emancipatory message. They 
examine how sexual politics shapes religious knowledge and authority in ways that 
enable patriarchal readings of the Quran (Barlas 2002). In addition to advancing women’s 
right to ijtehad (independent reasoning), they reject an orthodox view of gender 
complementarity and asymmetry as based in natural and divine law (Moghadam 2002, 
26). Bluntly put, it is as if women question the authority of tafsir, from which they are 
largely excluded anyway.
Others who closely identify with Islamic law argue that it justly protects and genuinely 
provides for women’s rights. Even when they accept that there are appropriate gender 
differences, they disagree that they limit women and men to only those spheres and roles 
(Roald 1998). In reaction to critiques of the religion, they highlight how religiosity can 
empower women to demand equality, challenge family-level patriarchy, participate in 
new arenas and to interpret the Quran from a less androcentric perspective (Duval 1998, 
64). This group finds a sense of empowerment in Islamist movements whose culturally 
different ideology incorporates religious commitment, moral indignation and political 
participation (Haddad 1998, 19). Part of the resurgence of Islam over the last several 
decades has, therefore, involved challenging western- and secular-defined modernity with 
an Islamic-modemist alternative (Esposito 1998, xxi).
Rather than Islam per se, many of the latter two groups assert that it is patriarchal values, 
within nationalist and religious ideologies, political economy and culture, that oppress 
women. Avoiding the easy dualism of a hegemonic West (‘modernity’) and defensive
10 She uses this term rather than ‘Eurocentric’ “to highlight the fact that ‘the western front’ expands far 
beyond Europe” (1997, 25).
11 Such as Fatima Memissi, Freda Hussain, Azizah al-Hibri, Riffat Hassan and Asma Barlas.
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Islam (‘tradition’), they see continuity of patriarchal ideals in both spheres. Both 
discourses use modem disciplinary and normalizing regimes of power. Nostalgia for 
selective traditions is also considered to be male-centred and modem (Tohidi and Bayes 
2001, 38, Nasr 1995). Essentially, women in this grouping contribute to the feminization 
of political, economic and religious decision-making processes. As Haidah Moghissi 
(1994, 183) has written on Iranian women’s activism, “The Islamic regime has not 
opened the gates. Women are jumping over the fences”. There is, therefore, much 
international precedent for Muslim women’s mobilization for greater rights and 
participation.
While Muslim women’s situations share commonalities, Islamic countries’ internal and 
comparative heterogeneity must be kept in mind12. As El-Solh and Mabro (1993, 5) 
caution, class, kinship, ethnicity and nationalism influence the exercise of patriarchy. 
They affect the practice of Islam and what is considered properly Islamic (Kandiyoti 
1991b, 24). Enfranchisement itself has been and remains a central struggle for Muslim 
feminists from Afganistan to Sudan. With minor exceptions across the Middle East, 
informal political culture and parliamentary democracy (where it exists) are gender 
segregated. Women have struggled to fill political and bureaucratic positions. Among 
other reasons, men may even “feel threatened by the potential of uncontrolled educated or 
economically indpendent women who may compromise their honour and therefore their 
status among other men” (Weiss 1998, 130).
Thus, somewhat ironically, Tohidi and Bayes (2001, 40-41) observe that new Islamist 
opposition movements “cannot gain women’s support without letting women mobilize
12 For example, in the “traditional” constitutions of Kuwait, the Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Northern 
Yemen and Sudan, women are consider bound to the family as wives and mothers. In the “progressive” 
constitutions of Syria, Southern Yemen, Algeria and (pre-US invasion) Iraq, women are also enabled to 
work and engage in the political process. In “accommodationist” constitutions such as those in Morocco 
and Egypt, women have wide ranging rights and opportunities, contingent on not subverting the Islamic 
sharia (Haddad 1998, 6). These differences are linked to larger Arab struggles for political autonomy, 
debates about the role of Islam in the state and differences among fundamentalist, traditional and modernist 
perspectives (El Solh and Mabro 1993, 6). Although I do not explore this literature here, it is worth noting 
that Islam is no more repressive toward women than Judaism and Christianity (Memissi 1991, vi, vii). The 
conservative Muslim-Catholic religious alliance against women’s rights suggests that these issues span a 
wider set of debates between authorities over religious doctrine, women and feminists (Bums, Scholzman 
and Verba 2001).
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and be actively present in the public and political domain”. Yet, “they do not know what 
to do with them after taking power and consolidating an Islamist state”. Nationalist, 
independence and even civil rights movements in the twentieth century have also faced 
the same accusation. However, pressure for reform and equal rights, and female 
constituents’ influence in helping Islamic elites retain state power, can lead to limited 
reforms and concessions regarding women’s civil rights. This highlights how religion 
alone does not explain the continuum of Muslim women’s gender identities and rights in 
different cultural and national settings. Nor, the choices they are empowered to make 
(Memissi 1993). Thus, although the Islamic community perceives itself as unified, Islam 
is fundamentally “plastic” and expressed through diverse practices (Bouhdiba 1985).
Studies of Islamic communities and Muslim women in non-Muslim countries suggest 
varied implications13. Women may use Islam in heterogenous ways as a “stock of 
symbols, signs and signals” to mark a sense of difference and belonging (Jansen 1998, 
75). In fact, whether coming from Islamic theological, Islamic feminist or Western 
feminist perspectives, scholarship appears compelled to engage with very modem 
conceptions of empowerment, choice, individuation, identity and gender asymmetry. 
Such an engagement fits with approaches in Trinidadian literature. Caribbean feminist 
scholars have shifted focus from an earlier dualistic, persistence-change paradigm to one 
that explores Indo-Trinidadian ethnic and religious identities as heterogeneous, multiple 
and gendered. With a clear emphasis on women’s agency and voice, they advocate 
examining women’s contestations as well as their collusions and desires to retain 
community.
13 Situated in ghettoized communities, Muslims’ views and lives may not be significantly affected by the 
wider society. However, where there is greater social interaction, there may be adaptation, awakening and 
renewal of beliefs, and various alterations in the way that community boundaries are defined (Roald 2001). 
Women may continue to have to struggle to participate, this time in secular governance (Keskin-Kozat 
2003). They may have greater room to experiment with multiple sexualities and identities or may long for a 
sense of stability left behind (Khan 2002). Conspicuous consumption may become a way of expressing 
spirituality (D’Alisera 2001). Muslims may treat Islam as a mobile ‘home’ amidst the alienation of their 
new surroundings (McMicheal 2002).
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6.8 Conclusion
While return to spirituality invokes the authority of God, ‘tradition’ and ‘correct’ 
practice, it also raises issues of participation. In this sense, it parallels questions being 
worked out through the habitus of other publics in this study. It also presents an analogy 
to the ways that notions of public and private are negotiated in other contexts. While the 
relationship between informality and formality is overtly gendered, there are many 
similarities to the ways that lore and law are claimed. From a different perspective, the 
San Fernando Jama Masjid comprises an organized association with formal authority and 
bureaucratic hierarchy.
The purpose of leadership, tiers of power and proscribed participation is to collectively 
cherish relationship, reasonableness and reciprocity in specific ways. Though it seems to 
introduce very different themes, these nonetheless lie alongside those appearing'the
A
market, mas camp and mosque as legitimate authority is lived. Amongst masjid members, 
relationship is in fact what is most inalienable, even more than votes or voice. Though 
this emerges in other sites, it is most sacrosanct here #
Return to spirituality, as an expression of normativity and ideals of order, contributes to 
the overall architecture for understanding how governance and participation play out in 
Trinidadian social life. In this instance, it points to the ways that political ideals such as 
enfranchisement, democracy and citizenship are worked through. It confirms that 
gradations of power influence how norms filter through governance practices. It 
emphasizes the significance of both formal restrictions and discursive privatizing. I 
touched on these factors in an earlier discussion of how publics, subpublics and 
constitutive stratification lines kindle plural perspectives.
As with market vendors and police or mas makers and Carnival Committee members, 
there is antagonism and divergence as well as agreement here. These are stimulated by 
relative capacities to construct reality, disagreement over labeling practices ‘private’ or 
‘public’, and alternative ways of accessing public life. Women and men in the ASJA also
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participate in other publics and this shapes their ideals. Even those with formalized 
authority often work out accepted practice informally and tolerantly. For example, while 
the Masjid President, ASJA President-General, the Spiritual Head and the male politician 
clearly held reservations about my participation and possible interpretations, they all 
good-naturedly let me attend meetings, interview them and seek their feedback on this 
chapter.
Niltifer Gole (2002, 174) notes that Muslims’ contemporary use of communication 
networks, participation in public debates, consumption patterns and values of 
individuation have fed Islam’s global penetration into the social fibre and imaginary. 
They have enhanced its ability to raise political questions about the foundational 
principles of collective life, common space, progressive politics and the Western liberal 
self. In this light, “Exploring these Islamic makings of the self and the micro-practices 
associated with it will lead us to understand new social imaginaries and the 
transformations of the public sphere” (ibid, 174). In other words, as I outlined in Chapter 
4, public life is not pre-established, but is continually constituted and negotiated through 
micropractices that perform ways of being public, and through women and men’s 
reflexivity about “the relations, actions, symbols, meanings, and codes, roles, statuses, 
social structures, ethical and legal rules, and other sociocultural components which make 
up their public ‘selves’” (ibid, 83).
The individuals and groups discussed in these pages illuminate the importance of what 
matters to women and men. This determines what they consider worth engaging with, 
how they sort out unexpected outcomes and constraints, and why they align with some 
influences over others. What is considered to matter most is deeply grounded in an 
everyday collective sense of the normative. Ideals of and desires for respectability, 
understood as spiritual obedience, correctness and fulfillment, appear here. Women and 
men’s differential access to and expression of these ideals illuminate how reputation and 
respectability, the kinds of status they afford, and the ways they connect to God, public 
life and democracy are gendered.
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As I discussed in the Introduction, it is ideals and desires for respectability that enable 
each site to appear homologous to the others. Everybody have to eat interprets illegality 
in terms that emphasise honesty, family, hard work and provision of food. Love for mas 
underscores the respect, recognition and reciprocity that bandleader Rosemary Kuru 
Jagessar commands as Queen of the Band. Contacts is precisely about being favourably 
looked upon, trusted, valued and looked after by those who have access to a variety of 
forms of power. It is also about trying to avoid dependence on illegal sources of income 
to provide for one’s family. This is particularly important to vulnerable groups of women 
and to men who shun the immorality associated with drug dealing and criminality. These 
chapters show women and men’s resistances, but also the myriad ways they claim power 
through their alignments with respectability.
Return to spirituality had specific and explicit meanings associated with the election, but 
it also reaffirmed much that is taken for granted. This is why, as an entry to 
understanding ASJA habitus and practice, it was powerfully political. It reproduced and 
regulated a variety of relationships to authority, to the ‘state’, to non-Muslim social 
spheres, to people of different creeds, and to women and men of the ASJA. It also 
provided the aesthetic against which women and men of the San Fernando jamaat could 
evaluate different sources of authority.
ASJA Islamic practice recognizes an autonomous place for women’s organizing and
power while denying women’s authority equality within the umma. While this occurs for
/ \
the reasons discussed above, it would be naive to not acknowledge that women’s greater 
participation in leadership and democracy would also feminize a public sphere overtly 
defined by and for masculinity and masculine domination. This would expand women’s 
options for both respectability and reputation, an experience central to male privilege 
(Sampath 1993, Hosein 2004), and it would make men both more formally and 
informally accountable to women. Putting the register of authority in the ASJA in such 
flux would shake up the forms of power and meaning associated with gender as well as 
those associated with community and religion. Situated in the larger non-Islamic public 
sphere, this could lead to increased feelings of community vulnerability and, for men,
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lesser status in the national (and international) competition among patriarchies 
(Mohammed 1994, 2002). It makes sense, then, that contestations over authority in the 
ASJA seek to maintain gendered notions of purity and authenticity even while insisting 
that authority, and even patriarchal authority, must be legitimate and reasonable rather 
than power by any means.
The four sites in the study work together to show aesthetic authority present in settings, 
practices and relations differently located in terms public and private, formal and 
informal, and official and popular, as well as in terms of ethnicity, religion, age, class and 
gender. The image that remains projects a panoramic view of how law operates through 
domination, taken for granted habitus and self-regulation. Lore darts and disappears 
among these with its own chameleon-like effects.
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Chapter Seven: Governance
Figure 41: Sharing Space
7.1 Introduction
When I first met Sandy, she was living with her common law partner Boscoe. They 
had informally adopted Brendon, their neighbour’s baby. Boscoe often got jobs with 
the URP because his uncle worked with the programme. Sandy was able to access 
relief employment less regularly, but sometimes worked informally with CEPEP 
when her aunt or sister, who were employed with the programme, fell ill. Sandy and 
Boscoe wanted to ‘build up’ their one room house on the Railway Line and get 
regular income because they now had a “son”. They were able to survive before on 
temporary employment and hustling some fish from friends on the Wharf. However, 
CEPEP, URP and the contacts they had with these programmes now became crucial. 
Their relations with neighbours, and Sandy’s sister, mother and aunt on the Railway 
Line, were also important as everyone often helped to feed or look after Brendon.
Brendon didn’t only alter Sandy and Boscoe’s relationship and create a new 
experience of parenting. He also became infused with their connection to extended 
family and neighbours, fishermen on the Wharf, political activists, elections and state 
programmes providing work and welfare. Sociality took on renewed significance in
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this couple’s relation to legality, nationalism, enfranchisement and patronage. It 
shaped Sandy’s desire to create a more permanent home on the Wharf even though its 
illegality would mean that she couldn’t access pipe-bome water or electricity. Her 
desire for a family, a home, wages and adequate food was also part of her larger 
attempt to concretise a feeling of belonging to banal aspects of Trinidadian family 
life. In these ways, sociality connected to CEPEP, URP and her dependence on 
government provision.
When I last visited Sandy, she and Brendon were by her mother who was talking 
about getting him to participate in Kiddie’s Carnival just as her grandchildren did, 
often in costumes paid for with CEPEP and URP wages. Boscoe and Sandy had 
broken up and so their different degrees of engagement with family, neighbours, 
politics and the state had shifted once again. Amidst these new circumstances, Sandy 
was trying to make ends meet and still dreamed of expanding her single room 
overlooking the sea.
7.2 Conceptualising Governance in Trinidad
Reflecting on stories such as Sandy’s, this study was concerned with the relationships, 
values and actions that mattered most to women and men. It then examined how these 1 
informed their participation in public life. I took this approach because for Sandy, like 
so many others, political participation was not necessarily different from the overall 
configuration of values, relationships and w'ays of getting by that women and men 
engage. Often, their degree of engagement came either through fortuitous connections 
or, as with Sandy, was the by-product of their desire for a different kind of 
relationship. In this case, it was Sandy’s willingness to adopt and love Brendon. It 
also seemed consistent with the dominant ethos of ethnographically informed 
anthropology to have the degree to which things mattered to informants as one of the 
criteria by which they were determined to matter to the study.
F;rom such starting points, I looked at the ways women and men managed and 1 
engaged with others, ideas, things, spaces, processes, institutions and habits. Finally, 
as part of exploring the political implications of informality, this study sought to
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understand the different ways that they participated in, experienced and negotiated 
different forms of authority. These themes of participation and authority illuminated 
often-overlooked aspects of public life that characterize politics and governance in 
Trinidad.
I emphasised public life because I was interested in the ways that women and men 
“privatized public space” or tenaciously insinuated their own styles of action on the 
“external order of the city” (de Certeau 1998, 9-13). I also showed how private 
spheres are made more public by state intervention or even gender relations. Through 
their social practices of resistance and appropriation, ordinary women and men gave 
meaning to city streets, sidewalk interactions, local government meetings and places 
where anyone could potentially gather.
The market, mas camp, masjid and squatting community featured in earlier chapters 
were ideal for delving into the intersections of private and public lives and spaces. 
These sites were simultaneously intimate and publicly accessible. Additionally, the | 
Railway Line exposed public programmes that operated through private networks, v
\
The masjid showed how privatized arenas could nonetheless be gendered publics. \ 
Family settings, such as the mas camp, were marked by stranger sociability, and the 
pavement leading to the market revealed public pathways that were ritually privatised. ! 
The spheres and meanings associated with notions of public and private were not 
static. Habits and routines developed by those most familiar with each setting shaped 
the space and the experience of more transient participants. Such ways of doing things 
extended even wider, creating the commonly traversed city space under study.
Each site was a different kind of catchment paralleling and flowing through the larger 
city, like a play within a play. This approach meant that in common with material 
culture studies, the sites themselves, their architectures, spaces and forms were 
included as parts of that authority normally reduced to the differential power and 
agencies of the persons within them. For example, an imam’s authority isn’t 
necessary for people to feel that certain behaviours are inappropriate within the 
masjid, and even the police know that a market works through its generation of a 
atmosphere that thrives on informal negotiation.
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Rather than bounding these settings within “civil society”, I defined them in terms of 
connections that created continuity between social life and the state. In this view, the 
state was only one public among many that often thoroughly intersected each other, 
marking the interactions of an expansive public life (Navaro-Yashin 2002). Questions 
regarding authority flowed from the innumerable meeting points among different 
gradations of power within both social life and the state. To participate in public life 
was to negotiate difference, competition, cooperation, and decision-making in the 
most everyday of instances and even more extraordinary encounters. Knowing when 
to call out to a customer in the Central Market was neither marginal to nor more 
central than knowing how to talk to an MP about securing a community standpipe or 
knowing how to vote in an election.
This focus was the path toward my larger interest in understanding how politics is 
lived. Vendors’, mas makers’, squatters’ and religious leaders’ engagements with 
authority were the basis for the politics I aimed to explore. In this sense, my intention 
was to gain insight about what I have called a politics of authority. Over a year of 
ethnographic fieldwork in San Fernando, Trinidad suggested that notions of sociality 
and legality significantly influenced this kind of politics. Sociality was associated 
with everyday, privatised priorities regarding food, family, friendship and faith. 
Legality was somewhat differently centred in the weight associated with leadership, 
rules and office. In different ways, each emphasised what mattered to ordinary 
women and men trying to earn a living, make art, worship God, lead others or simply 
“live good with people” (Khan 1995).
Notions of sociality and legality influenced how women and men negotiated values 
and decision-making with others, resolved conflict and cooperated. Against many 
assumptions about why people participate in public life, each illustrated that what 
matters to market vendors or state officials or women is a key starting point for 
understanding their own ways of conceiving, creating, regulating and undermining 
normative order. On the one hand, it led to participation that could be voluntaristic, 
emotional or efficacious. On the other, it meant that women and men could 
unwittingly find themselves part of larger institutional forces.
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Social politics and legal politics were each grounded in different spheres of informal 
and formal power, or lore and law. Lore^escribed-the habitual-praetiees, relations and 
values of informal social life. Law signified its alternative. It included structures such 
as hierarchy and office, and conventions such as legislation and ways of doing things 
that keep women and men within specific hierarchies. Yet, as earlier chapters 
highlighted, most interesting were the parallels, overlaps, appropriations, mimicry and 
resistances that interlocked the two. These suggested that the dualistic relationship 
between lore and law was not mainly or only one of opposition and antagonism. 
Rather, like two chameleons, each darted across the other, exchanging hue, blending 
and appearing like one or the other in different places at the same time. Underlying 
this, and critiquing the idea that duality can explain Trinidadian normative life (Miller 
1994), were diffused ideas about reasonableness and advantage.
These signalled the significance of contingency and context to any understanding of 
Trinidadian values and practices. Reasonableness was an unstable notion comprising 
shifting degrees of empathy, self-interest, fairness, autonomy and commonsense. 
Advantage described the potential for and negative connotations of excess. It 
encircled, blurred and stretched the edges of what was habitually accepted, but also 
clearly defined its outer limits. The authority of conceptions of reasonableness and 
excess emerged most palpably from informal social life or lore. In contrast, law 
seemed to stand for the entrenchment of standardized rules about what was 
acceptable. Despite this appearance, practices that reflected norms of reasonableness 
and advantage mingled in both spheres with a variety of other ways of doing things. 
This further underscored the continuum, complementarity and even similarities 
between two just as it confirmed much writing about a similar relationship between 
social life and the state.
Negotiation of sociality, legality and authority, notions of lore and law, and 
conceptions of reasonableness and advantage therefore formed the conceptual 
framework for this ethnography of politics. It outlined a way of thinking about how 
women and men participate in spaces saturated with different kinds of authority, and 
how they legitimized their practices. This included looking at how vendors and police 
enforce legislation, how party activists and squatters depend on patronage, how 
women and men participate in associational life, and how both mas makers and local
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governmental officials compete to lead a national event. In each instance, and 
comparing them, I delved into what individuals or groups thought made sense or 
mattered and what kinds of authority weighed in on the moment. The overall effect 
illuminated the continuities between what is often cast as ‘political’ or ‘non-political’.
As earlier chapters illustrated, only an ethnographic approach could have netted the 
nuances and navigations of everyday life in the market, mas camp or other settings. 
The ‘everyday’ includes both informal and formal ways of doing things. Ethnography 
best captures how interstices between the two are lived because it is a mode of 
knowing that"priviTege^experience. Attention to mainly documents and interviews 
would not have encountered lore in the spaces of popular morality where it is lived. 
The study’s research themes emphasised participation, experience, relationship and 
negotiation. These required a methodology that could capture the spontaneous, 
imaginative and habitual, and privilege taken-for-granted practices, rather than well- 
considered justifications. Ethnography, therefore, best suited situated and thick 
description of political ideals as they are conceptualised through practice.
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus” provided scaffolding that could support 
ethnography of the everyday, as well as the connections among different sites. It 
refers to the implicit value system that informs women and men’s decisions. 
“Dispositions” or the dominant and enduring beliefs and practices of a group are at its 
heart. People internalize these beliefs and then externalise them in their practices and 
choices. Social conditions may limit women and men’s choices and agency or they 
may make decisions that reflect divergent norms. Here, habitus therefore comprises 
layers of coherent and contradictory norms, and is dynamically engaged by the 
choices women and men make in their lived practice. Examining these practices 
means taking dispositions, social relations and the distinctive powers they create into 
account. I used this notion of habitually practiced knowledge to understand women 
and men’s “art of coexisting” (de Certeau 1984) in public life. It acknowledged the 
correspondences or homologies that exist across practices within individuals’ lives, 
informal and formal spheres, and the groups in the study.
The dispositions of imams, vendors, mas makers and squatters created an “aesthetic” 
(Miller 2006) of governance in Trinidad. This provides a complement to Bourdieu in
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as much as ethnographic attention to particular and individual lives alerts one to the 
degree that a habitus coalesces around an individual’s socialisation and disposition, 
which is not quite the same as the larger social dispositions. This is why the preceding 
chapters showed logic among diverse areas of public life and gradations of social 
engagement. Across groups and spheres, individuals used this “cosmological 
architecture” (ibid, 23) to legitimize their practices and the ways they made sense of 
rules, needs, emotions and relationships. An aesthetic authority, based on the 
importance of forging, maintaining and conducting relationships, therefore defined 
the governance practices illustrated in this study. It was mobilised by women and men 
negotiating efficacy, leadership, legitimacy, reciprocity, belonging, commonsense, 
reasonableness, personal style and ‘correct’ practice. It highlighted how authority 
springs from sources as diverse as emotions, personal style or charisma, bureaucracy, 
artistry and gender.
Traced back, this study examined the relationship between lore and law and, at 
another tier, a social and legal politics. I explored the values, practices and 
negotiations associated with sociality, and the dispositions that articulated them. 
These dispositions reached across and engaged ideas connected to legality as well. 
Then, I looked at the interaction between these two kinds of politics. They created 
habitual and homologous ways of expressing, participating in and negotiating 
authority. This politics of authority was defined by values of reasonableness and 
advantage that women and men referred to when legitimizing their practices, 
relationships, ideals and ways of making sense of the world. Overall, such styles of 
legitimization pointed to an aesthetic that normatively ordered overlapping individual, 
social and state-centred ways of doing things. Aesthetic authority was, therefore, the 
basis for my approach to everyday, lived aspects of governance in Trinidad.
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7.3 Traversing Informality
Figure 42: Governing Participation
Correspondingly, the key sites of the study allowed a pedestrian and participant’s 
view of lived politics. San Fernando Central Market vendors selling just in front and 
along Mucurapo Street actively renegotiated legality and illegality every “market 
day”. Over eight months, I stood with them as they illegally displayed the last of their 
perishable goods on the side of the road, and ran a brisk after-market trade selling 
cheaply to passers-by. Almost inevitably, City Police would arrive to clear them off 
the road. A range of negotiations would then ensue as vendors tried to justify 
themselves, continue selling or explain what they considered a fair compromise while 
packing up their vegetables and ground provisions.
After the police left, many would unpack and quicken their ‘hustle’ of goods in case 
police returned. While I attended to these interactions, I first delved into the market 
itself to understand how vendors related to each other and to market vending. I found 
that market life idealised the idea that everybody have to eat. This meant that 
everyone had a right to a livelihood that would enable them to meet their own and 
family needs. Further, everyone had a responsibility to share potential profits or to not 
take away anyone else’s “dollar” leaving them with nothing to take home. This value 
was then packed and unpacked, along with peppers, lettuce and pumpkin, on the road.
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Moving a few hundred feet further, community leaders in the San Fernando Jama 
Masjid constantly discussed and organised around questions of spirituality, gender 
and democracy. This particularly happens at extraordinary moments such as a 
national-level associational election. Over eight weeks of observing a masjid-led 
campaign and in the months of contact I had with masjid members, men and women 
debated and strategised about issues of enfranchisement and leadership. At times, men 
from the jamaat feared the association’s national leadership would disenfranchise 
them. At other times, the issue was one of fairly conducted elections. One woman 
circulated a petition for women’s right to attend and vote in the election. Other 
women feared they would be shamed for trying to attend or thought that voting should 
be left to men.
Everyone talked about what they considered to be Islamic leadership qualities, and the 
relationship between authority vested in the association’s constitutional head versus 
its spiritual head. Additionally, there was no clear consensus about women’s ‘correct’ 
participation in a variety of executive roles. Opinions differed by gender and 
generation as well as within gender and generational groups, and among members of 
different jamaats and Islamic associations. The election catalysed many different 
views about the connection between spirituality and enfranchisement. Return to 
spirituality emerged as key ideal, but with unexpectedly heterogeneous meanings. 
Although it sent a clear message affirming the association’s highest values, what it 
meant in practice and in electoral politics surprised and confused the masjid’s 
campaigners.
Just around the comer, on Sutton Street, Carnival costumes were being made almost 
year round by friends and family in the Lionel Jagessar and Associates mas camp. For 
close to thirty years, bandleaders Lionel and Rose produced ‘authentic’ and ‘fancy’ 
Indian mas costumes that stylize North American Native “Indian” nations’ dress, 
leadership, ancestry and cosmology. Their artistry continually reimagined and 
revitalised a connection to a Native American identity and spirituality within 
Trinidad’s Carnival. The camp relied on friends’ and family members’ freely-given 
time and skill to make costumes for the band. In exchange, they got food, and free or 
cheaper costumes. While the most skilled might be waged, the majority supported the
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band through late nights and long days of work because of a loyalty to Rose and 
Lionel, Carnival and mas, Indian mas, San Fernando and Trinidad. For the Jagessars, 
the band was a labour of love that affirmed their cultural leadership, authority and 
autonomy while providing an income.
Working at the camp for the five weeks preceding Carnival and in conversations with 
the Jagessar family over the next months, I saw how the ideal love for mas explained 
this medley of emotions and practice. Like bandleaders, the San Fernando Carnival 
Committee makes yearly attempts to harness, define and direct this love. Aiming to 
appropriate ultimate leadership of the event, this local government branch flexed is 
own legislated power in contested meetings about the management, development and 
purpose of Carnival. While debate and disagreement pivoted on routes, prizes and 
mles, it was really about the relationship between ideas of state and nation. On the 
one hand, love for mas nationalistically brought the two together. On the other, it 
provided the very reason mas makers could resist state domination, and separate state 
from nation.
Going further south, squatters living near the edge of the sea helped their extended 
family and neighbours survive by sharing the fish, groceries and networks they may 
have. Each week the majority joined their CEPEP or URP team clearing roadsides 
and drains. Although only the first is permanent employment, women and men living 
along the King’s Wharf Railway Line relied on these relief programmes. Securing a 
place in one often meant knowing influential members of the party in power and 
proving loyalty to the party. This was the value of having contacts.
Daily life involved continuously and strategically cultivating good relationships or 
connections with well-placed women and men who could help. The cleaner and 
secretary in the party’s constituency office, middle-ranking party activists, local 
government Councillors, the MP, URP foremen or CEPEP bosses were all ideal. If 
necessary, maintaining these useful contacts meant going to political rallies, joining a 
party group, participating in campaigning, voting, wearing the party’s T-shirt or 
volunteering for any kind of activity, including a lime with other workers. It even 
involved such public support for one party while voting for another. Alternately, 
squatters became workers who became party activists or became party activists who
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became workers. This was a ‘hustle’ to play belonging publicly and strategically. 
During the year I spent with CEPEP and URP workers living on the Railway Line, 
they highlighted just how much patronage determines women and men’s participation 
in party politics, even when this is denied. Having contacts was at the heart of how 
these workers made their vote work for them as it did for those winning power.
These economic, cultural, religious and residential catchments did not only confirm 
that the concepts everybody have to eat, love for mas, return to spirituality and 
contacts were bases for authority. They also illuminated how ideals regarding legality, 
enfranchisement, leadership, patronage and nationalism were lived and legitimized. I 
brought these perspectives to my reading of the wider literature on these themes. 
Pointing to the importance of engaging livelihood, emotion, spirituality, artistry, 
family and gender in a study of politics, these San Femandians’ practices also 
suggested possible conclusions about citizenship and governance. These dispositions 
typified how mundane practices blur formal and informal authority. They highlighted 
constant assertions of formal authority, continuously created and refined expressions 
of informal authority, and negotiation over legitimate practice. In these ways, they 
exemplified the study’s central themes.
Across sites, everybody have to eat epitomised social politics. It signified its highest 
form. To some extent, everybody have to eat was relevant in all the study’s sites. In 
the market, mas camp and Railway Line, informal practices defined by a concern with 
livelihood and survival, family well-being, tolerance, sharing with others and “living 
good with people” gave life to this ideal. Amongst market vendors, money had its 
own value because it enabled them to run a business, buy a car or just have money for 
beer, but it was really family and even being Tike family’ that presented a higher 
authority than law.
Social politics was also expressed in CEPEP workers buying discounted vegetables 
on their way home, imams seeking higher stipends, vendors’ appeals for easier 
treatment from police and mas makers’ demands for higher prizes. Everybody have to 
eat was an underlying value connecting vendors, bandleaders, masjid leaders and 
government workers despite their different livelihoods, relations amongst themselves 
and relations with the state. However, what stood out most was the ways this ideal
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morphed and moved through different sites and concerns, playing different functions 
and taking on new meanings.
The ideals return to spirituality, love for mas and contacts emerged as homologies 
that encompassed and extended everybody have to eat. They further intertwined it 
with leadership, legality, elections, government and nationalism. Return to spirituality 
took on vastly different, transnational meanings in the masjid and mas camp. 
However, in both instances, concerns with identity, survival, family and friendship 
were not far away. Love for mas similarly placed business and leadership in the 
context of cooperation and emotional connection to family, friends, art, culture and 
nation. Contacts most forcefully interjected these concerns into government practice, 
showing the opaque zone where what seems reasonable for some may expand into 
advantage of others.
The homologies extended to consumption and production as well as sacred and 
democratic practices. In the market, economic relations were indistinguishable from 
social relations. Those on the wharf strategically turned social relations into political 
ones. In the mas camp, notions of spirituality informed economic relations. Mosque 
leadership involved turning political relations into spiritual ones. These sites showed 
the sociality of consumption and production as well as the ways that sociality is 
consumed by and made sacred through political relations. This was how habitus was 
lived as a dynamic “extemalisation of intemalities” (Bourdieu 1990).
All these dispositions engaged social politics with legal politics, and affected how 
rules, leadership and office were lived. Roadside negotiations showed how 
informality, and even illegality, shaped City Police’s role in governance. 
Reciprocally, respect for the police and law, and self-regulation were part of vendors’ 
own practices. Although ASJA members negatively associated participation in public 
space with corruption and bacchanal, San Fernando Central Market vendors 
connected it to opportunities for family, livelihood and sociality, and the potential for 
greater morality. They crowded roadsides in order to govern them, along with police, 
by values they consider more transcendent than law.
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While everybody have to eat almost wholly expressed social politics, return to 
spirituality was also grounded in legal politics. Partly, authority came from religious 
codes and bureaucratic rules. Contestation therefore centred around the power of male 
ASJA leadership to interpret, define and decide. In both instances, these bases for 
order were more directly meaningful than the abstract virtues associated with 
taxpayers, citizens and business people.
Although mas camp life was similarly grounded in social politics, contestations over 
legitimate leadership challenged the jurisdiction of the Carnival Committee, its 
legislated authority, executive, and governing functions. Yet, like market vendors 
who reproduced formal authority, bandleaders continued to compete for prizes in state 
competitions. Railway Line residents especially sought to integrate sociality into the 
practices of political activists and elected politicians throughout the hierarchy of state 
bureaucracy. Contacts, therefore, also highlighted the importance of office. These 
homologous values were all concerned with leadership and therefore also engaged 
ideals grounded in legal politics.
These values underscored the “privatisation” of public roadsides, meetings, elections 
and bureaucracies. They identified ways ordinary women and men sought to make 
what most mattered to them shape their experience of governance. Each disposition 
showed different ways that sociality and legality infuse each other. Roadside vending 
actually marked a shoreline where the outer edges of the two overlapped and blurred, 
although they remained distinct.
While vendors and bandleaders sought to establish a space of informal authority, 
masjid leaders battled over the ‘correct’ interlock between formal leadership and 
informality. Campaigners aimed to sync AJSA governance to legal politics. 
Conversely, Railway Line residents instead hoped social politics would determine the 
practice of formal power. Such politics of authority created a continuum among state, 
associational, informally organised and spontaneous negotiations over authority.
Love for mas grounded leadership entirely in informal practice and meanings. 
Bandleaders’ negotiations with the San Fernando Carnival Committee, therefore, 
stretched legality to take on more everyday meanings. This is why the committee kept
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trying unsuccessfully to claim authority over love for mas, how it should be practiced 
and what it meant. It needed to command both formal and informal politics. The 
committee participated in and invoked informality very differently from police, who 
had more empathetic reasons. In the end, it often resorted to relying on legal 
domination and the force it afforded. In this way, the committee also set its own 
boundaries on bandleaders.
Contacts had the opposite effect. Mas makers set boundaries on legality even while 
accepting patronage. CEPEP and URP workers highlighted the extent to which 
contacts infiltrated political leadership and office. Along the Railway Line, residents 
clearly needed to interlock social and legal politics of for basic things like a job, 
amenities and groceries. Political leaders also appropriated it to claim and mobilise a 
politics of legality. They needed women and men’s votes to win the election. This is 
why contacts worked, both on the Railway Line and in the ASJA election.
In that election, return to spirituality expressed aspects of sociality, but was 
specifically used to claim and mobilise legal politics. This is why negotiations 
focused on questions of ‘correct’ Islamic business, leadership, electoral and gender 
practice, and referred to the ASJA Constitution, the Qur’an, Sunnah and Surahs. Even 
concerns about male and female honour played out in terms of these legalities. Yet, 
ironically, the ASJA election was won on the basis of friendship, family ties, concerns 
about (imams’) livelihood, and the idea that all jamaats would benefit. Hopes for a 
new PA system for a masjid or larger stipends to imams invested sociality with 
spiritual relevance. A successful leader ultimately needed to combine formal and 
informal bases for leadership. Islamic codes continued to affirm sociality’s spiritual 
significance, and to control women and men’s organisational roles. The ASJA 
executive skilfully combined constitutional and Islamic authority with social politics, 
and won.
As these examples showed, politics involved establishing, patrolling, blurring and 
dissolving the boundaries among different kinds of authority. If state actors’, 
associational heads’ and informal leaders’ participation in sociality was considered 
reasonable, it had great legitimacy. This explains the connections among ordinary 
people such as market vendors and others such as police, mas camp leaders,
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politicians and the incumbent ASJA executive. If their participation was not 
considered reasonable, sociality was used to highlight the limited legitimacy of legal 
politics. This was why neither the San Fernando Carnival Committee nor the masjid­
led campaign team successfully and legitimately dominated.
Notions of reasonableness were constitutive of these chameleon-like effects. 
Relatedly, advantage marked the borders of legitimate practice. Ideas about hustling, 
“how you talk to people”, pollution (haram) and corruption continued to connect a 
politics of authority to normative order. Yet, depending on the time of day, degree of 
need or competition involved, there were moments in each site when advantage might 
be widely and legitimately practiced. These were contexts when some sort of accepted 
hustle meant that some got while some did not get at all. Contacts especially enabled 
this. While encompassing everybody have to eat, this disposition most opposed it at 
the same time.
Across chapters, informal social life underscored the kinds of politics that expressed 
what mattered most. Social politics emerged from this sphere of lore. Four 
dispositions articulated its central concerns. In the context of everyday life, they 
comprised a habitus. The enduring values of this habitus included self-interest and 
survival, empathy, reciprocity, relationship and cooperation, reasonableness and 
common sense. Legal politics articulated those priorities embedded in more 
formalised spheres and practices.
Together, these shaped the spectrum of ways that informal and institutionalised norms 
were combined. Law was represented by low-level police officers, political party 
activists at all levels, high ranking associational leaders and elected politicians. 
However, everyone from squatters to imams to the Member of Parliament for San 
Fernando West were involved in interpreting and negotiating the meanings and 
practice of legality. Such actions suggest that the ‘otherness’ of official ideologies, 
associated with law, often fire up public deliberation and become kneaded into the 
formation of more consensual lore. Yet, structures and conventions also continued to 
limit women and men within specific goals, places and constraints.
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Rather than ethnic groups or the state or elites, it is dispositions that were most 
constitutive of these negotiations. This is why they could illuminate the 
correspondences and continuum that comprise governance of public life. In fact, a 
mas camp is much more like a market vending than expected and participating in 
masjid life seems not so removed from experiences living on the Railway Line. This 
angles a different lens to politics in Trinidad. It illustrates the power of an aesthetic 
order encompassing both social life and the state.
7.4 Asserting Authority
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Figure 43: Participating in Governance
A politics o f authority that stretches from close-knit to associational and community 
spaces and into the state clearly invites rethinking of the “boundaries between centre 
and periphery, public and private, legal and illegal” (Das and Poole 2004, 4). Women 
and men in this study mobilised concepts embedded in lore to work out their needs, 
values and relationships. They also appropriated concepts underlying law in ways that 
made sense to them. They creatively chose ideas from lore or law and gave them a
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variety of meanings. For example, market vendors interpreted legislation governing 
public space in ways that legitimized their obviously illegal practices.
Analogously, masjid-based campaigners marshalled ideas about enfranchisement and 
democracy, and gave it their own gendered twist. Ultimately, this enabled them 
maintain a transcendent (Miller 1994) sphere, unsullied by politics or competing 
patriarchies (Mohammed 1994). It also enabled them to reinterpret citizenship in 
transnational terms. Rather than being valued or practiced for its own sake, 
democracy provided a basis for patronage, leadership and gender, and, therefore, for 
spirituality. This is why the election pivoted on a battle over the meanings of return to 
spirituality, and raised contentions about corruption, headmanship, and male 
protection of Islamic, women’s and the community’s honour from non-Islamic 
spheres of civil and social life. It contained the potential beauty of uncorrupted 
relations with money, God and people.
Enfranchisement is therefore valued for its ability to mark configurations of public 
and private. In the masjid, family marks a sphere that should remain detached from 
election practices. Democracy is idealised, but only when it furthers goodness, justice, 
fairness, God and ‘tradition’. Its dangers are impurity, fear and confusion. This 
explains why non-participation is also an ideal. Both ideals of participation and non­
participation create publics and continuums of authority. Together, these create and 
revitalize ethnicity, gender and other bases for order within the ASJA’s Islamic 
cosmology. While on the one hand there are attempts to limit the sphere of politics, 
negotiations over enfranchisement also attempt to create an Islamic basis for politics. 
This is why return to spirituality intertwines Islam and democracy while entrenching 
the gendered relations that enable one to remain uncorrupted by the other.
Women’s non-participation in general ASJA elections is not the only instance of non­
participation. In San Fernando Carnival Committee meetings, discontent could be 
resolved by enabling mas makers to vote on decisions. However, key to that 
“consultative” (rather than democratic) process is that mas makers don’t have 
unlimited or formalized say. As Valverde (2003, 216) observes in Chile, participatory 
goverance “can become an application of the techniques of discipline...where an 
attempt is made to mould and shape a habitus of citizenship” that does not overwhelm
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the system or challenge the status quo. Winning general elections is also about 
especially encouraging some voters rather than others to turn up at the polls. Yet, on 
the Railway Line, non-participation can never be an ideal even if frustration with 
unfulfilled promises stops people from voting.
For Railway Line residents, it is precisely concerns grounded in family life that are 
the basis for the exchange of votes and jobs so central to patronage. Enfranchisement, 
coupled with patronage, secures the chance of feeling Trinidadian. Participation on 
the basis of love for mas aims for similar feeling. On the Line, it means being able to 
have money to contribute to “a cook” among workers or for food for an elderly 
neighbour’s welfare or for a lime at the end of a fortnight’s work. CEPEP and URP 
workers valued their participation in national elections because it helped them access 
those aspects of saving, consumption and helping others that many take for granted.
This community interpreted citizenship in banal terms (Billig 1995). They defined it 
as being able to pay a taxi to take their children to school, pay for a Kiddie’s Carnival 
costume, have a bankcard or buy a new pair of jeans. They could be part of everyday 
normative life including the exemplary red beans, macaroni pie, chicken, iced drinks 
and radio music (here playing from a recharged car battery) typical of Trinidadian 
‘Sunday lunch’. These markers of belonging rely on patronage, and party leaders’ 
ability to deliver welfare benefits, and improve the quality of life for those most in 
need and least represented. Participating in elections is about being able to be one of 
those able to ‘eat’ in its widest sense. As Carlene Edie (1989, 10) observed for 
Jamaica, “politics revolves around the job”.
Patronage occurs across sites in a variety of forms. It is affiliated with paternalism, 
election canvassing, food, jerseys, travel, getting your child a place in a school, 
helping mosques and communities, getting people to support who you support, 
looking good, giving prizes and rewards, subduing protest and crime, and fears of 
losing power. It is symbolized by money and its authority. It may, therefore, 
legitimize leadership, and compete with ‘tradition’, bureaucracy, spirituality and 
constitutional power, because it creates and feeds relationships. When bureaucracy 
becomes so personalized, it is may be good for Railway Line residents, but not mas
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leaders. The power of money may enable bureaucracies to compete with those whose 
authority is based on artistry and culture.
In the ASJA, patronage expanded the range of possible paths to spirituality. This was 
its importance in the election. It highlighted that material needs are still a part of a 
spiritual or cultural orientation. Sometimes, even transcendent appeals cannot secure 
cooperation like money can, and the two must combine. This may involve making 
political parties respond to Railway Line residents’ needs, making ASJA leadership 
promise to raise the stipend for imams or letting the Carnival Committee know that 
their decisions have to make sense to bandleaders if they want their cooperation. 
Patronage may help those participating to gain status, meet their needs and tighten 
complementary obligations, but it doesn’t necessarily build trust. This is why those in 
the masjid and in on the Line associate it with hustling. To benefit, one must 
strategically maneuver hopes, choices and loyalties through both formal and informal 
relations.
Voting and canvassing becomes another expression of a wider, everyday hustle to 
survive, share and feel, as Railway Line residents told me, “like here is a part of the 
world”. Such means of participating are valued because they build relationships of all 
kinds and assert the rights that should accompany them. Nonetheless, the ideas about 
democracy they mobilised reinforced gendered notions of the state as a paternalist 
provider and patron. On this point, Edie (1989) has also noted how patronage 
programmes “restore manhood” to less influential Members of Parliament. As on the 
Railway Line, enfranchisement enabled some Muslim women and men to challenge 
top-down leadership, just as it enabled top-down leadership to occur. These examples 
suggest how Trinidadian practices may appropriate the forms and meanings of 
democracy when asserting and defining belonging, rights, responsibilities and status 
on other terms.
For mas makers, Carnival is, like Sunday lunch, something that connects you to 
everybody. The Jagessars and other bandleaders interpreted citizenship in terms of 
informal nationalism (Eriksen 1992). For them, it was connected to getting help from 
friends and neighbhours, coming together to look good and have fun, making art and 
representing Trinidadian culture. Participation enabled them to produce, enjoy, save
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and share. Like masjid leaders, it also encouraged them to invest citizenship with 
ideas about leadership and, particularly, headmanship.
Like participating in an associational election, making an Indian mas band created 
feelings of belonging to transnational, informal and gendered discourses. All three 
buttressed mas makers’ attempts to present competing patriarchal leadership. Mas 
makers took notions of nationalism and gave them new meanings that were highly 
critical of bureaucracy and law. Even here, patronage played a powerful role in 
ordering relations among people and leaders, and along hierarchies of power. It 
provided a route to spirituality, family and art. Yet, mas makers played it veiy 
differently from masjid leaders and squatters, emphasising the connection between 
what most matters to people and political action.
Both mas makers and masjid members identify with the ‘past’, leadership, 
cooperation, autonomy, culture and community, family, friendship, connection with 
others and deep emotional commitment to practice. They each mobilize discourses of 
equality, but in different ways. Both are involved with questions of who leads and 
who defines legitimacy. Attempts to limit political control of mas makers’ livelihood 
therefore don’t seem so different from ones to separate politics from God. Whereas 
ASJA members may denote specific meanings of public space in order to protect God 
from politics, mas makers create other meanings to lift culture higher than politics and 
enable it to transcend state domination.
Both groups repudiate obligations based on patronage and state funding, and manage 
reciprocity on the basis of the separation of state and nation. In fact, while state 
officials may attempt to appropriate love for mas to bolster state legitimacy, the state 
gets more legitimacy from not attempting to appropriate authority within Islamic 
spheres. What is fascinating is that way that discourses about multiracial harmony, so 
intrinsic to the mas camp, also explain the autonomy of the masjid. Each legitimately 
brings ‘difference’ to the nation, tempered with ideals of “living good with people” 
(Khan 1995). For mas makers, Carnival has about as much to do with ‘correct’ 
practice as elections do for those in the masjid.
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Yuval-Davis (1997, 4) suggests understanding the notion of ‘the nation’ in terms of 
“nationalist ideologies and movements on the one hand and the institutions of the 
state on the other”. To understand transnational, banal, informal and gendered aspects 
of nationalism in Trinidad, one would have to look at the struggles between different 
kinds of formal and informal authority to define the informal sphere. Eriksen’s (1992) 
conceptualization of “dual nationalisms” provides a useful framework for 
understanding these takes on citizenship or belonging. Formal nationalism emerges 
from the demands of the modem nation-state. Informal nationalism, which is based in 
civil society, is identified in collective events that evoke shared emotions and bodily 
experiences among otherwise disparate groups (ibid, 141).
Writing of Trinidad and Mauritius, Erikson argues that state nationalisms are poorly 
institutionalized in these countries’ civil societies. Nationhood and nationality belong, 
in domestic discourses, to the sphere for ideology, not doxa. There is fierce 
contestation over their meanings (ibid, 143). There is, in fact, “tension” between state- 
centred formal nationalism and the informal nationalism of civil society (ibid, 147). 
Erikson compares festivals such as Divali and Carnival to Independence Day in 
Trinidad. These informal festivals have “firm roots in the immediate experiences of 
people” (ibid. 151). They, therefore, more easily produce shared meanings.
Whereas these festivals create affinities, and shared practices and spaces among 
diverse groups, the identity presented by the formal institutions of the state does not. 
Rather, its ideology “is not credible and therefore impotent” (ibid, 147). While “the 
normative pressure between the moral systems is mutual”, Eriksen writes, 
“proletarian (informal) values remain remarkably strong in daily practices and 
discourse in the contemporary Trinidadian class society” (ibid, 147).
Yet, informal nationalism may not necessarily contradict its state-centred counterpart. 
Erikson also points out that neither form of nationalism is less authentic than the 
other, nor less efficient at integrating individuals ideologically. However, formal 
nationalism must make appeals that aim larger than the state and its symbols. It must 
appeal also to livelihood, safety, neighbourhood/basic concerns and ambiguous or 
“multi-vocal” meanings (ibid, 159). Even in these instances, “the nationalist ethos of
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civil society is by no means a hostage of state ideology or values relating to 
capitalism” (ibid, 156).
As I show, neither is it overdetermined by ethnic, class or gender differences. 
Occupation, income and the status they afford as well as ethnic identities based on 
notions of ‘race’ and religion clearly nuance how women and men experience, claim, 
resist and twist aesthetic authority. As Rhoda Reddock (1995, 21) has written, “...in 
creole Trinidad and Tobago, the symbols of national culture and national identity 
emerged from a struggle over representation and citizenship of specific classes, 
genders and ethnic groups”. This is part of the “continuous “play” of history, culture 
and power” (Hall 1990, 225).
For example, some groups contest Carnival’s status as “national” culture. Indo- 
Trinidadians, and particularly Hindus, have led this assertion. Afrocentrists have also 
argued that Carnival is an African, not Trinidadian, festival. Much scholarship has 
critiqued these essentialist perspectives (Traube 1996, Allahar 1998, Ho 2000). 
Instead, Carnival has been theorized as historically symbolizing “the constructs and 
confines of division and nationalism inherent in Trinidad as a nation” (Allahar and 
Zavitz 2002, 136). Rather than simply mirroring Africans’ experience, it has reflected 
the changing structures, multi-ethnic social relations, and political and economic 
conditions of colonial history. As Reddock (1995, 21) puts it, “Through a continuous 
struggle and contestation, the authenticity of these symbols is being challenged by 
other groups and in the process are being transformed”.
The Jagessars’ clearly cherish and reproduce a religious and ethnic identity. Wendy 
Kalicharan, of the Kalicharans’ mas camp, also proudly claims to be the only Indo- 
Trinidadian woman to win the national Carnival Queen title and her son to be the only 
Indo-Trinidadian to win the national King title. As Burton Sankeralli (1998, 207) has 
commented, “Previously, Indian participation in Carnival took place within the Creole 
framework. Indians participated but were alienated from the Carnival mainstream 
itself. Presently...Indians are claiming Carnival space as Indians”. Yet, identities are 
not the only basis for their participation and feelings of belonging.
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Previous discussions of love for mas show how the Jagessars also claim citizenship to 
the nation on the basis of their expert artistry, popular leadership, identification with 
Native American cosmology, neighbourly relations, respect among peers, and desires 
for both pleasure and business. Similarly, the meanings and practices associated with 
Islamic identity are not static and, certainly, not always obvious as the limited success 
of the campaign slogan, return to spirituality, indicated to masjid campaign leaders.
The contents of different ethnic groups, such as shared ‘race’, history, culture, 
language, religion and place of birth, may be important. However, as Fredrick Barth 
observed in the 1960s, it is the activity of boundary making and the markers of 
boundaries that are significant (1969, 15).While ‘racial’ and religious discourses 
shape the context for explorations of differential citizenship, the dispositions in this 
study highlight other bases for belonging, identities, sources of power, and claims on 
nation and state.
To understand these popular ideals and forms of participation, one would also have to 
consider the significance of gender to struggles over belonging. After all, ethnically 
defined struggles are also patriarchal ones. This is not only because they are struggles 
among men. Also, power, authority and the state are understood in masculine terms. 
Gendering nationhood and citizenship means examining how specific ideals regarding 
womanhood and manhood are woven with these concepts (Jayawardena 1986, 
Pateman 1988, Spivak and Guha 1988, Enloe 1989, Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989, 
Chatteijee 1990, Kandiyoti 1991, Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992, Parker et al. 1992, 
Brah 1993, Chatteijee 1993,). Though they are imagined (Anderson 1983), they are 
experienced, organised and represented in ways that are marked by historically 
specific social and economic power relations (Yuval-Davis 1997, 3).
Thus, focus is also on how the women and men who are part of diverse groups have 
differential access to the state. As Yuval-Davis (1997, 24) describes, women’s “dual” 
citizenship has included them among general citizens and among those whose lives 
were specifically regulated. Despite claims to primordialism, discourses about 
citizenship are modem responses to contemporary situations. Similarly, national 
identities are not simply ahistorical truths, but “constituted in particular times and 
places through relations of power already existent in the society” (Sharp 1996, 103).
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On the one hand, there are credos of democratic citizenship such as freedom and 
individual autonomy. On the other, there are discourses of culture and tradition, which 
emphasise nationalism, religiosity and family (Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999, 1). 
This framing was powerfully significant. For example, although many women were 
involved in anti-colonial nationalist struggles, they were often excluded from public 
office and power after independence. Some nationalist movements also constructed 
‘traditions’ and collective identities that were disempowering for women. Often, the 
‘woman question’ was included in the public sphere of political contest between 
colonial powers and nationalist movements, but de-legitimised as a challenge to inner 
domains of sovereignty (Sharp 1996,103).
Whether at a national or sub-cultural level, institutionalised patriarchies like the 
family, religious organisations and cultural groups consider themselves to have 
rightful oversight over women’s lives to ensure particular values are reproduced. 
Women are “confined to the world of metaphor” and to hierarchical tropes of the 
family in national narratives (Walter 1995, 37). They are seen as protected by 
“masculine agency” (Sharp 1996, 100) in the “longed-for and struggled-over sense of 
national identity (McDowall 1999, 200). Ethnically-defined female gender identities 
therefore mark specific women’s bodies as the sovereign territory of males of that 
group and provide some basis for the definition of masculine ethnic identity.
Reflecting on gender and democracy in the Anglophone Caribbean, Reddock (2004, 
5) begins with recognition that issues of authoritarianism and patriarchal control have 
been intrinsic to the region’s history of political, quasi-political and inter-personal 
relations. Questions of nation and citizenship have been central to Caribbean social 
organization and social movements because of differences in power, autonomy and 
rights among waves of colonized and colonizing groups. Thus, her analysis examines 
spheres such as the workplace, the family and community spaces in addition to local 
and state level political systems. She concludes that gender ideologies influenced the 
range of ways women participated in union, welfare, nationalist, ‘racial’, religious and 
other movements. Women provided “a solid block of loyal support which however, 
was seldom translated into political office or power” (2004, 23).
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Decades of women’s activism has expanded women’s inclusion as citizens and 
gendered citizenship (ibid, 26-7). However, reviews over this period suggest that 
mainstream (‘male-stream’) approaches to state authority, citizen rights and 
Caribbean identities continue to implicitly assume the neutrality of patriarchal 
masculinities (ibid, 28). As Reddock points out, while having access to political office 
is a basic human right, enabling women (and men) to experience citizenship as 
enabling and empowering means mobilizing beyond the formalized spheres of 
parliament and local government.
In many ways, women mobilized forms of authority present in lore and law to claim 
power and challenge advantage. This is particularly why social politics was so 
significant. Women’s greater responsibility for food provision, family care and 
markers of morality were all sources of stratification as well as registers of power in 
their engagements with police, political activists and male masjid leaders.
Despite the inequities and inequalities associated with gender, the dispositions 
everybody have to eat, return to spirituality and contacts enabled women to legitimize 
forms of participation based on ambitions for family survival, empathy with others’ 
needs, feelings of success in negotiations with police, fears of spiritually incorrect 
male leadership, hopes for greater associational recognition and inclusion, confidence 
from managing households, friendships with politicians, love for a neighbour’s child, 
and desires for independence, respect and community. They continuously 
manoeuvred diverse kinds of stratification in the face of public officials and police, 
male peers, economic peripheralisation, social and political hierarchy, and gendered 
forms of exclusion. At the same time, men from varying groups also mobilised tactics 
masculine power and meaning justified by social and legal politics.
Ideological and material relations of gender shaped notions regarding public and 
private space, the sexual division of labour, sexuality, family, community and state 
officials’ practices. While women and men participated in public life for similar 
reasons, they nonetheless experienced normativity differently. As shown in the mas 
camp and masjid, an3 tcTa" extent in the Railway Line and market, this had 
implications for the ways they differently created and undermined order. Women and
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men’s engagements with participation and authority in public life and state 
governance were, therefore, gendered relations.
Both bureaucratic and informal power are paternalistic and patriarchal. In other 
words, state and society form a continuum linked through common underlying gender 
ideologies. Across class, religion and ‘race’, women managed power in ways 
informed by their inequitable and stratified access to sources of legitimacy. Yet, 
because God, emotions, family, reciprocity, culture, money and even being ‘fas’ 
enabled them to challenge advantage, the dispositions in this study also show that 
gender is mediated by surprising and unconventional sources of legitimate power.
Aesthetic authority therefore enabled women and men to establish the ‘right’ 
relationship amongst needs, things, people, spheres and ideals. This included the 
‘right’ relationship between politics and God, legislation and livelihood, and 
patronage and obligation as well as the rights that should legitimately accompany 
relationship. These deliberations were not without contestation. In fact, assertions and 
deliberations around normativity are what characterise ordinary women and men’s 
politics and their experience of governance of public life
7.5 Centering Normativity
Figure 44: Virtuosity: Combining Rules, Skill and Style
305
Participation was not inspired by abstract civic principles, but by ideals of i 
respectability and, often, the power of sentiment. Normative order was based on the 
virtues of sociality. It was also based on what felt ‘right’ or intuitively fit the values \ 
that patterned women and men’s lives, bringing a sense of balance, fair play and even 
beauty and pleasure. Hence, the dispositions I described asserted popular notions of 
what public life should be about. As Partha Chatteijee (2005, 84) described, in a 
“political society”, democratic politics is “a constantly shifting compromise between 
the normative values of modernity and the moral assertion of popular demands” 
(2005, 86). As women and men “bend and stretch the rules of bourgeois politics and 
rational bureaucracy”, they create forms of democratic practice that are 
unrecognisable from the names given to them by Western sociology and political 
theory (ibid, 100).
Practices that deliberated the ‘correct’ connection between God and elections, 
livelihood and legislation, reciprocity and public policy* and gender and leadership 
were, therefore, clearly central to the meaning and practice of citizenship. They were 
the overlooked stuff of politics. Women and men participated in various aspects of 
public life because it made sense in that moment, because it enabled them to combat 
immorality, assert male honour, achieve public recognition or repay debt. What they 
valued made illegal livelihood practices acceptable if they were considered reasonable 
and made sense. It made elections about whom you knew, what you could get and 
whom it was legitimate to exclude. It shaped an informal, imagined nationalism that 
could not be easily appropriated by state strategies for legitimacy. What mattered 
affirmed the practice of leadership as headmanship, and contested abstract civil values 
for governance of public space. It influenced practices of government because many 
officials themselves bought into these informal ideals.
In essence, what women and men considered moral ways of being informed their 
political action. These ideals shaped citizenship because democracy, the state and 
participation had meanings that reflected and were lived as effects of this normative 
order. Women and men mobilised the kinds of powers they offered, combined them 
with a range of others, and tactically slipped up and down different registers of 
authority. These ideals, therefore, also fundamentally contributed to the ways that 
inequalities, stratification and hegemony were navigated. Essentially, notions of right
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and reasonable relations defined what public life was about. They defined how 
women and men lived ideals, and good reasons to participate in a variety of civic, 
associational and neighbourly interactions. This was aesthetic authority in practice.
In the Introduction, I argued that authority was a ‘tactic’ (de Certeau 1984) that 
women and men invested with meaning and power. Power could be derived from, for 
example, family, need, knowledge, God, gender, office, emotions or legislation. 
Here, I have tried to show that when exercising various forms of power and moving 
up and down registers of authority, women and men try to determine for themselves 
the forms of power and meaning, and kinds of relations and practices, that make 
nationalism, democracy, gender and citizenship actually matter. The ways they are 
lived point to the movement between ‘higher’ meanings situated in law and signified 
by legislation, bureaucracy or what is read as God’s will, and those meaning saturated 
with lore. They also point to the significance of deliberations over legitimacy or what 
is allowed, efficacy or what works and leadership or who can lead.
Sometimes, different groups wanted to show that what they were doing accorded with 
established rules of legislation or God and principles of propriety. When specific 
justifications were considered ‘higher’ and more accepted by others, legitimacy itself 
could be a reason for women and men’s actions, gestures and words. Other times, 
they were simply acting efficaciously to most easily and quickly get what they wanted 
or needed. In some instances, the play of virtuosity or skill provided enough rationale. 
Sometimes, it was simply desires to feel good or to affirm relationship. Leaders also 
enabled groups to connect (or not) to specific concepts based on what most mattered 
to them. These registers emphasised that the practice and meanings of, for example, 
legality, enfranchisement, patronage and nationalism, cannot be assumed. In response, 
ethnography provided a starting point for critique, and for showing when, to what 
extent and for what reasons specific citizenship ideals may be mobilised. As well, it 
opened an entry for thinking through ways these produce public life.
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7.6 Making Politics Matter
Politics in Trinidad has hardly been conceptualised this way. While this study 
engaged common themes of leadership, bureaucracy and elections, it looked at 
aspects and layers not normally emphasised. It also showed ways they are connected 
together “in a promiscuous hybrid of accommodation and refusal, power and parody, 
embodiment and alienation” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2005, 127). This study did not 
provide only a “view from below” (Mies 1979) and from mid-level. It showed how 
perspectives at different strata move, morph and shift meaning as they are expressed 
in different kinds of practices. As Trinidadian political analysis infrequently evaluates 
assessments of the society made at election periods or at governmental levels against 
other, non-crisis moments and non-governmental spheres, this study sought to fill this 
gap. This is one of the reasons it focused on the connections and overlap of formality 
and informality as constitutive of Trinidadian politics. It therefore moved between 
government and resistance without falling into the paradigms either offered.
As there is little political anthropology on Trinidad, study of Trinidadian politics has 
hardly been ethnographic. It has, therefore, not been seriously grounded in ordinary 
women and men’s cosmologies, and their implications for governance at street, 
associational, local government and national election levels. This study is unique in 
this respect. I started it wondering about the feelings and ideals women and men 
articulate in their daily lives even as they responded to those of political leaders, 
parties and organized movements. My goal, therefore, was to study the ordinary 
practices that constitute informal politics. This is why I drew from theorizing 
grounded in emotions, ideals and personal relationships.
As anthropologists and feminists have long suggested, such study of manners, 
domestic relations, reproduction and the private sphere can evoke the organization of 
public life itself. As I discussed in the Introduction, the anthropology of Trinidad and 
Tobago has a long tradition of exploring these themes. Because of debates about 
pluralism and creolisation, and connectedly cultural persistence and change, 
anthropological writing has significantly engaged and critiqued local and regional 
discourses of ethnicity and nation. However, largely, this literature has not considered 
implications for governance in terms of associational organisation, electoral practice,
and an idea of the state. This study attempted to fill the fissure between political 
science and anthropology in Trinidad and Tobago.
In this sense, it complements other ethnographies of politics in the wider the 
Anglophone Caribbean. For these reasons, I cast a spotlight on the personal practices 
and ideals that point to moral codes, individual investment in society, and the ways 
that different groups imagine and regulate themselves and each other. In this way, I 
attempted to further the Caribbean literature that ‘democratises’ (Paley 2001) how 
politics is investigated and conceptualized.
Part of my approach involved delving into ‘margins’ where order is being constantly 
refounded (Das and Poole 2004, 8). These are sites that can be discursive, ideological 
or real. As these kinds of locations show, law and state practices can be colonized by 
informal forms of regulation that are grounded in values such as everybody have to 
eat. What I have shown is how technologies of power, situated both inside and 
outside of law, work to define governance. These create plural disciplinary practices 
that are based on a spectrum of imaginaries and drawn from official representations of 
justice and law as well as lived experience. However, while recent work on these 
themes has focused on ways that margins reinscribe the state, my questions were not 
just about how the state actually works.
Instead, I reflected “on how the practice and politics of life in these areas shaped the 
political, regulatory, and disciplinary practices” (ibid, 3) that constitute what is 
considered “the state”, as well as other clusters of authority, ideals and ways of doing 
things. In this sense, I was really interested in the relationships that emerged out of 
what can be called ‘margins’ and their implications. These included relationships to 
different kinds of spirituality, livelihood, friends and family, leaders and decision­
making, public and private spaces as well as to various levels, functions and officials 
that represent an idea of the state. I highlighted how ‘marginal’ women and men’s 
values were not at all marginal to a politics of authority at many gradations of power. 
In fact, in addition to state-centred ones, there were many other disciplinary 
regulations that shaped how they secured survival and sought justice in the everyday.
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Nonetheless, state-centred notions of “exception” provided a springboard for 
understanding concrete “practices that lie simultaneously outside and inside the law” 
(ibid, 15). For example, the police cajoling vendors to move off the road could be 
seen as “figures of local authority [who] represent both highly personalized forms of 
private power and the supposedly impersonal or neutral authority of the state” (ibid, 
14). They typified the ways that margins run through the state “breaking open the 
solidity often attributed” to it (ibid, 20) and colonising it with other “forms of 
legal/juridicial ideas” (ibid, 23). As Veena Das wrote of police in India, “police 
officers may be charged with implementing the rules and regulations of the state, but 
they do not cease being members of local worlds with their own customs and habits” 
(2005, 236).
Negotiations in carnival committee meetings and on the Railway Line provided 
analogous ways that bureaucracies can implement government policies, “not in 
accordance with rules and regulations, but in accordance with bureaucrats’ reading of 
the wishes of their superiors” (ibid, 239). Or, the intentions of high-ranking officials 
may never be implemented as they planned because lower level enforcement 
expresses different interests and goals (Ferguson 1994). This can lead to exclusions 
and repressions as well as subversions and reconfigurations. As Das points out, it is in 
the offices of petty bureaucrats and street comers patrolled by police that “forms of 
governance and modes of surveillance are put into operation” (2005, 241).
The ways that ordinary women and men claim practices and ideas emanating from an 
idea of the state also attest to the ways its power circulates and is continually 
reproduced. Together, these ways of working out right and reasonable practice show 
“how states manage those at the margins, and also how those living in these margins 
navigate the gaps between laws and their implementation” (ibid, 241). As earlier 
chapters illustrated, concerns about survival shape “new modalities of rule” (ibid, 
249).
This results in a regulatory plurality that consolidates state power while undermining 
state authority. For example, contrary to postcolonial elites’ efforts to use nationalism 
to legitimize state sovereignty (Hansen and Stepputat 2005, 26), bandleaders’ 
practices showed how they twist nationalism to legitimize their own informal
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sovereignty. In this way, mas makers were like “individuals and groups who “have 
managed to capture, privatize or make semi-autonomous territories, institutions, 
identity forms, and practices in the interstices of the fragmented configuration of 
sovereign power in the modem city-scapes” (Hansen and Stepputat 2005, 31). Their 
politics could not simply be located “within the constitutional limits of the state nor in 
the orderly transactions of bourgeois civil society (Chatteijee 2005, 94) even if they 
contributed to the ways that legalities and order were produced. The same is true for 
political activists who were like “networks of strongmen, brokers and fixers” (Hansen 
2005, 185) working in the morally ambiguous tributaries between legality, illegality 
and informality to secure water, jobs and groceries for Railway Line residents. 
Contacts, and notions that not all will get, pointed to ways that democracy creates 
formal sovereignties, “states of exception” and informal sovereignties.
Yet, many of the observations made about national elections, governmental 
bureaucracy, patronage and enforcement of legality had their parallels in AJSA 
members’ experiences of democracy and governance. This is why I did not define 
law only in terms of state sovereignty and why the state was not the “master signifier” 
(Hansen and Stepputat 2005, 4) of sovereignty itself. As Thomas Hansen writes of 
India, “...law, and an extensive system of legal regulation remained merely one of 
several forms of sovereignty...Adjudication within communities...local strongmen 
and other informal authorities were, and still remain, as important and enduring 
sources of authority in India as that of the modem legal form” (ibid, 23). As he later 
discusses, even the idea of the nation may situate it “as a moral and sovereign entity 
beyond, and in opposition to, the state and the political world (Hansen 2005, 180). 
This fits the way that the ASJA positioned itself as a “repertoire of authority” above 
non-Islamic publics and practices of citizenship. It also matches bandleaders’ 
wielding of informal nationalism against statist interpretations.
I also drew on Hansen’s understanding of sovereignty as “multiple, provisional and 
always contested, and of the state as an unfinished and continuous project of control 
and subordination” (ibid, 172). If the state is always unfinished, surely there are 
zones, moments and margins that are not only and ultimately about the state? 
Following Hansen’s considerations, and as I have shown in this study, I defined 
legitimate political action in terms of shifting norms that include notions of law, lore,
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leadership, illegality and informality. These are different registers that provide a 
framework for the ways that power can be invoked, mimicked and contested in lived 
practices of citizenship and belonging. From this perspective, I attempted to study the 
state without making it the point of the study.
At any rate, the state didn’t appear as a discrete, autonomous and abstract institution 
in the lives of those peopling this study. Nor did their idea of the state construe it as a 
coherent and supreme authority. In fact, just the opposite occurred. Vendors treated 
police as if they were vendors also needing to make their dollar. Mas makers 
dismissed state authority because they didn’t identify as mas makers. For those on the 
Railway Line, almost the only authority that mattered was the ones that they knew. 
Meanwhile, vendors, squatters and bandleaders challenged legislative, bureaucratic 
and statist logic with their own. Together, observations in San Fernando strongly 
argue that state effects seem so diffused they can hardly be studied as state effects or 
prove statism.
The play of hegemonic processes, in social relations, networks and institutions as well 
as in banal bureaucratic practices, shaped how women and men conceptualised and 
lived informal politics. They emphasised the centrality of social life to any 
understanding of governance. Governance is part and parcel of everyday life. Rather 
than studying various representations of the state, therefore, I examined aspects of *
cosmology, practice and meaning among individuals and groups with divergent 
political stakes, who are mobilising and reshaping the very ideas and institutions that 
shape their engagements with themselves, each other, leaders, bureaucracies and 
bases of authority situated in and out of the state. The making and breaking of 
different kinds of consensus are negotiations over the cultural terms that order the 
world and legitimize power (Comaroff 2002).
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7.7 Conclusion
Figure 45: Looking and Learning
This study has shown the role that lore plays in the ways that Trinidadians experience, 
participate in and negotiate authority. Crucially, lore sometimes has greater 
legitimacy than law. Women and men’s reasons for idealising participation and 
authority twist, mimic, change hue and combine lore and law. The interlock of the 
two constitutes public life. Politics is considered to be empathetic rather than 
alienating and, therefore, more morally right when these two are complementary. I 
have illustrated how women and men’s participation in public life reflects and creates 
normative order or what I have called aesthetic authority.
This order is premised on notions of reasonableness and advantage that flow through 
both social and state locations. I have shown that governance of public life cannot be 
understood if scholars start with received notions of governance, politics and 
democracy that often hide the views, ideals and actions of those selling on the street, 
making decisions for their masjid or taking care of a neighbour’s baby. The pictures I 
have drawn lead away from state- and elite-centred understandings of politics and 
show many powerful ways that informal social life matters.
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Overall, my intention in this study has been to respect the integrity of ethnography as 
more than an abstract text of hypothesis about general proposals of political order. 
Unlike in sociology, for example, the point of the work has not been to contest 
generalised analytic descriptions of what politics is for its own sake, but to show that 
a focus on this alone excludes most of the interesting observations that derive from 
the actual ethnographic encounter with these varied sites.
By contrast, I have tried to respect these every day encounters among women and 
men, and between people and situations by focusing on what facilitates and constrains 
the projects they embark upon to earn a living, enjoy their sociality and build their 
family. This is the politics they have to be concerned with and is therefore the politics 
that the ethnographer has to be concerned with. It is also what is most excluded when 
political analysis is only devoted to the formal aspects of democracy such as voting 
and bureaucracies. Here, they are included. However, I show how they are embodied 
in everyday and formal action or constant flow between lore and law.
I began this study because I wanted to know more about what ordinary women and 
men valued and how their values shaped political life. As Trinidad and Tobago 
citizen, I also wanted to contribute to national scholarship and to indigenous 
theorising. I therefore started by walking about, looking around and listening. 
Reflecting this grounded approach, the study has worked much more on its own terms 
such as lore and law, and its own interpretation of normative order such as between 
habitus and aesthetic.
I have been less respectful of the terms given in conventional political anthropology, 
but aimed to build from their meanings on the ground in San Fernando. My intention 
has been to give enough ethnographic exemplification so that study’s language is 
clear, consistent and justified by the originality of the consequences found through its 
use. By finding a language that seems closer to the understandings and experiences of 
the population in these four settings, I hoped to avoid squeezing them into 
inappropriate analytical forms that can mislead and jeapordize the integrity with 
which their daily lives is portrayed.
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It should now be clear that the choice of the five locations was not intended to be 
comprehensive. There are dozens of other sites that could have been included from 
hospitals and sports to actual voting and courts. Nonetheless, by juxtaposing these 
settings, I aimed to bring out a series of general points about their differences as well 
as their similarities, despite apparently entirely different contexts. In the last two 
sections above, I have tried to illuminate the panoramic view they together offer.
Although it seems somewhat parochial, I have confined my analysis to material 
specific to one city within the island of Trinidad, in the larger Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago. Although I have stuck close to the original data collected through my 
personal ethnography, it should be evident that many of the claims made are intended 
to be of general usage. The relationship between lore and law points to larger \ 
questions about how groups of women and men engage with each other in formal and 
informal settings, and the differential power and respect for normativity they bring. 
What is recognised as public and private, or authority and legitimacy, or the ways 
political power is dispersed will vary across every other potential ethnographic 
instance. In this light, the concept of aesthetic authority can be a useful tool for 
application in infinite other sites of analysis.
In other words in a totalitarian context on the one hand, where power tends to be 
asserted from above, or in a Scandinavian social democratic state where conformity 
tends to be asserted from below, there would be entirely different considerations than 
in this case in Trinidad. Nonetheless, at the level of how a market or a masjid might 
operate there would be issues on these middle grounds of people’s participation and 
interaction that could still stand comparisonwith theTlata in this thesis.
Many elements in the analytical sections of this thesis emerge from the decision to 
explore the intersection between every day social and political life. This is why I have 
explored the politics of author^  ^ discussions of lore and law.
This framework also allowed me to describe the nuanced ways that key dispositions 
enshrined informal rights based on lore. I showed how they could overcome law if, in 
conflict, they are seen as more basic. Lore provides legitimacy to claims to authority 
and, if sufficient, can effectively outrank law as it impinges on daily life. Still, as I 
have shown in police, bureaucrats, politicians and associational leaders’ practices, law
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is already saturated with lore and this porousness enables ideals of ‘right’ and 
reasonable relations to be worked out across spheres, roles, hierarchies and settings.
As I outlined in the Introduction, many studies concentrate on breakdown, conflict 
and power as violence, but anthropology is equally drawn to power that is in the 
ribffnaHveTTEis power is not simply collective and conservative nor dispersed across 
generalised capillaries, but also characterised by series of counter-forces held in 
dynamic balance. For example, while normativity in the masjid is made clear, it is 
also often under contention because of shifts in gender politics. Normativity should be 
situated within the tension of lore and law, and reasonableness and advantage, and the 
dynamic ways that legitimacy is asserted, resisted, twisted and imagined. Similarly, it 
is useful to keep in mind that resistance practices also contain desires for 
respectability and vice versa.
What I have tried to show here is the ordinary ways that Trinidadians attempt to 
establish order and understanding amidst stratification, ‘difference’ and a range of 
vulnerabilities. They do this by validating “proletarian” (Best 2001) conceptions of 
state and nation, and by asserting ownership of, rather than just belonging to, spaces, 
groups, things and ideas. Transcendent ideals regarding family, culture, God and 
community underscore their actions even as they maneuver the vagarities of daily life 
and relationships, the demands of survival and changes brought on by global- and 
national-level forces. In this context, when normativity remains true to changes in the 
world it operates in, it gains rather than loses authority by ability to remain in step 




Figure 46: Growing Up at the Shore of Unfolding
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